CarlinKnew
Well-Known Member
About a year ago I made this thread: http://www.religiousforums.com/foru...-you-cant-clearly-comprehensively-define.html
Having stumbled back upon this forum and reading my old threads, I noted that I never really got a coherent explanation from those who believe in a very specific and popular concept of free will. I found out that this extremely widespread belief had a name: Libertarian free will. Please remember that I am not concerned with debating compatibilism which is self evident:
The objections are:
And so now that I've found a source that defined my same argument more clearly, perhaps the proponents of Libertarian free will (the only type of free will that is controversial) can coherently defend their position here.
Having stumbled back upon this forum and reading my old threads, I noted that I never really got a coherent explanation from those who believe in a very specific and popular concept of free will. I found out that this extremely widespread belief had a name: Libertarian free will. Please remember that I am not concerned with debating compatibilism which is self evident:
Yes, everyone knows we make decisions. What is of importance, particularly for the Abrahamic religions, is:theopedia.com said:In compatibilism, free will is affected by human nature and man will never choose contrary to his nature and desires. Man will always do what he desires most at any particular moment - even when there are competing desires.
Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. All free will theists hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called a free choice. Libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to ones nature, predisposition and greatest desires. Responsibility, in this view, always means that one could have done otherwise.
The objections are:
\1) Causality If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.
\2) Responsibility Rather than salvage human responsibility, some maintain that libertarian freedom destroys it. If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices? Is it any more agreeable to reason to hold humans responsible for choices they didnt cause than to hold them responsible for choices that were caused and thus determined?
And so now that I've found a source that defined my same argument more clearly, perhaps the proponents of Libertarian free will (the only type of free will that is controversial) can coherently defend their position here.