I will admit that I have not read the briefs in the case before the Supreme Court and do not know what arguments have survived and made it into the case. I did read some from the original case, and from what I remember it had and argument about compelling someone to use their artistic talents against their beliefs. I do not remember how long ago it was that I read this and I have not read anything since. Who knows I could be getting details mixed up as I will say my memory is not as good as it used to be. But with the details you have given, in the fact he refused service before determining what they wanted, I would say they were discriminated against and the baker will lose the case, if those are truly the facts.
You sound so very reasonable. You're a person who can change his mind about something on the basis of the facts--what planet are you from?
If the Supreme Court thought that the case was without merit and the COA ruling is on solid ground, they would not have taken the case. There must be something in the Bakers appeal to cause the Supreme Court to question the COA's ruling and to take the case for review.
No, that isn't true. It only takes 4 Justices to vote to take a case, and these cases have been appealed to the Court for years now. There hasn't been a split among the Circuits or state courts on this issue, but the Court deciding the issue will put an end to the same case after case after case being heard and appealed in state courts.
The fact is that there is simply no question that Kennedy--who delivered
Romer v. Evans back in 1996--will vote to uphold CADA. And, again, I think there is good reason to expect that Roberts will join also, as he at least didn't join the dissent in
Parvan v. Smith. The rationale of this per curiam rests on the "equal benefits" dictum in
Obergefell. Non-discrimination in the provision of goods and services is not among those "equal benefits" that
Obergefell referred to, but there is a vague parallel.
But more importantly, there is simply no case law whatsoever for striking down public accommodations laws or for singling out a particular group or basis that should not be included in the law. If there were a valid argument for either a Free Exercise or Free Expression right for businesses to ignore public accommodations laws on the basis of sexual orientation, then the same argument would be valid for discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, age, disability, and any other basis.
With the details in the original case as I remember them I feel he should prevail. Artistic expression has almost always been considered a free speech issue and has been allowed even when controversial or seen to be without any artistic value. With this I feel it would be wrong for any government or person to compel someone to write, say, or create something that they do not believe in. Say the tables were turned and a pro-homosexual speaker were asked to create and give a speech against homosexuality. He is a regular speaker and hires himself out to do this service, should he be made to do this? Or an artist compelled to do a sculpture that that repulses them, or a writer to write something they find repulsive? I just feel it is not a good idea to make someone create something they are against, no matter what side you are on, it may come back to bit you.
Your scenarios of businesses of "pro-homosexual speakers" and sculptures are simply not analogous to anything related to public accommodations laws.
Briefly: Phillips claims that CADA compels speech, in violation of the First Amendment. But CADA literally says nothing about speech; it regulates conduct. CADA does not compel Phillips to either speak or host the government's message. Phillips claims that CADA compels him to speak a celebratory message about the marriage of same-sex couples or about same-sex marriage. But the law does not achieve that effect. As the Colorado court explained, Phillips remains free to express his views about same-sex marriage. Moreover, the idea that someone who sees one of Phillips' cakes will somehow understand it as Phillips' message celebrating same-sex marriage (or a particular marriage between a same-sex couple) is patently absurd: in the unlikely case that anyone would even know who baked the cake, people do not attribute a celebratory message to the baker. If any celebratory message is inferred from a wedding cake, the message is assumed to be that of the purchaser of the cake, not the baker (unless they are the same person).
Even if it were true that baking and selling wedding cakes is something other than what public accommodations laws refer to as “goods [and] services,” i.e., even if it were true that baking and selling wedding cakes are expressive activities such as generally protected by the First Amendment, that doesn't mean that the government cannot regulate such activity. If a law that burdens expressive activity meets the requirements of strict scrutiny, it's a constitutional law. The government regulates many forms of speech and expression. The requirements of strict scrutiny are that a law has a compelling governmental purpose, is narrowly tailored and is the least restrictive means for achieving that compelling governmental purpose. The anti-discrimination provisions of public accommodations laws have repeatedly been held to have a compelling governmental purpose--see
Roberts v. Jaycees (e.g., “. . . the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services . . . which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order.”). In pertaining to only businesses open to the public, and specifically exempting “places principally used for religious purposes,” CADA is narrowly tailored; and it's difficult to imagine a less restrictive way to achieve the desired goal than outlawing discrimination in the offerings of public goods and services. CADA fulfills the demands of strict scrutiny stipulated in the case law.