philalethes
New Member
(An excerpt from "Logic and Trascendence" by Frithjof Schuon)
Once again, it is by no means obvious why the peremptory denial of causes lying outside our sensory experience should be regarded as conforming to reason or why it should be reasonable to label things impossible merely because they appear improbable or extraordinary from the standpoint of current experience. Equating the supernatural and the irrational is characteristic in this respect: it amounts to claiming that the unknown or incomprehensible is the same as the absurd. The rationalism of a frog living at the bottom of a well is to deny the existence of mountains: perhaps this is "logic", but it has nothing to do with reality.
... First of all, however, an answer should be made to a curious objection put forward by rationalists, even though it has already been mentioned elsewhere in this book. The objection is as follows: whoever affirms that God exists is under the obligation to prove it, whereas the skeptic is in no way obliged to prove the contrary, since, so it seems, only he who makes an affirmation owes his critics a proof, he who denies it being under no such obligation. Consequently, the skeptic has the right to reject the existence of God without being required in his turn to prove the nonexistence of God. Now this kind of reasoning is arbitrary, and for the following reason: a man who finds himself unable to verify a statement has undoubtedly the right not to accept it as certain or as probable, but he has by no means the logical right to reject it without providing valid reasons for doing so. It is not difficult to discover the basis of the objection in question: it starts from the preconceived notion that the affirmation of God is something extraordinary, whereas the denial of God is normal. The skeptic starts, of course, from the idea that the normal man is the atheist, and from this he deduces a kind of one-way jurisprudence.
In the spiritual order a proof is of assistance only to the man who wishes to understand and who, by virtue of this wish, has already in some measure understood; it is of no practical use to one who, deep in his heart, does not want to change his position, and whose philosophy merely expresses this desire. It has been claimed that it is up to religion to prove itself in the face of the utmost ill-will, that religion is made for man, that it must therefore adapt itself to his needs, and that through its failure to do so it has become bankrupt. One might as well say that the alphabet has become bankrupt in a class where the pupils are determined not to learn it; with this kind of infralogic one might declare that the law is made for the honest people who are pleased to conform to it and that a new law is required for the others, a law adapted to the needs of their maliciousness and rejuvenated in conformity with their propensity for crime.
Once again, it is by no means obvious why the peremptory denial of causes lying outside our sensory experience should be regarded as conforming to reason or why it should be reasonable to label things impossible merely because they appear improbable or extraordinary from the standpoint of current experience. Equating the supernatural and the irrational is characteristic in this respect: it amounts to claiming that the unknown or incomprehensible is the same as the absurd. The rationalism of a frog living at the bottom of a well is to deny the existence of mountains: perhaps this is "logic", but it has nothing to do with reality.
... First of all, however, an answer should be made to a curious objection put forward by rationalists, even though it has already been mentioned elsewhere in this book. The objection is as follows: whoever affirms that God exists is under the obligation to prove it, whereas the skeptic is in no way obliged to prove the contrary, since, so it seems, only he who makes an affirmation owes his critics a proof, he who denies it being under no such obligation. Consequently, the skeptic has the right to reject the existence of God without being required in his turn to prove the nonexistence of God. Now this kind of reasoning is arbitrary, and for the following reason: a man who finds himself unable to verify a statement has undoubtedly the right not to accept it as certain or as probable, but he has by no means the logical right to reject it without providing valid reasons for doing so. It is not difficult to discover the basis of the objection in question: it starts from the preconceived notion that the affirmation of God is something extraordinary, whereas the denial of God is normal. The skeptic starts, of course, from the idea that the normal man is the atheist, and from this he deduces a kind of one-way jurisprudence.
In the spiritual order a proof is of assistance only to the man who wishes to understand and who, by virtue of this wish, has already in some measure understood; it is of no practical use to one who, deep in his heart, does not want to change his position, and whose philosophy merely expresses this desire. It has been claimed that it is up to religion to prove itself in the face of the utmost ill-will, that religion is made for man, that it must therefore adapt itself to his needs, and that through its failure to do so it has become bankrupt. One might as well say that the alphabet has become bankrupt in a class where the pupils are determined not to learn it; with this kind of infralogic one might declare that the law is made for the honest people who are pleased to conform to it and that a new law is required for the others, a law adapted to the needs of their maliciousness and rejuvenated in conformity with their propensity for crime.