Evidence

[Call_of_the_Wild]

IOWS they cannot be demonstrated as factual.

Who?

You are making claims to the truth.

Right, and so far I haven’t seen any good reasons to be convinced otherwise.

And I’m not sure what is meant by ‘philosophical evidence.’

Argumentation at which the conclusion follows logically based on the truth value of the premises leading up to it.

Thanks. But I’ll just continue with what I’ve been doing, if that’s okay with you?

Absolutely, by all means.

But that is exactly what I expect you to do! That response, however, has no relevance to the reply I gave with reference to your statement.

I forgot.

If the world is all that is the case, which is certainly logically possible given that it actually exists, then on that account the world is self-existent, that is to say it exists of itself requiring no creator or sustainer.

With all due respect, what part of the INFINITY PROBLEM don’t you understand? I’ve said it on at least 5 different occasions, and you are just simply failing to address it. If the universe never began, then it is temporally infinite, and this concept is plaguing with absurdities that you haven’t even begun to address. Second, I gave at least 6 different reasons why the universe is finite and therefore could not be self-existent, and if you disagree with any it would be nice if you could address them one by one.

For there is no logical impediment in conceiving of the world existing where before there was once nothing at all, a conception that is supported by being able to deny without contradiction the belief we have that every event must always answer to another, for there is demonstrably no necessity in cause.

“…conceiving of the world EXISTING where before there was once NOTHING at ALL??” If the world existed, then there was something, wasn’t there?

No, I’m sorry but you did not. And you must surely be aware that one thing being the cause of another is a contingent principle?

That is why there is an argument called the Argument from Contingency.

That is quite wrong! The Kalam Argument does not state that the cause of the universe is necessary

No, you are wrong lol. The KA doesn’t flat out explicitly state that “God is necessary” like the OA, but when you get in depth with the argument, you will found out that the cause of the universe is necessary. It doesn’t state it, it implies it. The argument states that the universe had a beginning and therefore requires a cause…and then you get in to explaining what attributes an entity would have to possess in order to be the absolute creator of the universe. You cannot begin to explain this without implying necessity.

You are!

Not

That he wanted to is already evident (if he existed). But the principle of sufficient reason, as I’ve explained it, requires a purpose. So what is your answer?

Fine. Pick a purpose.

Yes, that's right, because logically no argument can be made to God without reference to the world.

But God’s existence is not contingent upon whether or not the world exists. The world’s existence is contingent upon whether God exists.

If we said the world doesn’t exist we would be uttering an absurdity because the world does exist. The concept of ‘God’ is an entity that has always existed and cannot fail to exist, and yet there is nothing absurd in conceiving the non-existence of such a being. So the thing that need not be is while the thing that supposedly cannot fail to be, isn’t? So the very thing upon which the world, that needn’t exist but does exist, is said to depend for its existence is a thing that supposedly cannot but exist, but which is itself dependent upon the world in order to be the least intelligible. Therefore neither the world nor God necessarily exists, but the world is the only existent thing that cannot be denied.

I’ve read this about 8 times and each time I didn’t come any closer to understanding it. But unfortunately, I do want to understand it. So if you could format each point using numbers, perhaps.

The existence of the world can be stated and acknowledged without the least reference to any creator gods, whereas any attempt at the converse is impossible.

I’ve answered this already.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

So the antecedent event was contingent, and so is God himself, who now continues to exist in the temporal world!

Right. God was atemporal before the creation event, and became temporal after the creation event.

Then let me make it crystal clear to you that I’m saying it is an absurdity to assert that the Necessary Being used a contingent principle to bring about a contingent world.

You can assert it, sure, but you haven’t explained why. In fact, I don’t see any basis for it. I mean think about it; if I am a necessary being, and I decide to build a house, I am using a contingent principal to bring about a contingent object.

In fact, it is kinda funny. If I am a necessary being, I am prohibited from building a house because the house would be contingent??? I mean, cmon lol.

That argument is specious. You are saying there is change and change cannot happen without cause and effect, therefore change is necessary. You are misusing the term ‘necessary’ by applying it in the vernacular; in other words you are saying cause and effect would be required for change, which it is, but only in the contingent world, in which necessity can never be demonstrated.

Understood; however you are erroneously assuming that a necessary entity is prohibited from causing contingent changes, but I don’t see how this is the case at all. If God says “Let the sky turn green”, and the sky turns green…this is a necessary entity causing a contingent change. This does not contradict God’s nature of necessity at all. It doesn’t prohibit it, it doesn’t contradict it, and it isn’t absurd. In fact, I think it is quite logical. And if you think otherwise, I would like for you to explain why.

Yes but I am disagreeing with you. Please read again what I wrote: Cause and effect is a feature of the world and it is entirely consistent and not contradictory to assume that an initiation began within the world, and its contingency is only a difficulty for those who argue fallaciously that that it requires a necessary cause.

