is the definition of 'free will' such that it requires the decision be an 'uncaused cause'?
That's what I mean when I use the phrase. When I say free will, I mean that the observer of the theater of consciousness is the only source of the will, Freud's ego. If the self is merely the passive recipient of desires generated in the neural pathways which it delivers to the self, then you have what I would call the illusion of free will, which is merely the sensation of having a desire and executing an act in service of it. If the hypothalamus sense relative dehydration, it sends a message of thirst to consciousness, that, when possible, is generally followed by taking a drink. That's not what I mean by free will. I mean that the self decided to be thirsty, not the hypothalamus telling the self it's thirsty.
That is the illusion of free will. If that's what people mean by free will, then yes, we have that - desires and the ability to act on them.
A more complex scenario is having conflicting wills, dueling impulses. Can one be free and not the other? Suppose I receive that impulse to get a drink, but decide this time to prove that I don't have to act on it, I deliberately delay getting a readily available drink. Is that free will?
I say not. It also doesn't come from the observer as a matter of choice. He didn't choose to have that thought just then. Like the urge to drink, it's a message coming from neural circuitry also being delivered to the self. We can envision a tug of war of sorts, with one of these two prevailing, and the self being a passive observer, taking direction from the stronger urge.
Consider somebody trying to quit cigarettes. He gets an urge to smoke and a message to resist that urge. He'll identify with the second message as self. If so, he is redefining the self from the ego to some of the grey matter that informs it.
This is a concept like the supernatural or existence out of time that breaks down on close inspection and reveals that these phrases are incoherent.
Personally, I don't care if I am a passive automaton merely observing a screen called consciousness. If that's how it is, it's how it's always been. I didn't mind before knowing that, so what's the difference now? I'm OK with it whatever the case. Unlike some of the religious, I don't need there to be free will, because I have no belief in a God that damns, and therefore don't need to justify damnation.
This is brought into sharp relief when we see the theist arguing that predestination and free choice at the time of action are compatible despite that pair of ideas being incompatible and mutually exclusive. So, they just say that whatever action was taken could have been otherwise despite being known in advance by a deity. They do care which of these two is correct. I don't.
Having said all of that, and based on the Libet experiment, it looks like free will as I have defined it above is an illusion.