I wasn't talking about brain imaging as a method of ghost detection. I was taking issue with your claim that detectability is a fundamental, or reliable, or even coherent account or criterion for the "thing-detected" to be physical.
I was saying that by your logic here:
Which you repeated here:
then ghosts and whatnot are real because we can build devices that "detect" them, as in this kind of nonsense:
7 Ghost-Hunting Tools Recommended by Paranormal Investigators
Detection doesn't mean detecting something real or physical, as the process is heavily theory-dependent, context-dependent, and prone to a variety of issues ranging from a "detector" that registers ghosts because people assume so to the kinds of problems you actually run into in neuroscience when you aren't careful enough because you are ultimately relying not on the detection but on signal analysis and correlations in data given by the generated signal and the responses of participants (all of which depend crucially on a variety of theoretical frameworks, from the quantum-mechanical principles underlying NMR spin in e.g., BOLD contrast or other fMRI schemes to the neuron doctrine to construct validity concerning the unobservable abstractions as those in the study behind the popular science bunk you linked to that involve the nature of concepts/semantics as they are realized in language and then how these in turn are instantiated through postulated mechanisms in the brain).
As an example of how we can see "ghost" detection problems in a more serious, realistic case without leaving brain imagining methods, it has been "shown" that we can detect the neural responses to visual stimuli in subjects that are not only non-human, but which are quite clearly dead. This is an easy one, as I just wrote about it elsewhere:
"In 2009, a highly remarkable scientific experiment was performed by Bennett, Baird, Miller and Wolford, four American brain researchers. They used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a brain imaging technique, to determine which brain areas respond to emotional stimuli in a test subject. The subject was shown several emotionally laden pictures and was asked to verbalize the emotion shown. The display of pictures was alternated with rest, and by comparing the brain readings between exposure and rest, the researchers were able to clearly identify a brain area that showed a response to the stimulus offered (Bennett et al. 2011).
What was so remarkable about this experiment? Certainly not the idea of measuring brain response to pictures using fMRI; this had been done countless times by other researchers in the past. Also not the statistical methods used to find the relevant brain regions by comparing exposure and rest states; the same techniques had been used in many influential publications in brain imaging before.
The originality of the study lay in the choice of the test subject. This was not, as usual, a human, but an Atlantic salmon. Moreover, the salmon was stone dead, having been bought in the local supermarket on the very morning of the experiment." (emphasis added)
Goeman J.J. (2016)
Randomness and the Games of Science. In: Landsman K., van Wolde E. (eds)
The Challenge of Chance. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26300-7_5
Here is the original dead salmon imaging experiment:
"
Neural Correlates of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem Atlantic Salmon: An Argument For Proper Multiple Comparisons Correction"
Again, then, we run first into the issue that there are instruments and detectors built to "detect" things we don't believe to exist. So using your criterion doesn't mean much as it doesn't allow one to distinguish how rosary beads can be used to detect god from the ways in which fMRI detects brain function or how we can use particle colliders and whatnot that could be detecting pions or not because pion "interactions are independent of whether they are composed of QCD fields or of little green aliens"
from p. 568 of
Schwartz, M. D. (2014).
Quantum Field Theory and the Standard Model. Cambridge University Press.