Atheism does not exist

[Willamena]

But if truth is personal, then I'm happy calling truth subjective.

And I'm happy calling it relative and objective.

I'm not sure that others will go along with that, though. We humans crave certainty. We so want to know that our interior view is an exact match to exterior reality.

This, of course, assumes they are not.

We would need to talk about any possible connection between internal, definitional reality (our wordworlds) and the purported exterior reality, I think.

What sort of conversation did you have in mind? I would propose that "internal, definitional reality" and "purported exterior reality" are both products of the wordworld (like "subjective" and "objective" above). We will use them in whatever way they are pretty (have aesthetic value) and useful (have utility).

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

What sort of conversation did you have in mind? I would propose that "internal, definitional reality" and "purported exterior reality" are both products of the wordworld (like "subjective" and "objective" above). We will use them in whatever way they are pretty (have aesthetic value) and useful (have utility).

Let's say this:

In Willamena's wordworld, it is true that 'a collision between a bus and a human can end the life of the human.'

In AmbigGuy's wordworld, it is true that 'buses cannot hurt humans.'

Well, we can run a test. We can find some human willing to stand in the path of a bus, allow the bus to run him over, and go and see if that human was hurt by the experience.

Of course, one of us could hallucinate. We could still disagree whether the bus hurt the human or whether not, but let's say that we agree that the bus did indeed hurt the person.

In that case, my truth was wrong, wasn't it? You'd still not be willing to call my truth subjective?

 

[Willamena]

Let's say this:

In Willamena's wordworld, it is true that 'a collision between a bus and a human can end the life of the human.'

In Willamena's wordworld, that it's ontologically true (and, for the most part, 'true' is) means that it is true regardless of Willamena's wordworld. It is 'objective,' because Willamena can't see into things unconscious to her. Things cast into the future or projected as speculation have no truth value, yet. What's true is the here and now.

But inference has no truth value, anyway. It's falsifiable. This proposition you've composed is recognizably inference.

In AmbigGuy's wordworld, it is true that 'buses cannot hurt humans.'

Well, we can run a test. We can find some human willing to stand in the path of a bus, allow the bus to run him over, and go and see if that human was hurt by the experience.

Of course, one of us could hallucinate. We could still disagree whether the bus hurt the human or whether not, but let's say that we agree that the bus did indeed hurt the person.

In that case, my truth was wrong, wasn't it? You'd still not be willing to call my truth subjective?

Need better examples. How about something actually true to you?

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

In Willamena's wordworld, that it's ontologically true (and, for the most part, 'true' is) means that it is true regardless of Willamena's wordworld.

I have spent my intellectual adulthood fastidiously avoiding words like 'ontologically' and 'epistemology.' It's just a personal bias, but I'm afraid our wordworlds may be a bit too foreign to do much mind melding right now. Maybe they'll discover a Rosetta Stone one day and we will finally be able to figure one another out!

 

[Enai de a lukal]

If Jack says that A is true, and Jill says that -A is true, which is true?

If 27% of humans say that the cat is on the couch, and 64% say that the cat is not on the couch, then is it true or false that the cat is on the couch?

As I said before, truth is not a function of consensus. Just because there can be a dispute over truth doesn't show there's anything weird going on here. True statements are those that reflect facts/reflect reality. So no matter who thinks what, whether "the cat is on the couch" is true depends on the fact of the matter (i.e. the location of the cat). Do we sometimes have difficulty determining what the fact of the matter is? Of course. But you're overstating your case- whether "the cat is on the mat" is true can be settled by looking at the couch, and most cases of truth or knowledge are equally straightforward (do a mental brainstorm of all the things you know are true- the majority of them are pretty simple to verify).

In any case, 100% certitude or infallibility is a false standard- truth and knowledge depend on having an appropriate amount of evidence relative to the context and the claim in question. That we could one day turn out to be mistaken doesn't preclude us having knowledge or the truth. Truth and knowledge are open-ended.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

I am not talking about what should be considered knowledge, or how you think knowledge should be defined.

I'm not making a normative statement, but a descriptive one about what does or does not constitute truth or knowledge. You seem to by trying to make a psychological point about when people think they know something, i.e. when they're certain (which is likely a true observation, so far as it goes), but of course the question remains whether they actually know something or not; and I'm talking about those cases where someone does know something- and certitude is not the distinguishing feature of actual knowledge, but justified true belief.

Yes, for something to be considered knowledge, it should be a justified true belief. But that really only perfectly works in some omniscient utopia.

No, that knowledge is justified true belief "works" in this world, insofar as this is the proper characterization of what knowledge is; knowledge is belief which is justified and true.

This is the problem with the "true" criteria. Sure, we want the things we consider knowledge to be true, but the fact is that we often can't know whether it is for certain.

This is why 100% psychological certitude is a false standard; nothing except the tautologies of math and logic attain this sort of certainty. If this is what knowledge must be, then there really is no such thing as knowledge. But this is an absurd result- there is a clear difference between someone who knows how to get to the hospital from here and someone who does not, someone who knows the capitol of France and someone who does not, and so on. The question which epistemology answers is, what is the difference? And the answer is justified true belief.

 

[Willamena]

I have spent my intellectual adulthood fastidiously avoiding words like 'ontologically' and 'epistemology.'

I did too! If you were to see my first posts on these boards, you'd see me saying something similiar.

It's just a personal bias, but I'm afraid our wordworlds may be a bit too foreign to do much mind melding right now. Maybe they'll discover a Rosetta Stone one day and we will finally be able to figure one another out!

No worries.

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

As I said before, truth is not a function of consensus. Just because there can be a dispute over truth doesn't show there's anything weird going on here.

As much as I appreciate the polite tone of this latest message, I still need to press you for an answer to my question. You say that truth is not a function of consensus. So I ask again: How do we decide what is true? It's an important question. Really, really important in any discuss about knowledge, especially when someone is using the 'justified true belief' definition.

I mean, we cannot know anything at all unless we figure out how to decide whether a thing is true, yes? So if truth is not a function of consensus, how is truth decided?

Truth J = "Jesus physically rose from the dead, was God incarnate, and waits in Heaven for those who call Him Lord."

Truth C = "The cat is on the couch."

Let's say that 99.9% of the humans in your town proclaim both of these statements to be true.

But you've said that consensus doesn't determine truth, so I guess it really doesn't matter how many people proclaim the truth of these two truths. Yes? We can't declare that either Truth J or Truth C is true, not based on the 99.9% consensus.

So how do we decide which of these truths are actually true? Please tell me.

True statements are those that reflect facts/reflect reality.

And snakes swallow their tails. Really, don't you recognize a tautology when you recite one?

A 'fact' is a 'true thing.' A 'true thing' is a 'fact'.

Notice that your claim is couched not in the passive voice, but close. It has a non-human subject/actor. But in real life, statements can't actually reflect facts at all. One must have a human in the room. Truth requires a judge. A human judge.

So what you must say is something like this: "I can determine true things from false things by judging whether a statement actually reflects facts and reality."

Or, "A group of wise elders can determine true things from false things by judging whether a statement actually reflects facts and reality."

Or, "A prophet of God can determine true things from false things by judging whether a statement actually reflects facts and reality."

I need to know: Who exactly -- what person -- decides whether a thing is true or whether it's false?

You? Each of us? A consensus? A prophet of God?

Who can tell me whether a thing is true or whether not?

So no matter who thinks what, whether "the cat is on the couch" is true depends on the fact of the matter (i.e. the location of the cat). Do we sometimes have difficulty determining what the fact of the matter is? Of course. But you're
overstating your case- whether "the cat is on the mat" is true can be settled by looking at the couch, and most cases of truth or knowledge are equally straightforward (do a mental brainstorm of all the things you know are true- the majority of them are pretty simple to verify).

I'm going to declare you mistaken in various ways. First, you've chosen the most extreme case in all of Truthland as your example -- human vision being our most trusted physical sense. Second, despite what you assert, most truth claims are not of the let's-check-our-vision sort. Third, what if 65% of your fellows declare there is no cat on the mat but you yourself are sure that you see a cat on the mat. You can't give up your truth claim in the face of a consensus against you, so what do you do? You declare yourself the final arbiter of truth, don't you? What other option is there.

In any case, 100% certitude or infallibility is a false standard- truth and knowledge depend on having an appropriate amount of evidence relative to the context and the claim in question. That we could one day turn out to be mistaken doesn't preclude us having knowledge or the truth. Truth and knowledge are open-ended.

So when we claim to know things, it's possible that the things we know are not true?

But I've been saying that from the start. It's why I find the 'justified true belief' thing to be nonsense.

You are now saying that we can know things which might not be true. But earlier you insisted that we could not know untrue things.

