How to deal with people who deny free will?

[Kirran]

Cause and effect are incredibly nuanced notions that aren't just matters of idle philosophical debate or metaphysical discussions. Closure to efficient causation, for example, was the driving force behind Rosen's Relational Biology, circular causality is a recurring theme in complexity and systems sciences, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and retrocausality in general are major problems in modern physics, and perhaps the most widely used model of causation (counterfactual) fails to hold true for quantum mechanics (counterfactual causal models attribute a causal factor x to effect y iff [if and only if] had x not occurred, why couldn't have occurred).

It's important, especially in discussions on free will, not to fall into the trap of using a simplistic model of Aristotelian causality (for every effect there exists a cause) as
1) It is always possible to easily formulate any effect in terms of causes linguistically, but this tells us nothing other than that language is flexible
&
2) If we are interested in whether or not we can make choices that aren't determined by at most the configuration all "particles" in the entire universe the instant before our choice (i.e., can we make choices such that we could have made a different choice) it is crucial to understand or at least deal with the nature of causality.

Of course, it's all very well to just spout off the words 'cause and effect' without going into the meaning, and I'm by no means a physicist or a mathematician.

But I just think it seems like the most appropriate term for what I'm talking about. In reference to your 2), that is more or less my reasoning behind my lack of belief in free will as a concept. Does it hold true for you, personally?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Does it hold true for you, personally?

I think that we have free will (defined as the ability to make choices such that we could have made a different choice; ditto for actions). I believe there is little evidence at all to support the idea that this kind of free will doesn't exist (i.e., that the nature of the cosmos and causality make it impossible for us to self-determine; another term for that is "mental causation"). I side with Gisin (famous for his nonlocality experiments) in his contribution to the volume Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Exploring Free Will and Consciousness in the Light of Quantum Physics and Neuroscience when he gives as one of his reasons for supposing we have free will experiential evidence. As the idea that, given any effect, there are a set of causal factors that can be described operationally (i.e., in terms of some scientific jargon) and are wholly reductionist came into being not through experience or through experimentation, but as a side-effect of the success of deterministic classical physics, and as this failed utterly and came crashing down I see no reason to think as simply as Laplace did when it turns out he, Einstein, and others were so fantastically wrong about the nature of the cosmos and causality.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

I think that we have free will (defined as the ability to make choices such that we could have made a different choice; ditto for actions). I believe there is little evidence at all to support the idea that this kind of free will doesn't exist (i.e., that the nature of the cosmos and causality make it impossible for us to self-determine; another term for that is "mental causation"). I side with Gisin (famous for his nonlocality experiments) in his contribution to the volume Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Exploring Free Will and Consciousness in the Light of Quantum Physics and Neuroscience when he gives as one of his reasons for supposing we have free will experiential evidence. As the idea that, given any effect, there are a set of causal factors that can be described operationally (i.e., in terms of some scientific jargon) and are wholly reductionist came into being not through experience or through experimentation, but as a side-effect of the success of deterministic classical physics, and as this failed utterly and came crashing down I see no reason to think as simply as Laplace did when it turns out he, Einstein, and others were so fantastically wrong about the nature of the cosmos and causality.

The way the word choosing is used in common discourse, and in standard religion, are superior to any idea of any current scientist / intellectual. The correct formulation of choosing requires to acknowledge that what it is that makes the decision turn out the way it does, is categorically a matter of opinion.

The complexity of this issue is somewhat less than the rules of tic-tac-toe. It has nothing to do with people not being intelligent enough to figure it out, but instead it is deliberate unwillingness to accept subjectivity is valid. Anybody who would reasonably put different concepts side by side, and evaluate them, would immediately see that the religious / common discourse concept of choosing, which validates subjectivity, works the best.

It is purely human weakness, original sin, which makes people fail to acknowledge the right concept of free will. People want to make good and evil into a matter of fact, instead of leaving it a matter of opinion.

 

[lovemuffin]

I think that we have free will (defined as the ability to make choices such that we could have made a different choice; ditto for actions)

Would you describe the kind of free will you have as libertarian? I'm afraid I haven't read the book you cited, but "could have chosen differently" and your comments about determinism suggest some kind of libertarianism.

