Evidence ... ?

[Jayhawker Soule]

From the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary ...

evidence

something that furnishes proof​

proof

the cogency of evidence that compels acceptance by the mind of a truth or a fact​

Evidence. What is it? How is it validated?

 

[Evelyn]

Evidence. What is it? How is it validated?

Consistancy in correlation with what we know to be true?

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

Is consistency adequate?

The victim was reportedly killed by a woman dressed in beige slacks, a white top, and casual white shoes.​

If you own beige slacks, does that constitute evidence?
If I say that you own beige slacks, does that constitute evidence?
If it seems reasonable to me that you would own beige slacks, does that constitute evidence?

 

[Quiddity]

Is consistency adequate?

The victim was reportedly killed by a woman dressed in beige slacks, a white top, and casual white shoes.​

If you own beige slacks, does that constitute evidence?

If I say that you own beige slacks, does that constitute evidence?
If it seems reasonable to me that you would own beige slacks, does that constitute evidence?

I would say no. Unless you have more to build on.

 

[MdmSzdWhtGuy]

Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition) defines Evidence as thus:

Any species of proof, or probative matter, legally presented at the trial of an issue, by the acto fo the parties, and through the medium of witnesses, records, documents, exhibits, concrete objects, etc., for the purpose of inducing belief in the minds of the court or jury as to their contention.

Basically it means anything offered to prove up your contention, that is allowed into the courtroom by the rules of evidence.

Black's Law Dictionary Pocket Edition 1996 defines Evidence as:

A perceptible thing that tends to establish or disprove a fact, including testimony, documents, and other tangible objects.

Frankly I prefer the Pocket Edition definition, on this and many other terms. Simpler, and more concise. I also have out McCormick's Hornbook on Evidence, but was unable to find anything in it to improve on the simple definition provided by Black's Pocket Edition.

I think that Black's Pocket Edition provides the best useable definition for evidence. Some perceptible thing, be it testimony from eyewitnesses, a document which evidences someone's signature, a videotape of an actual event, a scientific test (thinki DNA, or matching bullet grooves to a gun) or tangible physical evidence, such as a fingerprint, or a bloody glove, which tends to prove, or disprove that which the speaker is trying to prove, or disprove.

B.

 

[Quiddity]

So is the word evidence in Law and Science differ?

 

[Cynic]

So is the word evidence in Law and Science differ?

No, the concept is closely similar. For law there is just a different context. But they both require proof that for one, is objective.

 

[Quiddity]

No, the concept is closely similar.

How does the evidence in Science try to induce belief?
That seems like a large enough difference to me.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

So is the word evidence in Law and Science differ?

Read here.

 

[JerryL]

So is the word evidence in Law and Science differ?

Somewhat. "Evidence" allows a bit more in law (such as testimony).

I'm reminded also, though I'm not sure why, of the story of three guys on a field in Ireland looking at a flock of black sheep.

First guy: The sheep in Ireland are black.
Second guy: We only know that *some* of the sheep in Ireland are black
Third guy: No, we only know that some of the sheep in Ireland are black on at least one side.

 

[Quiddity]

Read here.

Very useful link Jay...thanks.

 

[Scuba Pete]

Evidence is proof of something: you flip a light switch and the light comes on. We have evidence of electricity and we may believe it exists because of this evidence.

This is something that is easy for most of us to comprehend. But how about evidence that has more than one conclusion? Some have used the Big Bang Theory to prove that there is no God, while I use it to show that God exists. They say I have no evidence, and yet I use the same evidence that they use. The only difference being that it results in a different conclusion.

How about the "emotion" of love? It is proof of the devine to me and so I live in love as much as possible.

 

[michel]

Read here.

Thank you Jay; I hope you realize that my laptop is now running out of hard drive space because of all the good bookmarks with which you keep furnishing us.........

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

But how about evidence that has more than one conclusion?

If it confirms nothing relevant, if it falsifies nothing relevant, it is irrelevant.

Some have used the Big Bang Theory to prove that there is no God, while I use it to show that God exists. They say I have no evidence, and yet I use the same evidence that they use.

I would argue that you are both wrong.

How about the "emotion" of love? It is proof of the devine to me and so I live in love as much as possible.

I understand. But let's focus on your previous example for a bit.

 

[michel]

"Proof is arriving at a logical conclusion, based on the available evidence."