Huh? The world cannot be used to explain the origin of its own domain. So what is this talk about an initiation began with the world? The world is contingent, cot. You know this. So how can its origins possibly originate from within it?

What I’m saying (Buddy) is that no logically necessary argument can be built on contingent effects, not the world, not God, not anything.

Yes it can, actually. Both the KA and the Argument from Contingency demonstrates this.

But unlike his creation he knows this will be the case, or will not be the case, in real time; since the event, whatever it is, happens only according to his will and cannot occur without his knowledge. But in any case your analogy is irrelevant and your self-stultifying anthropomorphic explanation that god thinks and learns remains contradictory for the Supreme Being is knowledge itself by definition, for otherwise it could not be the Supreme Being.

I agree with you about the learning part. But as far as the thinking, I find it quite radical to think that the idea of a “thinking” God is contradictory. Care to explain why you believe this?

But that is just an if-then conditional tautology. One hundred percent proof that God’s existence is true means it is necessary if it is impossible to demonstrate a contradiction. And since any existent thing, as an a priori concept, can be denied both in thought and in fact the concept is not therefore demonstrably or factually true.

Its not just on mere thought alone. As I said at least 4 times, if God appeared before you right now, you can still easily conceive of him not existing. But that wouldn’t change the fact that he exist.

And to my original point that is still unaddressed;

1. Either a MGB exists, or doesn’t exist. (Cant both be true, and can’t both be false)
2. Either MGB exists necessarily, or MGB exist contingently (cant both be true or false)
3. If it is possible for MGB to exist necessarily, it must be possible for MGB to exist necessarily in some possible world
4. If it is possible for MGB to exist necessarily in some possible world, it must be possible for a MGB necessarily exist in this world.

If it is possible for a MGB to exist in any possible world, it must be possible to exist in every possible world. It can’t be both possible and impossible. So if it is possible, the potentiality of it being impossible is necessarily false. So there is no possible world at which the existence of a MGB is impossible.

So basically, if a MGB is possible in every possible world, there is at least one possible world at which a MGB exists. If a MGB exists in one possible world, it must exist in every possible world. Our world is included in the possibilities; therefore a MGB exists in our world.

There is just no way out of this, cot. It doesn’t matter what you say or how you say it. I have not yet seen a contradiction based on the concept of a MGB, so as far as I’m concerned the concept is coherent.

You are attempting to skirt round the problem while leaving it in place. This has nothing at all to do with a moral code, but with the pain and suffering in the world that directly contradicts a supposedly loving and benevolent God.

It has everything to do a moral code. If you are saying that all the pain and suffering in the world contradicts a loving and benevolent God, then you are giving me your presupposed standard which relative to the moral standards of a benevolent God. Based on that standard, you are saying that God shouldn’t do this, or should do that. How can you even begin to say God’s actions (or lack thereof) contradicts benevolence if you are not comparing it to your own moral code. So where do you get your moral code and ethics from and how are they not subjective in their own right?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Right. God was atemporal before the creation event, and became temporal after the creation event.

Nonsense. Atemporality precludes entering into causal relations which involve temporality. So an atemporal God cannot act in a temporal world, even to create a temporal world.

2. Either MGB exists necessarily, or MGB exist contingently (cant both be true or false)

You're leaving out two possibilities- necessarily, a MGB does NOT exist and contingently, a MGB exists.

If it is possible for MGB to exist necessarily, it must be possible for MGB to exist necessarily in some possible world

Sure, this is a tautalogy. But we've yet to show that it is possible for a MGB to exist necessarily.

If it is possible for MGB to exist necessarily in some possible world, it must be possible for a MGB necessarily exist in this world.

Ditto. You still are stuck on the "if" part; "if it is possible that a MGB exists necssarily" - you need to establish that it is possible a MGB exist necessarily.

Not sure how you're going to manage that.

There is just no way out of this, cot. It doesn’t matter what you say or how you say it.

Well, seeing as your argument is unsound, we don't need "a way out of it". You're the one advancing the modal argument, you need to establish its validity and the soundness of the premises. You have yet to show that is possible a MGB exists necessarily, as well as justify the inference here- which is, as I've pointed out to you, not universally accepted by logicians.

You've obviously overestimated the strength of this argument.

 

[Thief]

Nonsense. Atemporality precludes entering into causal relations which involve temporality. So an atemporal God cannot act in a temporal world, even to create a temporal world.

Nonsense. You can't separate a Creator from His creation.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Nonsense. Atemporality precludes entering into causal relations which involve temporality. So an atemporal God cannot act in a temporal world, even to create a temporal world.

Care to explain why? If a man has been sitting perfectly still in a chair for eternity, he is in a atemporal state. If the man begins to get up from the chair, he enters time. Where is the absurdity here?

You're leaving out two possibilities- necessarily, a MGB does NOT exist and contingently, a MGB exists.

Can you explain how/why the concept of a MGB is internally incoherent? If you can't, then there is no reason to think that there is no possible world at which a MGB can exist.

Sure, this is a tautalogy. But we've yet to show that it is possible for a MGB to exist necessarily.

If the mere concept is logical, then the possibility is plausible.

Ditto. You still are stuck on the "if" part; "if it is possible that a MGB exists necssarily" - you need to establish that it is possible a MGB exist necessarily.

See previous two responses.

Not sure how you're going to manage that.

Easy. As I said, the concept is not at all irrational, but the opposing view is. The difference between me and you is I can prove the absurdity with your view, but you cannot do the same for mines.

Well, seeing as your argument is unsound, we don't need "a way out of it". You're the one advancing the modal argument, you need to establish its validity and the soundness of the premises.

Please show how the existence of a MGB is absurd. If you can't explain this, then there is no need to discuss this any further. I am through going through these circles. If the concept of a MGB defies logic, then explain why and how and we can deal directly with this. Everything else is equivilent to running on a treadmill...running, but getting nowhwere.

You have yet to show that is possible a MGB exists necessarily, as well as justify the inference here- which is, as I've pointed out to you, not universally accepted by logicians.

Please explain how the concept of a MGB defies logic.

You've obviously overestimated the strength of this argument.

The argument is fireproof.

 

[cottage]

That's all fine and good, but I'm not sure how persuasive, or how necessary, any of this is. For one, its not obvious that you even have a valid argument here- in that you've shown there is any logical impossibility that God created the world for others.

What is being said is that there are no ‘others’ that are to benefit from being created, and therefore it is a logical impossibility. But perhaps you would like to argue as a special plea that for these yet-to-be ‘others’ existence is superior to non-existence?

Worse, you have, as I've said, left the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the toolbox for the theist to pick up and use themselves- which needn't be done in the first place. The entire argument falls apart if you yank the PSR out of the game- since it is neither a well-established scientific principle nor a logical truth- and point out the fallacy of composition lying at the heart of the argument.

You simply needn't let the argument get this far to refute it.

You’ve misunderstood me entirely. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, as I’ve used it here, is not the end game or a conclusion. And it is most certainly not being said that because no good reason can be given for God creating the world a necessary Being is therefore impossible. I have already given my rebuttal in respect of the ontological arguments, but my introducing the Principle of Sufficient Reason is to show that even for those that accept the non-inferential ontological argument as sound, the cosmological argument (to which the Principle applies) raises questions that cannot be answered coherently - if at all.

 

[cottage]

With all due respect, what part of the INFINITY PROBLEM don’t you understand? I’ve said it on at least 5 different occasions, and you are just simply failing to address it. If the universe never began, then it is temporally infinite, and this concept is plaguing with absurdities that you haven’t even begun to address. Second, I gave at least 6 different reasons why the universe is finite and therefore could not be self-existent, and if you disagree with any it would be nice if you could address them one by one.

Forgive me, but you are either not reading or not understanding what I’ve written. Please note that ‘self-existent’ doesn’t mean ‘the cause of itself’. Here it is again:

“If the world is all that is the case, which is certainly logically possible given that it actually exists, then on that account the world is self-existent, that is to say it exists of itself requiring no creator or sustainer. For there is no logical impediment in conceiving of the world existing where before there was once nothing at all, a conception that is supported by being able to deny without contradiction the belief we have that every event must always answer to another, for there is demonstrably no necessity in cause. And any causal regression must end with the world, and with the world being contingent no contradiction is implied in saying the world will end tomorrow, since it might!”

Oh, annd BTW, every single one of the six items you listed in a previous post is a causal property and can be rejected along with the principle of causality itself.

“…conceiving of the world EXISTING where before there was once NOTHING at ALL??” If the world existed, then there was something, wasn’t there?

Read it again, please, making special note of the words ‘where before’.

That is why there is an argument called the Argument from Contingency.

Yes, and the contingency argument takes cause to be necessary, which it demonstrably is not!

No, you are wrong lol. The KA doesn’t flat out explicitly state that “God is necessary” like the OA, but when you get in depth with the argument, you will found out that the cause of the universe is necessary. It doesn’t state it, it implies it. The argument states that the universe had a beginning and therefore requires a cause…and then you get in to explaining what attributes an entity would have to possess in order to be the absolute creator of the universe. You cannot begin to explain this without implying necessity.

Then you’ve just confirmed what I said to you! The Kalam argument is inferential and takes its premises from features of the known world, cause in this case. In other words it presumes to argue backwards from this world to some other world beyond experience (God). It is a causal argument and does not argue to or from ontological necessity.

Fine. Pick a purpose.