How do you reconcile the evidence for free will with the evidence that ties mental states and even decision making to physical states, like the efficacy of drugs, or alterations in thinking or behavior following traumatic brain injuries, and things like that? I get what you mean when you say that pure determinism is an extrapolation from other successes, but even where there weird sorts of behavior in QM with regard to causality, it seems difficult to me to make those coherent with the idea of choice, in the sense that just because state of affairs X can lead to either Y or Z, if the actual outcome is selected in an apparently random fashion, and in aggregate those events follow some deterministically evolving state function, it seems hard to describe that as will in a contra-causal way. I'd love to hear you elaborate on this since it's obvious you understand the physics much better than I do.

 

[Kirran]

I think that we have free will (defined as the ability to make choices such that we could have made a different choice; ditto for actions). I believe there is little evidence at all to support the idea that this kind of free will doesn't exist (i.e., that the nature of the cosmos and causality make it impossible for us to self-determine; another term for that is "mental causation"). I side with Gisin (famous for his nonlocality experiments) in his contribution to the volume Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Exploring Free Will and Consciousness in the Light of Quantum Physics and Neuroscience when he gives as one of his reasons for supposing we have free will experiential evidence. As the idea that, given any effect, there are a set of causal factors that can be described operationally (i.e., in terms of some scientific jargon) and are wholly reductionist came into being not through experience or through experimentation, but as a side-effect of the success of deterministic classical physics, and as this failed utterly and came crashing down I see no reason to think as simply as Laplace did when it turns out he, Einstein, and others were so fantastically wrong about the nature of the cosmos and causality.

I tend to think of it along these lines. To declare the existence of free will is an assertion, a positive claim. As we don't really understand the physics etc involved to a sufficient extent to prove its existence, although you're closer than I am to that it seems , then I don't accept the concept of free will. Again, that's not to say I DON'T believe in free will, because saying that doesn't feel quite right somehow. I just don't think the concept is really hugely valid

EDIT: I'd be categorised as a Compatibilist.

 

[JustWondering]

Doesn't sound absurd to me at all. Against freedom and emotions, evil, for freedom and emotions, good.

It is ridiculously evil, not just any common carelessness or whatever. It conveys a potential for unlimited evil, which is acted upon to varying degrees.

And I have no idea how to deal with people such as yourself. How am I supposed to deal with people who do not consider it a matter of opinion what emotions are in their heart?

What?! When did I EVER say I was against freedom and emotion? You really should stop putting words in other people's mouths. What does someone's beliefs have to do with their emotions? No one has control over what they feel regardless of what they believe. Someone with a phobia they know to be irrational will still feel fear when exposed to the source of their phobia, yes? I frankly think that you don't have a full grasp of the subject we are talking about. Your position is absurd.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

What?! When did I EVER say I was against freedom and emotion? You really should stop putting words in other people's mouths. What does someone's beliefs have to do with their emotions? No one has control over what they feel regardless of what they believe. Someone with a phobia they know to be irrational will still feel fear when exposed to the source of their phobia, yes? I frankly think that you don't have a full grasp of the subject we are talking about. Your position is absurd.

Your argumentation rejects freedom and emotions as they are in common discourse.

You choose to ignore common discourse, and instead choose to fantasize stuff as an intellectual, it leads you to reject freedom and emotion as they are in common discourse.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Would you describe the kind of free will you have as libertarian?

I wouldn't. Partially because I am not sure what I believe beyond the fact that I believe in some form of mental causation (some way in which our sense of self emerges from the brain as a functional self-determining property). Partially because I think that the determinism/indeterminism dichotomy that so defines libertarianism is mistaken (i.e., I don't believe these are the only options). Partially because, as important as I think philosophy is (and how great a travesty it is that so many practicing scientists today know little of it and worse are often dismissive of it), my work makes it difficult to think about free will as distinct from the mechanisms/processes involved. For example, I believe that quantum mechanics plays only a trivial role in even unconscious neural activity, let alone higher-level cognition (by "trivial" I mean that as the brain is composed of particles it is necessarily true that quantum physics plays a role, but the quantum-mechanical description of neuronal processes is so close to classical we can't even measure the difference). This means that either I am wrong about free will, or there is some way in which physics allows for downward causation/emergence/etc.

