Woah there, Big Guy! That's an indefensible statement unless you, Mikkel, are god and get to make the rules! Are you god?
It is conditional on humans remaining humans. Of course in principle God has knowledge, but since we have no knowledge of God and humans are not Gods, in practice as long as induction holds and the world remains the same, there is no knowledge as justified true beliefs.
We can imagine we have knowledge and consider what it means to have knowledge, but we can't do it in practice.
We run into Agrippa's trilemma for justification and the problem of what objective reality is other than being independent of the mind. I.e. the-thing-in-itself and the different skeptical versions of whether the world is fair or a computer simulated word and other versions.
So I am not claiming an absolute, I am stating a conditional claim. If knowledge remains as requiring a mind and reasoning, then as long as those limitations are in place, there is no knowledge of objective reality in practice in regards to what objective reality really is.
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3. The definition of relativism
There is no general agreed upon definition of cognitive relativism. Here is how it has been described by a few major theorists:
- “Reason is whatever the norms of the local culture believe it to be”. (Hilary Putnam, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (Cambridge, 1983), p. 235.)
- “The choice between competing theories is arbitrary, since there is no such thing as objective truth.” (Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II (London, 1963), p. 369f.)
- “There is no unique truth, no unique objective reality” (Ernest Gellner, Relativism and the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 1985), p. 84.)
- “There is no substantive overarching framework in which radically different and alternative schemes are commensurable” (Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 11-12.)
- “There is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society—ours—uses in one area of enquiry” (Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (Cambridge, 1991), p. 23.)
Without doubt, this lack of consensus about exactly what relativism asserts is one reason for the unsatisfactory character of much of the debate about its coherence and plausibility. Another reason is that very few philosophers are willing to apply the label “relativist” to themselves. Even Richard Rorty, who is widely regarded as one of the most articulate defenders of relativism, prefers to describe himself as a “pragmatist”, an “ironist” and an “ethnocentrist”.
Nevertheless, a reasonable definition of relativism may be constructed: one that describes the fundamental outlook of thinkers like Rorty, Kuhn, or Foucault while raising the hackles of their critics in the right way.
Cognitive relativism consists of two claims:
(1) The truth-value of any statement is always relative to some particular standpoint;
(2) No standpoint is metaphysically privileged over all others.
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Cognitive Relativism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy