Intellectual repugnance

[Ozzie]

Can ideas in and of themselves be repugnant?

Does it require someone to express them for you to find the idea repugnant?

Without them having been expressed would those ideas have held some kind of inert repugnance properly belonging to the ideas?

Or does the repugnance belong to the person expressing them?

Is repugnance a property of ideas, or a property of aversion to a person expressing an idea that is not repugnant in and of itself?

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

Does it require someone to express them for you to find the idea repugnant?

Racism.

 

[Ozzie]

Racism.

What is racism? Examine the word "niger" employed by a black v a white (for instance).

What makes the word niger racist?

You know why I had to edit this.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

This is adolescent rubbish ...

 

[Ozzie]

This is adolescent rubbish ...

Nice to be acknowledged as adolescent by a grandfather at 41.

Anyway it is important to examine the meaning of the word "niger" in context, and why it ought to hold different meanings therein whether you like it or not.

 

[Willamena]

Can ideas in and of themselves be repugnant?

Sure, they can be just as inherently repugnant in and of themselves as we assign them to be.

Does it require someone to express them for you to find the idea repugnant?

No, my own unexpressed ideas can be repugnant, too.

Without them having been expressed would those ideas have held some kind of inert repugnance properly belonging to the ideas?

See above.

Or does the repugnance belong to the person expressing them?

You can own the repugnance that is "in and of" the idea as much as you can own the idea that is "of itself" (i.e. you can also own the "of itself"). It's up to you whether or not and to what degree you give that ownership away by objectifying things.

Is repugnance a property of ideas, or a property of aversion to a person expressing an idea that is not repugnant in and of itself?

Yes.

 

[rojse]

Can ideas in and of themselves be repugnant?

Does it require someone to express them for you to find the idea repugnant?

Without them having been expressed would those ideas have held some kind of inert repugnance properly belonging to the ideas?

Or does the repugnance belong to the person expressing them?

Is repugnance a property of ideas, or a property of aversion to a person expressing an idea that is not repugnant in and of itself?

What about genocide?

 

[Yerda]

Can ideas in and of themselves be repugnant?

Is repugnance not a response?

 

[Aasimar]

Racism.

What about nationalism? Our country is better then yours? Very similar to racism.

 

[PureX]

I don't really see how an idea can be intellectually repugnant. Intellectually, an idea is just an idea. It has no particular intrinsic intellectual value. I can see how it could be morally repugnant, but not intellectually so.

 

[doppelganger]

I don't really see how an idea can be intellectually repugnant. Intellectually, an idea is just an idea. It has no particular intrinsic intellectual value. I can see how it could be morally repugnant, but not intellectually so.

Words can have incredible power though, based on how they are perceived. Lenny Bruce long ago played with this idea (and George Carlin ever since). Bruce used to do a whole routine on the words "niger[sic]" and "kike" and "whop," solely for the purpose of helping people recognize the power that words have over us (and making them laugh at the same time).

Words cover a multitude of sins.

 

[PureX]

Words can have incredible power though, based on how they are perceived. Lenny Bruce long ago played with this idea (and George Carlin ever since). Bruce used to do a whole routine on the words "niger[sic]" and "kike" and "whop," solely for the purpose of helping people recognize the power that words have over us (and making them laugh at the same time).

Words cover a multitude of sins.

But isn't our reaction to those words (ideas) a moral raction? The idea, for example, that people with dark colored skin are stupid and lazy is not in itself intellectually repugnant. The idea is repugnant because we perceive such an assertion as intentionally dishonest, intentionally harmful, and therefor immoral. Intellectually, however, it's just a false observation.

 

[doppelganger]

But isn't our reaction to those words (ideas) a moral raction?

It's a social reaction. A programmed reaction based on the significance we are taught to invest in the words. How can words themselves be moral and immoral but for the significance we give them?

The idea, for example, that people with dark colored skin are stupid and lazy is not in itself intellectually repugnant. The idea is repugnant because we perceive such an assertion as intentionally dishonest, intentionally harmful, and therefor immoral. Intellectually, however, it's just a false observation.

To those who think it is true, it is not a false observation. But aside from that, hiding from the word "niger[sic]" only invests the word with even more power without changing anything about the fact that some people are racists. That was Bruce's point.