The literature on such processes is vast:

Hence sources like the following:

"Complexity in biology: Exceeding the limits of reductionism and determinism using complexity theory"
"Cohesiveness: general systems and contra-reductionism revolution"
"R-Theory: A Synthesis of Robert Rosen's Relational Complexity"
"From knowledge, knowability and the search for objective randomness to a new vision of complexity"
Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science

The Limits of Reductionism in Biology

The Waning of Materialism

Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will

Emergence in Science and Philosophy

not to mention the various monograph series (Understanding Complex Systems; The Frontiers Collection; The Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology), journals, conferences, etc., all dedicated to understanding whether complex systems, especially biological, are ontologically reducible (and if not, whether something like "non-reductive physicalism" is defensible). Then there's the nice head-ache those of us who actually work with complex systems have to deal with thanks to modern physics:

"Causality Is Inconsistent With Quantum Field Theory"

"Einstein, Incompleteness, and the Epistemic View of Quantum States"

"On the incompatibility between quantum theory and general relativity"

"Realism and the physical world"

Quantum chance and non-locality: Probability and non-locality in the interpretations of quantum mechanics

Reexamining the Quantum-Classical Relation: Beyond Reductionism and Pluralism

Quantum Causality: Conceptual Issues in the Causal Theory of Quantum Mechanics (Studies in History and Philosophy of Science)

Particle Metaphysics: A Critical Account of Subatomic Reality (The Frontiers Collection)

and it gets worse when physicists start really messing with complex systems (especially neuroscience):

The Emerging Physics of Consciousness

Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer

(not to mention about half of what the series Advances in Consciousness Research puts out, that awful journal NeuroQuantology, and perhaps a quarter to half of what the literature on emergence in complex systems in general).

That's just several tiny samples of sources from a variety of perspectives and fields and doesn't begin to scratch the surface. But the point is that for me it seems at best superfluous to identify with philosophical positions and at worst problematic, as many of these implicitly or explicitly refer to or are based upon conceptions of the nature of the cosmos/physics.

How do you reconcile the evidence for free will with the evidence that ties mental states and even decision making to physical states, like the efficacy of drugs, or alterations in thinking or behavior following traumatic brain injuries, and things like that?

My view doesn't require a reconciliation with such evidence as I assume it to begin with.

I get what you mean when you say that pure determinism is an extrapolation from other successes, but even where there weird sorts of behavior in QM with regard to causality, it seems difficult to me to make those coherent with the idea of choice, in the sense that just because state of affairs X can lead to either Y or Z, if the actual outcome is selected in an apparently random fashion, and in aggregate those events follow some deterministically evolving state function, it seems hard to describe that as will in a contra-causal way.

As I said, I'm not a proponent of quantum consciousness. In fact, my doctoral work "is" an argument that this can't be so (the scare quotes are due to the fact that I was dumb enough to take consciousness, a phenomenon we don't really understand, and try to show something definitive about the role played by a physics we don't understand either other than mathematically and operationally; this was idiotic, and after many years of research and interdisciplinary work I am pretty certain that I will have to work on a different question/issue). With that caveat, the proposals of quantum consciousness use (in different ways) the fact that the wave-function evolves deterministically and yet QM is indeterminate as a sort of "consciousness-in-the-gaps" argument. Simplistically, the "collapse" of the wave function is choice. Consciousness, in these theories/models usually combines the ways in which weak emergent & hierarchical structures form out of complex interactions such that higher-level brain structures are able change the brains configuration state on a macrosale at the subatomic level by collapsing wave-functions that become the configuration which corresponds to a particular choice out of many possible ones.

The problem with such proposals, IMO, is not only that I don't see how the brain can, even given an extraordinary ability to sustain quantum coherence, could possibly utilize quantum mechanical processes at that scale. Also, the more such theories actually describe physical processes (such as Penrose & Hameroff's ORCH-OR), the less they are able to show the relevancy of quantum physics to brain function. In other words, it's easy to point to neuronal processes that involves subatomic dynamics for which classical physics is inadequate, but as we don't know if or how these matter it's not much different than simply saying the brain is matter and like all matter is at least in principle described by quantum physics.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

I wouldn't. Partially because I am not sure what I believe beyond the fact that I believe in some form of mental causation (some way in which our sense of self emerges from the brain as a functional self-determining property). Partially because I think that the determinism/indeterminism dichotomy that so defines libertarianism is mistaken (i.e., I don't believe these are the only options). Partially because, as important as I think philosophy is (and how great a travesty it is that so many practicing scientists today know little of it and worse are often dismissive of it), my work makes it difficult to think about free will as distinct from the mechanisms/processes involved. For example, I believe that quantum mechanics plays only a trivial role in even unconscious neural activity, let alone higher-level cognition (by "trivial" I mean that as the brain is composed of particles it is necessarily true that quantum physics plays a role, but the quantum-mechanical description of neuronal processes is so close to classical we can't even measure the difference). This means that either I am wrong about free will, or there is some way in which physics allows for downward causation/emergence/etc.

The literature on such processes is vast:


That's just several tiny samples of sources from a variety of perspectives and fields and doesn't begin to scratch the surface. But the point is that for me it seems at best superfluous to identify with philosophical positions and at worst problematic, as many of these implicitly or explicitly refer to or are based upon conceptions of the nature of the cosmos/physics.


My view doesn't require a reconciliation with such evidence as I assume it to begin with.


As I said, I'm not a proponent of quantum consciousness. In fact, my doctoral work "is" an argument that this can't be so (the scare quotes are due to the fact that I was dumb enough to take consciousness, a phenomenon we don't really understand, and try to show something definitive about the role played by a physics we don't understand either other than mathematically and operationally; this was idiotic, and after many years of research and interdisciplinary work I am pretty certain that I will have to work on a different question/issue). With that caveat, the proposals of quantum consciousness use (in different ways) the fact that the wave-function evolves deterministically and yet QM is indeterminate as a sort of "consciousness-in-the-gaps" argument. Simplistically, the "collapse" of the wave function is choice. Consciousness, in these theories/models usually combines the ways in which weak emergent & hierarchical structures form out of complex interactions such that higher-level brain structures are able change the brains configuration state on a macrosale at the subatomic level by collapsing wave-functions that become the configuration which corresponds to a particular choice out of many possible ones.

The problem with such proposals, IMO, is not only that I don't see how the brain can, even given an extraordinary ability to sustain quantum coherence, could possibly utilize quantum mechanical processes at that scale. Also, the more such theories actually describe physical processes (such as Penrose & Hameroff's ORCH-OR), the less they are able to show the relevancy of quantum physics to brain function. In other words, it's easy to point to neuronal processes that involves subatomic dynamics for which classical physics is inadequate, but as we don't know if or how these matter it's not much different than simply saying the brain is matter and like all matter is at least in principle described by quantum physics.

Bla-di-bla, and the result is, this doctor doesn't have the decency to be subjective towards who you are as being the owner of your decisions.

Does it increase the guilt, or lessen the guilt, that he puts so much work into supporting vile behaviour?

One could say it decreases it, for he really tried to get the right result, but just failed no matter how hard he tried.

Or one could say it increases it, for if he put so much work in it, it means he many more times chooses to ignore common discourse / standard religion in which subjectivity is validated.

It all depends on whether we judge him reasonably to be arrogant or considerate in the way he deals with common discourse and standard religion. I judge him to be arrogant, with smelly authoritarianism, elitism, creating a confusopoly (a variant of a monopoly, which is based around dominating the issue by confusing it, so that nobody understands the issue anymore and is no more able to participate in addressing it)

While common people can effectively talk in terms of choosing day in day out, 8 year olds can, supposedly this issue of free will requires years and years of higher education to deal with. That makes no sense. It is all nonsense, all of it. What concept was started out with originally thousands of years ago, as that the spirit or soul chooses, and the existence of said spirit or soul is a matter of opinion / faith, was right all along.

It's time to let the spirit shine again.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Bla-di-bla, and the result is, this doctor

I'm not a doctor.

doesn't have the decency to be subjective towards who you are as being the owner of your decisions.

The "common usage" sense of "subjective" makes it impossible for me to be subjective towards anybody. You're violating your own ridiculous rules here.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

I'm not a doctor.



The "common usage" sense of "subjective" makes it impossible for me to be subjective towards anybody. You're violating your own ridiculous rules here.

Which means to say you ignore common discourse, and say I have inaccurately reflected common discourse.

In common discourse, as you can for instance see on a TV soap opera, it is regarded as a matter of opinion what emotions people have in their heart. Is his love for me real, no, yes, no, I cannot decide it, what drama. It's also made exceedingly plain in the cliffhanger that these things love and hate are what makes the decisions turn out the way they do.

That is the way the logic actually functions in real life also, by making it categorically a matter of opinion what it is that makes a decision turn out the way it does.

What you say is intellectualism which undermines the game of life fundamentally so as to root out all emotion from life.

And who are you as being the owner of your decisions? What is the objectively factually correct answer then? A loving, nice person? You got it all figured out to suit yourself haven't you?

 

[Kirran]

Mohammad, to break my self-imposed fast on this discussion with a brief point - as far as I'm aware nobody here's saying that people's emotions aren't a matter of opinion, we're not even trying to make them all objective, and also it is absolutely true that emotion have an effect on how things turn out subsequently.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Which means to say you ignore common discourse, and say I have inaccurately reflected common discourse.

Right. My mistake. I was forgetting that you chose the more technical term to use. In any event, you used the word subjective as it cannot be used in "common discourse" (one can't be "subjective towards" someone else). Again, you are violating your own ridiculous rules about how language can (or at least should) be used in order to promote an idiomatic, personal definition of subjective in the exact same way you said scientists do and criticized them for doing.

That is the way the logic actually functions in real life also

Logic functions by being logic. The fact that people don't generally use much logic and that logic is often counter-intuitive doesn't mean it changes what logic is. I would think someone so strict about words being used as they are supposed to be wouldn't be so cavalier here.

What you say is intellectualism which undermines the game of life fundamentally so as to root out all emotion from life.

Interesting. What else can you tell me about who I am and what I believe that I wasn't aware of?

And who are you as being the owner of your decisions?

I don't consider my decisions capable of being "owned".

What is the objectively factually correct answer then?

What would a factually incorrect answer be?

You got it all figured out to suit yourself haven't you?

Mirror, mirror, on the wall,
Show me nothing after all
Reveal not from glassy door
My twisted soul, misshapen core
No need to tell me yet once more
The nothingness that I live for
The angel on my shoulder waits
To end what all of heaven hates
A life that has no worthy traits

And only darkness mates.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

Mohammad, to break my self-imposed fast on this discussion with a brief point - as far as I'm aware nobody here's saying that people's emotions aren't a matter of opinion, we're not even trying to make them all objective, and also it is absolutely true that emotion have an effect on how things turn out subsequently.

You are incorrect. This forum, like any other forum on the internet, is awash with atheists and the like, whose main point is to not accept anything is real, unless to be forced to the conclusion by evidence. Which means, only facts are accepted as valid, and opinion, subjectivity is rejected. It means love and hate are regarded as being electrochemical or information processes in the brain, a simple matter of fact issue like any other matter of fact issue.

And you also do not accept subjectivity as it is in common discourse. When you say love and hate are matters of opinion, you mean that different people have different emotions, you do not mean that the existence of the love and hate itself are a matter of opinion.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

Right. My mistake. I was forgetting that you chose the more technical term to use. In any event, you used the word subjective as it cannot be used in "common discourse" (one can't be "subjective towards" someone else). Again, you are violating your own ridiculous rules about how language can (or at least should) be used in order to promote an idiomatic, personal definition of subjective in the exact same way you said scientists do and criticized them for doing.



Logic functions by being logic. The fact that people don't generally use much logic and that logic is often counter-intuitive doesn't mean it changes what logic is. I would think someone so strict about words being used as they are supposed to be wouldn't be so cavalier here.


Interesting. What else can you tell me about who I am and what I believe that I wasn't aware of?



I don't consider my decisions capable of being "owned".


What would a factually incorrect answer be?


Mirror, mirror, on the wall,
Show me nothing after all
Reveal not from glassy door
My twisted soul, misshapen core
No need to tell me yet once more
The nothingness that I live for
The angel on my shoulder waits
To end what all of heaven hates
A life that has no worthy traits

And only darkness mates.

These are his decisions, he as being the owner of his decisions is guilty and evil, for putting out all that elitist and emotion destroying falsehoods about free will on the internet.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

These are his decisions, he as being the owner of his decisions is guilty and evil, for putting out all that elitist and emotion destroying falsehoods about free will on the internet.

As much as I recognize the extensive knowledge required to communicate in English as you do, and would not normally point to repeated and pervasive failures to accurately express English idioms, constructions, grammar, prefabs, etc., when you express how important it is to use "common discourse" and yet are not a native speaker nor capable of rendering your thoughts into idiomatic English I feel there is some justification in pointing out this rather stark, blatant contrast. If you can't express yourself using "common discourse" (at least in English), then why castigate others for doing what you demand yet fail to accomplish yourself?

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

As much as I recognize the extensive knowledge required to communicate in English as you do, and would not normally point to repeated and pervasive failures to accurately express English idioms, constructions, grammar, prefabs, etc., when you express how important it is to use "common discourse" and yet are not a native speaker nor capable of rendering your thoughts into idiomatic English I feel there is some justification in pointing out this rather stark, blatant contrast. If you can't express yourself using "common discourse" (at least in English), then why castigate others for doing what you demand yet fail to accomplish yourself?

A smart-alecky nonsense argument in order to avoid the issue, which I have seen dozens of times before.

You ignore common discourse in terms of choosing, emotions, in favor of fantasizing stuff, and then you turn around and pretend your fantasy has relevance to common discourse. That your ideas about choosing has any relevance to the way people talk in terms of choosing things in daily life, that your fantasy idea about love has relevance to people saying they love each other in real life.

How to deal with such people in real life who do not own up to the decisions they make?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

A smart-alecky nonsense argument in order to avoid the issue, which I have seen dozens of times before.

Actually it's an attempt to deal with the issue. You harp endlessly about two things especially: "common discourse" and "subjectivity". However, you display an inability to reflect common discourse, and one of the ways in which you do is a failure to use "subjectivity" the way it is in "common discourse".

Too many of your posts involve non-idiomatic English making it hard to understand what you actually mean:

You ignore common discourse in terms of choosing, emotions, in favor of fantasizing stuff, and then you turn around and pretend your fantasy has relevance to common discourse.

How do I "ignore common discourse in terms of choosing, emotions, in favor of...? That is, given that this statement doesn't make any sense, could you try rephrasing it to make in comprehensible? Try relying on "common discourse" (ok, I admit that last part was smart-alecky).

That your ideas about choosing has any relevance to the way people talk in terms of choosing things in daily life, that your fantasy idea about love has relevance to people saying they love each other in real life.

Apart from this not actually consisting of sentences, I'm not sure how you are deriving the above from anything I've said. But I am particularly curious about my "fantasy idea about love"

Love seldom found but ever sought
Beyond all words yet held in thought
Between a unity of two
Never lost and never through
But always true

 

[Kirran]

You are incorrect. This forum, like any other forum on the internet, is awash with atheists and the like, whose main point is to not accept anything is real, unless to be forced to the conclusion by evidence. Which means, only facts are accepted as valid, and opinion, subjectivity is rejected. It means love and hate are regarded as being electrochemical or information processes in the brain, a simple matter of fact issue like any other matter of fact issue.

And you also do not accept subjectivity as it is in common discourse. When you say love and hate are matters of opinion, you mean that different people have different emotions, you do not mean that the existence of the love and hate itself are a matter of opinion.

To me, everything is a matter of opinion, including the existence of love and hate. But there's no need to get caught up in repeating the same argument again.

Let me just say, that regardless of whether you think I'm evil, I'm actually very happy within myself, and I try to ensure other people are happy as well. So I don't have any regrets about holding the opinions I do.

Good day.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

To me, everything is a matter of opinion, including the existence of love and hate. But there's no need to get caught up in repeating the same argument again.

Let me just say, that regardless of whether you think I'm evil, I'm actually very happy within myself, and I try to ensure other people are happy as well. So I don't have any regrets about holding the opinions I do.

Good day.

If you set out to treat everything as a matter of fact, then the meaning of fact will blend into the meaning of opinion, making it arbitrary on a deeper level whether it is all a matter of opinion or all a matter of fact. But you set out with regarding every issue as an issue of fact, you did not set out with treating every issue as an issue of opinion, which are ofcourse both wrong.