Determinism/Free Will

[Brian2]

There are responses one could make to AlexanderG, and there are other arguments, besides the one presented by AlexanderG that persuade me to reject free will.

But really if you have no free will you cannot be persuaded to reject it. You will reject it because that is just what you will do in determinism.
The persuasion would come in as part of the illusion that tricks us into thinking we are actually choosing.

 

[Brian2]

Not so. It's impossible for us to choose to do anything that differs even in the tiniest detail from what God perfectly foresaw hence intended, before [he] made the universe.We MUST run down the groove [he] intended us to run down. Our sense of freely choosing is totally illusory. What we do is always and only what God always intended us to do. Had [he] intended anything else, [he] would have made the universe differently so that this alternative wish of [his] happened instead.

Why do you equate God's foreknowledge with His intention?
If God had foreknown that we would choose differently then that is what He would have foreknown.
Whichever we will freely choose is what God foreknows.
It is a mistake to then twist the whole thing around and make God's foreknowledge into a prison. To do that is just to deny that God can foreknow what randomness will bring or what a person with free will is going to do.
Your argument is none other than a denial at the start of God's power and omniscience,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, but you put that at the end as if the argument proves it.
It is circular reasoning.

 

[blü 2]

Why do you equate God's foreknowledge with His intention?

Because [he]'s omnipotent and omniscient and perfect, so the future can ONLY be exactly according to [his] wishes.

If God had foreknown that we would choose differently then that is what He would have foreknown.

Yes, [he] chose to create a universe in which exactly that would happen.

Whichever we will freely choose is what God foreknows.

No, we can ONLY choose EXACTLY what God perfectly foresaw before [he] decided, about 14 billion years ago, to make the universe EXACTLY as it is.

It is a mistake to then twist the whole thing around and make God's foreknowledge into a prison.

It's a mistake to think that, given an omnipotent, omniscient, perfect God, it could be anything else.

To do that is just to deny that God can foreknow what randomness will bring or what a person with free will is going to do.

No, that could only be true if God were not omniscient, or not omnipotent, or not perfect.

Your argument is none other than a denial at the start of God's power and omniscience

No, it's a logically inescapable consequence of attributing to God omnipotence, omniscience and perfection.

 

[MikeF]

This is a physical basis for the "reasons" that we evaluate, both for an against a certain choice, when we are thinking about what to choose. This is entirely deterministic as far as I can tell. The associations you make in your brain when thinking about a certain choice, based on your past experiences, sensory preferences, expected outcomes, and current mood, will all determine your choice via a network of positive and suppressive electrical activation.

This is where I disagree. Strictly physical phenomena are governed by the Laws of Nature, if you will. These are essentially rules that dictate the outcome of physical interactions between physical phenomena based on the properties of the phenomena. In a strictly physical system, each present, or 'now', is determined, as you suggest, by the causal chain of physical cause and effect.

The human brain, however, operates in abstractions. These abstract constructs reside in the neural patterns you describe. However, the interactive properties of the abstract constructs and interactions between abstract constructs are not physical, are not bound to the laws of nature. The rules that affect the relationships and interactions of the abstract constructs in our thoughts are governed by both the hard-wired algorithms of the neural network of the brain, but also by "software" if you will. This software are rules that are abstract constructs themselves that can be learned, self-created, and are malleable and able to be ignored. This system of thought is capable of what I would term "Fee Association". Disparate and unconnected constructs not associated by physical interaction, can nevertheless 'interact' in the abstract systems of the CNS.

Since thoughts are not bound by the Laws of Nature, by physical laws, our thoughts and the actions that result from them are not fully deterministic as a purely physical system would be.

Our CNS, together with the abstract systems of thought it creates, is more than simply physical. Yes, aspects of human behavior will necessarily be physically deterministic, but we are a complex synthesis of both physical interaction and the interaction of abstractions. Our behavior is not fully deterministic. I believe we have capacity for volition.

