The article is at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...ror_attacks_in_europe_or_the_middle_east.html
I like it a lot, mainly because it is both sensible and informed. It struck me that it touches on a lot of realities of politics that deserve some comment and clarification.
Perhaps chief among them, it almost takes for granted that the Middle Eastern conflicts are strongly correlated to the Sunni/Shia division in Islam. That is perhaps something that should be evidenced, but I don't think there is any serious challenge to that statement. The division may or may not be easy to understand, worth emphasizing or worth downplaying or even resolving entirely, but it has a lot of political significance and has had for centuries.
Also, the dangerous extremists exist both among Sunni (most notably ISIS) and Shia (Al-Qaeda, among others) and they are very much at odds with each other, to the point that it may be a significant challenge to overcome one without promoting the other.
The article also hints that ultimately the dangers of Muslim extremists are remarkably decentralized, even outright chaotic in their arising and behavior - and that may well be one of the most worrisome things that it suggests, IMO accurately. ISIS may well crumble under its own weight or even be defeated by military and diplomatic actions, but that does not mean that any significant measure of improvement will follow.
Also noticeable in the article and IMO commendable is the acknowledgement of how fragile and complex these fictional constructs that we call "nations" are. Syria is plagued by civil war and there is no easy way out of its predicaments, nor is there any magical "sovereignity" to take refuge on. Syria is just a place that many people have an interest in for various, often suspect and/or conflicting reasons.
One thing I want to understand better are the perspectives of Muslims about this Shia/Sunni divide and its political consequences. I know for a fact that many or most Muslims wish the division did not exist, but it is not very clear what, if anything, can be done about it, in either the religious or political fronts. Which benefits, if any, there are in the existence of this division? Is it even clear whether it would be best to establish clear representation and rights to both groups, or instead to deemphasize that distinction between Shias and Sunnis?
Yet another interesting fact hinted by the article is the significant challenge involved in actually learning to want peace. Far too often we end up pursuing supremacy at the expense of peace, perhaps because keeping peace is actually taxing and even at odds with human nature. It may well be that the duty to learn to overcome those impulses is a necessary priority for humanity as a whole.
The article also hints at what is meant in the USA by "nation-building", an expression that I find deeply ironic when used by USA politicians, whose idea of nation building involves using military might and other means of even more questionable legitimacy to supress or outright destroy local political movements in foreign territory. How they can defend such an idea while presumably still finding their own rebellion against Great Britain in the 18th century a good thing is not something I feel ready to explain.
Fred Kaplan does not attempt to address that, nor does he use that odd expression, but he does point out that it is in the USA best interests that Iraq establishes a regime that is at least stable in the military and political senses, is on speaking terms with the USA, and somehow does not encourage extremists from either the Sunni and Kurd minorities nor the Shia majority. Whether that can be done at all is something of an open question. Even if it can, odds are that it will increase Iranian influence in Iraq, and who knows what can come from that?
A major mistake that I see is the insistence of the USA in thinking of military interventions as a necessary tool for "nation building". That did not work for the British in the 13 colonies, and it wil not work in the Middle East. Fear of reprisal is not adherence to national ideals.
Another mistake which is perhaps being avoided so far would be the reliance on the Sunni / Shia lines of division for goal planning. The division is all too real - probably far too real for anyone's good, even - but it must be deemphasized if true peace is to be attained. Shias and Sunnis must have good reasons not to fear and mistrust each other, as well as to not feel wary towards the USA. Supporting the Shias in Syria and the Sunnis in Iraq may well be necessary out of humanitarian concerns alone, but making too big an issue of the division will result in either choosing one side over the other or being mistrusted by both.
I like it a lot, mainly because it is both sensible and informed. It struck me that it touches on a lot of realities of politics that deserve some comment and clarification.
Perhaps chief among them, it almost takes for granted that the Middle Eastern conflicts are strongly correlated to the Sunni/Shia division in Islam. That is perhaps something that should be evidenced, but I don't think there is any serious challenge to that statement. The division may or may not be easy to understand, worth emphasizing or worth downplaying or even resolving entirely, but it has a lot of political significance and has had for centuries.
The article also hints that ultimately the dangers of Muslim extremists are remarkably decentralized, even outright chaotic in their arising and behavior - and that may well be one of the most worrisome things that it suggests, IMO accurately. ISIS may well crumble under its own weight or even be defeated by military and diplomatic actions, but that does not mean that any significant measure of improvement will follow.
Also noticeable in the article and IMO commendable is the acknowledgement of how fragile and complex these fictional constructs that we call "nations" are. Syria is plagued by civil war and there is no easy way out of its predicaments, nor is there any magical "sovereignity" to take refuge on. Syria is just a place that many people have an interest in for various, often suspect and/or conflicting reasons.
One thing I want to understand better are the perspectives of Muslims about this Shia/Sunni divide and its political consequences. I know for a fact that many or most Muslims wish the division did not exist, but it is not very clear what, if anything, can be done about it, in either the religious or political fronts. Which benefits, if any, there are in the existence of this division? Is it even clear whether it would be best to establish clear representation and rights to both groups, or instead to deemphasize that distinction between Shias and Sunnis?
Yet another interesting fact hinted by the article is the significant challenge involved in actually learning to want peace. Far too often we end up pursuing supremacy at the expense of peace, perhaps because keeping peace is actually taxing and even at odds with human nature. It may well be that the duty to learn to overcome those impulses is a necessary priority for humanity as a whole.
The article also hints at what is meant in the USA by "nation-building", an expression that I find deeply ironic when used by USA politicians, whose idea of nation building involves using military might and other means of even more questionable legitimacy to supress or outright destroy local political movements in foreign territory. How they can defend such an idea while presumably still finding their own rebellion against Great Britain in the 18th century a good thing is not something I feel ready to explain.
Fred Kaplan does not attempt to address that, nor does he use that odd expression, but he does point out that it is in the USA best interests that Iraq establishes a regime that is at least stable in the military and political senses, is on speaking terms with the USA, and somehow does not encourage extremists from either the Sunni and Kurd minorities nor the Shia majority. Whether that can be done at all is something of an open question. Even if it can, odds are that it will increase Iranian influence in Iraq, and who knows what can come from that?
A major mistake that I see is the insistence of the USA in thinking of military interventions as a necessary tool for "nation building". That did not work for the British in the 13 colonies, and it wil not work in the Middle East. Fear of reprisal is not adherence to national ideals.
Another mistake which is perhaps being avoided so far would be the reliance on the Sunni / Shia lines of division for goal planning. The division is all too real - probably far too real for anyone's good, even - but it must be deemphasized if true peace is to be attained. Shias and Sunnis must have good reasons not to fear and mistrust each other, as well as to not feel wary towards the USA. Supporting the Shias in Syria and the Sunnis in Iraq may well be necessary out of humanitarian concerns alone, but making too big an issue of the division will result in either choosing one side over the other or being mistrusted by both.
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