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Is there really Cause and Effect?

FranklinMichaelV.3

Well-Known Member
I'm not well versed in the philosophy of cause and effect. Growing up it seemed like a rather easy to grasp. I do X and I'll get Y. Much of what we do rely on cause and effect, and religion itself especially in Christianity positions God as a Cause and the Universe as an effect.

I've been trying to read up on causality lately and I'll admit it flies over my head, but it seems that the way we "perceive, think, or accept" causality may not be how it actually operates. I've also learned that a lot of things deal more with correlations rather than a singular known cause.

I was hoping someone could clear this up for me, and if a good debate comes out of it as well, the better :D
 

FranklinMichaelV.3

Well-Known Member
I hit my finger with a hammer, and it hurt. So, yes, there is cause and effect.

Right but is the hammer the cause of your pain? For instance takes someone with congenital analgesia, if you hit them with the hammer they don't feel pain, but it's not because the hammer didn't hit them. Their body doesn't register the pain, the hammer plays a role sure but it's not what causes pain though is it?
 

Kilgore Trout

Misanthropic Humanist
Right but is the hammer the cause of your pain? For instance takes someone with congenital analgesia, if you hit them with the hammer they don't feel pain, but it's not because the hammer didn't hit them. Their body doesn't register the pain, the hammer plays a role sure but it's not what causes pain though is it?

Causes can have many effects, and effects can have many causes. If you're not sure whether hitting your finger with a hammer will cause you pain, give it a try.
 

FranklinMichaelV.3

Well-Known Member
Causes can have many effects, and effects can have many causes. If you're not sure whether hitting your finger with a hammer will cause you pain, give it a try.

I know that hitting my finger with a hammer will lead to me having pain, but is it necessarily the cause of my pain, wouldn't it be considered a correlation, more so than a cause? For instance you can feel pain without being hit by a hammer, or anything some people have experienced pains that are strictly in their minds.
 

Willamena

Just me
Premium Member
Empirically speaking, we know effects and assign causes (hopefully with logic). Inference helps.
 

Kilgore Trout

Misanthropic Humanist
I know that hitting my finger with a hammer will lead to me having pain, but is it necessarily the cause of my pain, wouldn't it be considered a correlation, more so than a cause? For instance you can feel pain without being hit by a hammer, or anything some people have experienced pains that are strictly in their minds.

Yes, but if you hit your finger with a hammer, that particular pain that you will feel will be directly caused by the hammer smashing your finger. Hammers hitting fingers don't cause all pain, everywhere. However, this doesn't mean it isn't the cause of pain in instances where people hit their fingers with hammers.
 

FranklinMichaelV.3

Well-Known Member
Yes, but if you hit your finger with a hammer, that particular pain that you will feel will be directly caused by the hammer smashing your finger. Hammers hitting fingers don't cause all pain, everywhere. However, this doesn't mean it isn't the cause of pain in instances where people hit their fingers with hammers.

Ah okay
 

YmirGF

Bodhisattva in Recovery
Then again, in the case of drug addiction "effect" most definitely affects "cause". If it were not for the "effect" there would be no good reason to pump large doses of random chemicals into our bodies. Unfortunately or fortunately, depending on how you look at it, there is a penalty for this effect.
 

Call_of_the_Wild

Well-Known Member
I'm not well versed in the philosophy of cause and effect. Growing up it seemed like a rather easy to grasp. I do X and I'll get Y. Much of what we do rely on cause and effect, and religion itself especially in Christianity positions God as a Cause and the Universe as an effect.

I've been trying to read up on causality lately and I'll admit it flies over my head, but it seems that the way we "perceive, think, or accept" causality may not be how it actually operates. I've also learned that a lot of things deal more with correlations rather than a singular known cause.

I was hoping someone could clear this up for me, and if a good debate comes out of it as well, the better :D

You've just said it yourself; If you do X, you will get Y. Whatever the result (Y) will be is dependent upon any number of underlining factors, and these factors are themselves dependent upon a different X and Y, but they are all correlated with each other.

There is a such thing as "simultaneous causation" at which we can imagine a bowling ball resting on a cushion for eternity. The ball is causing the indentation of the cushion, but there are no preceding events leading up to the indentation.

Either way, the concept is clear.
 

PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
You've just said it yourself; If you do X, you will get Y. Whatever the result (Y) will be is dependent upon any number of underlining factors, and these factors are themselves dependent upon a different X and Y, but they are all correlated with each other.

There is a such thing as "simultaneous causation" at which we can imagine a bowling ball resting on a cushion for eternity. The ball is causing the indentation of the cushion, but there are no preceding events leading up to the indentation.

Either way, the concept is clear.
The indentation doesn't have a cause - it was always there.
 

cottage

Well-Known Member
We don’t see cause. The Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference identifies the impossibility of directly observing causal effects. David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature said if we strike an object there is no reason to suppose, other than by referring to past experience, that it will not remain stationary rather than being given to motion. Any scientific explanation that appears to account for the object’s motion holds true only so long as the action can be demonstrated in experience. No matter how many times I kick a football to find to find it carries forward in motion I am not justified in stating, as a logical law, that striking the ball with my foot will always have the same result.

Okay, it is the case that every effect must have a cause only in the sense that the term ‘effect’ is taken imply the term ‘cause’; but there is no logical necessity outside this meaning, just as we might say that mermaids are part fish, part human, but which is not to say that mermaids must exist. David Hume said we observe that B follows A and the mind wants to make a necessary connection between the two and announces boldly that A is the cause of B. So it isn’t a question of reason but a case of learned experience, custom and habit. Against that it might be objected that we are born with an instinct that makes us wary of fire, which might suggest that the significance of direct experience is not a great as we suppose. For if experience can be shown to play a smaller part in our understanding might the ability of fire to cause pain and destroy tissue be innate and true independent of experience? Well, we should consider the very first of any species on observing a flame. On that first sighting there is nothing self-evident in the flame from which the new species could deduce the ability to combust objects. Only by observation and experimentation, by which we mean experience, can the benefits and dangers of fire and flames be understood. And so it seems likely that instinct has its ground in the first instance of a particular experience, which is then passed down to us in our genes along with the custom of inferring a connection between other events that always appear to happen together. But in any case there is no necessary connection.
 

PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
We don’t see cause. The Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference identifies the impossibility of directly observing causal effects. David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature said if we strike an object there is no reason to suppose, other than by referring to past experience, that it will not remain stationary rather than being given to motion. Any scientific explanation that appears to account for the object’s motion holds true only so long as the action can be demonstrated in experience. No matter how many times I kick a football to find to find it carries forward in motion I am not justified in stating, as a logical law, that striking the ball with my foot will always have the same result.
However, you can say it will happen with high confidence. :D
 

FranklinMichaelV.3

Well-Known Member
We don’t see cause. The Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference identifies the impossibility of directly observing causal effects. David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature said if we strike an object there is no reason to suppose, other than by referring to past experience, that it will not remain stationary rather than being given to motion. Any scientific explanation that appears to account for the object’s motion holds true only so long as the action can be demonstrated in experience. No matter how many times I kick a football to find to find it carries forward in motion I am not justified in stating, as a logical law, that striking the ball with my foot will always have the same result.

Okay, it is the case that every effect must have a cause only in the sense that the term ‘effect’ is taken imply the term ‘cause’; but there is no logical necessity outside this meaning, just as we might say that mermaids are part fish, part human, but which is not to say that mermaids must exist. David Hume said we observe that B follows A and the mind wants to make a necessary connection between the two and announces boldly that A is the cause of B. So it isn’t a question of reason but a case of learned experience, custom and habit. Against that it might be objected that we are born with an instinct that makes us wary of fire, which might suggest that the significance of direct experience is not a great as we suppose. For if experience can be shown to play a smaller part in our understanding might the ability of fire to cause pain and destroy tissue be innate and true independent of experience? Well, we should consider the very first of any species on observing a flame. On that first sighting there is nothing self-evident in the flame from which the new species could deduce the ability to combust objects. Only by observation and experimentation, by which we mean experience, can the benefits and dangers of fire and flames be understood. And so it seems likely that instinct has its ground in the first instance of a particular experience, which is then passed down to us in our genes along with the custom of inferring a connection between other events that always appear to happen together. But in any case there is no necessary connection.

I'm going to have to read this over several times to really get the gist of it.
 
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Slapstick

Active Member
I'm not well versed in the philosophy of cause and effect. Growing up it seemed like a rather easy to grasp. I do X and I'll get Y. Much of what we do rely on cause and effect, and religion itself especially in Christianity positions God as a Cause and the Universe as an effect.

I've been trying to read up on causality lately and I'll admit it flies over my head, but it seems that the way we "perceive, think, or accept" causality may not be how it actually operates. I've also learned that a lot of things deal more with correlations rather than a singular known cause.