The point? That the word's suppression gives it the power, the violence, the viciousness. If President Kennedy got on television and said, "Tonight I'd like to introduce the ******s in my cabinet,: and he yelled "nig- ger******************************gigger" at every ****** he saw, "boogeyboogeyboogeyboogeyboogey,nig-ger******************" till ****** didn't mean anything any more, till ****** lost its meaning-- you'd never make any four-year-old "******" cry when he came home from school.

 

[PureX]

It's a social reaction. A programmed reaction based on the significance we are taught to invest in the words. How can words themselves be moral and immoral but for the significance we give them?

It's not all social. We choose to accept or reject the constructs we are given by our society. We choose the significance we give to the ideas we encounter.

To those who think it is true, it is not a false observation. But aside from that, hiding from the word "niger[sic]" only invests the word with even more power without changing anything about the fact that some people are racists. That was Bruce's point.

That word or any other has no power but what we let it have. Ideas are powerless until we imbue them with significance. That's what I meant by there being no such thing as intellectual repugnance. The intellect is just a mechanism. Repugnance is a reaction as a result of value judgments made after the intellectual idea is recognized and then processed relative to the paradigm of ideas we've already chosen to hold as our reality. Intellectualism doesn't lead to repugnance. Value assessment, does. I suppose we could call value assessment a part of the intellect, but then we just keep falling back into that tired old paradigm of all of existence springing from our own thoughts. And I don't buy it.

The closest thing I can think of to "intellectual repugnance" would be the visceral reaction we might have to someone "cheating" at an exchange of ideas, as in a debate or something: such as an ad hominum attack.

 

[doppelganger]

That word or any other has no power but what we let it have. Ideas are powerless until we imbue them with significance. That's what I meant by there being no such thing as intellectual repugnance. The intellect is just a mechanism. Repugnance is a reaction as a result of value judgments made after the intellectual idea is recognized and then processed relative to the paradigm of ideas we've already chosen to hold as our reality.

Okay. Then we agree.

Intellectualism doesn't lead to repugnance. Value assessment, does. I suppose we could call value assessment a part of the intellect, but then we just keep falling back into that tired old paradigm of all of existence springing from our own thoughts. And I don't buy it.

That's okay. You don't have to buy it. That's the beauty of it all.

The closest thing I can think of to "intellectual repugnance" would be the visceral reaction we might have to someone "cheating" at an exchange of ideas, as in a debate or something: such as an ad hominum attack.

Any obvious logical fallacy, or just ad hominem? Sometimes the substance or content of an idea is itself a logical fallacy though, isn't it? Aren't there even times when the idea itself is an ad hominem? That would make the idea close to something you consider "repugnant."

For clarity's sake, my posts about Bruce were to tie together both the OP and the silliness of trying to stifle discussion by calling someone's ideas "adolescent rubbish."

 

[PureX]

Any obvious logical fallacy, or just ad hominem? Sometimes the substance or content of an idea is itself a logical fallacy though, isn't it? Aren't there even times when the idea itself is an ad hominem? That would make the idea close to something you consider "repugnant."

For clarity's sake, my posts about Bruce were to tie together both the OP and the silliness of trying to stifle discussion by calling someone's ideas "adolescent rubbish."

Yes. But I can't myself think of an example of intellectual repugnance. Even the one I gave is really a value assessment being applied to the idea of an ad hominum after the fact. Even if I were to say that to attack the person for presenting the argument is repugnant, I still don't believe that the repugnance resides in the words "ad hominum" nor in the intellectual idea those words define. The repugnance, if it resides anywhere, resides in my reaction to the idea, not in the idea itself.

I guess that's all I wanted to point out.

 

[Bathsheba]

Is repugnance a property of ideas, or a property of aversion to a person expressing an idea that is not repugnant in and of itself?

Ozzie, very interesting question, I don't know how I net out on this just yet. I need to savor the question for a while.

Let me think out loud for a few seconds. My apologies in advance if I have missed the objective of your original post.

