OK, but I would note that tje foundation of my assertions is that the fundamental particles are *defined* by how they interact. How something interacts with other things is what it is.
In many cases, yes. We can point to the physical processes in the brain that *are* the sensation of 'seeing yellow'.
Once again, I base my assertions on the actual evidence from brain studies.
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I don't think it is an illusion, exactly. It is an epiphenomenon produced by the activity of the brain.
Actually, we can do something easy like this.
OK, I read it. Schrodinger was a brilliant man and that particular essay was very good. But it was written long before we even knew about DNA. We have learned a few things since then.
So, I have learned Schrodingers intuition about these things as he had it, when? Way before any detailed studies of the brain were done? Well before any type of imagine technology existed?
We *do* see differences in how the neurons people have process colors to give the slightly different color triangles. Furthermore, a good part of that happens well before consciousness.
And, again, I think that studies since then have negated his position.
I *strongly* disagree. Consciousness is intimately relational: it depends on processing of information from the senses, on processing internally stored information, on telling the muscles when and how to move, etc. We are not passive observers. Our minds (our brains) process the information, using expectations and other data to give us what we actually experience.
And I disagree. You can't discern it without changing your own mind state.
If you record the changes from the empty file, yes.
Only because in that axiomatic system, the other numbers are defined in terms of zero. it is equally easy to start with 1. or to give the axioms for the integers where there is no 'first'.
All this shows is that the processing of the color space cannot be perfectly (or even mostly) symmetrical. So?
Now it looks to me that you are repeating unfounded assumptions.
On the contrary, in your response, I find nothing but unfounded assertions.
You often say "I strongly disagree". But I find no reasoning for your disagreement.
You cannot explain why you think that ‘Hard Problem of consciousness/Explanatory Gap’ is not a problem when you cannot explain how matter characterised by properties like mass, charge, and momentum give rise to phenomenal consciousness. You do not seem to even accept ‘Mental Causation’ (even while using your mind). The three main issues are repeated below.
To brush away the ‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’, you take the plea that consciousness is mere epiphenomenalism, even as steam is epiphenomena of the steam engine. Just as steam has no causal power over the engine, epiphenomenalism holds that consciousness/mind has no causal effect on the physical body whatsoever. This is absurd, outdated, and blatantly wrong. It cannot even accommodate the possibility of mental causation, which is the basis of our legal and moral systems. Epiphenomenalism is only logically consistent with the complete absence of mentality; mindless bodies would function in exactly the same way, as the mind has no capacity to generate any causal impact. Epiphenomenalism cannot account for the first party experiences that we all have.
Epiphenomenalism is self-refuting since, if the mind did not have any causal effect on the body, then there should not be any recognition of it.
If epiphenomenalism holds true then rational considerations can have no causal influence on our beliefs and actions. Epiphenomenalism has been rejected by physicalist philosophers Daniel Dennet and Karl Popper on the ground of the evolutionary theory with the argument that if the mind was not causal then evolution would have got rid of the mind long ago. But mental causation is self-evident to everyone.
Then, you accuse Schrödinger’s views from ‘What is Life’, referred in my last post, to be dated. But have you addressed his thesis? Has the following conclusion of Schrödinger become false?
“…. Two general facts (a) that all scientific knowledge is based on sense perception, and (b) that none the less the scientific views of natural processes formed in this way lack all sensual qualities and therefore cannot account for the latter.”
If Schrodinger is dated, I think
Sam Harris is not so dated. Let us see what he says in his book: "
Waking Up".
……In scientific terms, however, consciousness remains notoriously difficult to understand, or even to define.
……..whatever else consciousness may or may not entail in physical terms, the difference between it and unconsciousness is a matter of subjective experience.
……experience is one thing, and our growing scientific picture of reality is another. ……..And whether something seems conscious from the outside is never quite the point. ……..To say that consciousness may only seem to exist, from the inside, is to admit its existence in full—for if things seem any way at all, that is consciousness.
…….We know, of course, that human minds are the product of human brains. There is simply no question that your ability to decode and understand this sentence depends upon neurophysiological events taking place inside your head at this moment. But most of this mental work occurs entirely in the dark, and it is a mystery why any part of the process should be attended by consciousness.
…….Nothing about a brain, when surveyed as a physical system, suggests that it is a locus of experience. Were we not already brimming with consciousness ourselves, we would find no evidence for it in the universe—nor would we have any notion of the many experiential states that it gives rise to.
……we have committed ourselves to this much: First there is a physical world, unconscious and seething with unperceived events; then, by virtue of some physical property or process, consciousness itself springs, or staggers, into being. This idea seems to me not merely strange but perfectly mysterious. That doesn’t mean it isn’t true. When we linger over the details, however, this notion of emergence seems merely a placeholder for a miracle.”
……This situation has been characterized as an “explanatory gap” and as the “hard problem of consciousness.
………Any attempt to understand consciousness in terms of brain activity merely correlates a person’s ability to report an experience (demonstrating that he was aware of it) with specific states of his brain. While such correlations can amount to fascinating neuroscience, they bring us no closer to explaining the emergence of consciousness itself.
And more. You can yourselves read the rest of the book
if you really are open to new knowledge.
To say that consciousness is relational is to equate consciousness with the infamous Ponzi scheme that is built on myth. If consciousness is merely relational, what is the validity of all your claims? On the other hand, we know that self-awareness is intrinsic to existence. All our knowledge is based on the premise that our aware self is intrinsic to all knowledge processes. Although, it is elementary that the continual changes of world states are discernible only because of an intrinsic competence to know, extreme commitment to physicalism will not let one accept this. But let us see what great Bertrand Russel had to say on this.
It was Bertrand Russel who held that science reveals the structure of the world but not its intrinsic nature. According to him, since structure requires something non-structural in order to make the transition from mere abstraction to concrete existence, “the core of subjectivity common to all consciousness”, could be postulated as the intrinsic ground of the structural features outlined by physical science. This has come to be known as Russellian Monism that holds that consciousness, in its most basic form of bare subjectivity, is the intrinsic nature which ‘grounds’ or makes concrete the system of relationally defined structure discerned by physics. By and large, we have no access to this level of reality except for a limited acquaintance with it in our own experience.
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I reject all your arguments with adequate reasoning and with support from respected scientists and philosophers. However, I recognise that with a preexisting commitment to physicalism our views can never converge. This song depicts the situation.
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