Atheism is not a default position

[Willamena]

Time to lay this rhinoceros to rest. If you accept that atheism describes the person who has no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god, then atheism cannot be described as a "default position" on a scale of beliefs.

Default: Amongst a mess of options, the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing.

Thing about this: belief isn't an act. It's not something we do, and especially not something we choose to do. It's a description of the world, nothing more, nothing less.

Take the world.

The world is the case.

If we wish to examine truth or untruth, belief or doubt, certainty or uncertainty about the world, then we must hold the world distinct from those things we wish to examine. Hence, we will refer to it, and all its parts, as "the case."

The world is the case, and of the case things may be true or false, hence they may be believed or doubted, with degrees of certainty or uncertainty.

If I say, "I believe George went to the store," that lends it uncertainty. It says that because of insufficient knowledge there may some amount of doubt about George's activities, but still I have a degree of certainty about it. Similarly, to say, "I don't believe George went to the store," is to assert its uncertainty. Belief is the case described in such a way as to hold a degree of certainty.

If I say "George went to the store," then asserting the truth of that lends it a face that says there is no doubt, no uncertainty about George's journey. Truth is the case described as apart from me, apart from the certainty a consciousness might know.

That's because a consciousness is distinct from the world it knows.

The default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing. The world is the case.

Both asserting a degree of certainty to the world and describing it as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do. They are dong something, not nothing. Where the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing, asserting belief and truth--and their counterparts disbelief and falsehood--about what is the case are doing something.

In discussion, we do not fail to do something about the world.

 

[George-ananda]

BTW, George went to the bar; not the store tonight, And he is not an atheist; not even by default.

Pardon my diversion: But I think Willamena makes a good argument.

 

[Guy Threepwood]

Time to lay this rhinoceros to rest. If you accept that atheism describes the person who has no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god, then atheism cannot be described as a "default position" on a scale of beliefs.

Default: Amongst a mess of options, the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing.

Thing about this: belief isn't an act. It's not something we do, and especially not something we choose to do. It's a description of the world, nothing more, nothing less.

Take the world.

The world is the case.

If we wish to examine truth or untruth, belief or doubt, certainty or uncertainty about the world, then we must hold the world distinct from those things we wish to examine. Hence, we will refer to it, and all its parts, as "the case."

The world is the case, and of the case things may be true or false, hence they may be believed or doubted, with degrees of certainty or uncertainty.

If I say, "I believe George went to the store," that lends it uncertainty. It says that because of insufficient knowledge there may some amount of doubt about George's activities, but still I have a degree of certainty about it. Similarly, to say, "I don't believe George went to the store," is to assert its uncertainty. Belief is the case described in such a way as to hold a degree of certainty.

If I say "George went to the store," then asserting the truth of that lends it a face that says there is no doubt, no uncertainty about George's journey. Truth is the case described as apart from me, apart from the certainty a consciousness might know.

That's because a consciousness is distinct from the world it knows.

The default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing. The world is the case.

Both asserting a degree of certainty to the world and describing it as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do. They are dong something, not nothing. Where the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing, asserting belief and truth--and their counterparts disbelief and falsehood--about what is the case are doing something.

In discussion, we do not fail to do something about the world.

I think I agree with that rationale- what is the 'default' result of a coin toss? claiming lack of belief in heads doesn't make tails default or vice versa.
no more than my skepticism of atheism makes theism the default..

 

[Bunyip]

Time to lay this rhinoceros to rest. If you accept that atheism describes the person who has no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god, then atheism cannot be described as a "default position" on a scale of beliefs.

Why not? How does that follow?

Default: Amongst a mess of options, the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing.

Thing about this: belief isn't an act. It's not something we do, and especially not something we choose to do. It's a description of the world, nothing more, nothing less.

Take the world.

The world is the case.

If we wish to examine truth or untruth, belief or doubt, certainty or uncertainty about the world, then we must hold the world distinct from those things we wish to examine. Hence, we will refer to it, and all its parts, as "the case."

The world is the case, and of the case things may be true or false, hence they may be believed or doubted, with degrees of certainty or uncertainty.

If I say, "I believe George went to the store," that lends it uncertainty. It says that because of insufficient knowledge there may some amount of doubt about George's activities, but still I have a degree of certainty about it. Similarly, to say, "I don't believe George went to the store," is to assert its uncertainty. Belief is the case described in such a way as to hold a degree of certainty.

If I say "George went to the store," then asserting the truth of that lends it a face that says there is no doubt, no uncertainty about George's journey. Truth is the case described as apart from me, apart from the certainty a consciousness might know.

That's because a consciousness is distinct from the world it knows.

The default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing. The world is the case.

Both asserting a degree of certainty to the world and describing it as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do. They are dong something, not nothing. Where the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing, asserting belief and truth--and their counterparts disbelief and falsehood--about what is the case are doing something.

In discussion, we do not fail to do something about the world.

 

[Willamena]

Why not? How does that follow?

That's explained in the following part. The first statement is just a summary, as any good exposition is.

**thumbs up**

 

[Bunyip]

That's explained in the following part. The first statement is just a summary, as any good exposition is.

**thumbs up**

II read the post - I just don't see your rationale.

Try writing it in relation to whether 'X' does or does not exist, rather than 'What do you think George may have got up to?'

The former is a claim of existence, the latter - a more open and general speculative discussion.

 

[Willamena]

Try writing it in relation to whether 'X' does or does not exist, rather than 'What do you think George may have got up to?'

Sure!

Let X exist.

Both asserting a degree of certainty of X to the world and describing X as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do.

 

[Bunyip]

Sure!

Let X exist.

Both asserting a degree of certainty of X to the world and describing X as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do.

Sure, how does that relate to the question of atheism being the default? Given that neither theism, nor atheism infer certainty - surely certainty is not relevant?

 

[Willamena]

Sure, how does that relate to the question of atheism being the default? Given that neither theism, nor atheism infer certainty - surely certainty is not relevant?

All topics have inherent certainty/uncertainty if consciousness is separate from the world. Where we describe the world with either truth or belief, we have adopted that attitude.

 

[Bunyip]

All topics have inherent certainty/uncertainty if consciousness is separate from the world. Where we describe the world with either truth or belief, we have adopted that attitude.

Sure, atheism/theism is just about belief - not certainty, or truth. So how is atheism not the default?

 

[jojom]

Time to lay this rhinoceros to rest. If you accept that atheism describes the person who has no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god, then atheism cannot be described as a "default position" on a scale of beliefs.

You're correct. Atheism is the belief that god does not exist. However, your following statement is truly awry:

Thing about this: belief isn't an act. It's not something we do, and especially not something we choose to do.

belief
[bih-leef]
noun
1.something believed; an opinion or conviction:
a belief that the earth is flat.

believe [believed]
[bih-leev]
verb (used without object), believed, believing.
1.to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the reliability of something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing so:
Only if one believes in something can one act purposefully.

verb (used with object), believed, believing.
2.to have confidence or faith in the truth of (a positive assertion, story, etc.); give credence to.​

Notice that "believe" ("believed") is a verb, a word expressing an action, state, or a relation between two things, and in this case, an action. What it comes down to is that belief is the product of an act. In coming to the belief X isn't Y we did something; our brain went through some kind of processing machinations. Sorry, but you've made a major blunder here.

If we wish to examine truth or untruth, belief or doubt, certainty or uncertainty about the world, then we must hold the world distinct from those things we wish to examine. Hence, we will refer to it, and all its parts, as "the case."

The world is the case, and of the case things may be true or false, hence they may be believed or doubted, with degrees of certainty or uncertainty.

OR not believed.

If I say, "I believe George went to the store," that lends it uncertainty.

Not at all. George may really have went to the store, but having not seen him do it, but only hearing about it, you aren't ready to claim knowledge of it, just belief. The uncertainty isn't in the fact of the matter but in how you apprehend it.

It says that because of insufficient knowledge there may some amount of doubt about George's activities, but still I have a degree of certainty about it. Similarly, to say, "I don't believe George went to the store," is to assert its uncertainty.

NO, it only identifies YOUR uncertainty.

Belief is the case described in such a way as to hold a degree of certainty.

Personal certainty. Not the fact of George's action.

If I say "George went to the store," then asserting the truth of that lends it a face that says there is no doubt, no uncertainty about George's journey.

No doubt or uncertainty in YOUR mind. I may have very good reason not to believe you, even if George did go to the store. Perhaps you're compulsive liar.

Truth is the case described as apart from me,

I would say, "FACT is the case. . . ."

apart from the certainty a consciousness might know.

Certainty is not a matter of knowing a fact, which would be knowledge, but the state of being free from doubt or reservation; being confident, sure.

That's because a consciousness is distinct from the world it knows.

So consciousness isn't part of the world? Or, are you saying that one cannot know he is conscious?

The default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing. The world is the case.

Excuse me! If I don't believe anything about god then it's the world? This isn't making any sense at all.

Both asserting a degree of certainty to the world and describing it as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do.

Care to rephrase, because again, this isn't making any sense at all.

They are dong something, not nothing. Where the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing, asserting belief and truth--and their counterparts disbelief and falsehood--about what is the case are doing something.

In discussion, we do not fail to do something about the world.

?????????????????????????????????????????????????

 

[Liu]

I'd normally understand atheism in a different way (as in, someone who believes/assumes that there are no gods), but okay, let's take your definition for the purpose of this thread, Willamena.

But I don't get it either how it then wouldn't be the default. We can hardly do nothing about the world, but we can theoretically do nothing about religion.
It's difficult to imagine how someone could reach that default state of doing/thinking nothing about the topic of religion, at least in this society, but let's assume someone is growing up in a society were he or she is never confronted with that topic at all. He or she would also not be old enough to have come up with such a concept by him/herself. He or she then would be in the situation to have "no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god", namely be an atheist in your definition. So, for this person atheism certainly would be the default.
So I don't understand how you come to your conclusion.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Time to lay this rhinoceros to rest. If you accept that atheism describes the person who has no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god, then atheism cannot be described as a "default position" on a scale of beliefs.

Default: Amongst a mess of options, the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing.

Thing about this: belief isn't an act. It's not something we do, and especially not something we choose to do. It's a description of the world, nothing more, nothing less.

Take the world.

The world is the case.

If we wish to examine truth or untruth, belief or doubt, certainty or uncertainty about the world, then we must hold the world distinct from those things we wish to examine. Hence, we will refer to it, and all its parts, as "the case."

The world is the case, and of the case things may be true or false, hence they may be believed or doubted, with degrees of certainty or uncertainty.

If I say, "I believe George went to the store," that lends it uncertainty. It says that because of insufficient knowledge there may some amount of doubt about George's activities, but still I have a degree of certainty about it. Similarly, to say, "I don't believe George went to the store," is to assert its uncertainty. Belief is the case described in such a way as to hold a degree of certainty.

If I say "George went to the store," then asserting the truth of that lends it a face that says there is no doubt, no uncertainty about George's journey. Truth is the case described as apart from me, apart from the certainty a consciousness might know.

That's because a consciousness is distinct from the world it knows.

The default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing. The world is the case.

Both asserting a degree of certainty to the world and describing it as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do. They are dong something, not nothing. Where the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing, asserting belief and truth--and their counterparts disbelief and falsehood--about what is the case are doing something.

In discussion, we do not fail to do something about the world.

I quoted the above in full because it is worth reading twice (and thrice), even though all I would add is that for those who to disregard philosophical arguments (I include the use of logic here) but who tend to accept scientific consensus as being (at least likely) true, then I could add that research in evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and elsewhere indicates that "religion is natural, atheism is not" (I put that in quotes because it is the title of one of many peer-reviewed articles in science journals/volumes to demonstrate that this is so).

 

[Liu]

I thought about that notion of "religion is natural" as well, which is why I described a hypothetical situation in my comment. The society in which the default situation is true for many people over the age of, say, 3 is unlikely to exist.

But I've read the thread's first post about six times by now and it still doesn't make sense to me, for the reasons stated.

 

[Laika]

Time to lay this rhinoceros to rest. If you accept that atheism describes the person who has no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god, then atheism cannot be described as a "default position" on a scale of beliefs.

Default: Amongst a mess of options, the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing.

Thing about this: belief isn't an act. It's not something we do, and especially not something we choose to do. It's a description of the world, nothing more, nothing less.

Take the world.

The world is the case.

