There is more to the link than that. The link is only and introduction in rxploring the relationship between human will and determinism.
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Is Free Will Incompatible with Neuroscience?
- Thread starter Rational Agnostic
- Start date
There is more to the link than that. The link is only and introduction in rxploring the relationship between human will and determinism.
True, sort of just there is extensive evidence in neuroscience and the behavioral sciences for the nature of human will. Neuroscience is not necessarily compatable nor incompatable with Free Will, because the concept of 'Free Will' is not defined well enough for scoence.
Science experimentally and objectively has shown that there are many deterministic aspects of human will. As far as the extent of possible Free Will beyond this has not been determined. The following is a good site to begin the discussion on the nature of human will and the concept of 'Free Will.' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
Some refer 'Free Will' as libertarian 'Free Will,' which is the emost unlikely possibility as per our knowledge of human will. Others like those who believe in 'compatabilism.' consider more realistically that humans have a degree possible 'Free Will.'
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I largely agree with this (I would say emphatically agree but for the caveats below). I think it extremely unlikely that quantum theory is necessary in any non-trivial way to explain the neurophysiology or neurobiology underlying cognitive processes. But quantum theory is still relevant to discussions on consciousness and free will, even if largely indirectly.
Firstly, quantum theory shows us that classicality is an emergent phenomenon. It is not agreed upon what exactly it is that classical physics emerges from (i.e., what quantum theory is supposed to be or describe, assuming that it is fundamental), but certain results such as the various so-called Bell theorems hold for any and all possible theories regardless.
Secondly, and related to the Bell theorems and similar no-go theorems (CHSH, Kochen–Specker, etc.), have—alongside quantum foundations more generally—forced us to take quite seriously even on an operational level questions which not long ago would have been thought relevant only to philosophers. The ability to make free choices is a prerequisite for the entirety of scientific inquiry. But it was not until the introduction of superdeterminism and choices between other loopholes of Bell inequality violations that we were forced not only to seriously consider the ways in which the capacity to make free rather than somehow predetermined choices became a serious, theoretical and operational issue in fundamental physics. It is possible to deny the validity of any theorem applied to physics or others sciences such as the Bell inequality by denying the capacity of experimentalists to determine experimental or observational conditions. Even those who strongly dislike the implications of violations of Bell’s inequality, however, do not go for this option as an out. It is now much clearer how,and has been made formally more explicit that, if experimenters are not capable of free choices than empirical inquiry is logically baseless and empirical science fruitless:
“The condition that the choice of the experimenters is taken to be a free one means that the experimentalist must be thought to be able to choose them at will, without being unconsciously forced to one or the other choice by some hidden determinism. This condition has an important role in the proof of the theorem. It is often left implicit because of its apparent obviousness. Here it is explicitly stated. But let it be observed that, when all is said and done, it appears as constituting the very condition of the possibility of any empirical science.” (p. 64)
B. d’Espagnat (2006). On Physics and Philosophy. Princeton University Press.
“the existence of such curves would seem to lead to the possibility of logical paradoxes…Of course there is a contradiction only if one assumes a simple notion of free will; but this is not something which can be dropped lightly since the whole of our philosophy of science is based on the assumption that one is free to perform any experiment” (p. 189)
S.W. Hawking & G. F. R. Ellis (1973). The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time (Cambridge Monographs on Mathematical Physics). Cambridge University Press.
“Sometimes it is claimed that such a freedom is illusory. Yet, without this freedom all experimental science would be pointless:
To deny the freedom of action of an experimenter
is to deny the meaningfulness of experimental science.” (p. 175; italics in original)
H. Primas (2009). Complementarity of Mind and Matter. In H. Atmanspacher & H. Primas (Eds.) Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science (pp. 171-209). Springer.
Thirdly, and again relatedly, quantum theory forced us to once again consider our role as observers in physical theory. In classical physics, notions of measurement and observation are external to theory due to the determinate, realist, and objective nature of descriptions of physical systems. This is not so in quantum theory. As a result, we were forced to recognize how far afield we had taken certain assumptions in classical physics and how erroneous were certain extrapolations regarding the relevance of physical laws which hold strictly only for closed, isolated systems to the universe:
“The scientist subconsciously, almost inadvertently, simplifies his problem of understanding Nature by disregarding or cutting out of the picture to be constructed, himself, his own personality, the subject of cognizance.
