Determinism/Free Will

[joe1776]

How can we trace all our choices back to the big bang when animals with some sort of will about what they will do did not come on the scene until relatively recently.

Why does that matter? I assume they were caused and didn't just suddenly appear.

 

[AlexanderG]

For sake of clarity, I suggest we forget randomness and focus on causation.

If, according to your instructions, I'm not free to define "free will" as having reasons (which implies causation), you're telling me that I'm limited to describing a free will choice as an uncaused event.

Suppose I choose to define a free will choice as an event caused by the ego's reasoning function of the brain. How have you ruled that out if not by defining "free will" as required to be an uncaused event.

By "an event caused by the ego's reasoning function of the brain," what do you mean?

Do you mean the neuronal process that causes one action to be triggered by the brain instead of an alternative action? Because it is well understood how cumulative positive signals onto a single neuron, from enough other neurons, can trigger it to activate. There are also signals from other neurons that can suppress the activation of the target neuron they are triggering onto. When all of these inputs are added up, if the net effect rises above a certain electrical threshold, then the target neuron will activate.

This is a physical basis for the "reasons" that we evaluate, both for an against a certain choice, when we are thinking about what to choose. This is entirely deterministic as far as I can tell. The associations you make in your brain when thinking about a certain choice, based on your past experiences, sensory preferences, expected outcomes, and current mood, will all determine your choice via a network of positive and suppressive electrical activation.

 

[blü 2]

The first one you mentioned gives no problems for the Bible God because it is a crazy argument which denies the possibility that the Bible God can know what we will freely choose.
If He knows what we will freely choose then we are freely choosing it even if God knows what it will be.

That contradicts God's perfect omniscience, by which [he] already knew, before [he] made the universe, EVERYTHING that would ever happen in it, including this post I'm typing and what the clock will read when I pour my morning coffee in ten weeks', ten months', ten years' time.

That's to say, EITHER humans have free will in theological terms (though not in physical terms) OR God is not omniscient and not perfect and (since if [he] were all powerful [he] could make [him]self omniscient and perfect) not all powerful either.

 

[vulcanlogician]

No. I'm saying we are caused to make certain choices for reasons or for no reasons. If for reasons, then our choice is determined by the reasons. If for no reasons, then our choice is random. You're free to define the mechanism that underlies "free will" that is based on neither reasons or no reasons. I've had a lot of these discussions and I've never heard a coherent answer.

I've heard this argument before, and at least one scholar in the field, Robert Kane, has spent some time working on it. It was some time ago that I read his argument, but it goes something like this:

We have the basic control over our will that we imagine we have, although there are many influences on our behavior that we are not aware of. Many of our choices depend on our own reasons that we formulate beforehand, but this process of reasoning can unfold a number of ways depending on factors involved in the decision and (more importantly) the kind of person who is doing the reasoning/choosing.

Kane then proposes that many of our actions throughout our lives are "self forming actions." According to him, and again, my memory is foggy here, most of us live in circumstances where our self-forming actions have played a significant enough role in our lives that we could be said to

1) have free will

and

2) be considered responsible for our actions.

 

[joe1776]

By "an event caused by the ego's reasoning function of the brain," what do you mean?

Do you mean the neuronal process that causes one action to be triggered by the brain instead of an alternative action? Because it is well understood how cumulative positive signals onto a single neuron, from enough other neurons, can trigger it to activate. There are also signals from other neurons that can suppress the activation of the target neuron they are triggering onto. When all of these inputs are added up, if the net effect rises above a certain electrical threshold, then the target neuron will activate.

This is a physical basis for the "reasons" that we evaluate, both for an against a certain choice, when we are thinking about what to choose. This is entirely deterministic as far as I can tell. The associations you make in your brain when thinking about a certain choice, based on your past experiences, sensory preferences, expected outcomes, and current mood, will all determine your choice via a network of positive and suppressive electrical activation.

You wrote about the event I described "This is entirely deterministic as far as I can tell." How could you possibly know that with any certainty?

It's well known that we can't tell the difference between free will and the illusion of free will, but that problem cuts both ways. Doesn't it? How can you tell difference between determinism and the illusion of determinism?

 

[Heyo]

This is a physical basis for the "reasons" that we evaluate, both for an against a certain choice, when we are thinking about what to choose. This is entirely deterministic as far as I can tell.

Nope. While a neuron isn't on the size of quantum events, an ion channel is. Also, some potassium decays and can activate or inhibit a neuron. So, if a neuron reaches the firing potential is in part random, not entirely deterministic. And as there is a chain of neurons which have to fire to form a thought, the randomness potentiates and becomes chaotic.
Neurologists argue about how much our thoughts are random or chaotic but they are definitely not determined.

 

[Brian2]

Why does that matter? I assume they were caused and didn't just suddenly appear.

I suppose that being with a will can be considered as a cause but you cannot say that their choice was caused by materialist mechanisms when the cause might be ideas floating about in their head.

 

[Brian2]

That contradicts God's perfect omniscience, by which [he] already knew, before [he] made the universe, EVERYTHING that would ever happen in it, including this post I'm typing and what the clock will read when I pour my morning coffee in ten weeks', ten months', ten years' time.

That's to say, EITHER humans have free will in theological terms (though not in physical terms) OR God is not omniscient and not perfect and (since if [he] were all powerful [he] could make [him]self omniscient and perfect) not all powerful either.

You neglect the fact which messes up the whole argument. God knows what we will freely choose to do.
We cannot do other than what God knows we will freely do and God knowing it does not take that free choice away from us.
If we knew what God knows and could not deviate from that, you might have a point, but we do not know and so we freely choose.

 

[joe1776]

I suppose that being with a will can be considered as a cause but you cannot say that their choice was caused by materialist mechanisms when the cause might be ideas floating about in their head.

I don't advocate a materialist philosophy. I suspect that there are mysteries that will always remain so.

 

[blü 2]

You neglect the fact which messes up the whole argument. God knows what we will freely choose to do.

Not so. It's impossible for us to choose to do anything that differs even in the tiniest detail from what God perfectly foresaw hence intended, before [he] made the universe.We MUST run down the groove [he] intended us to run down. Our sense of freely choosing is totally illusory. What we do is always and only what God always intended us to do. Had [he] intended anything else, [he] would have made the universe differently so that this alternative wish of [his] happened instead.

 

[MikeF]

There certainly is scientific support for part of your thesis in quantum mechanics. ...

The important question to ask is, "Why did she make the choice she made?" If causes beyond her control determined the choice she made, it is not a free choice, and it isn't free will.

It seems there is some consensus that one of the properties of the cosmos, of matter/energy, is an element of randomness, and according to @Heyo a property called chaos.

If that is the case, then any future state of the Cosmos is not pre-determined, rather, it will be an evolving process and future states cannot be exactly predicted or inferred from the present state or precisely inferred from historical states. I still hold that the immediate future is, for all intents and purposes, essentially quite deterministic.

This then is the environment, the system, in which we exist, with an unfixed future.

How does choice operate in this system? On one level, I see it as strictly deterministic. Let's take a computer, for example. A computer is programed to receive input, analyze the input, make a choice based on the algorithms of the computer's programing, resulting in an output of that choice. I see this as strictly deterministic, bound to the causal chain of cause and effect with or without an injection of randomness. Randomness can be involved in the sense that the code responds to unpredicted or random input, or one can inject some randomness into the data processing with a random number generator, or the like. All would conform to the strict determinism described by @AlexanderG.

I see all of life on earth as the expression of an adaptability/survivability algorithm. I speculate that life exploits the randomness/chaos feature of the cosmos to indiscriminately generate physical adaptability/survivability options in response to the reality of a constantly and unpredictably changing system, that system being the Earth and our solar system. This algorithm I would also view as strictly deterministic. The algorithm of life, the replication process, generates variations indiscriminately, without thought, and those variations will either continue to survive and reproduce or expire, overcome by the changes in the system. This generating of options is still bound to the causal chain of cause and effect and randomness. The physical options generated by the replication process depend entirely on physical states prior and during the replication process, all causally linked. And just as a random number generator can inject randomness in computer processing, the replication process relies on the randomness/chaos features of the natural world in generating options in lifeforms.

Now consider human beings. Our central nervous system acts much like a computer, receiving inputs, analyzing data, and creating output. On the surface, it would seem that we are just as deterministically bound in our decision making abilities as a digital computer. However, my speculation is that our biological computer has the unique ability to get around, or break the causal chain, or strict determinism. Where the algorithm of life operates strictly within the physical world, our thoughts, the thoughts generated by the central nervous system, operates in abstractions. Although the underlying hardware is physical, the thoughts themselves are abstract representations of physical things and the invention of abstract constructs and concepts. What this means is manipulation of these abstractions is not bound to any physical chain of cause and effect. We can utilize any particular current physical state as informational input, but we are not bound by cause and effect in our contemplation of future events and conditions. We can imagine a whole host of changes being injected into the present state of a system that doesn't rely solely on the natural property of randomness/chaos, but instead is caused by willful intention. When this myriad of options not bound by cause and effect is generated by our reasoning brain, we now have the ability to make a willful choice between these unbound options, a choice free from the strict adherence to cause and effect.

It is in this way that we have agency and can overcome strict determinism. Strict determinism could be seen in terms of a leaf floating on the ocean. The random and sometimes chaotic actions of the ocean surface represents our ever changing environment. The causal chain of forces, wind and waves (exhibiting randomness and chaotic properties), dictates exactly where the leaf will travel, the leaf's fate is strictly deterministic. Our central nervous system, our reasoning brain, results in an existence not represented by a leaf, but rather by a boat, with a rudder to steer and a propulsion system that enables intentional progress.

We are able to exert a will, not strictly bound by cause and effect, nor merely the result random firings of neurons, such that we can create and work towards future goals that would not happen under strictly deterministic conditions. Yes, much of our behavior is simply reflexive response to the causal chain of events around us. We are fettered by the realities of real world conditions, our biological limitations, and the limits to our understanding of the world from which we construct our mental abstractions. But the greater our knowledge and understanding, the greater the set of abstractions upon which we can reason and consequently the greater the number of future conditions unbound by cause and effect that we can imagine and choose from. It is in this way that I speculate that our behavior, our will, is not fully or strictly deterministic.

For @blü 2 I offer this as the mechanism by which we alter our future, untethered to the causal chain.

Thoughts?

 

[Heyo]

Now consider human beings. Our central nervous system acts much like a computer, receiving inputs, analyzing data, and creating output. On the surface, it would seem that we are just as deterministically bound in our decision making abilities as a digital computer.

Only that our brain isn't a digital computer. Sure, neurons, on the macro level, work digital, either firing or not but a single ion can change the outcome.
And when minimal differences are re-fed into the same system, after some iterations there can be very different end results from minimally different starting conditions.
The re-feeding is essential in this process. A simple brain, with strait line from input to action doesn't show chaos. But a complex brain, where a temporary result can be used as a new input is non deterministic.

 

[MikeF]

Only that our brain isn't a digital computer. Sure, neurons, on the macro level, work digital, either firing or not but a single ion can change the outcome.
And when minimal differences are re-fed into the same system, after some iterations there can be very different end results from minimally different starting conditions.
The re-feeding is essential in this process. A simple brain, with strait line from input to action doesn't show chaos. But a complex brain, where a temporary result can be used as a new input is non deterministic.

We can think of the human brain as an organic computer, and all other life forms with a CNS as having organic computers as well. Yes, as you suggest, and I though I was suggesting, there is more to our complex human organic computer than can be found in a digital computer. I'm sure we could find other life forms who's organic computer has capabilities only equivalent to a man-made digital computer.

I used a digital computer as an example of something that makes choices (we are ultimately talking about choices after all) that I considered to be strictly deterministic. Others in this thread consider human thought or behavior to be strictly deterministic as well. I'm trying to draw a contrast.

 

[blü 2]

Although the underlying hardware is physical, the thoughts themselves are abstract representations of physical things and the invention of abstract constructs and concepts. What this means is manipulation of these abstractions is not bound to any physical chain of cause and effect.

Yes we can imagine unicorns, characters in fiction, divinities, ghosts, numbers, abstractions like 'a chair', love, justice, flatulence, discombobulation and so on. But the brain's mechanism bringing those concepts and imaginings about is still complex interacting chains of cause+effect, possibly disturbed here and there by the results of quantum randomness.

On what we presently know, I see no escape from that.

 

[MikeF]

Yes we can imagine unicorns, characters in fiction, divinities, ghosts, numbers, abstractions like 'a chair', love, justice, flatulence, discombobulation and so on. But the brain's mechanism bringing those concepts and imaginings about is still complex interacting chains of cause+effect, possibly disturbed here and there by the results of quantum randomness.

On what we presently know, I see no escape from that.

And yet our experience and interaction with the world is quite different than that of the vast majority of the animal and plant kingdom. Wouldn't you agree? Do we not (at times) exert a creative will, something beyond mere reaction to immediate events? When we project our abstract representations of the present into the future, those projections are not bound by the causal links upon which actual reality will continue to play out. Most often they will, as it is with other animals, but do we not have a capacity to do more than simply accurately anticipate the near outcome of causal events?

 

[blü 2]

And yet our experience and interaction with the world is quite different than that of the vast majority of the animal and plant kingdom. Wouldn't you agree? Do we not (at times) exert a creative will, something beyond mere reaction to immediate events?

That would be because our brains are more complex and (in human terms) more capable than the brains of any other creature we know. We are so much the product of our brains that 20-25% of the body's resources go to maintenance of the brain. That's a huge investment, but we can justify it to ourselves by noting that it works. Perhaps in particular it allows complex language, the greatest enhancer of group cooperation, which in turn is a great advantage in surviving long enough to breed.

 

[MikeF]

That would be because our brains are more complex and (in human terms) more capable than the brains of any other creature we know. We are so much the product of our brains that 20-25% of the body's resources go to maintenance of the brain. That's a huge investment, but we can justify it to ourselves by noting that it works. Perhaps in particular it allows complex language, the greatest enhancer of group cooperation, which in turn is a great advantage in surviving long enough to breed.

Indeed. All that is certainly true. And I certainly do not begrudge your reluctance to speculate, even if it is only speculation. I certainly am not arguing against the notion that material physical things are bound to deterministic cause and effect, made unpredictable by some natural property of randomness/chaos effect.

Does the human brain work in the way we imagine a strictly deterministic brain would work? Even considering the injection of some principle of randomness being injected into the process, is it what we would expect? You may say, "Why yes, it behaves in a strictly deterministic way, exactly as one would expect." I can not respond any other way than to say we seem to operate more like a boat than a leaf.

 

[vulcanlogician]

It is in this way that we have agency and can overcome strict determinism. Strict determinism could be seen in terms of a leaf floating on the ocean. The random and sometimes chaotic actions of the ocean surface represents our ever changing environment. The causal chain of forces, wind and waves (exhibiting randomness and chaotic properties), dictates exactly where the leaf will travel, the leaf's fate is strictly deterministic. Our central nervous system, our reasoning brain, results in an existence not represented by a leaf, but rather by a boat, with a rudder to steer and a propulsion system that enables intentional progress.

We are able to exert a will, not strictly bound by cause and effect, nor merely the result random firings of neurons, such that we can create and work towards future goals that would not happen under strictly deterministic conditions. Yes, much of our behavior is simply reflexive response to the causal chain of events around us. We are fettered by the realities of real world conditions, our biological limitations, and the limits to our understanding of the world from which we construct our mental abstractions. But the greater our knowledge and understanding, the greater the set of abstractions upon which we can reason and consequently the greater the number of future conditions unbound by cause and effect that we can imagine and choose from. It is in this way that I speculate that our behavior, our will, is not fully or strictly deterministic.

Like I said in my last post, I like the strategy you're employing. I'm not a fan of looking at AlexanderG's argument (which was something like,"either something is random or it's for reasons") and calling it a day as far as free will goes. I think AlexanderG says something significant, and probably true, but I think it's the starting point for the debate rather than a fitting closing statement. There are responses one could make to AlexanderG, and there are other arguments, besides the one presented by AlexanderG that persuade me to reject free will.

At the very least I would want to work out what is meant by "reason" as AlexanderG means it. It is a famously vague word. You could talk about the "reason" the earth is the temperature that it is. And there are a multitude of reasons in this case: its distance from the sun, the temperature of the sun itself, atmospheric conditions that better allow the Earth to retain heat etc.

We also use the term "reason" to disclose our purposes: "Is there a reason you didn't put the shovel back in the toolshed?" -- "Yes. I wanted to work in the garden tomorrow, and I didn't feel like going all the way to the toolshed just to get it."

Another way we might employ "reason" and this is what I think AlexanderG meant, is, "the support for making one choice over another." And it's worth mulling over exactly what we mean by support. If I go to my fridge and choose one beer over another, I might have logical reasons for doing so. Maybe I want to save the good beer for when a friend visits. So, in this case I selected one beer over another according to a pure calculus of desired outcomes.

But I may not involve logic at all when selecting a beer. Sometimes my choice boils down to "whatever I feel like choosing at the time." But this ultimately involves my inner urges and appetites. "I want the beer that I crave right now." I imagine tasting one (the IPA) and the other (the lager). And I make my choice based on which one seems most appealing to my tastebuds.

Even proponents of free will agree, there are brain processes which we do not have control over. I think it needs to be sussed out the general territory where brain functions facilitate free choice and where the brain simply acts as a physical object running an algorithm, as you put it. Because insofar as the brain is a physical object which (in certain ways) resembles a computer running algorithms, I think we can safely say that part of the brain does not have free will, and may even run interference on free will, if free will happens to exist in some modicum. I think the real question is about that part of the brain that mediates between different appetites and things like that (the reptilian parts that govern most of our action, and are instrumental in "appetite" choices like selecting one beer over the other.

To me, "reason" insofar as "support for one decision over another" doesn't play a substantial role in the reality of free will. But what DOES interest me, as far as free will goes, are the laws of nature, the physical states of the universe, and what must necessarily proceed from the former and the latter. And how these things particularly affect free will.

If you want to argue libertarianism or hard incompatibilism (two conflicting theories) it might be best to begin with the consequence argument. The consequence argument is something upon which both libertarians and hard incompatibilists agree. The funny thing about the consequence argument is that it appears like something that only supports free will skepticism. But that's not the case. Libertarians also accept the argument as true. A libertarian says that deterministic systems exist in the universe, and no free choice exists within them. But, according to libertarians, there is room for the possibility of free choice (not solid proof of free choice, mind you, but room for the possibility) when we understand that the universe is not completely deterministic, as QM demonstrates plainly. I think this is one of your main points (ie. something you agree with) but perhaps we should clarify this before proceeding.


THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT:

(1) There is nothing we can now do to change the past.
(2) There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature.
(3) There is nothing we can now do to change the past and the laws of
nature.
(4) If determinism is true, our present actions are necessary consequences
of the past and the laws of nature. (That is, it must be the case that, given
the past and the laws of nature, our present actions occur.)
(5) Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the fact that our
present actions occur.
-- Robert Kane, Four Views on Free Will

 

[MikeF]

Like I said in my last post, I like the strategy you're employing.

This post is just some general questions and I'll get back to the details of your response in a moment.

I'm curious as to whether you see this topic as a philosophical one, or a scientific one. Certainly it has a long tradition as a philosophical problem, I'm just curious as to whether you feel it remains so in the 21st century.

One of the things I find difficult in Philosophy, or rather discussions that defer to the technical terms of philosophical disciplines, is that philosophical terms and -isms can carry a lot of historical baggage, up to 2,500 years worth. This hasn't been an issue in our discussions, but I do see it come up from time to time. In this thread, the term "Free Will" acted as a trigger word that evoked all the religious associations of the concept, even if the context of the OP did not reference that use. Is it appropriate to retire certain words or phrases at times?

 

[MikeF]

Like I said in my last post, I like the strategy you're employing. I'm not a fan of looking at AlexanderG's argument (which was something like,"either something is random or it's for reasons") and calling it a day as far as free will goes. I think AlexanderG says something significant, and probably true, but I think it's the starting point for the debate rather than a fitting closing statement. There are responses one could make to AlexanderG, and there are other arguments, besides the one presented by AlexanderG that persuade me to reject free will.

I agree entirely. However, as you say, AlexanderG is describing a real phenomenon, or expression of the properties of the cosmos. To my mind, it might be best to give this its own name and acknowledgement, and then define or describe its role in the human decision-making process.

My suggestion would be vector determinism, or vector physical determinism. This would encompass the causal chains of physical interactions, be it at the atomic level or gravitational interaction of massive bodies. And as you say, this is the starting point, this is the physical environment in which we operate and make our choices. We must then determine whether the choices we make strictly adhere to vector physical determinism (awkward wording, I know) or if there is something additional going on.

At the very least I would want to work out what is meant by "reason" as AlexanderG means it. It is a famously vague word. You could talk about the "reason" the earth is the temperature that it is. And there are a multitude of reasons in this case: its distance from the sun, the temperature of the sun itself, atmospheric conditions that better allow the Earth to retain heat etc.
We also use the term "reason" to disclose our purposes: "Is there a reason you didn't put the shovel back in the toolshed?" -- "Yes. I wanted to work in the garden tomorrow, and I didn't feel like going all the way to the toolshed just to get it."
Another way we might employ "reason" and this is what I think AlexanderG meant, is, "the support for making one choice over another." And it's worth mulling over exactly what we mean by support. If I go to my fridge and choose one beer over another, I might have logical reasons for doing so. Maybe I want to save the good beer for when a friend visits. So, in this case I selected one beer over another according to a pure calculus of desired outcomes.
But I may not involve logic at all when selecting a beer. Sometimes my choice boils down to "whatever I feel like choosing at the time." But this ultimately involves my inner urges and appetites. "I want the beer that I crave right now." I imagine tasting one (the IPA) and the other (the lager). And I make my choice based on which one seems most appealing to my tastebuds.

Nicely laid out. I agree.

...
I think we can safely say that part of the brain does not have free will, and may even run interference on free will, if free will happens to exist in some modicum.
...

I certainly agree, and hopefully my comments have indicated that.

...To me, "reason" insofar as "support for one decision over another" doesn't play a substantial role in the reality of free will. But what DOES interest me, as far as free will goes, are the laws of nature, the physical states of the universe, and what must necessarily proceed from the former and the latter. And how these things particularly affect free will.

Given the quote preceding this one, should we even be referencing "Free Will" or "free will" at this point? We seem to have rejected the concept, at least in a staunch libertarian sense. At the same time, we have a strong sense that there is more at play than my coined phrase "vector physical determinism" or whatever appropriate term you would like to use in its place.

The word 'will' still seems relevant, but it is used as verb forms as well as a noun and can reference more that choice, such as desire or determination. The word 'volition' seems to have a more narrow usage as a noun, the power or act of making a choice or decision.
Should we consider changing the words we use?

As to the sentiment of this quote, I agree with you and feel it is reflected in my comments thus far.

...If you want to argue libertarianism or hard incompatibilism (two conflicting theories).

No, not really. I'm ready to set both aside and take a fresh look at things.

This comment brings to mind debates such as "Nature vs Nurture" or "A Priori vs Tabula Rasa". The human organism is much more complex than such stark dichotomies. We realize now that we human beings are a product of both nature and nurture, and that we have limited pre-wired instinctual behaviors as well as a great ignorance of the reality of the world which must be learned through experience from the moment we are born. I think this holds true for human volition as well.

A libertarian says that deterministic systems exist in the universe, and no free choice exists within them.

Would you say that this corresponds to my concept of "vector physical determinism"? Do we need the adjective "free". or can we simply say "no choice"?

But, according to libertarians, there is room for the possibility of free choice (not solid proof of free choice, mind you, but room for the possibility) when we understand that the universe is not completely deterministic, as QM demonstrates plainly. I think this is one of your main points (ie. something you agree with) but perhaps we should clarify this before proceeding.

This first hurdle is whether there is such a thing as choice. Absent life, is it safe to say that the cosmos proceeds in a strictly deterministic way (my vector physical determinism, to be consistent) and there is no choice whatsoever in such a system? Interactions are governed by natural laws (an acceptable term?) such that outcomes of events are governed by these laws.

Is a simple computer no different? Does the programing simply become additional laws that further govern interaction on top of the natural laws, such that there is no true 'choice' being made, simply the expression of natural laws and laws added by the computer?

Is the algorithm of life, encoded in DNA, simply another rule set added to the existing Natural Law rules that govern physical interactions such that 'choice' still does not exist?

Add in the organic based biological computers of organisms with a CNS. Is it simply more rule sets added to Natural Law, bound to strict physical determinism and 'choice' continues to not exist?

When, then, does volition exist? If it can exist, what enables it? I'm of the opinion that volition does exist and human beings can express it to some extent. I think you agree. I do not think that the volition we posses is by any means free or unencumbered. I think you may agree with that also, but I'll let you state your position directly.

Now we need to find the cause of volition and the extent to which it can be exercised.

THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT:
(1) There is nothing we can now do to change the past.
(2) There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature.
(3) There is nothing we can now do to change the past and the laws of
nature.
(4) If determinism is true, our present actions are necessary consequences
of the past and the laws of nature. (That is, it must be the case that, given
the past and the laws of nature, our present actions occur.)
(5) Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the fact that our
present actions occur.
-- Robert Kane, Four Views on Free Will

I am in full agreement with statement (1).

I agree with statement (2), but given my comments above, it begs the question "Can we add to the Laws of Nature?". Or more precisely perhaps, can algorithms be created within Natural Law, either through random interaction or volition, that create additional rules that would not be present otherwise, and all such rule sets in concert affect the system.

For statement (3), the issues raised in (2) apply.

For statement (4) I would ask whether determinism applies universally, or only under certain conditions. For that matter, is there more than one kind of determinism, in which case, one would need to know how many and determine if all types always have influence or if certain conditions are required for some types of determinism to occur. I think we have identified one type of determinism, vector physical determinism (yes, I have to use this phrase until you give me another), and it remains as to whether we can establish others or if it applies universally.

My concern with both statements (4) and (5) is they address only the past and present and not the future. When we talk about choice or volition, we are talking about affecting the future. I disagree with this notion that "there is nothing we can do now to change the fact that our present actions occur." Technically it is correct in a sense, and as I have described in my comments, that in very short time intervals the cosmos appears strictly deterministic. There is very little time in which dramatic change will occur to alter the course of events. However, each present is a realized future. We cannot change the present in the present, but can we change future presents through volition? I say yes. Does this make sense? The Consequence Argument fails to take in the totality of what is occurring, in my opinion.

I shall leave things here and await your reply.

EDIT: What about the term "Billiard Ball Determinism" as a replacement for "Vector Physical Determinism"?