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Einstein and "spooky actions"

PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
Can you describe for me what the no-cloning theorem is?
It's the statement that one can't copy an unknown quantum state.

Perhaps there's a better way of getting at this. Why do we us amplitudes instead of calculating probabilities directly in QM?
We do? The probabilities of the various observable values are the output of any QM model.
(Alternate answer: because its not possible to get the correct behaviour out of purely real numbers.)

Yes, of course. All models are wrong. That's why we have statistical mechanics. We know that we're wrong but things get too complicated. The difference is that we called it "statistical mechanics" because we were using probability theory and statistics to simplify some system yet say something meaningful. Here, we're doing much the same, only we are calling the probability function the system rather than describing the system in terms of probabilities.
The system - a Hilbert space vector - isn't probabilistic. It's the observable quantities that are, in some way, probabilistic.

If we want to describe how a quantum system evolves over time, but we know that any observation of the system will disturb it in some non-trivial way (whether "collapsing" or creating "branching histories" or "branching universe" or whatever), how do we specify the initial state of the system such that we can describe how it evolves?
I'm failing to understand how the two parts of this question connect to one another. What does the WF collapse have to do with modelling time evolution?

It's not that no physical system exists, but we have described something that doesn't.
Why not? Who's to say that the fundamental units of the universe are not these complex-valued waves?

To see that this is obvious in at least one sense, think of the fact that the state vector is said to contain all possible information about the system.
1) How can that be true if the uncertainty principle is true?
Because position and momentum are not part of the system's information.

2) If we have completely described the system, and we observe it at some point, why do we need Hermitian operators to tell us what we observe?
Because reality runs on model-view-controller? :cool:

Now I'm asking: The state vector of some pure system is a complete description of the system as an element in Hilbert space. How do we determine what the variables that are characteristic of the system are? Put simply: we have a vector that isn't generalized with n this or a1, a2, etc., but with actual values. How do we obtain these values?
We know what particles/fields we're trying to measure? Don't we?
Regardless of dimension, we describe the system in terms or a ray or a vector in a Hilbert space. At then end of an experiment, is the system still in Hilbert space?
The system is a Hilbert space object, so yes.

Our we in Hilbert space? If the answer to both is "yes", then why do we ever talk about some system in terms of anything other than Hilbert space (more specifically, Euclidean or Minkowski space)?
We experience things in the 4D spacetime described by GR. Whether or not we actually are in that spacetime (whatever that actually means) depends on whether you say that an entire human is described by a wavefunction. (Probably yes)

If the answer to the first is "yes", then what does the projection postulate entail in terms of the space in which the system is and the values obtained by measurement?
I think you don't want to look at the projection postulate, but at the positional operator. But apart from that, why we experience things in 3D/4D... I have no idea.

Schroedinger's cat was the first serious challenge to this logic as it used quantum formalism, that "it's just math" approach, and proved that a cat can be alive and dead at the same time.
No, it proved that thinking of objects being both alive and dead at the same time in a "real" sense was silly. :p

Let's assume some possible world where we are both renowned physicists with the necessary equipment to prepare a quantum system for an experimental procedure. We use the same formalisms and the same design. So why isn't it like rolling dice? That is, even though we're using probabilities, we aren't generalizing them in the way we do for rolling dice such that given an idealized system (dice or quantum), one prepared and transcribed in the same way, we can't just say the probability of getting snake eyes is constant (as it is in classical probability and statistical mechanics)?
It is like dice? If we've both set up the same apparatus in the same way, then the chance of any given observation should be equal.

There is everything mysterious about wavefunctions being spread out, because I don't typically call the probability of getting heads or tail flipping a fair coin as being spread out.
That's because, unlike the eigenvalues of the position operator, the space of "eigen"values of a coin toss is discrete and finite.

In QM, we describe something like the double-slit experiment in terms of the following probabilities: getting one result corresponding (in some way) to detection and to one of the slits, getting a result corresponding (in some way) to the other, and getting a result corresponding to both.
Which variant of the double-slit are you describing? Because the electron impacting the screen doesn't automatically suggest it followed any particular path to get there.

But we never get both, and thus if we assume that both occurred we are no longer dealing with probabilities (because all outcomes occur), but we are using them regardless. We are applying probabilistic reasoning without a basis for our probabilistic outcome.
There's no reason within probability theory that one, the other and both is not a valid event space. There's just very few real-world scenarios where that makes sense to consider.

I am, although my interpretation of it differs from Wikipedia's which I find too often reflects the defense of those who distort and claim it is simplification. The way math is taught and the way psych students learn about neurons are perfect examples.
EDIT: I don't think I've heard this term and was confusing it with 'the noble lie' which, thankfully, is basically the same.
IMO, the noble lie is tricking someone into believing something wrong for the greater good, whereas lying to children is telling them something that's a better approximation than what they already know, but not all the way to the truth.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
It's the statement that one can't copy an unknown quantum state.

Sort of. That kind of makes it seem far more trivial than it is, especially when you wish to treat all quantum systems alike:
"This fragility of quantum states is also reflected in the famous no-cloning theorem, which states that it is in general impossible to duplicate an unknown quantum state. Another way of expressing this fact is to say that it is impossible to uniquely determine an unknown quantum state of an individual system by means of measurements performed on that system only"

Schlosshauer's Decoherence and the Quantum-To-Classical Transition (The Frontiers Collection).


We do? The probabilities of the various observable values are the output of any QM model.

Which doesn't answer my question. Probability in QM is determined through a process used nowhere else. It is not calculated indirectly. Why?

They aren't. They're the application about an assumption of the system that allows the outputs to be derived via both experimental measurements and a mathematical operator that was developed theoretically (again under assumptions) to relate measurements to a system such that we could describe the system without knowing how the description relates to what is supposedly does.


(Alternate answer: because its not possible to get the correct behaviour out of purely real numbers.)


The system - a Hilbert space vector - isn't probabilistic. It's the observable quantities that are, in some way, probabilistic.

There are various ways of representing quantum systems, but they are all probabilistic. In the "Hilbert space vector", the probabilities are what is used such that we can have a system in Hilbert space. A vector (or ray) isn't very useful for experiments when all it has is unknowns.


I'm failing to understand how the two parts of this question connect to one another. What does the WF collapse have to do with modelling time evolution?
How do we determine what the initial state of the system is? If my system is me dropping a coin off of a tall building, I can describe the size of the coin, its weight, it's height when I drop it, etc. That's because I can see it, weigh it, measure it. I can't do that in QM without altering the system in non-trivial ways (or, in your interpretation, splitting universes).


Who's to say that the fundamental units of the universe are not these complex-valued waves?

Quantum physics.


Because position and momentum are not part of the system's information.
What is?


We know what particles/fields we're trying to measure? Don't we?

No. Hence the no-cloning and uncertainty principles. Sure we aren't clueless. But the preparation of a system is in a measurement because it is an interaction with the system. Thus we are describing the state of the system in such a way that
1) It is theory dependent not observational
2) It is dependent upon the experimenter not the experiment.

The system is a Hilbert space object, so yes.

"object"? What object? And where is this Hilbert space that it is in?


We experience things in the 4D spacetime described by GR.
Including all quantum experiments, which never conclude in a system in Hilbert space.


I think you don't want to look at the projection postulate
I do.

No, it proved that thinking of objects being both alive and dead at the same time in a "real" sense was silly. :p

"Silly" is quite the adjective given that this description is logically consistent and you propose we just "just follow the math". That's where it takes us.


If we've both set up the same apparatus in the same way, then the chance of any given observation should be equal.

But it isn't.


That's because, unlike the eigenvalues of the position operator, the space of "eigen"values of a coin toss is discrete and finite.

There are no eigenvalues of a coin toss.


Which variant of the double-slit are you describing? Because the electron impacting the screen doesn't automatically suggest it followed any particular path to get there.

That's why is said "in some way". I don't care about the path here. The existence of the slits and screen affects the results and we describe the system in terms of the probabilities of how the system interacts with the slits such that the various results follow from this.


There's no reason within probability theory that one, the other and both is not a valid event space.
The problem is that we never get both, and although we are using probability to evaluate the outcome we have not yet but may get, we are saying that certain outcomes are more likely. There is nothing in MWI that explains this. In fact, it prohibits the very postulates, like the born rule and no-cloning principle, used in experiments.


There's just very few real-world scenarios where that makes sense to consider.
Yes. Quantum physics. Of course, as the MWI is pretty useless if it can't derive QM results without baseless ad hoc maneuvers, then those few scenarios are all that matter.
 
Hey Legion and Poly,

Could one of you please summarize, in 1-3 sentences, the central question you are disagreeing about? I'm lost.
 

idav

Being
Premium Member
Hey Legion and Poly,

Could one of you please summarize, in 1-3 sentences, the central question you are disagreeing about? I'm lost.

This. :eek:

From what I can gather they are disagreeing with the reality that the maths represent ir if there even is a reality.:shrug:
 

idav

Being
Premium Member
I do tend to side with the multi world qm interpretation which is basically saying all paths are taken. So if there is a measurement then its positive, its always positive which how qm experiments are so successful at being right, not because a particle knew to be at a specific place.
 

PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
BTW, I read that paper about entanglement swapping, and suddenly realized that in the double-slit experiment where you're covering one slit, the object is still behaving like a wave. Feynman was right: it just interferes with itself in such a way that the only place it doesn't cancel out is directly behind the slit. :D
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Hey Legion and Poly,

Could one of you please summarize, in 1-3 sentences, the central question you are disagreeing about? I'm lost.

Whether or not the universe is a single wave function and whether or not the many-worlds interpretation requires ad hoc justifications to the experimental process. Polyhedral's answer to the first issue is yes:
We still observe things in the everything's-a-WF model, it just shows up differently. The answer is now not "The wave collapses when you open the box and the cat is definitely alive or dead," it's, "The cat is both alive and dead, and your brain just got entangled with it."

My answer to the second issue is yes. I concur with Adrian Kent here:
"There is a compelling intellectual case for exploring whether purely unitary quantum theory defines a sensible and scientifically adequate theory, as Everett originally proposed. Many different and incompatible attempts to define a coherent Everettian quantum theory have been made over the past 50 years. However, no known version of the theory (unadorned by extra ad hoc postulates) can account for the appearance of probabilities and explain why the theory it was meant to replace, Copenhagen quantum theory, appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our evolutionary history appears to be Born-rule typical."
"One World Versus Many: The Inadequacy of Everettian Accounts of Evolution, Probability, and Scientific Confirmation" in Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality (Oxfored, 2010).


(if I've misrepresented Polyhedral in anyway, I apologize and ask that he correct me).
 
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idav

Being
Premium Member
BTW, I read that paper about entanglement swapping, and suddenly realized that in the double-slit experiment where you're covering one slit, the object is still behaving like a wave. Feynman was right: it just interferes with itself in such a way that the only place it doesn't cancel out is directly behind the slit. :D

Yes ageed. The one wave becomes two waves but not necessarily to obects/particles, that the tough one. Despite if you wanna say a photon is just a wave thingy frequency.:p. Is the photon a wave , yes is the photon a particlee, yes. Is it only in one place yes. Is it in multiple place again yes. All those conflicting results all from confirmed experimentation. The photon is everywhere and nowhere at once or its just that fast.
 

PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
Sort of. That kind of makes it seem far more trivial than it is, especially when you wish to treat all quantum systems alike:
"This fragility of quantum states is also reflected in the famous no-cloning theorem, which states that it is in general impossible to duplicate an unknown quantum state. Another way of expressing this fact is to say that it is impossible to uniquely determine an unknown quantum state of an individual system by means of measurements performed on that system only"

Schlosshauer's Decoherence and the Quantum-To-Classical Transition (The Frontiers Collection).
...Those are completely different statements. The one logically follows from the other, yes - since an inability to clone a state combined with "destructive reads" logically implies an unknown state cannot be fully determined - but they're not two ways of saying the same thing at all.

Which doesn't answer my question. Probability in QM is determined through a process used nowhere else. It is not calculated indirectly. Why?
Because the Born rule says so. Why is the Born rule there? I don't know. I don't think anyone does.

They aren't. They're the application about an assumption of the system that allows the outputs to be derived via both experimental measurements and a mathematical operator that was developed theoretically (again under assumptions) to relate measurements to a system such that we could describe the system without knowing how the description relates to what is supposedly does.
So what does the description "supposedly do?" It's a description, pulled out of the world of Forms, not a transformation or translation of anything that actually exists. It just is.

There are various ways of representing quantum systems, but they are all probabilistic. In the "Hilbert space vector", the probabilities are what is used such that we can have a system in Hilbert space. A vector (or ray) isn't very useful for experiments when all it has is unknowns.
I don't know what you mean by the "can" in that sentence. We can do algebra in the Hilbert space without any notion of probability.

How do we determine what the initial state of the system is? If my system is me dropping a coin off of a tall building, I can describe the size of the coin, its weight, it's height when I drop it, etc. That's because I can see it, weigh it, measure it. I can't do that in QM without altering the system in non-trivial ways (or, in your interpretation, splitting universes).
So measure it and then track the evolution from the resulting eigenstate.

Quantum physics.

What is?
Related idea: how would you represent a quantum object in a computer program?
Code:
class Fermion extends Wavicle {
...
}
What sort of thing goes in the gap? What does the space of all possible instances look like?

Logically, the space of all possible instances should be translatable into the Hilbert space of one particle, since the members of the Hilbert space are supposed to be individual particle states. Also since the position/momentum operators are Fourier duals of each other, only one need be specified - that uniquely determines the other.

No. Hence the no-cloning and uncertainty principles. Sure we aren't clueless. But the preparation of a system is in a measurement because it is an interaction with the system.
I'm not sure what that has to do with what I meant - we know the mass, charge and other properties of the things we're trying to measure, so we can construct a model that way. (e.g. we know what type of thing we're firing through double slits at the screen.)

Thus we are describing the state of the system in such a way that
1) It is theory dependent not observational
But our descriptions are theories! That's always been true! There's nothing "more real" about the theory that atoms are little billard balls - it's still a description that depends on the theory of Newtonian mechanics.

2) It is dependent upon the experimenter not the experiment.
Again, I'm not sure what you mean or how this differs from classical physics. There's no subjective criteria involved in measuring a quantum system, ala psychology.

"object"? What object? And where is this Hilbert space that it is in?
A Hilbert space vector is an object, just like '2' is an object. And that doesn't even make sense. Where what? How we can we assign a 'where' to a space, except by sticking it inside a bigger one?

Including all quantum experiments, which never conclude in a system in Hilbert space.
Is there a physical significance to an experiment concluding? You seem to be suggesting that the system somehow transition from Hilbert space to "real" space, which is never does.

Why, when the position operator is what controls dimensionality of the measurement?


"Silly" is quite the adjective given that this description is logically consistent and you propose we just "just follow the math". That's where it takes us.




But it isn't.
Why not? What precisely does that mean? That I will get different results than you, because I am not you? Or because I built the apparatus differently?


There are no eigenvalues of a coin toss.
Hence the quotes.


That's why is said "in some way". I don't care about the path here. The existence of the slits and screen affects the results and we describe the system in terms of the probabilities of how the system interacts with the slits such that the various results follow from this.
There isn't any probability of the system interacting with the slits? The particles never hang around the slits somehow, they always interact with the screen.


The problem is that we never get both, and although we are using probability to evaluate the outcome we have not yet but may get, we are saying that certain outcomes are more likely. There is nothing in MWI that explains this. In fact, it prohibits the very postulates, like the born rule and no-cloning principle, used in experiments.
MWI doesn't prohibit the Born rule, it just doesn't include it, which is indeed a problem - you have to arbitarily bolt the measure onto the theory, inelegantly. However, AFAIK, there's no derivation of the Born rule inside Copenhagen either.

What does the no-cloning principle have to do with MWI?
 

PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
Yes ageed. The one wave becomes two waves but not necessarily to obects/particles, that the tough one. Despite if you wanna say a photon is just a wave thingy frequency.:p. Is the photon a wave , yes is the photon a particlee, yes.
It's a wibbly-wobbly quantum-thing...

The photon is everywhere and nowhere at once or its just that fast.
The photon is everywhere that has that particular energy... but you've got a very low chance of it entangling with your detector. :p
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
...Those are completely different statements. The one logically follows from the other, yes - since an inability to clone a state combined with "destructive reads" logically implies an unknown state cannot be fully determined - but they're not two ways of saying the same thing at all.

When we specify the initial state of a quantum system, we do so by some measurement that disturbs it. Having done that, we then do so again. Why does this matter? Because the only way we can now say something about the system is because we have built-in a theoretical and statistical framework such that we can call "preparing" a system something it is not. We don't prepare a system, we set up an experiment and describe the system according to a priori theory, not actual observations or knowledge of that system.

Which means that if we want to "uniquely determine an unknown quantum state of an individual system by means of measurements performed on that system only", we can't do so. We have to introduce statistically derived mechanisms which go into both how we describe the system and measure observables. Because without these, once we prepare a system don't have the means we use to obtain observables.

Because the Born rule says so. Why is the Born rule there? I don't know. I don't think anyone does.

Everybody knows why: It worked. I don't think anybody knows why it works, but there are reasons why they know it work that include how he derived it in the first place and the assumptions that went into it.


I don't know what you mean by the "can" in that sentence. We can do algebra in the Hilbert space without any notion of probability.
italics in original, emphases added:
"the description of the state and its evolution does not constitute the entire quantum formalism. The wave function provides only a formal description and does not by itself make contact with the properties of the system. Using only the wave function and its evolution, we cannot make predictions about the typical systems in which we are interested, such as the electrons in an atom, the conduction electrons of a metal, and photons of light. The connection of the wave function to any physical properties is made through the rules of measurement"

We can do algebra all day long. If I have an algebraic model of a line, I can use a more advanced version to describe everything from climate dynamics to the ways in which human cognition routinely fails us. Or I could sit around plugging random numbers into some regression model.

I can "do the algebra" billions of times, but what's the point? The point is to describe a "something" that has specific values when transcribed. How are these values obtained?


So measure it and then track the evolution from the resulting eigenstate.
If I "measure" it, then this process is pointless. The entire thing is dead on arrival. The preparation of the system that allows us to get an initial state to track can't be the measurement because then we have no initial state.





What sort of thing goes in the gap?
That depends upon lab specific notations and specific equipment. Basically, the preparation process is a "measurement", but we can't call it that or we have no initial state (the no-cloning theorem relates to this), which is why reduplication is impossible except under certain logical assumptions relating repeated measurements/results into a probabilistic formalism which allows us to take specific experimental designs combined with QM and call something a system such that when we measure it we will obtain particular values that relate to the system.



I'm not sure what that has to do with what I meant - we know the mass, charge and other properties of the things we're trying to measure
We don't (but we're pretty good with modern ion traps and such to get very close to predicted values). And most of the time they're the same thing just looked at differently:
"Six quarks, six leptons, together with the gluons of QCD and the photon and weak bosons, are enough to describe the tangible world and more, with remarkable economy"
Cahn, R. N., & Goldhaber, G. (2009). The experimental foundations of particle physics. (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

But what about electrons and muons and fermions and leptons and all the other guys? And why can't we use one quark instead of 6? Because most of the particles we talk about are just different ways of saying something else.


But our descriptions are theories!
No, they aren't. Because the descriptions relates the experimental set-up to a theoretical and statistical framework so that we can have a system we never observed in an initial state or any state and end up with a final state.


Again, I'm not sure what you mean or how this differs from classical physics. There's no subjective criteria involved in measuring a quantum system, ala psychology.

There absolutely subjective criteria for measuring it without psychology because it is uniquely determined in terms of specific characteristics that were never observed but will be related to specific measurements.


A Hilbert space vector is an object

Fantastic. I can give you a vector in Euclidian space which is an object corresponding to the word "Hilbert" in which each component is assigned a value based upon the ordinal position of the letter. But what's the point?

What are the values in the vector and how are they obtained?


How we can we assign a 'where' to a space, except by sticking it inside a bigger one?

The null space. Or, alternatively, any by having the "where" occupy the entire dimensional space.


Is there a physical significance to an experiment concluding?
Of course.
You seem to be suggesting that the system somehow transition from Hilbert space to "real" space, which is never does.

Hilbert space is just a name for an abstract mathematical space with certain properties. It's as "real" as addition or a billionth dimensional Euclidean space. But because a wave function is a function, we require it to obey particular rules. A Hilbert space has these.

Why, when the position operator is what controls dimensionality of the measurement?

Because in general terms the projection postulate is an central distinguishing feature of different QM interpretations, as well as the ways in which the abstract system is projected (or not, in which case something else is required to explain the experimental results) such that we have measurements of actual values.

Why not? What precisely does that mean? That I will get different results than you, because I am not you? Or because I built the apparatus differently?

Depends on how you want to conceive it. But it is easiest to frame it in terms of the experimental procedure and what that entails: "preparing" a system such that it has "values" which, but as this process isn't actually related to the system, quantum indeterminacy ensures that the same experimental process repeated exactly in same way will by no means ensure that the results is at all the same.

There isn't any probability of the system interacting with the slits?
Of course there is. Hence the reasoning behind the path integral.



MWI doesn't prohibit the Born rule, it just doesn't include it, which is indeed a problem

It does include it (or some version of it). There is no way to obtain any information about any experiment ever without this or something like it, which is the basis for the ad hoc criticisms of MWIs.

However, AFAIK, there's no derivation of the Born rule inside Copenhagen either.
He won a nobel prize for this derivation.
 
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idav

Being
Premium Member
It's a wibbly-wobbly quantum-thing...


The photon is everywhere that has that particular energy... but you've got a very low chance of it entangling with your detector. :p

It is something physical in that it has physical properties such as mass charge and spin. The wibbly wobbly quantumy thingy is the wave aspect.

According to the experiments hasnt the photon ”known” every time we attempt a peak?
 
Legion said:
Everybody knows why: It [the Born rule] worked. I don't think anybody knows why it works, but there are reasons why they know it work that include how he derived it in the first place and the assumptions that went into it.
...
He won a nobel prize for this derivation.
He won it for his formulation. I think Poly's point is that the Born rule is one of the fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics. It's not a consequence which is derived, such as Fermi's golden rule.
 

PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
It is something physical in that it has physical properties such as mass charge and spin. The wibbly wobbly quantumy thingy is the wave aspect.
The mass, charge and spin are encoded in the quantum thing. :D
(Specifically, you can write a WF for an arbitary boson or fermion, and then fill in values for mass, electric charge and spin. There's no "extra" information required apart from the WF.)

According to the experiments hasnt the photon ”known” every time we attempt a peak?
I don't think so. Pick an experiment and I'll explain why, if you like.

He won it for his formulation. I think Poly's point is that the Born rule is one of the fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics. It's not a consequence which is derived, such as Fermi's golden rule.
Bingo! Copenhagen, like MWI, doesn't let you derive it at all - it just magically appears as an axiom for no theorectical reason.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
He won it for his formulation. I think Poly's point is that the Born rule is one of the fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics. It's not a consequence which is derived, such as Fermi's golden rule.

First, I used the term because Polyhedral did. Second, and far more importantly, how do Fermi's rule and Born's rule differ in terms of one being derived? I have Wheeler & Zurek's "reader" on quantum measurement, which contains a translation of Born's original (1926) work. In it, he states: "I myself, impressed with the closed character and logical nature of quantum mechanics, came to the presumption of that this theory is complete and the problem of transitions must be contained in it. I believe that I have now succeeded in proving this." From the German original: "Ich glaube, daß er mir jetzt gelungen ist, dies nachzuweisen"

How can we say that "Fermi's golden rule" was derived when, once "derived", it required another: Dirac's. Fermi refers to golden rule no. 1 (p. 136) and no. 2 (p. 142) in Nuclear Physics: A course given by Enrico Fermi at the University of Chicago (notes compiled by Jay Orear, A. H. Rosenfeld, and R. A. schluter) (University of Chicago Press; Revised ed.; 1950).

Furthermore, Fermi describes his rule in terms of being "calculated with the help of perturbation theory (i.e., there is no better way known)." p. 136


In Born's textbook (Atomic Physics), he describes the way in which he first formulated the idea of a theoretical basis for Bohr's theory, and then derived this basis through (at first) scattering theory: "The physical justification for this hypothesis is derived from the consideration of scattering processes" p. 83

Both Born and Dirac (the latter in "The Quantum Theory of Emission and Absorption of Radiation") demonstrate how they used existing theory and formulae to (as Born put it in his acceptance speech) give a "theoretical basis" not only for already theories but also for already existing formulae. Dirac modified the Hamiltonian into a form applicable to Einstein-Bose mechanics.

What is the distinction you are making such that the one is derived and the other formulated?

EDIT: 2 sequential scans from Born's 1926 paper (taken from Wheeler's book):
legiononomamoi-albums-other-picture4479-born1.jpg


legiononomamoi-albums-other-picture4480-born2.jpg


I'll grant you that
1) Again, it's not a derivation (but I don't think either I or Polyhedral were being formal/technical)
2) One cannot derive the Born rule itself, in that the "only one interpretation" part in the above scan is by no means proven.

but Born did not derive the Born rule. That's just what the use of his work is called, and to say that it isn't derived, while saying Fermi's golden rule is, seems to be rather odd.
Dirac's own solution did with the Hamiltonian something quite analogous to Born's use of scattering theory. And both used other earlier works (Dirac used born) to take what was present and alter it. In fact, Dirac explicitly mentions "Born's method" to find a solution (p. 256), and then suggests on the next page using "an alternative solution" (his own). It seems like Dirac thought his formulation of "golden rule no.2" was a solution of the type Born offered.
 
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PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
An appropriate metaphor would be escape velocity in Newtonian gravity. The concept and equation of escape velocity can be derived a priori from the law of gravity. The law of gravity itself, however, cannot be derived from any other rules - it must be empirically deduced from observation. (Until GR came along.) Fermi's rule was derived as a special case in already-existing laws of quantum mechanics, (as with escape velocity) whereas Born's rule is not. The latter just appears from the empirical deduction with no grander reason behind it.
 
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LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
An appropriate metaphor would be escape velocity in Newtonian gravity. The concept and equation of escape velocity can be derived a priori from the law of gravity.
Your "appropriate metaphor" is derived from something we know to be false.


The law of gravity itself, however, cannot be derived from any other rules
Possibly because any "law of gravity" is either inaccurate, not generally accepted, or both.

Fermi's rule was derived as a special case in already-existing laws of quantum mechanics
So was Born's work. Meanwhile, the "rule" which bears Fermi's name was not only largely contributed by another, but all work was done in the same manner Born did: derive a method of explaining outcomes through mathematical solutions of empirical models.

The latter just appears from the empirical deduction with no grander reason behind it.

Appears from "empirical deduction"? That means it is deduced from a rational, analytic, and formal process consistent with logic. If something "appears" through empirical deduction it is a central, fundamental basis for the entire scientific evidence. And until you can inform me how Born's work differs from "Fermi's Golden Rule" which not only imitated the process Born used but was inadequate enough for Dirac to do most of the work (and Dirac describes his process as analogous to Born's), then the distinction is invalid. Or you are taking an interpretation that isn't Born's work (although It may be his view) and claiming that this cannot be derived. However, as this holds true of every single interpretation of QM that exists, it's irrelevant.
 
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idav

Being
Premium Member
An appropriate metaphor would be escape velocity in Newtonian gravity. The concept and equation of escape velocity can be derived a priori from the law of gravity. The law of gravity itself, however, cannot be derived from any other rules - it must be empirically deduced from observation. (Until GR came along.) Fermi's rule was derived as a special case in already-existing laws of quantum mechanics, (as with escape velocity) whereas Born's rule is not. The latter just appears from the empirical deduction with no grander reason behind it.

The inversion of gravity in the form of mass is energy, this what GR says E =… so it can only describe things with mass.
 

idav

Being
Premium Member
A good metaphor. Kinda like when we know what goes up comes down but we were eventually able to show that no fairy dust was involved.
 

PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
Your "appropriate metaphor" is derived from something we know to be false.

Possibly because any "law of gravity" is either inaccurate, not generally accepted, or both.
I did specify the context - Newtonian gravity, where the law of gravity is F=Gmm/r². The fact that the entire theory has been superseded doesn't change how the concepts within the theory are related.

So was Born's work. Meanwhile, the "rule" which bears Fermi's name was not only largely contributed by another, but all work was done in the same manner Born did: derive a method of explaining outcomes through mathematical solutions of empirical models.
I'm not talking about how the relationship was produced originally, but how it relates to the wider model. Fermi's rule is not axiomatic, whereas Born's is.
 
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