Free Will is one of those concepts that seems stranger and stranger the more I think about it.
Does it mean that even if *I* am exactly the same and *everything* else is exactly the same, I would potentially make a different decision?
Yes, the concept of 'free will' is highly problematic particularly from the libertarian 'free will.'
https://www.theopedia.com/libertarian-free-will
Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. All "free will theists" hold that
libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called a free choice. Libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to one's nature, predisposition and greatest desires. Responsibility, in this view, always means that one could have done otherwise.
This may be contrasted with variations of belief in limited 'free will' as with Compatibilist view compatible with determinism. I describe 'free will' in terms of the potential of 'free will' where humans have a will but it is not necessarily free. In this concept we make 'potential choices within a limited range of choices based on a history of cause and effect events that can go back to the origins of humanity. All cause and effect events in terms of human will and by the way in all of nature based on the premise of 'natural laww and processes. The variation in our decision making process as well as cause and effect events in nature are 'fractal in nature' always within a limited number of outcomes. In other words we are not above the constraints of limitrd cause and effect events throughout nature.
Would I not *expect* my decisions to be based on my desires, my experiences, my biases, my psychology, what is available, etc? And, if the causal nexus of all of those leading to my 'choice' happens within my body, even within my brain, is that not then *my* choice? And would that not be the case even in a deterministic setting?
So what does the adjective 'free' mean in this context? And, in that case, is the definition of 'free will' such that it requires the decision be an 'uncaused cause'?
You describe above some of the constraints that go back through history and beyond in the chain of choices and outcomes of human choices and all 'cause and effect' events.
Though the fractal nature of the variability of outcomes of events defeats the concept of the influence of the flap of the wing of a butterfly in the outcome of future events.'
The outcomes of ALL cause and effect events are intimately apart of the deterministic natural nature of out physical existence. Determinism assures that no two Sugar Maple leaves will be exactly the same, but all Sugar Maple leaves will be similar to all Sugar Maple leaves.