If we wish to examine truth or untruth, belief or doubt, certainty or uncertainty about the world, then we must hold the world distinct from those things we wish to examine. Hence, we will refer to it, and all its parts, as "the case."

The world is the case, and of the case things may be true or false, hence they may be believed or doubted, with degrees of certainty or uncertainty.

If I say, "I believe George went to the store," that lends it uncertainty. It says that because of insufficient knowledge there may some amount of doubt about George's activities, but still I have a degree of certainty about it. Similarly, to say, "I don't believe George went to the store," is to assert its uncertainty. Belief is the case described in such a way as to hold a degree of certainty.

If I say "George went to the store," then asserting the truth of that lends it a face that says there is no doubt, no uncertainty about George's journey. Truth is the case described as apart from me, apart from the certainty a consciousness might know.

That's because a consciousness is distinct from the world it knows.

The default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing. The world is the case.

Both asserting a degree of certainty to the world and describing it as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do. They are dong something, not nothing. Where the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing, asserting belief and truth--and their counterparts disbelief and falsehood--about what is the case are doing something.

In discussion, we do not fail to do something about the world.

I can only agree with this. Speaking as an atheist, I would say that until we are prepared to assert atheism as a fact and not simply a belief, it is not the default position. the 'lack of belief' in god implicitly assumes that belief in god is our natural state. I am not of the opinion that belief in god is inherent in human beings, but I'm more than happy to concide that as animals primarily governed by our emotions, religion offers a more fulfilling set of beliefs than a very limited and 'weak' atheism. Atheism may well be the more rational and scientific position to hold, but in some ways it is yet to be the more 'human' one as questions regarding the meaning of life, our response to death, our insiginficance in the universe call on something "more" than just rational explanations and require deeper emotional impulses that can fulfill our need for meaning.

Science may well find answers to these questions, particuarly through neuroscience and the attempt to explain our own inner state by objective methods of enquiry, but so far atheists- out of a belief in the superiority of reason- have largely refused to ask them. It is noteworthy that most atheists today dismiss communism as a religion because they behaved like believers, so they can cling on to the belief in the superiority of reason, without ever asking whether such behaviour may reflect deeper yearnings for a sense of order in the universe. I think atheism is more impoverished for it as it often refuses to recognise the role religion plays in accepting the human condition. something has to take gods place to give order and meaning to the world; a 'lack of belief' is not sufficient in that nor is it a default position.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I thought about that notion of "religion is natural" as well, which is why I described a hypothetical situation in my comment. The society in which the default situation is true for someone over the age of, say, 3 is unlikely to exist.

But I've read the thread's first post about six times by now and it still doesn't make sense to me, for the reasons stated.

See e.g.,
Inzlicht, M., Tullett, A. M., & Good, M. (2011). The need to believe: A neuroscience account of religion as a motivated process. Religion, brain & behavior, 1(3), 192-212.

and other attached documents.

 

[Liu]

Thanks for the literature, but at least according to the titles those essays support my point: People normally do believe in something related to religion, either the existence or the non-existence or the uncertainty of the existence of gods (and hence are not in the default situation of doing nothing about religion), so atheists, as defined in the original post, only exist under very peculiar circumstances, namely those of the default situation.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Thanks for the literature, but at least according to the titles those essays support my point: People normally do believe in something related to religion, either the existence or the non-existence or the uncertainty of the existence of gods (and hence are not in the default situation of doing nothing about religion), so atheists, as defined in the original post, only exist under very peculiar circumstances.

Just considering the titles and ignoring the content, how does e.g., "religion is natural" suggest what you describe?

 

[Liu]

Religion is natural implies, as I understand it, that a society will normally come up with religious beliefs (e.g. beliefs in gods) since it's natural for humans to develop such concepts.Also if not every individual in a given society may come up with this concept on their own, they will normally hear about such concepts as part of their socialization and education.
And if someone has such a concept, he or she must have a position towards the truthfulness of that concept, i.e. either it is true, or it is false, or one doesn't know. Even the position of not knowing it is one that normally arises out of a thinking process, so, when confronted with the concept of religion one can not do nothing about it, the same as one can not do nothing about the world, a point on which I agree with Willamena.

 

[paarsurrey]

Atheism is not a default position

It never was.
Regards