Enai de a lukal
Well-Known Member
What then separates claims of knowledge from knowledge?
The tribunal of evidence.
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What then separates claims of knowledge from knowledge?
It ignores the possibility of human error -- which is why I find it such a dangerous definition.
You've yet to say why knowledge must be immune to error. This is a strawman you've built. As I've stressed repeatedly, and the empirical sciences clearly provide a model for, knowledge is defeasible, fallible, and open-ended. Knowledge and truth consist in the best possible (or, more accurately, the least bad) explanation for a body of evidence.
A tribunal of evidence isn't required to know that I just ate dinner.The tribunal of evidence.
Because it's true.You've yet to say why knowledge must be immune to error.
You've yet to say why knowledge must be immune to error. This is a strawman you've built. As I've stressed repeatedly, and the empirical sciences clearly provide a model for, knowledge is defeasible, fallible, and open-ended. Knowledge and truth consist in the best possible (or, more accurately, the least bad) explanation for a body of evidence.
And if the belief is cognitive and meaningful, then it is either true or false. It may not be PC to ask whether the theist or the atheist is correct, but it is surely a pertinent question- and if neither of them are correct or incorrect, this can only be because the claim in question (does God exist?) is nonsensical to begin with.
But the claim that God exists is cognitive and meaningful; it's just false. Atheism is, at best, the knowledge that theism is false.
That's right: if it's not true, then you only think you know.But I wasnt asking about other people judging my knowledge claim. I was asking about myself. You seemed to be admitting that when I know that the cat is on the mat, it could be untrue that the cat is on the mat. To my mind, that offends the definition. According to the definition, I cannot know that the cat is on the mat unless it is true that the cat is on the mat.
They often do, but we're not talking about claiming belief; we're talking about belief itself.So you think that when people claim to 'believe' something, they don't consider that their belief is justified and true?
But it may or may not be actually justified.That's not my experience. If someone says that he believes Jesus is Lord or believes that the sun will rise tomorrow, he is thinking that his belief is justified and true.
You can't distinguish between belief and knowledge? I think you're putting me on.Do you know of a formal definition of 'belief' which differs from 'justified true belief'? Does epistemology have such a formal definition, to your knowledge, and does it differentiate between belief and knowledge?
It doesn't assert that at all. Why would you think this?OK, we'll have to just disagree about that. I think such a definition asserts the possibility that we can know things trascendently, in the way that God might know something.
According to both views. I have no idea why you've decided to ignore the possibility that people can think they know something but be mistaken.But according to my view, I could be wrong about anything, anytime.
The part that I've highlighted was the correct answer.Well, it's like someone claiming to 'have an idea.' That person may be lying to me and not actually have an idea. I don't know, but I usually just take their word for it. Or they may claim to be a Christian. That's fine with me. I assume that they really do think of themselves as Christians.
Same when someone claims to know something. I assume that he actually is knowing a thing if he claims to be knowing a thing. Whatever mental state equals 'knowing'... this guy is probably experiencing that mental state. Why would he lie to me?
Of course, with the 'justified true belief' definition, I can never know whether anyone actually knows anything. That's because I don't consider myself capable of discerning 'true' from 'false' in any transcendent way. I can have an opinion that his knowledge is at variance with external reality, but I can't know that he's wrong.
We can be sure to a high degree of certainty, but not with perfect certainty, no.OK. But we can't know which time I really knew it and which time I only thought that I knew it?
There's a big difference. It's just that we aren't in a position to tell which one's the case with absolute certainty; most of the time, we have to rely on an assessment of the balance of probabilities. Sometimes, we aren't in a position to distinguish at all.So as Willemena asks, there's no difference between knowing something vs. claiming to know something?
I'd put my money on myself, because based on your arguments in this thread, I trust my reasoning more than I trust yours.But some claims are verifiable? Really? That's an interesting assertion. OK, so maybe you will take a shot at The Most Frightening Question In All Of Truthdom. Here it is, cast in three different forms:
If I say a claim is verified, but you say the claim isn't verified... is the claim verified or isn't it?
The number of people who believe a proposition doesn't dictate the truth of or falsehood of the proposition. Believing that it does dictate this is a logical fallacy called argumentum ad populum.If 55% of observers say that the cat is on the mat, but 42% say that the cat is not on the mat... is it true or false that the cat is on the mat? (Let's say you're in the 42% group.)
There is no final authority.TMFQIAOT: Who -- which person or persons -- is the final authority as to whether a claim has been verified (is true)?
Who says, with final authority, whether a claim is verified?
If you can answer this question, I think I'll be able to understand your position much better.
Rather, if it's not true, then you only believe.That's right: if it's not true, then you only think you know.
Degrees of certainty contain inherent uncertainty. We justify believing so that we don't have to rely on accidentally being right. If we cannot be certain, we rely on accidentally being right.There's a big difference. It's just that we aren't in a position to tell which one's the case with absolute certainty; most of the time, we have to rely on an assessment of the balance of probabilities. Sometimes, we aren't in a position to distinguish at all.
Thank you, thank you, thank you for answering my simple question.There is no final authority.
According to both views. I have no idea why you've decided to ignore the possibility that people can think they know something but be mistaken.
That seems entirely reasonable and well-expressed. I have no problem with it. I just have a problem with the 'justified true belief' definition of knowledge -- continuing to believe that its adherents must believe in magic. The magic power of a human brain to distinguish between truth and falsity.We all construct mental models of how we think the world works. We then put these models to the test by trying to live as if they're true. Sometimes, our expectations (i.e. the predictions of our models) are satisfied; other times, they're
violated.
The more our mental models are tested and found to work, the more reliable we can take them to be. We can't ever reach perfect certainty, but we can compare competing beliefs and see which one agrees better with observations.
We make our own judgements about what we think is true and false. These judgements are either correct or incorrect, reasonable or unreasonable. Not all beliefs are equally reasonable.Thank you, thank you, thank you for answering my simple question.
So here's what I know about your position on determining truth:
1) Human consensus does not determine truth.
2) There is no final authority to say what is true and what isn't true.
Therefore I conclude that you and I agree that each human decides for himself what is true and what is false.
Yes? Please stop me if you disagree.
No. Making a judgement about whether a thing is true does not do anything to actually make it true or false.But if that is the case -- that each person decides for himself what is true -- then all knowledge is equally legitimate according to the JTB definition. Necessarily so. Every person knows those things for which he has justifed true belief.
I have no idea where you're coming from here. If you get offended at the fact that humans are fallible, I'm not sure what I can say to help you, but your offense doesn't magically make all of your judgements correct.And if I insist that you don't really know what you claim to know, I'm just being arrogant and confused. I'm insisting that you actually have no right to judge truth for yourself. I myself am the ultimate judge of truth, and I have judged that your knowledge is based on an untrue belief.
The logical fallacy you're committing here is called "poisoning the well".A humble truth-lover would not exclaim, "You don't really know that! You only think that you know that!" A humble truth-lover would say, "Well, I disagree with you that your known thing is true. But we all have our opinions about truth."
That depends on how you do it.How could they be mistaken? Think it through all the way to the end. If there is no final authority as to what is true, then Penguin can never know that the other guy has false knowledge (is mistaken). The other guy's knowledge can never 'turn out to be false'... as another JTB champ has phrased it.
When you assume that the other guy's knowledge has turned out to be false knowledge, or is 'mistaken knowledge', you are declaring yourself to be the final judge of what is true/false. Aren't you?
It doesn't imply that. It just makes the definition not particularly useful. However, things that aren't useful aren't necessarily logically incoherent.That seems entirely reasonable and well-expressed. I have no problem with it. I just have a problem with the 'justified true belief' definition of knowledge -- continuing to believe that its adherents must believe in magic. The magic power of a human brain to distinguish between truth and falsity.
]My more elegant and accurate definition says that belief and knowledge are the very same things -- psychological certainty than our mental image matches external reality -- with 'knowledge' often or usually being a stronger claim of mental certainty than 'belief.'
You do that.
Knowledge and truth are objective. Your saying truth is like the definition of theory but its more like a law.
A tribunal of evidence isn't required to know that I just ate dinner.
Unless you can find the courage to answer my oft-repeated question, I'm afraid I can only see you as a sideline player.
If neither are lying they are both correct
No. It depends- like with the cat- whether God actually exists or not; obviously, if God does not exist, the theist can not be correct, and visa versa.The theist,by definition, believes in a God. So s/he is correct
The atheist,by definition,has no belief in a God. So s/he is correct
NP- that was actually the intended topic, but we've had a few posters wishing to muddy the water by raising non-existence objections to the uncontroversial and obvious characterization of knowledge as justified and true belief.You've said that last line before. Can you share what that knowledge showing theism is false? I asked before but maybe you missed it or I missed your reply
According to both views. I have no idea why you've decided to ignore the possibility that people can think they know something but be mistaken.
The part that I've highlighted was the correct answer.
We can be sure to a high degree of certainty, but not with perfect certainty, no.
There's a big difference. It's just that we aren't in a position to tell which one's the case with absolute certainty; most of the time, we have to rely on an assessment of the balance of probabilities. Sometimes, we aren't in a position to distinguish at all.
I'd put my money on myself, because based on your arguments in this thread, I trust my reasoning more than I trust yours.
The number of people who believe a proposition doesn't dictate the truth of or falsehood of the proposition. Believing that it does dictate this is a logical fallacy called argumentum ad populum.
There is no final authority.
Here's how it works, IMO:
We all construct mental models of how we think the world works. We then put these models to the test by trying to live as if they're true. Sometimes, our expectations (i.e. the predictions of our models) are satisfied; other times, they're violated.
The more our mental models are tested and found to work, the more reliable we can take them to be. We can't ever reach perfect certainty, but we can compare competing beliefs and see which one agrees better with observations.
Fair enough. That would be knowledge as "justified, sufficiently evidenced belief."Evidence is what distinguishes knowledge from belief.
Fair enough. That would be knowledge as "justified, sufficiently evidenced belief."
The tribunal of evidence.
Knowledge and truth are objective in the sense that they are subject-invariant; they don't vary from person to person. That isn't to say that they aren't open-ended.
Consider a pretty uncontroversial example- I know that the sun will rise tomorrow. However, it is quite possible that it does not; indeed, there is no logical necessity that the sun rise tomorrow. But my belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is based on sufficient evidence for this belief- the fact that the sun has hitherto risen every day.
Thus, my this belief constitutes knowledge, if anything does, and is yet fallible and open-ended.
If knowledge and truth must be absolutely immune to the possibility of error, then knowledge and truth cannot exist. But knowledge and truth do exist, this the impossibility of error cannot be the criteria, but is a mere chimera we're chasing.
***
Just because you don't like the answer doesn't mean you haven't been given one. We don't have access to a bird's, or God's, eye view of things, so yes, we're limited to our own judgment, our own perspective; but this doesn't entail, at all, that all beliefs are then equal. Beliefs are differentiated on the basis of evidence- and sufficient evidence distinguishes knowledge from belief.