It would be like putting a subject in a room with a two-way mirror, two pressure sensitive floor tiles (one red, one blue) and a dog in a glass cage attached to the roof (with air conditioning). By standing on the red plate the dog will be given a small electric shock and yelp in pain, yet standing on the blue has no observable impact within that room. Subject A decides to stand on the blue square because they do not want to cause the dog harm (and because they do not like the noise it makes).
Suddenly one of the walls (not the mirror) suddenly became transparent and in the next room the same experiment was being run under what appeared exactly the same conditions (when subject B stood on red the dog suspended in their ceiling was being shocked, while on the blue nothing seemed to happen). Yet unlike in the first case, Subject B (standing on red yet looking at the repeatedly electrocuted dog with regret). Yet before subject A could respond to B's behavior, B tells them that in another room a small child was being electrocuted if he stands on blue and that B knew this not as a result of a wall being made transparent for him/her but rather as a result of a 'vision'. Subject A has never had a vision and does not know what they entail or how it could be considered real enough to ignore the objectively negative outcome of the dog being electrocuted right before him/her, but: If B is right, then perhaps A should stand on the red square too because although making the dog suffer is bad, it is worse not to prevent the child being electrocuted.
Another wall becomes transparent, and subject C (seated comfortably on red ignoring the screaming dog) enters the discussion having heard the previous claims they insists that they had a vision, and that there was no child being electrocuted but rather a canary; also that the dog was merely an illusion. If C is right, then perhaps A should stand on the red square too since the dog is an illusion its 'suffering' while disheartening is not real, and could not even be compared to the canary's True suffering.
It is then that the third wall becomes transparent and subject D (standing on the blue) enters the discussion, they once had a vision too - in that vision when he stood on red the dog was not in pain and when he stood on blue the dog was in pain - the precise opposite of the experiment's conditions; yet when D had tested the claims and realized that the vision had been incorrect as it pertained to the room he was in (indeed the dog was shocked when they stood on red and not when standing on blue).
What can we reasonably assume Subject A to be able to recognize:
- Similarities between cells: identical structure of each cell and the observable outcomes of actions in those cells (rectangular room, one two-way mirror, dog attached to ceiling cage, red/blue floor tiles - standing on red resulting in dog apparently being shocked, blue resulting in no apparent outcome in a row of adjacent cells) means that we can reasonably assume that A can assume that A, B, C and D are in near identical circumstances. Therefore A has no reason to believe the possible non observable outcomes of standing on the blue square might be different between cells.
- Fallibility: Subject A has never had a vision, but both B and C claim to have had visions which they claim to be true; D has also claimed to have had a vision yet which they claim to have been false; A cannot know if D really had a vision which was false, but A can know that a claimed vision can be false.
- Falsity: A has no reason to believe blue outcomes differs between cells and the visions of B and C with regards to the blue square are incompatible; therefore A can reasonably assume at least one of these is false.
What possible reason would an observer behind the two-way mirror have to condemn Subject A for standing on the blue tile under such a circumstance?
- Even were two dogs (in the observer's room) to be electrocuted were A to stand on blue - this does not match any of the visions (indeed amusingly enough, D's vision comes closest) nor is there any reason for A to believe that such a circumstance might eventuate were they to stand on blue. Despite two dogs being electrocuted (and thus twice the negative outcome) there is absolutely no reason for the subject to believe this occurs and a rational decision would be to stand on the blue tile. For what reason would this possibly be considered by an observer to be worse than standing on the red?
- Even assume if you like, that C was correct with regards to the dog being an illusion in that the glass cage is an incredibly realistic 3D computer screen. There is still absolutely no rational reason to believe that A has sufficient reason to assume as much or to believe that standing on the red might be better than standing on the blue.