That makes no sense. Do I not deserve a proper reply to my question: “But the principle of sufficient reason, as I’ve explained it, requires a purpose. So what is your answer?”

I’ve read this about 8 times and each time I didn’t come any closer to understanding it. But unfortunately, I do want to understand it. So if you could format each point using numbers, perhaps.

It’s dead simple, really it is. It’s not a riddle. Try spacing out each sentence to read separately.

I’ve answered this already.

Where? Am I missing something? Or did you mean this: “But God’s existence is not contingent upon whether or not the world exists. The world’s existence is contingent upon whether God exists”? If so then you are only referring to a concept and a belief. The world exists as a plain fact and even the most ardent and committed believer must acknowledge the world’s actual existence in order to argue to a creator; it cannot be done the other way about.

 

[cottage]

Right. God was atemporal before the creation event, and became temporal after the creation event.

Okay, so God exists in time and space now? I just need to be sure of what you’re stating before I reply.

You can assert it, sure, but you haven’t explained why. In fact, I don’t see any basis for it. I mean think about it; if I am a necessary being, and I decide to build a house, I am using a contingent principal to bring about a contingent object.

The contingent principle I’m referring to is that of causation, the necessary link between God’s potential and his actions. All contingent things, anything God has supposedly brought into being, does not have to exist. So if God has to rely on cause to create contingent things, then both the created things themselves and the means of creation can be denied without contradiction. God’s creative powers are thus contingent and limited. It demonstrates a dependency upon his creation, which is patently absurd.

In fact, it is kinda funny. If I am a necessary being, I am prohibited from building a house because the house would be contingent??? I mean, cmon lol.

I can’t figure where you’ve got that from, certainly not from anything that I’ve said!

Understood; however you are erroneously assuming that a necessary entity is prohibited from causing contingent changes, but I don’t see how this is the case at all. If God says “Let the sky turn green”, and the sky turns green…this is a necessary entity causing a contingent change. This does not contradict God’s nature of necessity at all. It doesn’t prohibit it, it doesn’t contradict it, and it isn’t absurd. In fact, I think it is quite logical. And if you think otherwise, I would like for you to explain why.

But that isn’t my argument at all! I can’t see how anything in that passage has any significance to the quote you’re responding to – or anything else that I’ve said. And I most certainly have not said or implied that God cannot make changes in the contingent world!

Huh? The world cannot be used to explain the origin of its own domain. So what is this talk about an initiation began with the world? The world is contingent, cot. You know this. So how can its origins possibly originate from within it?

It appears that we have an on-going communication problem with this particular issue. I don’t know whether it’s me not explaining myself sufficiently or you overlooking my argument due to pre-conceived notions of what you think I’m saying. I’m going to put it in very brief and simple terms for you. You ask how the world can be the cause of itself? I’m saying the question doesn’t even arise, since I am denying any necessity in cause. In essence the mantra ‘Everything that begins to exist is in want of a cause for its existence’ is a principle without significance except in the sensible world. By the same argument it follows that there can be no external causes, as causation is only a contingent feature. And there is no problem of an infinite regression of causes because the entire series will cease with the world’s end. To sum up, the world, which needn’t exist at all, exists now where before there was nothing but is neither caused nor is it the cause of itself and one day it will doubtless cease to be.

Yes it can, actually. Both the KA and the Argument from Contingency demonstrates this.

Neither the Kalam nor the contingency argument demonstrates that God exists upon contingent effects. The Kalam argument assumes it, and the Argument from Contingency fails to recognize that causation is itself contingent.

I agree with you about the learning part. But as far as the thinking, I find it quite radical to think that the idea of a “thinking” God is contradictory. Care to explain why you believe this?

Thinking is reasoning and reasoning is problem solving, weighing up possibilities and coming to a conclusion. God, the Supreme Being, is defined as omniscient and a God that has to consider, reflect, ponder, or appraise his decisions before committing to them wouldn’t be as supreme as a God that didn’t suffer that constraint.

Its not just on mere thought alone. As I said at least 4 times, if God appeared before you right now, you can still easily conceive of him not existing. But that wouldn’t change the fact that he exist.

It certainly would if your claim is that God logically necessary, but given what you say here your God is contingent! A Being that cannot be denied with the mind as well as with the senses is maximally greater than a being that cannot be denied with the senses alone. Taken together I think that constitutes some kind of proof, don’t you? But by your own admission that isn’t the case.

And to my original point that is still unaddressed;
There is just no way out of this, cot. It doesn’t matter what you say or how you say it. I have not yet seen a contradiction based on the concept of a MGB, so as far as I’m concerned the concept is coherent.

Axiom S5 (as it applies to Plantinga’s argument) states that if a thing's definition only allows it to exist necessarily, which of course it does in this case, then if there is a possible world in which it exists, it exists in all possible worlds. Now every world that isn’t necessary is contingent, and therefore possible worlds are possible beings. The concept of Supreme Being is the only necessary being, and thus there are no possibly necessary worlds. And if there are no possibly necessary worlds then there is no contradiction in saying there are no worlds other than this, the actual world (which being actual is also possible). So this, the actual world, is the only possible world, and in which case every thing in this contingent actual world can be conceived as non-existent. There is nothing internal or external that implies a contradiction and from which it follows that as there is no Maximally Greatest Being in the actual world there is therefore no Maximally Great Being in every world. If no such being exists in every world then it demonstrably true that no Maximally Great Being exists of necessity.

It has everything to do a moral code. If you are saying that all the pain and suffering in the world contradicts a loving and benevolent God, then you are giving me your presupposed standard which relative to the moral standards of a benevolent God. Based on that standard, you are saying that God shouldn’t do this, or should do that. How can you even begin to say God’s actions (or lack thereof) contradicts benevolence if you are not comparing it to your own moral code. So where do you get your moral code and ethics from and how are they not subjective in their own right?

I am not proposing any moral imperative, or saying God should or should not do certain things. I’m identifying the contradiction, which is that God is not the thing that believers say he is. It is as simple as saying black is not white.
If God is Omni-benevolent then there is no suffering. But there is suffering, and therefore God is not Omni-benevolent. Why, or if, people should suffer is completely irrelevant to the issue. Now it might be said, arguably, that not everyone suffers and therefore God is benevolent. But that simply re-states and confirms the contradiction, for it is shown that God is sometimes benevolent, sometimes not. And in which case he is not omni-benevolent!

 

[cottage]

If the mere concept is logical, then the possibility is plausible.

But that's not right, is it? A concept being logically possible does not mean it must be plausible.

Australia could appear in the middle of the North Sea overnight. It is logically possible but I don't think any reasonable person would say it is plausible, that is to say credible or likely.

 

[idav]

Call, there is no evidence that anything is necessary. We dont know that a creator is neccessary and being able to speculate it doesnt make it so. It could be possible that it is contigent on something but its also possible its not therefore not necessary.

 

[Sha'irullah]

Care to explain why? If a man has been sitting perfectly still in a chair for eternity, he is in a atemporal state. If the man begins to get up from the chair, he enters time. Where is the absurdity here

I could not help myself and had to respond to this absurdity.
Being perfectly still does not make one outside of the boundaries of time. Anything that is touched by our laws of physics exists in time. Motion and time are not relative to each other in any shape or form.

What you have just described is beyond ludicrous that it would result in comedic relieve for your average physicist.
The state of motion does nor does the state of inertion in any shape or form deny or apply freedoms to the perpetual existence of time.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

I could not help myself and had to respond to this absurdity.

Being perfectly still does not make one outside of the boundaries of time. Anything that is touched by our laws of physics exists in time. Motion and time are not relative to each other in any shape or form.

Ok, so lets see how my logic hold up against scrutiny. So Sterling, if you have been sitting perfectly still for all eternity, how many moments led up to you sitting? How many moments passed after you sat?? Please answer both questions.

What you have just described is beyond ludicrous that it would result in comedic relieve for your average physicist.

What is comedic is the fact that you tried to have a “gotcha” moment with me, but as we will both come to learn, you will be unable to answer the two questions above, and that is what is needed if you are to offer a legitimate response to my analogy.

The state of motion does nor does the state of inertion in any shape or form deny or apply freedoms to the perpetual existence of time.

It doesn’t AFTER time began to exist, but it does BEFORE time began to exist.

 

[FranklinMichaelV.3]

Ok, so lets see how my logic hold up against scrutiny. So Sterling, if you have been sitting perfectly still for all eternity, how many moments led up to you sitting? How many moments passed after you sat?? Please answer both questions.



What is comedic is the fact that you tried to have a “gotcha” moment with me, but as we will both come to learn, you will be unable to answer the two questions above, and that is what is needed if you are to offer a legitimate response to my analogy.



It doesn’t AFTER time began to exist, but it does BEFORE time began to exist.

Each stage of sitting is a moment. Each stage of shifting from sitting to get up...is a moment. It's still within time. Even when you say something is eternal it's still a boundary within time. Time isn't at least to my mind, just seconds, minutes or hours. But simply moments. Even if nothing is happening it's still a moment.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Forgive me, but you are either not reading or not understanding what I’ve written. Please note that ‘self-existent’ doesn’t mean ‘the cause of itself’. Here it is again:

“If the world is all that is the case, which is certainly logically possible given that it actually exists, then on that account the world is self-existent, that is to say it exists of itself requiring no creator or sustainer. For there is no logical impediment in conceiving of the world existing where before there was once nothing at all, a conception that is supported by being able to deny without contradiction the belief we have that every event must always answer to another, for there is demonstrably no necessity in cause. And any causal regression must end with the world, and with the world being contingent no contradiction is implied in saying the world will end tomorrow, since it might!”

You know what, cot, it doesn’t even matter whether or not I didn’t read or understand your previous post. It just doesn’t matter. If you deny the First Cause hypothesis, then you, by DEFAULT, automatically believe in the absurdity of infinite regress in time. Either there was an absolutely first cause of space, time and matter……or there was a naturalistic past eternal chain of events that led up to the current moment. Those are the ONLY two options, so if you deny one, you are subjecting yourself to the other. So it doesn’t even matter what you meant by “self-existent”, or what I thought you meant by self-existent. Regardless of what you mean, you are implying the “past-eternal” hypothesis in some way, shape, or form. I already why that hypothesis is absurd, which is the infinity problem; (also which for the life of me you still haven’t addressed).

Oh, annd BTW, every single one of the six items you listed in a previous post is a causal property and can be rejected along with the principle of causality itself.

Elaboration needed.

Read it again, please, making special note of the words ‘where before’.

I read again and it didn’t help in any way.

Yes, and the contingency argument takes cause to be necessary, which it demonstrably is not!

If a necessary cause is negated, then you subject yourself right back to the infinity problem, which I keep mentioning and you keep failing to address.

Then you’ve just confirmed what I said to you! The Kalam argument is inferential and takes its premises from features of the known world, cause in this case. In other words it presumes to argue backwards from this world to some other world beyond experience (God). It is a causal argument and does not argue to or from ontological necessity.

Am I in the twilight zone?? You just admitted that the argument “presumes to argue backwards from this world to some other world beyond experience (God).” By definition, God is a NECESSARY BEING. The argument is that God is the only being that is capable of creating space, time, and matter…and this can only be the case if God was a NECESSARY BEING.

That makes no sense. Do I not deserve a proper reply to my question: “But the principle of sufficient reason, as I’ve explained it, requires a purpose. So what is your answer?”

I will, once you respond to the infinity problem that I laid out at least 8 different times. Explain how the universe can eventually begin to exist some 13.7 billion years ago if it was just one event on an infinitely (and past eternal) chain of events. Infinity cannot be traversed by one-by-one increments, and this is exactly what one will have to believe if you negate the existence of a First Cause.

It’s dead simple, really it is. It’s not a riddle. Try spacing out each sentence to read separately.

…coming from someone that previously said “if it is something you don’t understand, ask me and I will elaborate”.

Where? Am I missing something? Or did you mean this: “But God’s existence is not contingent upon whether or not the world exists. The world’s existence is contingent upon whether God exists”? If so then you are only referring to a concept and a belief. The world exists as a plain fact and even the most ardent and committed believer must acknowledge the world’s actual existence in order to argue to a creator; it cannot be done the other way about.

I fail to see the point and/or relevance.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Okay, so God exists in time and space now? I just need to be sure of what you’re stating before I reply.

Yes, God exists in time, but he doesn’t necessarily exist in space..since God is immaterial. But he is casually active in space (Christian view) without physically occupying space. God exists in time as of now, but he didn’t exist in time before the creation even (when time was created). Time is a creation of God. So before the creation event, God was timeless (changeless). It wasn’t until the moment of creation that God became temporal.

The contingent principle I’m referring to is that of causation, the necessary link between God’s potential and his actions. All contingent things, anything God has supposedly brought into being, does not have to exist. So if God has to rely on cause to create contingent things, then both the created things themselves and the means of creation can be denied without contradiction. God’s creative powers are thus contingent and limited. It demonstrates a dependency upon his creation, which is patently absurd.

I don’t understand how you can jump from the assertion that God created contingent things, so therefore the created things themselves and the means of creation can be denied without contradiction. That makes absolutely no sense to me whatsoever. I also have no idea on what you mean by it demonstrates a dependency upon his creation. Dependency as far as what?

I can’t figure where you’ve got that from, certainly not from anything that I’ve said!

I don’t know either.

But that isn’t my argument at all! I can’t see how anything in that passage has any significance to the quote you’re responding to – or anything else that I’ve said. And I most certainly have not said or implied that God cannot make changes in the contingent world!

Well, I am consistently failing to understand some of the stuff you are saying. So call it a swing and a miss on my part.

It appears that we have an on-going communication problem with this particular issue. I don’t know whether it’s me not explaining myself sufficiently or you overlooking my argument due to pre-conceived notions of what you think I’m saying.

The first option, I presume.

By the same argument it follows that there can be no external causes, as causation is only a contingent feature. And there is no problem of an infinite regression of causes because the entire series will cease with the world’s end. To sum up, the world, which needn’t exist at all, exists now where before there was nothing but is neither caused nor is it the cause of itself and one day it will doubtless cease to be.

Ok I understand now. It doesn’t make any sense. Instead of commenting on why I believe it is absolutely absurd, I will accept that we disagree and move on.

Neither the Kalam nor the contingency argument demonstrates that God exists upon contingent effects. The Kalam argument assumes it, and the Argument from Contingency fails to recognize that causation is itself contingent.

Regardless of what you THINK about the argument, I would like to see why the conclusions of both arguments are false.

Thinking is reasoning and reasoning is problem solving, weighing up possibilities and coming to a conclusion. God, the Supreme Being, is defined as omniscient and a God that has to consider, reflect, ponder, or appraise his decisions before committing to them wouldn’t be as supreme as a God that didn’t suffer that constraint.

So if you are omniscient, can you hold a conversation with someone? If you are omniscient, can you answer questions if someone asks you? Please answer these questions.

It certainly would if your claim is that God logically necessary, but given what you say here your God is contingent! A Being that cannot be denied with the mind as well as with the senses is maximally greater than a being that cannot be denied with the senses alone. Taken together I think that constitutes some kind of proof, don’t you? But by your own admission that isn’t the case.

Not at all, and for at least two reasons; the first reason is the fact that it may be easy for you to conceive of God to not exist, but you can’t conceive of a God that is omnipresent to not exist. Remember that omnipresence is one of the attributes of God. If omnipresence is an attribute, than how can you conceive of something to not exist that possess such an attribute. In fact, that is a contradiction. That is equivalent to saying “I can conceive the thought of an omnipresent being to not be present”, which is absurd.

The second reason is the fact that your logic can be flipped right back around on you. If all it takes is denial of the mind, then I can deny the proposition of God NOT existing. I can easily imagine a MGB existing. So if you being able to conceive of a MGB NOT existing makes it necessarily non-existent, then me being able to conceive of a MGB existing makes it necessarily exist.

if there is a possible world in which it exists, it exists in all possible worlds. Now every world that isn’t necessary is contingent, and therefore possible worlds are possible beings. The concept of Supreme Being is the only necessary being, and thus there are no possibly necessary worlds. And if there are no possibly necessary worlds then there is no contradiction in saying there are no worlds other than this, the actual world (which being actual is also possible).

But there is a possible necessary world, the world of supernatural reality. God exists in reality, and that reality is as necessary as God himself. Reality is everything real. If God exists, he exists in reality, and the reality that he exists is a necessary reality (or world). So I disagree with the notion that there are no possible necessary worlds, because if God exist, then there is. With that being said I do agree with the fact that there are no possible necessary NATURAL worlds. Big distinction that is to be made here.

So this, the actual world, is the only possible world

This is completely false. If God decided to make an alien universe, that is contingently possible.

and in which case every thing in this contingent actual world can be conceived as non-existent. There is nothing internal or external that implies a contradiction and from which it follows that as there is no Maximally Greatest Being in the actual world there is therefore no Maximally Great Being in every world. If no such being exists in every world then it demonstrably true that no Maximally Great Being exists of necessity.

I don’t even understand this, but what I do know is there is no way logically possible that you can state how a MGB doesn’t exist in every possible world. Such a being has already been defined as omnipresent, so based on this it is illogical to even begin a statement with “If no such being exists in every world.”

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

I am not proposing any moral imperative, or saying God should or should not do certain things. I’m identifying the contradiction, which is that God is not the thing that believers say he is. It is as simple as saying black is not white.

Umm, Cot..you are saying it is a contradiction based on your standard of what omni-benevolence means to YOU. In order to contradict anything, there has to be a standard at which you compare it too. How can you not see this?

If God is Omni-benevolent then there is no suffering. But there is suffering, and therefore God is not Omni-benevolent.

See, right there!!! Exactly what I thought; You are saying there is a contradiction between omni-benevolence and suffering. By your standard of benevolence, suffering should not occur. Based on what though? I fail to see how objective morality exists based on contingent reasoning, and how your subjective opinion about how God conducts his moral duties is anything but…subjective at best.

Why, or if, people should suffer is completely irrelevant to the issue. Now it might be said, arguably, that not everyone suffers and therefore God is benevolent. But that simply re-states and confirms the contradiction, for it is shown that God is sometimes benevolent, sometimes not. And in which case he is not omni-benevolent!

But before we even get in to depth about morality, we have to determine whether are not objective morality even exists, wouldn’t you agree?

But that's not right, is it? A concept being logically possible does not mean it must be plausible.

It is if the subject is necessity.

Australia could appear in the middle of the North Sea overnight. It is logically possible but I don't think any reasonable person would say it is plausible, that is to say credible or likely.

And that is why the concept of necessity and contingency are apples and oranges.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Each stage of sitting is a moment.

There isn't a sitting moment if there was never a beginning point of inference. If you have been sitting perfectly still for eternity, then there were no moments prior to you sitting nor are there moments after you sat. Time is simply non-existence.

Each stage of shifting from sitting to get up...is a moment. It's still within time.

I agree, that is why I said time began from the moment I BEGAN TO STAND UP from sitting.

Even when you say something is eternal it's still a boundary within time. Time isn't at least to my mind, just seconds, minutes or hours. But simply moments. Even if nothing is happening it's still a moment.

It is only bound to time from the moment the first change occurred. If you have been sitting perfectly still for eternity, there is no change. Now I agree, if everything in the universe just froze to a stationary-state, time would continue. But this is not the cause if nothing ever "began".

 

[FranklinMichaelV.3]

There isn't a sitting moment if there was never a beginning point of inference. If you have been sitting perfectly still for eternity, then there were no moments prior to you sitting nor are there moments after you sat. Time is simply non-existence.



I agree, that is why I said time began from the moment I BEGAN TO STAND UP from sitting.



It is only bound to time from the moment the first change occurred. If you have been sitting perfectly still for eternity, there is no change. Now I agree, if everything in the universe just froze to a stationary-state, time would continue. But this is not the cause if nothing ever "began".

It sounds to me that you're saying that nothing created something.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

What is being said is that there are no ‘others’ that are to benefit from being created, and therefore it is a logical impossibility.

Right. All I'm saying is that your argument here is superfluous, so it doesn't matter that its not obviously airtight.

You’ve misunderstood me entirely. The Principle of Sufficient Reason... is most certainly not being said that because no good reason can be given for God creating the world a necessary Being is therefore impossible.

I realize that. And while I don't think I've misunderstood you at all, this response makes me wonder the extent to which you have understood my point.

... my introducing the Principle of Sufficient Reason is to show that even for those that accept the non-inferential ontological argument as sound, the cosmological argument (to which the Principle applies) raises questions that cannot be answered coherently - if at all.

What is the "non-inferential" ontological argument, as opposed to the traditional ontoloical arguments? I have no idea what that means. And RE causal arguments or fine-tuning arguments for the existence of God, as I've repeated several times now, we can simply revoke the PSR and slam the door on the argument entirely.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Care to explain why? If a man has been sitting perfectly still in a chair for eternity, he is in a atemporal state.

No. Eternal duration is not the same thing as atemporality. Atemporality means temporality does not apply at all- attributes of time or duration are absolutely inapplicable- whereas eternal duration is a measure of temporality (namely, of an infinite quantity). And a being which does anything cannot be atemporal, since actions occur within space-time and necessarily have a temporal location/duration; an atemporal and acting/intervening being is a contradiction in terms.

Can you explain how/why the concept of a MGB is internally incoherent? If you can't, then there is no reason to think that there is no possible world at which a MGB can exist.

First of all, this is not relevant- I was merely pointing out that you left out half of the available options.

Secondly, having "no reason to think that there is no possible world in which a MGB can exist" is not the same as having good reason to think there is a possible world in which a MGB can exist. You need the latter for the MOA to go through, and have yet to provide it.

Moreover, a maximally great being would appear to be contradictory, since maximums of various traits would appear to exclude one another; I cannot be maximally generous and maximally frugal, for instance, because these traits are mutally exclusive. A maximally greates being in the relevant sense is like a being that is completely white and completely red all over- self-contadictory.

Easy. As I said, the concept is not at all irrational, but the opposing view is. The difference between me and you is I can prove the absurdity with your view, but you cannot do the same for mines.

Then do it.

Show that "there is no logically possible world P such that, in P, "a MGB does not exist" is contradictory" is contradictory or absurd (since this is the denial of your claim, that "it is possible that a MGB exists necessarily")

Please explain how the concept of a MGB defies logic.

We've been over this- remember this?

I am saying God’s existence is a necessary truth because it is POSSIBLE for it to be a necessary truth. Nothing that exists within the universe is necessarily true, and since God is said to exist externally from the universe, his existence would have to be necessary.

The problem is that this is not really an acceptable inference in modal logic (that if it is possible that P is necessary, then P, or then P is necessary). But if the inference is allowed, then it follows that it is possible that it is necessary that a slightly less than maximally great being exists, and we can infer that an infinite number of slightly less than maximally great beings exist necessarily- and thus the maximally great being cannot be responsible for their existence (since each slightly less than maximally great being exists necessarily in its own right), and thus the maximally great being is not maximally great.

Not a good result, either way.

The operative inference in the argument is not accepted in many systems of modal logic- it does not "defy logic" so much as it is not generally acceptable logic.

The argument is fireproof.

if I were a fireman, I would not buy fire-retardant products from you since you obviously a very peculiar idea of what constitutes "fireproof". You have here an argument which is either question-begging or invalid, and is not even arguably sound. I wouldn't call that "fireproof"- but hey, to each their own.