Surely the definition of 'logic' is a very personal assessment ? Without becoming too embroyled in sexism, women and men have different perceptions of logic.

 

[Quiddity]

*fiddles with his hands in interest*

 

[Scuba Pete]

If it confirms nothing relevant, if it falsifies nothing relevant, it is irrelevant.

That's one way to look at it, but relevance is in the eye of the beholder.

I would argue that you are both wrong.

The conclusions or that this is a piece of evidence?

I understand. But let's focus on your previous example for a bit.

Go for it.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

The Big Bang is not evidence of God. Nor, in fact, is it evidence against God.

What the Big Bang is, however, is evidence of the explanatory power of science - as is evolution. But the implications of such evidence are, in my opinion, far more supportive of nontheism ...

It is clear that the ontology of philosophical naturalism is itself theoretical in the scientific sense: it is an explanation, albeit much more general than a scientific one, of what is warranted as knowledge, why we do not have certain other kinds of "knowledge," and why we therefore cannot lay cognitive claim to ontological categories such as the supernatural. It is not a categorical rejection of the supernatural, but a constantly tentative rejection of it in light of the heretofore consistent lack of confirmation of it. And rather than accepting methodological naturalism a priori as the only reliable methodology for acquiring knowledge about the cosmos, it accepts it rather as a methodology the reliability of which has been established historically by its success and the absence of any successful alternative method for acquiring knowledge about either the natural world or a supernatural order. The general rule for philosophical naturalism is this: the more of the cosmos which science is able to explain, the less warrant there is for explanations which include a divine or transcendent principle as a causal factor.

For the philosophical naturalist, the rejection of supernaturalism is a case of "death by a thousand cuts."

Since its inception, methodological naturalism has consistently chipped away at the plausibility of the existential claims made by supernaturalism by providing increasingly successful explanations of aspects of the world which religion has historically sought to explain, e.g., human origins. The threat faced by supernaturalism is not the threat of logical disproof, but the fact of having its explanations supplanted by scientific ones.

- see Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection (2000)​

We point to the Big Bang, Nucleosynthesis, and Evolution, not as evidence disproving God but as rational explanation making recourse to a Supernatural agent unnecessary.

 

[linwood]

It is clear that the ontology of philosophical naturalism is itself theoretical in the scientific sense: it is an explanation, albeit much more general than a scientific one, of what is warranted as knowledge, why we do not have certain other kinds of "knowledge," and why we therefore cannot lay cognitive claim to ontological categories such as the supernatural. It is not a categorical rejection of the supernatural, but a constantly tentative rejection of it in light of the heretofore consistent lack of confirmation of it. And rather than accepting methodological naturalism a priori as the only reliable methodology for acquiring knowledge about the cosmos, it accepts it rather as a methodology the reliability of which has been established historically by its success and the absence of any successful alternative method for acquiring knowledge about either the natural world or a supernatural order. The general rule for philosophical naturalism is this: the more of the cosmos which science is able to explain, the less warrant there is for explanations which include a divine or transcendent principle as a causal factor.

For the philosophical naturalist, the rejection of supernaturalism is a case of "death by a thousand cuts."

Since its inception, methodological naturalism has consistently chipped away at the plausibility of the existential claims made by supernaturalism by providing increasingly successful explanations of aspects of the world which religion has historically sought to explain, e.g., human origins. The threat faced by supernaturalism is not the threat of logical disproof, but the fact of having its explanations supplanted by scientific ones.

- see Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection (2000)​

You must spread some Karma around before giving it to Jayhawker Soule again.

 

[linwood]

The aim of this paper is to examine the question of whether methodological naturalism entails philosophical naturalism.[2] This is a fundamentally important question; depending on the answer, religion in the traditional sense --as belief in a supernatural entity and/or a transcendent dimension of reality--becomes either epistemologically justifiable or unjustifiable. My conclusion is that the relationship between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism, although not that of logical entailment, is not such that philosophical naturalism is a mere logical possibility, whereas, given the proven reliability of methodological naturalism in yielding knowledge of the natural world and the unavailability of any method at all for knowing the supernatural, supernaturalism is little more than a logical possibility. Philosophical naturalism is emphatically not an arbitrary philosophical preference, but rather the only reasonable metaphysical conclusion--if by reasonable one means both empirically grounded and logically coherent.

Very nice article.