This debate business is harder than it looks, eh?

 

[Willamena]

I mean, we cannot know anything at all unless we figure out how to decide whether a thing is true...

Is this true? If it is, did it require any consensus to determine?

 

[jaycdp]

the so called atheist of the world is fighting another atheist who thinks about the physical and ignores the being. for instance Christians consider god comes into the womb and create human being. Then the people who thinks that is an insult to the creation by man so they found a counter argument and finally ended up in the monkey theory. the whole point is both are lacking the psychology behind the creation and spirituality behind the creation. So you decide who is real atheist and who is fake atheist.

 

[adi2d]

the so called atheist of the world is fighting another atheist who thinks about the physical and ignores the being. for instance Christians consider god comes into the womb and create human being. Then the people who thinks that is an insult to the creation by man so they found a counter argument and finally ended up in the monkey theory. the whole point is both are lacking the psychology behind the creation and spirituality behind the creation. So you decide who is real atheist and who is fake atheist.

The real atheist doesn't believe God exists. Whether they believe in the "monkey theory" or not is just a detail. One might think ocean view is best place to build a house. The other might disagree and think the mountain view is best.
Why is this so hard for people? It says nothing about who is right. Theism and atheism are only about what a person believes(or doesn't)



Just noticed my spellcheck says theism is spelled wrong. The suggestion is atheism. For what its worth I thought it was funny

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

Is this true? If it is, did it require any consensus to determine?

Well, I think it's true definitionally... to use a concept which I believe you used earlier.

The definition says that 'knowledge' = 'justified true belief.'

I'm assuming we are OK with using the verb form 'to know' in order to make knowledge claims. If I 'have knowledge' about something, then I 'know' that thing.

So in order to know a thing -- at least according to the definition -- we must determine whether or not that thing is true.

Yes? No?

As for the consensus thing, that's not mine. I'm an actual prophet of God. I'm not dependent upon human authority to determine truth.

 

[ArtieE]

the so called atheist of the world is fighting another atheist who thinks about the physical and ignores the being. for instance Christians consider god comes into the womb and create human being. Then the people who thinks that is an insult to the creation by man so they found a counter argument and finally ended up in the monkey theory. the whole point is both are lacking the psychology behind the creation and spirituality behind the creation. So you decide who is real atheist and who is fake atheist.

Nonsense. An atheist has an absence of belief in gods. Nothing to do with Christians and wombs and monkeys.

 

[steeltoes]

I would like to ask and encourage atheist to provide a proper definition of atheism as it is HEAVILY misused and often contradicts itself when used improperly. The definitive key point though is how can one keep it separate from agnosticism.

I have had no experiences with any god whatsoever, not even a hint of one, I can't say I have any knowledge as it concerns gods, I have received opinions and colorful descriptions but nothing as useful as knowledge, so why should it concern me if the term "atheism" is "HEAVILY misused" when it does not have anything to do with me? If 'atheism' means 'without theism' then what is the problem? Theism and atheism mean nothing to me so maybe your friend is right, there is no such thing as atheists, just theists that can't stand the thought.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Well, I think it's true definitionally... to use a concept which I believe you used earlier.

The definition says that 'knowledge' = 'justified true belief.'

I'm assuming we are OK with using the verb form 'to know' in order to make knowledge claims. If I 'have knowledge' about something, then I 'know' that thing.

So in order to know a thing -- at least according to the definition -- we must determine whether or not that thing is true.

Yes? No?

No, actually.

I think you're conflating a few issues here.

To know something, your belief must be true and justified. You don't need to know that it's true.

There's a difference between knowing 'X' and knowing that you know 'X'.

 

[Willamena]

Trying this again...

So in order to know a thing -- at least according to the definition -- we must determine whether or not that thing is true.

Yes? No?

The determination of truth is made by each of us unconsciously. I truly believe that there is no one to say what the mechanism is (despite philosophical theorizing). In that regard, your question poses 'knowing' backwards: we don't have to determine "what is" in order to know, but rather, our determination of "what is" has put things in order such that we can use the verb we made in wordworld just for this purpose: 'to know'.

I said earlier that we use words to make the world pretty and useful. I find it particularly useful and particularly beautifying to understand that for all our presenting "what is" in words, for all our stating the fact of things (beleifs), we have the power to cast a world that is true apart from wordworld. I've tried to imagine how to explain 'ontological' and it's really just as simple as stating things in concrete terms of "what is."