Inadvertently the thinker steps back into the role of an external observer. This facilitates the task very much. But it leaves gaps, enormous lacunae, leads to paradoxes and antinomies whenever, unaware of this initial renunciation, one tries to find oneself in the picture or to put oneself, one's own thinking and sensing mind, back into the picture.”
Schrödinger, E. (1954). Nature and the Greeks. In E. Schrödinger 'Nature and the Greeks' and 'Science and Humanism' (pp. 1-99). Cambridge University Press.
“The freedom of experimentation, presupposed in classical physics, is of course retained and corresponds to the free choice of experimental arrangement for which the mathematical structure of the quantum mechanical formalism offers the appropriate latitude.”
Bohr, N. (1958). Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. John Wiley & Sons.
Other relevancies could be raised, but this post is long enough as is.
It is worth noting that this interpretation of QM makes little sense without assuming a dualist view of consciousness that is nonphysical. See attached.
I agree with you in the fundamentals of QM, but your reference to the 'Many Worlds' is a bit dated. I believe that classical physics is emergent from Quantum Mechanics eventhough some details are not worked out.
Observations called randomness in the behavior in Quantum Mechanics is a problem of the limited human perspective, and more recent research is beginning to show this apparent randomness is not so random, understandable and predictable. Part of the research is that the basic Quantum particles can now be imaged. I believe Quantum Mechanics is fubdamentally deterministic.
I do not believe we have yet defined the limits of 'physical laws which hold strictly only for closed, isolated systems to the universe' in part because we have not defined the limits of our universe.
As far as neuroscience, and the behavior of our nervous system goes basic classical physics expalains it very well. Yes as throughout the physical nature of our physical existence, including nervous systemd, Quantum behavior can be observed above the Quantum plank scale level.
I disagree with your reference concerning determinism and 'Free Will.' (freedom of choice?)..
I was going to ask your position but this seems to sum it up.
My position mainly is that I don't believe our lives are predetermined from birth.
Actually I think causality is necessary for free will. What I don't agree with is that our lives are predetermined because of it.
mikkel_the_dane
My own religion
Then explain what free means if caused.
I don't think caused means determined.
Just because an event may be a cause for a decision, I don't think the past leading up to the event determine the decision. Free in this case means not restricted by the past.
mikkel_the_dane
My own religion
Then you have to explain determine.
I agree, but incomplete. The question is to what degree is our life predetermined. I am a compatabilist where there is a degree (?) of Free Will, likely limited..
The choice between limited options, and the limitation of the options beyond the possibilities if caused by such things as the Laws of Nature, genetics, the chain of previous cause and effect outcomes, previous choices, and the influence of culture.
mikkel_the_dane
My own religion
Yeah and the ability to do meta-cognition or not.
Decide.
I suspect very limited, but I don't think it takes much to change the course of our future between A and B, not between A and infinite other possibilities.
mikkel_the_dane
My own religion
Don't understand.
Well, I probably could have replaced the word "determine" with the word "decide" if that makes it any clearer.
mikkel_the_dane
My own religion
Free will is at best not free, but a limited process in some brains as to how the cognition functions. That is how close I can get.
We don't have to go on, because you seem to use "loose" words and I do it differently. That is okay. I accept that you understand it differently and that you believe you have evidence.
Sort of agree. I consider there to be a potential of free willl, not Capitalized 'Free Will.' the future can be different, but not changed, becauese the future has not happened.
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That article surely looks cool. I will definetely look into it with more focus than a first approximation cursory reading.
First impression is that he found a way to allow Everett/not-Copenhagen without paying a too big price in terms of non physicalism. The price is, apparently, dualism, or a soft form thereof. I am not a dualist, obviously, but I am not so sure whether dualism and physicalism are mutually exclusive. He definitely seems more anxious to trade negation of the latter with affirmation of the former. They surely smell like they are mutually incompatible, but I am not so sure now.
the question is, even if we bite the bullet of the multi mind hypothesis, and its prima-facie dualism, what would be the consequences for free will.
Ciao
- viole
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