 

[vulcanlogician]

But really if you have no free will you cannot be persuaded to reject it. You will reject it because that is just what you will do in determinism.
The persuasion would come in as part of the illusion that tricks us into thinking we are actually choosing.

An unfree agent can be persuaded.

You are right to say that, if determinism is true, I do not freely decide to accept it. I like the theory because information I've been shown, thoughts I've had, conclusions that I've arrived at.... it may be that I have control over these events, that I've freely chosen to favor determinism. Or it could be that I am but a witness to these events, and the laws of nature and prior causes are what's really involved in causing these events to transpire.

Even someone who rejects free will does not deny that we make choices. Like, if I go to my fridge for a snack and I see yogurt and an orange. Let's say I feel like having an orange... so I choose to grab an orange out of the refrigerator and leave the yogurt. That's a choice I made. "Choice" is what we call it when we perform such activities. (And there's no denying that we DO perform such activities.) But is that choice FREE?

The question is: what's going on when I choose the orange rather than the yogurt? From my own perspective, it appears like I am steering the ship. Something "inside me" decides right then and there to get an orange and I direct my body to grab the fruit. That's the experience we all have.

But there's a disconnect with that interpretation of events and what we know from studying nature. When studying nature, we assume that all effects have causes, and that causes don't arise spontaneously out of thin air. If that's true... (and pretty much all science is based on that assumption) then whence comes free will? It's a legit question.

 

[vulcanlogician]

The word 'will' still seems relevant, but it is used as verb forms as well as a noun and can reference more that choice, such as desire or determination. The word 'volition' seems to have a more narrow usage as a noun, the power or act of making a choice or decision.
Should we consider changing the words we use?

I don't think so. "Will" and "volition" are fairly interchangeable terms. I say we just use whichever one helps us say what we're saying. I feel the same way about "vector" and "billiard ball" determinism. They both adequately express your meaning: "those phenomena which must happen due to prior states of the universe, as opposed to those that are subject to randomness via QM." That's how I understand that particular distinction of yours. Billiard ball determinism may be better because it might be more easily understood to someone who decides to jump in the convo without having read the whole thread.

Is a simple computer no different? Does the programing simply become additional laws that further govern interaction on top of the natural laws, such that there is no true 'choice' being made, simply the expression of natural laws and laws added by the computer?

Is the algorithm of life, encoded in DNA, simply another rule set added to the existing Natural Law rules that govern physical interactions such that 'choice' still does not exist?

Add in the organic based biological computers of organisms with a CNS. Is it simply more rule sets added to Natural Law, bound to strict physical determinism and 'choice' continues to not exist?

I want to say life is no different than rocks rolling down a hill, or charged particles flying off of the surface of the sun. The laws of nature govern what happens. Life is the same. It is just more complex.

Look at a DNA strand. What exactly does it do to enable the organism to live and act? It bonds to structures in the nucleus of a cell and (via the deterministic laws of chemistry) forms strands of RNA. These RNA strands kind of float around until they are bonded with other things that are floating around in the cell. Several thousand chemical reactions later, we have macroscopic effects in the universe (say, an organism behaving a certain way) that all began with ribonucleic acids floating around in protoplasm. The neurological system just adds more complexity. It doesn't alter the way the microscopic world acts. And, in the case of life, it's just a huge complex system of microscopic chemical and physical reactions. A bunch of tiny billiard balls, if you will.

When, then, does volition exist? If it can exist, what enables it? I'm of the opinion that volition does exist and human beings can express it to some extent. I think you agree. I do not think that the volition we posses is by any means free or unencumbered. I think you may agree with that also, but I'll let you state your position directly.

Even the most hardened determinist will say that "will" or "volition" exists. These are words we use to describe certain activities that sentient organisms engage in.

Like with my "picking a beer" example. I will to choose one over the other. No one denies that. But was there "freedom" in the act? Nobody doubts that one beer was taken out of the fridge, and the other left behind... and that the activity of my organism resulted in the one beer being taken out of the fridge and the other being left. The question is: "Could I have done otherwise?"

Is there something physical that happened *exactly* when I made my choice that is not fully explained by prior causes? When I made my choice, did I alter the future of the universe myself ? Or is my choice fully explicable by neurons firing and other cell activity?

I agree with statement (2), but given my comments above, it begs the question "Can we add to the Laws of Nature?". Or more precisely perhaps, can algorithms be created within Natural Law, either through random interaction or volition, that create additional rules that would not be present otherwise, and all such rule sets in concert affect the system.

I think, at face value, we shouldn't doubt proposition 2. It's a sound proposition. We can't change the laws of nature. If a libertarian wants to prove free will he must demonstrate that life or at least sentient life, is a cause unto itself.

*** So somewhere you expressed a dissatisfaction working in the standard theoretical framework; I can't find where. I'm fine discussing the issue independently of the theories, but I must warn you. I like the theories a lot. They are very useful when thinking about the issue because they have resolved a ton of basic questions about free will-- questions which, once resolved point to a trilemma between the three main theories.

But I also understand wanting to think about the issue independently of them. So we can proceed that way, if you'd like, but I reserve the right to point out things that fit in the theoretical framework as they apply. And I'm not sure I can have the discussion without bringing in the theories from time to time because, as I said before, they are useful.

*Response to what you said about the consequence argument in next post*

 

[vulcanlogician]

For statement (4) I would ask whether determinism applies universally, or only under certain conditions. For that matter, is there more than one kind of determinism, in which case, one would need to know how many and determine if all types always have influence or if certain conditions are required for some types of determinism to occur. I think we have identified one type of determinism, vector physical determinism (yes, I have to use this phrase until you give me another), and it remains as to whether we can establish others or if it applies universally.

Determinism in the sense of "prior states cause subsequent states" applies universally, yes. If someone can explain how the universe can be otherwise, I'm all ears. If someone can show me where life is a physical force unto itself, that works independently of the laws of nature, I'm all ears.

So premise 4 seems valid.

The 5th item is not up for debate unless it can be demonstrated that at least one of 1-4 are false. (Or that 1-4 don't necessarily entail 5.) Otherwise, I want to say that the consequence argument is 100% valid.

 

[MikeF]

Determinism in the sense of "prior states cause subsequent states" applies universally, yes. If someone can explain how the universe can be otherwise, I'm all ears. If someone can show me where life is a physical force unto itself, that works independently of the laws of nature, I'm all ears.

So premise 4 seems valid.

The 5th item is not up for debate unless it can be demonstrated that at least one of 1-4 are false. (Or that 1-4 don't necessarily entail 5.) Otherwise, I want to say that the consequence argument is 100% valid.

In Billiard Ball Determinism, if we consider a specific system of physical causal chains starting with an arbitrary past state we label 'State A' and follow those interactions to the present conditions or 'Present State', is it possible within the laws of nature, and hence the laws of Billiard Ball Determinism, for a cause at State A to directly effect Present State, without an intervening causal chain through the time interval?

 

[MikeF]

*** So somewhere you expressed a dissatisfaction working in the standard theoretical framework; I can't find where. I'm fine discussing the issue independently of the theories, but I must warn you. I like the theories a lot. They are very useful when thinking about the issue because they have resolved a ton of basic questions about free will-- questions which, once resolved point to a trilemma between the three main theories.
But I also understand wanting to think about the issue independently of them. So we can proceed that way, if you'd like, but I reserve the right to point out things that fit in the theoretical framework as they apply. And I'm not sure I can have the discussion without bringing in the theories from time to time because, as I said before, they are useful.
*Response to what you said about the consequence argument in next post*

The comment was primarily tongue-in-cheek and I tried to indicate such with the smiley face.

It is my expectation that you will bring established theory into the discussion. I, as a novice however, will have to work to understand exactly what is mean by the label of each theory, what assumptions are incorporated into it, and whether I agree. If I accept a term without a full understanding of all that it brings into an argument, I see myself using the term incompletely or inappropriately in discussion.

Ok, let's be honest. I will most likely use them inappropriately regardless.

 

[MikeF]

I don't think so. "Will" and "volition" are fairly interchangeable terms. I say we just use whichever one helps us say what we're saying. I feel the same way about "vector" and "billiard ball" determinism. They both adequately express your meaning: "those phenomena which must happen due to prior states of the universe, as opposed to those that are subject to randomness via QM." That's how I understand that particular distinction of yours. Billiard ball determinism may be better because it might be more easily understood to someone who decides to jump in the convo without having read the whole thread.

No problem concerning the interchangeability of 'will' and 'volition'.

I'm not sure I have Determinism nailed down correctly. You distinguish between "those phenomena which *must* happen due to prior states" and "those that are subject to randomness via QM". My question would be can we make that distinction. My impression would be that randomness would always be in play, it is just that it is not always apparent on a small scale and in short time intervals. Heyo introduced the concept of Chaos or Chaos Theory into the problem as an additional property or factor that is in play in addition to our nebulous reference to "randomness".

If randomness/chaos is always in play (and through whatever cause or causes, be it QM or other factors as well), the strict physical causal relationship implied by "Billiard Ball Determinism", ie "those phenomena which *must* happen due to prior states" may not be accurate. Perhaps it is analogous to the relationship between Newtonian Physics and General Relativity. Newtonian Physics or Classical Mechanics can be accurate for objects that are not extremely massive and speeds below the speed of light. General Relativity includes massive objects and events at the speed of light. Is our assumption of physical determinism separate from randomness an artifact of small time scales? We can make the assumption and make accurate predictions within a restricted timeframe, just as Classical Mechanics is useful and accurate in restricted circumstances, but at different scales we must have a more encompassing explanation of events in large systems and over longer time periods.

If randomness/chaos is always in play, then I think my label "Billiard Ball Determinism" is misleading.

If randomness/chaos are always active properties, then perhaps determinism in general is misleading or inaccurate. Could it be more accurate to consider the Cosmos as probabilistic as opposed to deterministic? In that case, we would need a new -ism. Probabilistic Cosmos Theory? I'm sure an -ism already exists.

I will spend some time reading about Determinism to try and get a better handle on exactly what is meant and if my concerns above are incorporated in deterministic Philosophies, or if they have been considered and rejected. This still feels like a science problem to me, however.

In the meantime, I'm sure you can set me straight, right off the bat.

 

[Brian2]

Because [he]'s omnipotent and omniscient and perfect, so the future can ONLY be exactly according to [his] wishes.

Not according to His wishes but according to His foreknowledge. So He allows the future to unfold as He sees it will. And that future contains beings who have a will and use it as they see fit.

Yes, [he] chose to create a universe in which exactly that would happen.

God can see the ultimate end and so has decided that to allow us to freely choose will work out OK in the end.

No, we can ONLY choose EXACTLY what God perfectly foresaw before [he] decided, about 14 billion years ago, to make the universe EXACTLY as it is.

True, but it is a future of freely choosing beings that God has seen do what they will do.

No, that could only be true if God were not omniscient, or not omnipotent, or not perfect.
No, it's a logically inescapable consequence of attributing to God omnipotence, omniscience and perfection.

If God can foresee what freely choosing being will do then we are freely choosing.
Whether God knew it or not we would do the same things.
So God's knowing does not change anything for us.

 

[Brian2]

An unfree agent can be persuaded.

You are right to say that, if determinism is true, I do not freely decide to accept it. I like the theory because information I've been shown, thoughts I've had, conclusions that I've arrived at.... it may be that I have control over these events, that I've freely chosen to favor determinism. Or it could be that I am but a witness to these events, and the laws of nature and prior causes are what's really involved in causing these events to transpire.

Even someone who rejects free will does not deny that we make choices. Like, if I go to my fridge for a snack and I see yogurt and an orange. Let's say I feel like having an orange... so I choose to grab an orange out of the refrigerator and leave the yogurt. That's a choice I made. "Choice" is what we call it when we perform such activities. (And there's no denying that we DO perform such activities.) But is that choice FREE?

The question is: what's going on when I choose the orange rather than the yogurt? From my own perspective, it appears like I am steering the ship. Something "inside me" decides right then and there to get an orange and I direct my body to grab the fruit. That's the experience we all have.

But there's a disconnect with that interpretation of events and what we know from studying nature. When studying nature, we assume that all effects have causes, and that causes don't arise spontaneously out of thin air. If that's true... (and pretty much all science is based on that assumption) then whence comes free will? It's a legit question.

Maybe the answer is that the study of our will is not the study of nature.

 

[blü 2]

Not according to His wishes but according to His foreknowledge. So He allows the future to unfold as He sees it will. And that future contains beings who have a will and use it as they see fit.

Yes, according to [his] wishes. If you perfectly know that by taking steps A, B and C, the outcome will be X, and you then take steps A, B and C, EITHER you intended X OR you blundered into error. But a perfect God will never blunder into error, which leaves only God's intention.

Now, if we were free to take an omnipotent omniscient perfect God by surprise, to blindside [him], to defeat [his] intention, THAT would be theological free will.

Though we'd still have the problem of physical freewill, of course.

And God will have a parallel problem, I dare say, since God must have [his] own decision-making mental processes.

 

[vulcanlogician]

If randomness/chaos is always in play (and through whatever cause or causes, be it QM or other factors as well), the strict physical causal relationship implied by "Billiard Ball Determinism", ie "those phenomena which *must* happen due to prior states" may not be accurate.

The issue here is that I would want to call QM "true physical randomness." Whereas the rest of "randomness" that we experience in life is not truly random (like, at a fundamental level). When we roll dice, for instance. To us, the outcome of the dice seems random. But actually it isn't. It is deterministic what numbers will show on the dice (according to how the dice are thrown and how the laws of nature affect where they end up.) There isn't any genuine randomness going on with physical reality until you bring in QM.

Even things like chaos theory often do not describe truly random physical realities. Chaos theory often tries to make sense of systems so complicated, they may as well be random.

That's why I distinguish events that *must* happen from those that are truly random. If you throw a baseball at a broad side of a barn, from three feet away, it WILL strike the side of the barn. QM doesn't affect physical actions like that (except in extreme, hypothetical cases). Therefore, when speaking of some physical events, we are right to assume determinism is true. The thing that makes QM's "randomness" come into account is that even determinists must agree (because of scientific evidence) that the universe isn't entirely deterministic.

 

[Heyo]

Even things like chaos theory often do not describe truly random physical realities. Chaos theory often tries to make sense of systems so complicated, they may as well be random.

It seems you don't see the fundamental randomness of chaos. All events have a slight indeterminism based in the quantum realm (Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). This usually has nothing to do with macro physics but when you iterate events (like multiple swings of a double pendulum), the uncertainties add up to a level where quantum randomness is visible in the macro world.

 

[vulcanlogician]

It seems you don't see the fundamental randomness of chaos. All events have a slight indeterminism based in the quantum realm (Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). This usually has nothing to do with macro physics but when you iterate events (like multiple swings of a double pendulum), the uncertainties add up to a level where quantum randomness is visible in the macro world.

What I'm saying is that the only source of randomness that finds expression in the physical world is QM. I'm differentiating that kind of randomness from the other kinds. Like rolling dice... it appears random to us, but is strictly determined by Newtonian laws. True that if you trace the causal chain back far enough you may see influence from quantum effects, but my larger point was there are causal chains to begin with. Not everything is random. Some wave functions have collapsed.

 

[Heyo]

What I'm saying is that the only source of randomness that finds expression in the physical world is QM. I'm differentiating that kind of randomness from the other kinds. Like rolling dice... it appears random to us, but is strictly determined by Newtonian laws. True that if you trace the causal chain back far enough you may see influence from quantum effects, but my larger point was there are causal chains to begin with. Not everything is random. Some wave functions have collapsed.

Almost all macroscopic things are deterministic, like a rolling die. My point was that chaotic systems are special in so far that that chaos, chaos theory deals with, is about iterated events that have, through the summation of uncertainties, QM random character. Chaos theory is not a purely Newtonian science, it is somewhere between Newtonian and QM.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Almost all macroscopic things are deterministic, like a rolling die. My point was that chaotic systems are special in so far that that chaos, chaos theory deals with, is about iterated events that have, through the summation of uncertainties, QM random character. Chaos theory is not a purely Newtonian science, it is somewhere between Newtonian and QM.

Well it's math, right? That's not a science. Math doesn't make claims about the natural world.

I mean, I'm pretty ignorant about chaos theory. The most I ever "learned" about it was from the book Jurassic Park where the character Ian Malcolm describes, through a series of diagrams, random and arbitrary stipulations that coalesce into an ordered system. I'll google it here in a bit. 90s potboilers aren't the best source of knowledge. But going on what I know (which is not the best, I admit) I don't see how chaos theory comes to bear on what is or is not deterministic in the universe.

To me, the question boils down to: Does the physical universe and the laws of nature make room for free will? How does chaos theory help resolve that?

 

[Balthazzar]

Warning! Posts are long! Only proceed if you've nothing better to do.

@vulcanlogician
Since this is definitely an new line of conversation, I have started this new thread separate from our current conversation. Our touching upon Free Will has had me thinking about it. As a consequence, I have formed a rough outline concerning my thoughts regarding the deterministic status of the universe and the capacity for human beings to exercise Free Will. Here is my speculation based on my very limited understand of cosmology and human behavior. I may use terms considered technical in a non-technical or non-standard usage. Hopefully context will supply sufficient meaning of my intent. This is a two-part post.

I do not see the cosmos as being fully deterministic, that all events are caused by and are the result of all previous events such that, once started, this chain of events will continue unaltered into the future resulting in only one possible future, the causal chain essentially making all future events preordained and inevitable. I speculate that in large systems of particles, there is an element of randomness injected into this process of cause and effect. This property of randomness means that just prior to each present moment, there is a slight possibility of variation in what may occur when the moment becomes now. If there is very slight variable outcome in the future second, the farther one looks into the future, the variability becomes cumulative and stronger the farther we project into the future from the present. The result then is that the distant future is not fixed. The present is determined strictly by the sum of all past events, and the immediate future is so strongly influence or determined by present conditions that any variability will be, or seem imperceptible. However, I speculate that there is some very small component of randomness exerting its influence. This, to me, indicates that if we were able to reset the cosmos to some prior condition, each restart from those initial conditions would exhibit some amount of drift from the first observed course or chain of cause and effect such that no two courses of observed events from the same initial conditions would be exactly the same over time, the drift becoming more apparent the longer time elapses from initial conditions. If everything is exactly the same, quantum states (whatever that is, exactly, or electron spins, etc) and there is no randomness or probability involved, then perhaps the cosmos is fully deterministic and the future is set, I don't think this is the case.

Why do I imagine this? If one considers the Big Bang, or if you prefer, the expansion of cosmos from a uniform, dense, high energy state, as this energy began to cool during expansion, matter began to precipitate out of this energy in a non-uniform way, and resulting matter began to interact in a random series of collisions, which eventually lead to the random accumulation of matter into the celestial bodies of the cosmos. What would happen if we were able to restart the Big Bang from its initial conditions? I contend that during the cooling expansion and the resulting clumping together of matter, the cosmos would not clump in exactly the same way. The resulting pattern of galaxies, stars, planets, etc would be different each time we set off the Big Bang due to the randomness in how cooling would occur and particles would interact and accumulate.

All this matter/energy, in constant motion and random interaction leads me to believe that any future state of the cosmos is not set, just the present and past. What if we wind back to only half the estimated age of the expansion? How different might the the present of that reset cosmos be to our current present? Exactly the same? Very similar, only slightly different? Different enough that life never materialized?

Is there an element of randomness in the continual change of the cosmos? Perhaps it has already been established or proven, I have no idea. Love to hear your thoughts though.

I didn't read the entirety of your opening posts, but ... this is an interesting topic, so ... I might enjoy a discussion. You speak of the cosmos as being the determining factor, which I'll agree is deterministic. I also acknowledge choice being of our freedom of will. It's evident that our choices matter, yet it would seem that they don't matter looking forward another few billion years. I can't claim a hard deterministic stance, but I am a determinist who acknowledges free will choice in any given situation.

I sometimes wonder if a channel and flow type system is in play as it relates to our choices. Gravity, paths of least resistance, and determined destinations/outcomes would seem our reality, coupled with the obstacles in-between here and there. I'll try to finish reading your posts later. I just wanted to chime in before I do.

 

[MikeF]

The issue here is that I would want to call QM "true physical randomness." Whereas the rest of "randomness" that we experience in life is not truly random (like, at a fundamental level). When we roll dice, for instance. To us, the outcome of the dice seems random. But actually it isn't. It is deterministic what numbers will show on the dice (according to how the dice are thrown and how the laws of nature affect where they end up.) There isn't any genuine randomness going on with physical reality until you bring in QM.

Even things like chaos theory often do not describe truly random physical realities. Chaos theory often tries to make sense of systems so complicated, they may as well be random.

That's why I distinguish events that *must* happen from those that are truly random. If you throw a baseball at a broad side of a barn, from three feet away, it WILL strike the side of the barn. QM doesn't affect physical actions like that (except in extreme, hypothetical cases). Therefore, when speaking of some physical events, we are right to assume determinism is true. The thing that makes QM's "randomness" come into account is that even determinists must agree (because of scientific evidence) that the universe isn't entirely deterministic.

I think it is safe to say that we are both in agreement that the physical laws of the cosmos are fixed. The properties of matter/energy that are exhibited in varying states and conditions and configurations do not change or fluctuate.

I think it is safe to say that we both agree that at the quantum level, particle motion, although constrained within certain physical parameters, a particles position at any instant cannot be predicted, it's motion random, and all one can do is describe the particles motion in statistical or probabilistic terms.

The question now seems to be, to what extent does the randomness of QM affect what would logically be a fully deterministic cosmos if only fixed physical laws held sway. That QM has some affect, and you concede that "(because of scientific evidence) that the universe isn't entirely deterministic", I suggest our conclusion should be that the cosmos is not deterministic, that Determinism is not true, rather, the cosmos is indeterministic or probabilistic, and therefore some form of Indeterminism.

You want to make a distinction between between what *must* happen and that which is truly random. I would argue that your perception of what *must* occur is an illusion caused by restricting observations to a narrow time interval and the interaction of a limited set of elements.

For example, in the ball thrown against a barn scenario, if we restrict our scenario to the release of a ball within three feet of the side of a barn, the ball will certainly hit the side of the barn. However, can you say exactly where on the wall the ball will strike? Can you say what exact part of the ball will strike the barn? Can you say where exactly the ball will end up after the event of striking the barn occurs, including the balls orientation? If we consider a real world scenario, could an event conceivably interrupt the throw, or cause the thrower to release the ball ineffectually? If the ball bounces to the left or the right of the thrower, how will that difference alter subsequent events?

I suggest that your "must" is simply an ever increasing probability that an event will occur at time zero. Even then, our perception is so coarse, that a loosely defined event (such as a ball hitting a barn) may reach a time interval prior to the expected event where the event becomes coarsely *inevitable*. Still, this *inevitable* coarse event does not speak to what will *exactly* occur at time zero, nor does it speak to what will *exactly* result from the event going into the future.

When we zoom out and look at large systems, all the infinitesimally small variations of possible outcomes begin to add up over time. I think global weather patterns are a good example of how this ever present randomness plays out on a large scale. In weather forecasting, we can only speak of probabilities, with any accuracy declining the further into the future one tries to forecast.

If we are in agreement that the physical world is indeterministic, then this sets the environment in which our Central Nervous System operates, and it would be in that framework that we would explore how the CNS functions and how that functioning affects, influences, or determines volition.