We state the fact of things, "what is," and that is essential belief. It is like painting a picture of "what is." Then we subtract from that picture the act of having painted and the painter, to fix the picture solidly. That is ontological truth, the concrete version of "what is." It is a picture painted minus a painter.

It sounds manipulative, magic even, but it's really just beautifying. The picture made without us behind it is pretty. That's not to say the picture with us isn't pretty, too, but while the painter is there, posed with brush in hand, the picture might change at any moment according to his whim. That doesn't make the picture wrong.

This is just to say that we do know truth. The painter is painting acurately, he just gets a bit pedantic about detailing at times.

Now, this is an introduction to existentialism. How do we know the picture is 'right'? It isn't, it's just concrete: "right" and "wrong" are wordworld terms. How do we know the picture's 'real'? It isn't, it's just concrete: "real" and "unreal" are metapictures overtop of the picture. How do we know anything is what's 'true'? Belief (the recognition of "what is") was painted.

The ancient Greek philosophers addressed this directly by distinguishing the ontological (concrete) picture from the picture being painted, as I tried to do above. The analysis involved in distinguishing these things is the field of epistemology.

Their ideas say nothing about painting incorrectly--if you think about it, if we cannot know if we paint correctly, then there is no more reason to assume we paint incorrectly than that we paint correctly. But we do know some things, right? There are some things we've paint correctly, so why think any of it is painted incorrectly?* Why assume an imagined concrete reality is grossly different from any "what is" that we paint? There's no good reason to assume our painting is anything but correct, for each of us.

*Most of what is ascribed to falsehood and incorrectness can more properly be attributable to context and perspective, and so correctness of the overall picture can be preseved.

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

No, actually.

I think you're conflating a few issues here.

To know something, your belief must be true and justified. You don't need to know that it's true.

There's a difference between knowing 'X' and knowing that you know 'X'.

Well OK. It kinda sorta occurred to me that someone might argue such a position, but to my mind, it renders the definition not only useless but especially useless.

So when we claim to know that the cat is on the mat, we're admitting that it might be true that the cat is on the mat and it might be false that the cat is on the mat?

But how is that any different from believing that the cat is on the mat?

Maybe you are agreeing with me that all claims of knowledge and belief are simply claims that we possess psychological certainty about the matters?

Earlier, one champion of the definition exclaimed that, "We cannot know false things." Would you agree with that? I certainly wouldn't. I see people knowing things all day, every day, and some of their knowledge seems blatantly at odds with reality.

I used to know that the moons of Jupiter were geologically dead. Now I know that they aren't.

But if anyone objects that I 'didn't really know it,' they are believing in magic, I think. They are claiming that we really can know whether a thing is true or whether false in some sense transcending mere human opinion.

They are disagreeing with you about the necessity of knowing the truth or falsity of a matter before we can have knowledge about that matter.

Am I making any sense for you?

 

[Willamena]

Earlier, one champion of the definition exclaimed that, "We cannot know false things." Would you agree with that? I certainly wouldn't. I see people knowing things all day, every day, and some of their knowledge seems blatantly at odds with reality.

I used to know that the moons of Jupiter were geologically dead. Now I know that they aren't.

Truth is here and now, and its shape corresponds with the shape of the sum of the information at our disposal at any given moment. With new information comes new opportunties to flip that unconscious switch and say 'true,' and our beliefs 'change,' following truth like a beacon light.

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

Truth is here and now, and its shape corresponds with the shape of the sum of the information at our disposal at any given moment. With new information comes new opportunties to flip that unconscious switch and say 'true,' and our beliefs 'change,' following truth like a beacon light.

I think that's a great way to look at it, Willemena, but again I suggest that you and I may be the odd-guys-out in seeing truth as malleable. We humans need to know our place in the world. We need to put the world into fixed form so we can relax and get on with things. Most of us do. It's why we flock to scripture and to prophets of God. It's why many of us would rather live under a king or tyrant than be responsible for managing the world ourselves.

So it seems to me anyway.

 

[Willamena]

I think that's a great way to look at it, Willemena, but again I suggest that you and I may be the odd-guys-out in seeing truth as malleable. We humans need to know our place in the world. We need to put the world into fixed form so we can relax and get on with things. Most of us do. It's why we flock to scripture and to prophets of God. It's why many of us would rather live under a king or tyrant than be responsible for managing the world ourselves.

So it seems to me anyway.

Not as odd-guy-out as you might think.