• Welcome to Religious Forums, a friendly forum to discuss all religions in a friendly surrounding.

    Your voice is missing! You will need to register to get access to the following site features:
    • Reply to discussions and create your own threads.
    • Our modern chat room. No add-ons or extensions required, just login and start chatting!
    • Access to private conversations with other members.

    We hope to see you as a part of our community soon!

Non-physical entities with causal powers: computer programs

atanu

Member
Premium Member
I decided to put this post here as this is where such posts normally go (rather than e.g., the "Science & Technology" section, which isn't a debate forum, or the "General Debates" section). I have, more than once, taken issue with comparisons between the mind or brain and computers. Also, computers are about as close as we can get to a wholly reducible system as
1) We build them, from the theoretical designs of Church and Turing to the actual implementations from the ENIAC to the computer/smartphone/tablet/etc. you are using to access this post.
2) They are quite literally physical instantiations of formal logic.
3) They are modularly and hierarchically organized (unlike most natural systems and in particular all living systems), especially with respect to function (unlike the brain, where memory systems are not only--at least somewhat--indistinct from one another, but are also indistinct from any would-be processor). So RAM, for example, is a particular type of memory located in a specific place that interacts with other likewise functionally organized components of the system in deliberate, pre-defined ways.
4) Everything about computers is rule-based, finite, discrete, and just generally the seeming epitome of a reducible system in basically all senses of the term.

So I found it interesting when, in the volume
Aguirre, A., Foster, B., & Merali, Z. (Eds.). (2015). Questioning the Foundations of Physics: Which of Our Fundamental Assumptions are Wrong? (The Frontiers Collection). Springer.

I found computers used as an example not only of non-physical entities but anti-reductionism in the contributing paper "Recognizing Top-Down Causation" by Ellis. I've included a summary of his use of this example, and for those who wish for an even more minimal amount of information part A is the most relevant:
"Definition 1 (Causal Effect) If making a change in a quantity X results in a reliable demonstrable change in a quantity Y in a given context, then X has a causal effect on Y...
Definition 2 (Existence) If Y is a physical entity made up of ordinary matter, and X is some kind of entity that has a demonstrable causal effect on Y as per Definition 1, then we must acknowledge that X also exists (even if it is not made up of such matter)...
A: Causal Efficacy of Non Physical entities: Both the program and the data are non-physical entities, indeed so is all software. A program is not a physical thing you can point to, but by Definition 2 it certainly exists. You can point to a CD or flashdrive where it is stored, but that is not the thing in itself: it is a medium in which it is stored. The program itself is an abstract entity, shaped by abstract logic. Is the software nothing but its realisation through a specific set of stored electronic states in the computer memory banks? No it is not because it is the precise pattern in those states that matters: a higher level relation that is not apparent at the scale of the electrons themselves. Its a relational thing (and if you get the relations between the symbols wrong, so you have a syntax error, it will all come to a grinding halt). This abstract nature of software is realised in the concept of virtual machines, which occur at every level in the computer hierarchy except the bottom one. But this tower of virtual machines causes physical effects in the real world, for example when a computer controls a robot in an assembly line to create physical artefacts.
B: Logical relations rule at the higher levels: The dynamics at all levels is driven by the logic of the algorithms employed in the high level programs. They decide what computations take place, and they have the power to change the world. This abstract logic cannot be deduced from the laws of physics: they operate in a completely different realm. Furthermore the relevant higher level variables in those algorithms cannot be obtained by coarse graining any lower level physical states. They are not coarse-grained or emergent variables: they are assigned variables, with specific abstract properties that then mediate their behaviour.
C: Underlying physics allows arbitrary programs and data: Digital computers are universal computers. The underlying physics does not constrain the logic or type of computation possible, which Turing has shown is universal. Physics does not constrain the data used, nor what can be computed (although it does constrain the speed at which this can be done). It enables the higher level actions rather than constraining them. The program logic dictates the course of things.
D: Multiple realisability at lower levels. The same high level logic can be implemented in many different ways: electronic (transistors), electrical (relays), hydraulic (valves), biological (interacting molecules) for example. The logic of the program can be realised by any of these underlying physical entities, which clearly demonstrates that it is not the lower level physics that is driving the causation. This multiple realisability is a key feature characterising top-down action: when some high level logic is driving causation at lower levels, it does not matter how that logic is physically instantiated: it can be realised in many different ways."

I do not know if I have the correct question or not. Let me ask it anyway. How the non-physical connects to and drives the physical layer?
 

Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
Nakosis, I was simply pointing out that evolution is not a random process. It is guided. As for "evolutionary synthesis", that refers to a broader perspective on evolutionary processes than classical Darwinian, not a new theory that replaces the role of natural selection. Indeed, non-random natural selection is still embraced as the central factor guiding evolution. That observation has not changed. It's actually very important to point out that evolution is not really a "chance" or "random" process, because that is a very common misconception.

That's fine. I just thought it equally important to note that a lot has changed since the theory of natural selection was developed. But basically we are in agreement, it is not simply a matter of random mutation.

My real question is what role intelligence plays in evolution.
 

Runewolf1973

Materialism/Animism
My real question is what role intelligence plays in evolution.


Human intelligence is allowing us to live longer and we are we are getting stronger mentally, but weaker physically overall due to not having to chase after our food with pointy sticks.
 

Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member

That is a very complex discussion which is still in the process of being answered as far as I can tell. Even the role of natural selection is still be questioned by scientists.

Everything from natural disasters to intelligent selection can affect evolution. Scientist from many different disciplines have come together to try and answer that. Me, as an armchair philosopher, I not even going to pretend I have an answer to that.
 

Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
Human intelligence is allowing us to live longer and we are we are getting stronger mentally, but weaker physically overall due to not having to chase after our food with pointy sticks.

Sure but I was thinking along the lines of artificial selection or selective breeding. Genetics also has a role in evolution. As we learn about DNA, how we humans might possible be able to alter the course of evolution.
 

Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
Sorry, if I was unclear. I was using "linguistic entity" in a broad sense to mean any instrument whose primary purpose is to convey information. In the case of a computer program, as in the case of a novel, there is a physical instrument used to convey the information, but the information content goes beyond the physical signal. Information theory is only about information associated with signal processing, not the actual meaning or significance of the information conveyed by the signal. So I felt that the issues you were raising in the OP went beyond the fact that a program is a kind of "non-physical causer". Any linguistic entity is that, but they all come sheathed in physical "bodies" or signals. They have this interesting dual nature. So you can use a word like "book" to refer to a physical object or an informational object, and the semantic properties of the word shift dramatically when you switch between them.

Are there any theories how information gets assigned meaning? This to me seems the non-physical which I don't really have an explanation for.
 

Runewolf1973

Materialism/Animism
I even read somewhere that primitive man's use of fire may have altered our body chemistry and genes in such a way that resulted in our gradual loss of hair. The aquisition of fire was a big stage in our evolution.
 

Runewolf1973

Materialism/Animism
Sure but I was thinking along the lines of artificial selection or selective breeding. Genetics also has a role in evolution. As we learn about DNA, how we humans might possible be able to alter the course of evolution.


We have no doubt altered the course of evolution with modern medicine.
 

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
Are there any theories how information gets assigned meaning? This to me seems the non-physical which I don't really have an explanation for.
Yes. That is essentially what theories of semantics are about, but the topic is huge. I just thought that Legion raised some interesting points about what we mean when we talk about computer programs, which are really entities designed for ultimately compilation into so-called machine language--instructions that control computer activity.

As for evolution, that topic is best taken up elsewhere, I think. Intelligence obviously enhances the survival of organisms such as ourselves, so it would naturally be selected for in our species. The process of evolution itself is a fully automatic process that requires no intelligence to be set in motion. Broadly speaking, it affects any self-replicating process in physical reality. Biological evolution is just a type of evolutionary process.
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
A physical environment that is stable enough not to disrupt the self-replication process. Not an intelligent "watchmaker".

Yeah. I knew your answer. Thanks.

Can you provide us with one or two examples of this 'directing' by the physical environment? To start with, I can say that our own physical conditions constrain a lot of our motives and actions. Are you pointing to that?
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
As for evolution, that topic is best taken up elsewhere, I think. Intelligence obviously enhances the survival of organisms such as ourselves, so it would naturally be selected for in our species. The process of evolution itself is a fully automatic process that requires no intelligence to be set in motion. Broadly speaking, it affects any self-replicating process in physical reality. Biological evolution is just a type of evolutionary process.

I wonder as to how the so-called unconscious automatic selection process selects intelligence? Is there any agency separate from us that is doing the selecting?
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Sorry, if I was unclear. I was using "linguistic entity" in a broad sense to mean any instrument whose primary purpose is to convey information. In the case of a computer program, as in the case of a novel, there is a physical instrument used to convey the information, but the information content goes beyond the physical signal. Information theory is only about information associated with signal processing, not the actual meaning or significance of the information conveyed by the signal. So I felt that the issues you were raising in the OP went beyond the fact that a program is a kind of "non-physical causer". Any linguistic entity is that, but they all come sheathed in physical "bodies" or signals. They have this interesting dual nature. So you can use a word like "book" to refer to a physical object or an informational object, and the semantic properties of the word shift dramatically when you switch between them.
Ah. Thanks!
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Yes, but that is all that is necessary to define them as "physical". What are electrons, protons and neutrons made of, what are quarks made of?
Perhaps a more appropriate question would be "do 'particles' like electrons or quarks exist, and if so what can we say about their nature?" This is because
1) A large number of particles are said to exist because (essentially) they balance equations. With the advent of quantum mechanics, we lost the capacity to relate the representations of properties of systems (such as the system's state) with any known "objective" entity as well as the ability to assert that entities have the properties they do independent of "observation". Most modern physics builds off of this fundamental disconnect between the mathematical formalism of physics and any "objective" reality by using mathematics to derive conclusions about the nature of reality (hence the standard model, QED, QFT, M-theory, etc.). Anything that builds upon quantum mechanics is building upon a mathematical formalism that relates to the physical world in some way we don't understand and at the moment appear to be incapable of ever understanding. Thus particles are not simply found, tested, or investigated empirically because we can't do this. Rather, they are quite fundamentally the result of mathematical derivations.
2) We know quantum mechanics is not "complete", in that regardless of whether or not general relativity provides us with an "accurate" explanation of gravitational effects, any physical theory must deal with the clear evidence that at least special relativity or an equivalent relativistic model must be used. Quantum mechanics is inconsistent with special relativity, which has been and remains a driving force behind field theories in quantum physics (simply put, QM requires highly oscillating energy in microscopic systems but doesn't allow for the matter-energy equivalence principle required by relativistic physics). So any theory, from QED to particle physics, that builds on QM requires building upon a theory of physical reality that doesn't describe physical reality in any known way (and that many argue doesn't describe it at all).

There is a force of some kind which under the right circumstances we can measure.
In QFT/particle physics, gravitation is a particle (the graviton). We "measure" it by mathematically inserting it. In general relativity, gravitation doesn't exist (the geometry of spacetime gives us the mechanics that would appear to result from the force of gravity). In neither case can measurement determine much of anything about this force, which remains perhaps the unsolved problem in modern physics.

Physical we usually mean a "solid" object, but that doesn't seem to be the way it is used in physics.
The problem is more extreme. A physical system in physics frequently refers to a system that doesn't exist as anything other than a mathematical entity in an abstract, mathematical "space" (such as Hilbert space).

When scientist preform an experiment the object they detect is created because they have caused an interaction of forces.
Ignoring the problems caused by more complicated physics, even in quantum mechanics we know this is false. In classical physics, we performed experiments by preparing a system in such as way as to isolate it and measure some property under certain conditions that didn't disturb the system. In quantum mechanics, preparing a system involves fundamentally disturbing it repeatedly until we have no idea what the system is but have a mathematical, statistical representation of such that when we perform what we call "measurement" we can relate the mathematical formalism to outcomes using statistical operators.
 

Runewolf1973

Materialism/Animism
Perhaps a more appropriate question would be "do 'particles' like electrons or quarks exist, and if so what can we say about their nature?" This is because
1) A large number of particles are said to exist because (essentially) they balance equations. With the advent of quantum mechanics, we lost the capacity to relate the representations of properties of systems (such as the system's state) with any known "objective" entity as well as the ability to assert that entities have the properties they do independent of "observation". Most modern physics builds off of this fundamental disconnect between the mathematical formalism of physics and any "objective" reality by using mathematics to derive conclusions about the nature of reality (hence the standard model, QED, QFT, M-theory, etc.). Anything that builds upon quantum mechanics is building upon a mathematical formalism that relates to the physical world in some way we don't understand and at the moment appear to be incapable of ever understanding. Thus particles are not simply found, tested, or investigated empirically because we can't do this. Rather, they are quite fundamentally the result of mathematical derivations.
2) We know quantum mechanics is not "complete", in that regardless of whether or not general relativity provides us with an "accurate" explanation of gravitational effects, any physical theory must deal with the clear evidence that at least special relativity or an equivalent relativistic model must be used. Quantum mechanics is inconsistent with special relativity, which has been and remains a driving force behind field theories in quantum physics (simply put, QM requires highly oscillating energy in microscopic systems but doesn't allow for the matter-energy equivalence principle required by relativistic physics). So any theory, from QED to particle physics, that builds on QM requires building upon a theory of physical reality that doesn't describe physical reality in any known way (and that many argue doesn't describe it at all).


In QFT/particle physics, gravitation is a particle (the graviton). We "measure" it by mathematically inserting it. In general relativity, gravitation doesn't exist (the geometry of spacetime gives us the mechanics that would appear to result from the force of gravity). In neither case can measurement determine much of anything about this force, which remains perhaps the unsolved problem in modern physics.


The problem is more extreme. A physical system in physics frequently refers to a system that doesn't exist as anything other than a mathematical entity in an abstract, mathematical "space" (such as Hilbert space).


Ignoring the problems caused by more complicated physics, even in quantum mechanics we know this is false. In classical physics, we performed experiments by preparing a system in such as way as to isolate it and measure some property under certain conditions that didn't disturb the system. In quantum mechanics, preparing a system involves fundamentally disturbing it repeatedly until we have no idea what the system is but have a mathematical, statistical representation of such that when we perform what we call "measurement" we can relate the mathematical formalism to outcomes using statistical operators.


On a larger scale gravity and electromagnetism affect us and everything around us on a constant daily basis. Without the forces which hold atoms together we would not have the various elements. So what is real? Perhaps everything can be boiled down to mathematics, but I think there is more to reality than just the equations. What do you think reality or this universe is composed of? The way I see it, interaction is essential, everything interacts in some way.
 
Last edited:

viole

Ontological Naturalist
Premium Member
I decided to put this post here as this is where such posts normally go (rather than e.g., the "Science & Technology" section, which isn't a debate forum, or the "General Debates" section). I have, more than once, taken issue with comparisons between the mind or brain and computers. Also, computers are about as close as we can get to a wholly reducible system as
1) We build them, from the theoretical designs of Church and Turing to the actual implementations from the ENIAC to the computer/smartphone/tablet/etc. you are using to access this post.
2) They are quite literally physical instantiations of formal logic.
3) They are modularly and hierarchically organized (unlike most natural systems and in particular all living systems), especially with respect to function (unlike the brain, where memory systems are not only--at least somewhat--indistinct from one another, but are also indistinct from any would-be processor). So RAM, for example, is a particular type of memory located in a specific place that interacts with other likewise functionally organized components of the system in deliberate, pre-defined ways.
4) Everything about computers is rule-based, finite, discrete, and just generally the seeming epitome of a reducible system in basically all senses of the term.

So I found it interesting when, in the volume
Aguirre, A., Foster, B., & Merali, Z. (Eds.). (2015). Questioning the Foundations of Physics: Which of Our Fundamental Assumptions are Wrong? (The Frontiers Collection). Springer.

I found computers used as an example not only of non-physical entities but anti-reductionism in the contributing paper "Recognizing Top-Down Causation" by Ellis. I've included a summary of his use of this example, and for those who wish for an even more minimal amount of information part A is the most relevant:
"Definition 1 (Causal Effect) If making a change in a quantity X results in a reliable demonstrable change in a quantity Y in a given context, then X has a causal effect on Y...
Definition 2 (Existence) If Y is a physical entity made up of ordinary matter, and X is some kind of entity that has a demonstrable causal effect on Y as per Definition 1, then we must acknowledge that X also exists (even if it is not made up of such matter)...
A: Causal Efficacy of Non Physical entities: Both the program and the data are non-physical entities, indeed so is all software. A program is not a physical thing you can point to, but by Definition 2 it certainly exists. You can point to a CD or flashdrive where it is stored, but that is not the thing in itself: it is a medium in which it is stored. The program itself is an abstract entity, shaped by abstract logic. Is the software nothing but its realisation through a specific set of stored electronic states in the computer memory banks? No it is not because it is the precise pattern in those states that matters: a higher level relation that is not apparent at the scale of the electrons themselves. Its a relational thing (and if you get the relations between the symbols wrong, so you have a syntax error, it will all come to a grinding halt). This abstract nature of software is realised in the concept of virtual machines, which occur at every level in the computer hierarchy except the bottom one. But this tower of virtual machines causes physical effects in the real world, for example when a computer controls a robot in an assembly line to create physical artefacts.
B: Logical relations rule at the higher levels: The dynamics at all levels is driven by the logic of the algorithms employed in the high level programs. They decide what computations take place, and they have the power to change the world. This abstract logic cannot be deduced from the laws of physics: they operate in a completely different realm. Furthermore the relevant higher level variables in those algorithms cannot be obtained by coarse graining any lower level physical states. They are not coarse-grained or emergent variables: they are assigned variables, with specific abstract properties that then mediate their behaviour.
C: Underlying physics allows arbitrary programs and data: Digital computers are universal computers. The underlying physics does not constrain the logic or type of computation possible, which Turing has shown is universal. Physics does not constrain the data used, nor what can be computed (although it does constrain the speed at which this can be done). It enables the higher level actions rather than constraining them. The program logic dictates the course of things.
D: Multiple realisability at lower levels. The same high level logic can be implemented in many different ways: electronic (transistors), electrical (relays), hydraulic (valves), biological (interacting molecules) for example. The logic of the program can be realised by any of these underlying physical entities, which clearly demonstrates that it is not the lower level physics that is driving the causation. This multiple realisability is a key feature characterising top-down action: when some high level logic is driving causation at lower levels, it does not matter how that logic is physically instantiated: it can be realised in many different ways."

I believe information is very physical, independently from where and how it is stored. In the same way energy is very physical too, independently from its instantiation as electrical, gavitational, etc. i even think the two things are actually the same.

Ciao

- viole
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
On a larger scale gravity and electromagnetism affect us
On a large scale, there exists something that affects us which we variously refer to as e.g., gravitons, gravity, spacetime curvature, etc. All we know is that the entirety of modern physics and basically all of physics research since ~1905 indicates that whatever this force/forces, effect/effects, or "thing" / "things" is/are, it isn't "gravity". Also, as electromagnetisms requires fundamentally that waves exist and they don't, it is completely wrong (although extremely useful).
Without the forces which hold atoms
The constituent components of atoms are not "held together" because, our best theories tell us, they aren't actually constituent parts. Rather, at that level things stop being localized or discrete and whatever electrons or quarks or whatever "are", they aren't discrete, well-defined (in the sense of having properties like momentum, position, velocity, mass, etc.), or "parts". Also, we don't know "holds" atoms together. The theory of gravity entails every atom in the universe collapsing almost instantaneously and prohibits the existence of atoms.

So what is real? Perhaps everything can be boiled down to mathematics
A common perspective, but one I don't like. However, I've addressed this particular issue in greater detail here: Mathematics: Formalisms or Physics? Mathematics and the nature of reality
What do you think reality or this universe is composed of?
Mostly things that are in some sense physical, but likely also non-physical "functional" components that we must assert exist precisely because of how they interact (causally) with the physical.
 

Runewolf1973

Materialism/Animism
On a large scale, there exists something that affects us which we variously refer to as e.g., gravitons, gravity, spacetime curvature, etc. All we know is that the entirety of modern physics and basically all of physics research since ~1905 indicates that whatever this force/forces, effect/effects, or "thing" / "things" is/are, it isn't "gravity". Also, as electromagnetisms requires fundamentally that waves exist and they don't, it is completely wrong (although extremely useful).

The constituent components of atoms are not "held together" because, our best theories tell us, they aren't actually constituent parts. Rather, at that level things stop being localized or discrete and whatever electrons or quarks or whatever "are", they aren't discrete, well-defined (in the sense of having properties like momentum, position, velocity, mass, etc.), or "parts". Also, we don't know "holds" atoms together. The theory of gravity entails every atom in the universe collapsing almost instantaneously and prohibits the existence of atoms.


A common perspective, but one I don't like. However, I've addressed this particular issue in greater detail here: Mathematics: Formalisms or Physics? Mathematics and the nature of reality

Mostly things that are in some sense physical, but likely also non-physical "functional" components that we must assert exist precisely because of how they interact (causally) with the physical.


Thank you! That was both interesting and useful. I guess it depends to an extent on how we define "physical" as well. Nevertheless, it would seem that some form of interaction, in one way or another, is the key to all of this.
 
Last edited:
Top