I was hoping someone could clear this up for me, and if a good debate comes out of it as well, the better :D
I would say cause and effect has a lot to do with the observer or subjective bias. The effects are not always the result of the cause, based on whether the cause is or was intentional or unintentional. In other words, the results would be totally random with no expected result.
 
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bobhikes

Nondetermined
Premium Member
Yes there is cause and effect

All causes create effect.
All effects have a cause.
The cause can not always be determined for the effect.
The effect can not always be determined for the cause.
Nothing is random however everything is unique so this makes it impossible to determine the full cause/effect relation.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Short Answer to title thread: No.
Long answer:
Causality is inconsistent with modern physics
A common model of causation is counterfactual definiteness. It's problematic for quantum physics (hence Einstein's quip about the moon still being there if you don't look), but it's good enough here. Counterfactual definiteness gives us causality by asking whether, if some action hadn't been taken, some event/effect/process/etc., would have happened anyway. If I hadn't dropped the glass, it wouldn't have broken. If they hadn't had sex, she wouldn't be pregnant. If they hadn't smoked 10 packs a day, they wouldn't have gotten cancer. And so on. We can cause conscious experiences physically using this model of causation (one of the strongest). It's even easier to do so with newer models that incorporate quantum causality, as these involve chance-raising.

Linguistically, cause and effect is easily expressed and easily expressed naively. For example, I might say that the reason I am craving cookies is because the environmental conditions tens of thousands of years ago made humans who craved sugars, fats, and salts more than other humans more likely to survive to pass on their genes. So the cause for my craving is my ancestors from so long ago we're all descended from them. On the other hand, I'm hungry. And when I'm hungry I crave things like foods high in sugars, fats, and/or salts. So hunger is the cause. But my stomach has connections to my peripheral nervous system and both are connected to salivary glands, cognitive-emotional regulation networks, etc., responsible for both producing signals that my stomach is empty and generating feedback loops that influence how hungry I feel and what I crave. However, each cell, electrical impulse, etc., is made up of things like electrons. So clearly everything is caused by tiny nonlocalized particles interacting with God-knows-what. As modern physics postulates that we cannot (even in theory) know with certainty particular aspects about quantum "particles", it could very well be that we will be forced to accept interpretations of quantum mechanics involving the postulation of quantum processes that are created by infinitely many universes. Such theories pretty much preclude any "ultimate" causal model in which we can explain anything and everything through particle physics.

So we have to rely on a different causal model. Namely, we wish to look at things like "cause" in terms of Events/Processes. The question "what caused the glass to break?" has only one verb that has tense: the verb "caused". The event in question, however, is the breaking of a class. The infinitive form of "break" makes this event atemporal: it is conceptualized not as occurring through time but as a singular "whole", an "event". We can't even really break down the event in real time. When did it start? When I dropped the glass? But it wasn't broken then. When it "hit" the floor? The moment the molecules of the glass first made contact with those of the floor, it didn't break. Very soon after, the vibrations of the matter of the glass were sufficient enough to begin the process of molecules dividing that would become visible breaks and eventually result in broken chunks of glass. But it is impossible to say when this start and probably even when we can agree to say the glass is breaking because of it.

In order to speak about causation, we need to understand that causes are conceptualized entities that do not correspond to anything that is necessarily identifiable as physical in the world:

"A simple representation of components to a system is the input/output block diagram. In this representation, each block represents an agent that effects a change on something, namely its input. The result of this interaction is some output. The abstract way of representing this is
gif.latex

where f is the process that takes input A into output B. Clearly B can now become the input for some other process so that we can visualize a system as a network of these interactions. The relational system represents a very special kind of transition this way. Rather than break everything down in the usual reductionist manner, these transitions are selected for an important distinguishing property, namely their expression of process rather than material things directly. This is best explained with an example. The system Rosen uses for an example is the Metabolism-Repair or [M,R] system. The process, f, in this case stands for the entire metabolism going on in an organism. This is, indeed, quite an abstraction. Clearly, the use of such a representation is meant to suppress the myriad of detail that would only serve to distract us from the more simple argument put this way. It does more because it allows processes we know are going on to be divorced from the requirement that they be fragmentable or reducible to material parts alone...
The transition, f, which is being called metabolism, is a mapping taking some set of metabolites, A, into some set of products, B. What are the members of A? Really everything in the organism has to be included in A, and there has to be an implicit agreement that at least some of the members of A can enter the organism from its environment. What are the members of B? Many, if not all, of the members of A since the transitions in the reduced system are all strung together in the many intricate patterns or networks that make up the organism’s metabolism. It also must be true that some members of B leave the organism as products of metabolism. The usefulness of this abstract representation becomes clearer if the causal nature of the events is made clear...
the mapping, f...is a functional component of the system we are developing. A functional component has many interesting attributes. First of all, it exists independent of the material parts that make it possible. This idea has been so frequently misunderstood that it requires a careful discussion. Reductionism has taught us that every thing in a real system can be expressed as a collection of material parts. This is not so in the case of functional components. We only know about them because they do something. Looking at the parts involved does not lead us to knowing about them if they are not doing that something. Furthermore, they only exist in a given context. “Metabolism” as discussed here has no meaning in a machine. It also would have no meaning if we had all the chemical components of the organism in jars on a lab bench. Now we have a way of dealing with context dependence in a system theoretical manner. Not only are they only defined in their context, they also are constantly contributing to that context. This is as self- referential a situation as there is. What it means is that if the context, the particular system, is destroyed or even severely altered, the context defining the functional component will no longer exist and the functional component will also disappear...
The semantic parallel with language is in the concept of functional component. Pull things apart as reductionism asks us to do and something essential about the system is lost. Philosophically this has revolutionary consequences. The acceptance of this idea means that one recognizes ontological status for something other than mere atoms and molecules. It says that material reality is only a part of that real world we are so anxious to understand. In addition to material reality there are functional components that are also essential to our understanding of any complex reality.

Mikulecky, D. C. (2005). The Circle That Never Ends: Can Complexity be Made Simple?. In Complexity in Chemistry, Biology, and Ecology (pp. 97-153). Springer
"The stretching and folding operation of a chaotic attractor systematically removes the initial information and replaces it with new information: the stretch makes small-scale uncertainties larger, the fold brings widely separated trajectories together and erases large-scale information. Thus chaotic attractors act as a kind of pump bringing microscopic fluctuations up to a macroscopic expression. In this light it is clear that no exact solution, no short cut to tell the future, can exist. After a brief time interval the uncertainty specified by the initial measurement covers the entire attractor and all predictive power is lost: there is simply no causal connection between past and future."
James P. Crutchfield, J. Doyne Farmer, Norman H. Packard, and Robert S. Shaw

...

"A more dramatic example of mind– brain causation comes from the world of neurophysiology. Recent work by Max Bennett (Bennett and Barden, 2001) in Australia has determined that neurons continually put out little tendrils that can link up with others and effectively rewire the brain on a time scale of twenty minutes! This seems to serve the function of adapting the neuro-circuitry to operate more effectively in the light of various mental experiences (e.g. learning to play a video game). To the physicist this looks deeply puzzling. How can a higher-level phenomenon like ‘experience’, which is also a global concept, have causal control over microscopic regions at the sub-neuronal level? The tendrils will be pushed and pulled by local forces (presumably good old electromagnetic ones). So how does a force at a point in space (the end of a tendril) ‘know about’, say, the thrill of a game?"
Paul Davies
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
I'm going to have to read this over several times to really get the gist of it.

Hume's point essentially boils down to two things- first, that there is nothing more to causation than conjunction/correlation. We never experience such things as causes, or causality, as a force, principle, or object; for instance, we see the billiard ball hit the other, and the second go rolling across the table, and so we say, "the one was the cause of the other". But causality was not given in the experience. What we refer to as causation- such as a billiard ball striking and imparting motion to another- is simply the constant/consistent conjunction of certain events- i.e. every time we see A, we see B.

The second point is that causal connections are not logical or necessary connections- one cannot validly infer the cause from an effect. For instance, it is not logically necessary that the second ball move upon being struck by the first- logically speaking, it could remain in place, explode into bits, or sprout a rocket-pack and fly to Mars. This is, in essence, the difference between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning; whereas from the argument "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man" the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" follows necessarily (logically), an argument involving causality (induction), does not logically guarantee the conclusion. For instance, the following is not a valid argument-

Every time the billiard ball strikes the other, it goes rolling across the table.
The billiard ball struck the other, therefore it went rolling across the table.

So our inferences or conclusions about causality, or which involve induction, are not deductively valid, and cannot be justified on deductive grounds. But they cannot be justified on inductive grounds either, as this would beg the question. This dilemma is known as "the problem of induction".
 
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