PureX
Veteran Member
I think there are a couple of related but different issues involved in the question of free will that cause us to become easily 'sidetracked'.
One issue is the idea that 'true freedom' must have no external causation. And yet every event has some causation in that nothing occurs in abject isolation (there is no abject isolation).
Another is that 'true freedom' can't be derived from chance. It must be intentional. But that brings up a whole existential philosophical quandary regarding the roles and relationship between chance and intention in creating and maintaining existence as we know it. Both are logically evident, yet both are hotly debated, while neither are provable.
And if these two don't provide a big enough mine field of possible rabbit holes to fall into, there the fact that freedom is a relative condition. Not an ideological absolute. So it can only be assessed in relation to a lack of it. Which opens another can of endless debate.
Personally, I tend to avoid this question all together based on the realization that it is my not knowing whether or not I have free will that gives me, in effect, free will. Since, whether my decisions are actually free or not is irrelevant to me given that I can't know either way. So they are my will from my perspective. And my perspective is the one perspective I have.
One issue is the idea that 'true freedom' must have no external causation. And yet every event has some causation in that nothing occurs in abject isolation (there is no abject isolation).
Another is that 'true freedom' can't be derived from chance. It must be intentional. But that brings up a whole existential philosophical quandary regarding the roles and relationship between chance and intention in creating and maintaining existence as we know it. Both are logically evident, yet both are hotly debated, while neither are provable.
And if these two don't provide a big enough mine field of possible rabbit holes to fall into, there the fact that freedom is a relative condition. Not an ideological absolute. So it can only be assessed in relation to a lack of it. Which opens another can of endless debate.
Personally, I tend to avoid this question all together based on the realization that it is my not knowing whether or not I have free will that gives me, in effect, free will. Since, whether my decisions are actually free or not is irrelevant to me given that I can't know either way. So they are my will from my perspective. And my perspective is the one perspective I have.