I can identify times when I have been conscious of my aversion to an idea and I needed to ask myself, "Is it me or the idea that causes me to not accept the idea?" For example, I recall having an aversion to the idea of visiting my sister after she had been critical of my behavior. Someone suggested that I go see her, give her a hug and talk about other things. The idea that I might forgive her attack and love her unconditionally was initially repugnant (I had my back up against the wall; I was very resistant to putting myself in line for more potential criticism). In this instance it seems likely that the "idea" (unconditional love) was repugnant because of my aversion to another "idea" (I might be opening myself up to more pain.)

When I'm not tasked with actually implementing unconditional love, the idea itself isn't repugnant, it makes sense and inspires. My response to an idea in a given context often dictates whether I will be averse to the idea.

Switching gears now; I’m told that some ideas have an evolutionary basis. For example, the idea of killing somebody up close is repugnant to most humans. However, killing at a distance is less repugnant to some humans. Again, context is very important and I am averse to “ideas” out of context.


[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Distance as a Psychological Weapon:[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] Another key factor in overcoming the resistance to killing is distance, which has been partially addressed earlier. The utility of weapons that kill from a distance cannot be truly understood without understanding the psychological enabling aspect of distance, which, simply stated, means that the further away you are the easier it is to kill. Thus, dropping bombs from 20,000 feet or firing artillery from 2 miles away is, psychologically speaking, not at all difficult (and there is no indication of any noncompliance in these situations), but hand-to-hand combat and firing a rifle from 20 feet is very difficult (with high incidence of nonfirers) and from a few feet away it is virtually impossible to stab an opponent. John Keegan's landmark book The Face of Battle makes a comparative study of Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815), and the Somme (1916). In his analysis of these three battles spanning over 500 years, Keegan repeatedly notes the amazing absence of bayonet wounds incurred during the massed bayonet attacks at Waterloo and the Somme. At Waterloo Keegan notes that, "There were numbers of sword and lance wounds to be treated and some bayonet wounds, though these had usually been inflicted after the man had already been disabled, there being no evidence of the armies having crossed bayonets at Waterloo." By World War I edged-weapon combat had almost disappeared, and Keegan notes that in the Battle of the Somme, "edged-weapon wounds were a fraction of one per cent of all wounds inflicted in the First World War." Indeed, all evidence indicates that ancient battles were not much more than great shoving matches, until one side or the other fled. This can be observed in the battle record of Alexander the Great, who (according to Ardant du Picq's studies of ancient records) lost a total of approximately 700 men "to the sword" in all his battles put together, and this is simply because Alexander the Great always won, and the actual killing happened only to the losers after the battle (Fig. 1).[/FONT]

[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]

[/FONT]​

[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The only thing greater than the resistance to killing at close range is the resistance to being killed at close range. Close-range interpersonal aggression is the universal human phobia, which is why the initiation of midbrain processing is so powerful and intense in these situations. Thus, one limitation to killing at long range is that greater distance results in a reduced psychological effect on the enemy. This manifests itself in the constant thwarting of each new generation of air power advocates and other adherents of sterile, long-range, high-tech warfare and a constant need for close combat troops to defeat an enemy.
[/FONT]​

[/FONT]

 

[PureX]

OK, so what we're asking about, here then, is the correlation between an idea, and a visceral reaction. Idea: killing a human being. Visceral reaction: repugnance. Idea: holding a harry spider in your hand. Visceral reaction: repugnance.

It is true that some people have a visceral reaction to some ideas. But is that reaction CAUSED by the idea itself, or is it triggering another idea: the idea of moral, ethical, physical, unacceptability. And if it is acting as a trigger, as I believe it to be, then I don't believe we can honestly attach our value systems to the ideas we are evaluating, as is perhaps being suggested.

Is a harry spider inherently repugnant because some folks have a viscerally repugnant reaction to it? No, it's not. Is killing another human being an inherently repugnant act just because some people have a viscerally repugnant reaction to it? No, I don't believe that we can say it is.

 

[YmirGF]

Racism.

For the most part that is fairly true Jay, but to a racist suggesting that racism is repugnant would be very repugnant in and of itself.

The thought of me personally voting for a Democrat is about is repugnant as things get in my books, lol. I also find MANY religious concepts to be totally repugnant because I feel they have no actual basis in reality. I also find the idea of giving Al "Chicken Little" Gore, a Nobel prize, to be intellectually repugnant, however if said body gave out an award for the Best Effort in Fear Mongering I might not be so repulsed.

:slap: