A Problem of Evil for Atheists

[lewisnotmiller]

Faith isn't really about facts, as I see it, it is what you stand for.

I'm a little scared to ask, but what is it you think you stand for that?

 

[DayRaven]

what is it you think you stand for that?

It would be nice to answer that but, unfortunately, I cannot.

All I can offer is a few things that I'm reasonably convinced of. I'm more inclined to theism (despite being practically an atheist) because I believe Being in general, if not necessarily humanity in particular, is purposed or willed into Being. That said to paraphrase Sophocles: there is nothing more wonderful and terrible than the human being. Looking outward is good but it is in the human face that the mystery of Being is at its most pronounced. That's why I find people both amazing and frightening: something both familiar and alien is looking back at you. In that way I consider humanity to be sacred and destined for.....something, but it is down to us whether we sink or swim.

 

[Cephus]

I often wonder if I could (by magic or science) take Richard Dawkins back to the time of Jesus and he witnessed the events (assuming for this argument that the gospels are accurate) the crucifixion and three days later he witnessed the empty tomb and then he saw and poked (like Thomas) his finger in the living Christ's wounds would he really believe? (in fact I wonder this for myself as much as Mr Dawkins).

Faith isn't really about facts, as I see it, it is what you stand for.

I think he would, unlike people like Ray Comfort, who has gone on record saying that there is no possibility that he would ever change his mind, no matter what he saw. If you did the same thing for apologists like Comfort, took him back in time, showed him that the nativity story never happened, Jesus was never crucified, never came back from the dead, etc., he'd still believe it because his faith isn't about the facts, it's about the feeling.

Dawkins, indeed every atheist I'm aware of, are perfectly willing to change their minds if given actual evidence to support the theist story.

 

[philbo]

I often wonder if I could (by magic or science) take Richard Dawkins back to the time of Jesus and he witnessed the events (assuming for this argument that the gospels are accurate) the crucifixion and three days later he witnessed the empty tomb and then he saw and poked (like Thomas) his finger in the living Christ's wounds would he really believe? (in fact I wonder this for myself as much as Mr Dawkins).

Faith isn't really about facts, as I see it, it is what you stand for.

I dare say if you could convince Dawkins that what he was observing was exactly what you describe, he'd change his mind. Though it would take a lot more than viewing a crucifixion and an empty tomb three days later: he has probably watched enough Jonathan Creek episodes to realize that sometimes things aren't always as they seem.

I'm also fairly sure that unless some objective corroboration were available, he'd assume it was some kind of personal hallucination rather than revealed truth.

Faith most certainly isn't about facts: it's more about what you do when there aren't any.

 

[DayRaven]

Faith most certainly isn't about facts: it's more about what you do when there aren't any.

I think I might have been misunderstood.

The Greek word in the NT, which is translated as faith, is pistis (in the Latin alphabet). It means trust (as well as faith and belief). Now it is my contention that, ultimately, everyone has faith (trust) in something that isn't susceptible to verificationism; I include the scientific quest in this. Don't misunderstand me I value science and empiricism but it seems clear to me that they are built upon a belief about the nature of reality that (true or no) is unverifiable by the very means of investigation that science relies on.

As for Mr Dawkins he would argue that only that which can be verified is true: a claim which, of course, fails its own test.

 

[philbo]

I think I might have been misunderstood.

The Greek word in the NT, which is translated as faith, is pistis (in the Latin alphabet). It means trust (as well as faith and belief). Now it is my contention that, ultimately, everyone has faith (trust) in something that isn't susceptible to verificationism; I include the scientific quest in this. Don't misunderstand me I value science and empiricism but it seems clear to me that they are built upon a belief about the nature of reality that (true or no) is unverifiable by the very means of investigation that science relies on.

As for Mr Dawkins he would argue that only that which can be verified is true: a claim which, of course, fails its own test.

You misrepresent Dawkins (I'm not surprised, most people seem to use some third-hand chinese-whisper strawman of what the chap says, more often than not).

But to address your point: to some extent, that's where the idea of prediction and falsifiability come in: it is reasonable to have faith that the nature of reality you are building your science upon is an accurate representation if the predictions you make about its behaviour are what occurs. To that extent, there is a faith underlying science, but it's one that is tested an almost infinite number of times every second: we don't sometimes float off into space; lights work when we flick the switch.. posts on an internet forum show up when you hit "post reply".

It is therefore a mistake to assume that because there is underlying all science a faith that the natural world is as we think it is, this "faith" has an equivalence to every other use of the word. Of course, it is possible that we're in a matrix-like real-world emulation, and would have no means of testing this as everything we could use to test it is part of the same program.. but if that were the case, we might just as well carry on as if the world is as we experience it..

 

[Robert.Evans]

On a smartphone, so apologies on brevity for now, but Id disagree with objective evil existing as a first point.

Wow! You have a phone!

 

[DayRaven]

You misrepresent Dawkins

Quite probable.

I have only read his God Delusion (some time ago), which I thought a very poorly argued text. Some of his subsequent statements have not inclined me favourably towards him. To be fair I'm not a fan of the "new atheists" in general I prefer the works of atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel.

it is reasonable to have faith that the nature of reality you are building your science upon is an accurate representation if the predictions you make about its behaviour are what occurs.

But this only shows that the laws of prediction work (in a given system) it makes no claim as to what those laws actually represent.

It is therefore a mistake to assume that because there is underlying all science a faith that the natural world is as we think it is, this "faith" has an equivalence to every other use of the word.

I'm not sure what you mean. Could you expand on this please?

 

[philbo]

Quite probable.

I have only read his God Delusion (some time ago), which I thought a very poorly argued text. Some of his subsequent statements have not inclined me favourably towards him. To be fair I'm not a fan of the "new atheists" in general I prefer the works of atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel.

The God Delusion not my favourite book that he's written (of the ones I've read, anyway), but I can see why he wrote what he did, when you consider the target audience.

You're not the first person to say it was very poorly argued, though so far I've not come across anyone who can give an example of a poor argument in the book without misrepresenting the argument he was making.

But this only shows that the laws of prediction work (in a given system) it makes no claim as to what those laws actually represent.

Yep. But the thing is, those laws of prediction are founded on the understanding of a view of the reality of the underlying system, and if they continue to work, it suggests that understanding is correct. Imagine if every single time you prayed, that prayer was answered - you'd very soon be working on the assumption that the god you happened to be praying to was real (even if it turned out to be something completely different answering the prayer)

I'm not sure what you mean. Could you expand on this please?

To fall back on the analogy in my previous paragraph: if, whenever you prayed, your prayer was answered, your wish fulfilled: would you consider the faith you might then hold about whoever you were praying to equivalent to the faith that you hold about whichever deity you fancy now?

 

[DayRaven]

You're not the first person to say it was very poorly argued, though so far I've not come across anyone who can give an example of a poor argument in the book without misrepresenting the argument he was making.

From what I gather, and I have read some modern theology from neo-Thomists like Edward Feser through to the afore mentioned atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel, Dawkins is attacked for his lack of understanding (particularly of classical theism) by both theists and atheists.

You might find the below article interesting:

The New Philistinism » AEI

But the thing is, those laws of prediction are founded on the understanding of a view of the reality of the underlying system, and if they continue to work, it suggests that understanding is correct.

But are the laws a true reflection or mere appearance? That is the question that instrumentalism asks.

 

[philbo]

From what I gather, and I have read some modern theology from neo-Thomists like Edward Feser through to the afore mentioned atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel, Dawkins is attacked for his lack of understanding (particularly of classical theism) by both theists and atheists.

With the implied argument that he doesn't properly understand classic theism, therefore is cannot adequately refute it? The problem with that is that there are almost as many varying beliefs as there are believers, it is simply not possible to understand all of them - they cannot all be right (though it is still possible that they are all wrong).

I'm not here to argue the God Delusion point by point: I didn't particularly enjoy reading it, as I'm fairly sure I'm not the target audience (but I was given the book, ironically enough as a Christmas present, and felt obliged to), most of it was offering rebuttals to arguments that, as a Brit surrounded by a very different sort of Christianity, I had never had put to me. For example, there are barely a handful of people locally who would try arguing creationism, the only one who does regularly is possibly the most small-minded petty and hateful character I've encountered.. a self-declared "reverend" who keeps trying to argue using a science he simply doesn't comprehend so can't see why he gets so often ridiculed - yet the arguments he makes are almost mainstream on that side of the Atlantic.

You might find the below article interesting:

The New Philistinism » AEI

What made you think that I'd find it interesting? A bit of petty bickering by an atheist with a book to promote?

No, I'm not surprised that the understanding of esoteric elements of theology is imperfect in a biologist. Feser makes the case that because of this arguments against the existence of god require a theologist's understanding, it's hypocritical to expect theologians to understand evolutionary theory in order to dismiss it. Where there is a fundamental difference, IMO, is that the atheist, evolutionary argument is derived from direct observation of the world we see around us - it is an explanation of what is there. To discard this without understanding still requires an explanation which explains observation - for an atheist railing against "New Atheism", Edward Feser doesn't really try very hard.

But are the laws a true reflection or mere appearance? That is the question that instrumentalism asks.

Does it matter, given that they work and continue to do so? As I pointed out before, you, me and pretty much everyone else on the planet lives their lives believing unquestioningly that the predictive side of the laws of science are going to work: that their car will start when they turn the key (or if it doesn't getting more petrol is likely to be more helpful than prayer if the tank is empty) and all the myriad of other things we take for granted.

If it's mere appearance, then it's a damn good illusion that never puts a foot wrong. It's easy to have faith that it is a true reflection of reality because nothing ever contradicts it. Ever. No magic, no miracles, nothing.

So would you consider the "faith" underlying the scientific understanding to be equivalent to the "faith" required to believe in a god who never does anything measurable whatsoever, based solely on a couple of books which we have already decided that there are bits we want to ignore?

 

[DayRaven]

I'm not here to argue the God Delusion point by point

I was simply making the point that Dawkins has misunderstood some of the arguments that he seeks to refute. And, yes, I would argue it is necessary to understand what your opponent is actually saying, not what you think he is saying or what you want others to think. Otherwise you just have misunderstanding and a descent into pointlessness.

An honest mistake or a deliberate distortion is another argument. Naturally this can apply to those who misunderstand Dawkins' statements.

What made you think that I'd find it interesting?

I wrote you might, not that you would. Besides why would I necessarily assume that you wouldn't? I wasn't suggesting you would enjoy it or agree with it.

Does it matter

That depends on your purpose.

As I pointed out before, you, me and pretty much everyone else on the planet lives their lives believing unquestioningly

I'm not denying any of this.

It's easy to have faith that it is a true reflection of reality because nothing ever contradicts it. Ever.

I'm, perhaps, not being clear.

Instrumentalism is a valid position in the philosophy of science. All it means is that laws are devices for the description and prediction of phenomenon. The terms occurring in those laws need not reference actual things existing. The alternative is realism.

So would you consider the "faith" underlying the scientific understanding to be equivalent to the "faith" required to believe in a god who never does anything measurable whatsoever, based solely on a couple of books which we have already decided that there are bits we want to ignore?

I'm saying that faith is not verifiable whatever its object.

 

[philbo]

I'm saying that faith is not verifiable whatever its object.

So you do see an equivalence between the sort of faith that underlies our every scientific discovery and faith in something without any material, repeatable evidence whatsoever?

 

[DayRaven]

So you do see an equivalence between the sort of faith that underlies our every scientific discovery and faith in something without any material, repeatable evidence whatsoever?

I'm not sure what you mean by "sort" of faith. As I wrote earlier faith is simply trust that something is so.

If you are asking me do I believe that the scientific view of the world is based upon a belief about the nature of reality that cannot itself be verified then my answer is yes.

I believe this for all fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality and believe there are only two possibilities:

a) Acceptance that some things are taken on trust.
b) Extreme scepticism.

 

[viole]

So here's something interesting I came across. Never really considered it this way.

From: Maverick Philosopher: A Problem of Evil for Atheists


_______________________________________________________



Suppose you are an atheist who considers life to be worth living. You deny God, but affirm life, this life, as it is, here and now. Suppose you take the fact of evil to tell against the existence of God. Do you also take the fact of evil to tell against the affirmability of life? If not, why not?

In this entry I will explain what I take to be one sort of problem of evil for atheists, or rather, for naturalists. (One can be an atheist without being a naturalist, but not vice versa.) For present purposes, an atheist is one who affirms the nonexistence of God, as God is traditionally conceived, and a naturalist is one who affirms that reality, with the possible exception of so-called abstract objects, is exhausted by space-time-matter. Naturalism entails atheism, but atheism does not entail naturalism.

Are the following propositions logically consistent?

a. Life is affirmable.

b. Naturalism is true.

c. Evil objectively exists.

1. What it means for life to be affirmable

To claim that life is affirmable is to claim that it is reasonable to say 'yes' to it. Life is affirmed by the vast majority blindly and instinctually, and so can be; in this trivial sense life is of course affirmable. But I mean 'affirmable' in a non-trivial sense as signifying that life is worthy of affirmation. This is of course not obvious. Otherwise there wouldn't be pessimists and anti-natalists. Let me make this a bit more precise.

To claim that life is affirmable is to maintain that human life has an overall positive value that outweighs the inevitable negatives. Note the restriction to human life. I am glad that there are cats, but I am in no position to affirm feline life in the relevant sense of 'affirm': I am not a cat and so I do not know what it is like 'from the inside' to be a cat.

'Human life' is not to be understood biologically but existentially. What we are concerned with is not an objective phenomenon in nature, but life as lived and experienced from a subjective center. So the question is not whether it is better or worse for the physical universe to contain specimens of a certain zoological species, the species h. sapiens. The question is whether it is on balance a good thing that there is human life as it is subjectively lived from a personal center toward a meaning- and value-laden world of persons and things. The question is whether it is on balance a good thing that there is human subjectivity.

Now it may be that over the course of a particular human life a preponderance of positive noninstrumental good is realized. But that is consistent with human life in general not being worth living. If my life turns out to have been worth living, if I can reasonably affirm it on my death bed and pronounce it good on balance, it doesn't follow that human life in general is worth living. Let us agree that a particular human life is worth living if, over the course of that life, a preponderance of positive noninstrumental value is realized. To say that positive value preponderates is to say that it outweighs the negative.

The question, then, is whether human life, human subjectivity, in general is affirmable. To make the question a bit more concrete, and to bring home the point that the question does not concern oneself alone, consider the question of procreation. To procreate consciously and thoughtfully is to affirm life other than one's own.

Suppose that one's life has been on balance good up to the point of one's procreating. Should one be party to the coming-into-existence of additional centers of consciousness and self-consciousness when there is no guarantee that their lives will be on balance good, and some chance that their lives will be on balance horrendous? Would you have children if you knew that they would be tortured to death in the equivalent of Auschwitz? Note that if a couple has children, then they are directly responsible for the existence of those children; but they are also indirectly responsible in ever diminishing measure for the existence of grandchildren, great grandchildren, etc. If life is not affirmable, then it is arguable that it is morally wrong to have children, life being a mistake that ought not be perpetuated. If on the other hand life is affirmable, then, while there might be particular reasons for some people not to have children, there would be no general reason rooted in the nature of things.

2. Is life affirmable

Evidently, whoever wrote that article does not undestand a pure naturalist's mindset.

For a natualist, we perceive life as affirmable (consciously) because every conscious affirmation is the (unconscious) product of a computation of a certain machine molded by evolution and selected to favor genes spread. Nothing more, nothing less.

No matter how perilous the lives of those gene carriers is going to be. An endangered gene, or the gene of a slave, is far better than no gene, and this is how the machine in our skull ticks, no matter how philosophical we want to be.

For a naturlists we are vessels selected to spread replication units and no matter how much we ponder about that, we cannot really get out of there.

We are naturally selected to make life affirmable, in general, independently of the metaphysical values we attribute to the world, or the existentialist problems associated. Things like unredeemed evil are irrelevant to a naturalist to explain this apparent paradox.

For the same reason, objective morality is nonsensical to a naturalist. At the bottom, we label evil what might endanger the survival of our genes, and it could not be otherwise, since we are still here and growing. The underlying computation is unconscious. its instanciation is conscious.Therefore, morality is nonsensical without a biological context. It is as objective as our love for fat food.

In other words, despite slavery, the holocaust, a few psychopaths or any other tragedy, our brain is programmed to affirm life, especially the one of our closest genetic keens, for purely biological reasons, which are outside our conscious control. And the fact that we are seven billions and counting seems to confirm that this is good enough. For the moment.

Ciao

- viole

 

[philbo]

I'm not sure what you mean by "sort" of faith. As I wrote earlier faith is simply trust that something is so.

If you are asking me do I believe that the scientific view of the world is based upon a belief about the nature of reality that cannot itself be verified then my answer is yes.

I believe this for all fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality and believe there are only two possibilities:

a) Acceptance that some things are taken on trust.
b) Extreme scepticism.

But do you not see the difference between something taken on trust where the results of it being taken on trust work every single time it is tested, and taking something on trust with nothing?

This is what I'm trying to get at: that while there are plenty of things which are taken on trust underlying science, there is no equivalence between this and, for example, taking on trust that a god exists when there's no equivalent validation. The problem I have with your insistence that underlying science there must be a faith is that your corollary from that will be that there is in effect no difference between "faith" in science and "faith" in God, which I believe is erroneous.

 

[DayRaven]

where the results of it being taken on trust work every single time it is tested

This is an argument from utility: if useful therefore true. The obvious problem here is that a religious person could just as easily say "every time I pray to God I feel better" (indeed studies have shown a placebo effect in prayer) but this, I'm sure you would agree, is no proof that their God exists.

Likewise the fact that scientific theories have accurate predictive qualities, whilst useful, isn't necessarily a claim to the validity (or indeed the falsity) of the theory as regards its relation to existing phenomenon.

As it happens I have great faith in science but I side with the instrumentalist position.