Platonic Argument Against Materialism

[1137]

1. Materialism requires Platonism to be correct.

2. Platonism proves materialism incorrect.

3. Therefore, it would be paradoxical for materialism to be correct.

Why number 1? Platonism recognizes things like natural kinds and the existence of Forms - objective characteristics that provide the essence of objects. If Platonism is not true then all characteristics, identification, etc are simple mental fabrications. Without it science itself would not be possible, for science relies on the being objective characteristics to study.

Why number 2? Rather obviously Forms and natural kinds and such are not material. If immaterial things are necessary for the world then materialism cannot be true.

Why 3? Because to reject Platonism would reject all that led to and supports physicalism. If characteristics and categories are only assigned by the brain, this is the exact opposite of materialism. And yet this is one of the most common objections to Platonism.

 

[Jumi]

Can't agree with number 1, therefore I reject 2 and 3. Materialism is the belief that everything in the universe is made up of matter. No amount of mental gymnastics can avoid this definition. If one rejects materialism on a personal level that's a fine reason as any that you've personally found to your own belief. To prove materialism wrong you would need to prove monism itself as something wrong.

 

[shunyadragon]

1. Materialism requires Platonism to be correct.

2. Platonism proves materialism incorrect.

3. Therefore, it would be paradoxical for materialism to be correct.

Why number 1? Platonism recognizes things like natural kinds and the existence of Forms - objective characteristics that provide the essence of objects. If Platonism is not true then all characteristics, identification, etc are simple mental fabrications. Without it science itself would not be possible, for science relies on the being objective characteristics to study.

This is a created argument based on the conclusion. Classic 'Begging the question.' #1 is clearly false and requires assumptions that materialism does not make, therefore the remaining is a house of cards.

 

[Liu]

Can't agree with number 1, therefore I reject 2 and 3. Materialism is the belief that everything in the universe is made up of matter.

Not necessarily even of matter, but of energy in all its forms.
Also, I'd rather say that materialism (or physicalism) is the belief that everything in the cosmos can be explained by the laws of physics, i.e. everything having a rational cause.

Or which kind of materialism are we discussing here?

It's a matter of debate whether "immaterial" things like thoughts have such a rational cause or are acausal.
My own position is that thoughts are causal and that there is no fundamental difference between perceiving an external object via the senses or a thought or feeling via the mind.

The abstractions the mind can find are in the basic forms already there in the "objective" universe and nothing unnatural, in my opinion.

 

[Fool]

1. Materialism requires Platonism to be correct.

2. Platonism proves materialism incorrect.

3. Therefore, it would be paradoxical for materialism to be correct.

Why number 1? Platonism recognizes things like natural kinds and the existence of Forms - objective characteristics that provide the essence of objects. If Platonism is not true then all characteristics, identification, etc are simple mental fabrications. Without it science itself would not be possible, for science relies on the being objective characteristics to study.

Why number 2? Rather obviously Forms and natural kinds and such are not material. If immaterial things are necessary for the world then materialism cannot be true.

Why 3? Because to reject Platonism would reject all that led to and supports physicalism. If characteristics and categories are only assigned by the brain, this is the exact opposite of materialism. And yet this is one of the most common objections to Platonism.

i haven't studied platonism enough to really offer a concise opinion but I am aware of platonic forms.


but I wonder if the theories on creation of the universe lends itself to the same idea of some conscious energy creating all these myriad forms.

the only problem western science has with the idea of this energy is having intelligence/consciousness. most science wants to believe it's random and chaotic. thats scientism.

 

[1137]

Can't agree with number 1, therefore I reject 2 and 3. Materialism is the belief that everything in the universe is made up of matter. No amount of mental gymnastics can avoid this definition. If one rejects materialism on a personal level that's a fine reason as any that you've personally found to your own belief. To prove materialism wrong you would need to prove monism itself as something wrong.

Yeah I agree with that definition. But for it to be true natural kinds and forms must also be true. Let's look at the biological study of species. Species are natural kinds, there are objective differences between them which define them. This is in fact how science categorizes them in the first place. There is a form of home sapien-ness that differs from all other species, for example. Yet the form of home sapiens is itself not something material. We can't hold characteristics. One of the most common objections from atheists to Platonism is that forms and natural kinds are "just classifications we make up." This would mean that all reality relies solely on the mind and is not in any way objectively real! Which then obviously leads materialism to fail if they reject them.

This is a created argument based on the conclusion. Classic 'Begging the question.' #1 is clearly false and requires assumptions that materialism does not make, therefore the remaining is a house of cards.

I don't start at the end. How is one "clearly false?" You don't think materialism relies on am objective and consistent external world?

 

[Willamena]

1. Materialism requires Platonism to be correct.

2. Platonism proves materialism incorrect.

3. Therefore, it would be paradoxical for materialism to be correct.

Why number 1? Platonism recognizes things like natural kinds and the existence of Forms - objective characteristics that provide the essence of objects. If Platonism is not true then all characteristics, identification, etc are simple mental fabrications. Without it science itself would not be possible, for science relies on the being objective characteristics to study.

Why number 2? Rather obviously Forms and natural kinds and such are not material. If immaterial things are necessary for the world then materialism cannot be true.

Why 3? Because to reject Platonism would reject all that led to and supports physicalism. If characteristics and categories are only assigned by the brain, this is the exact opposite of materialism. And yet this is one of the most common objections to Platonism.

The Forms are what we call, today, Abstract Objects. They are not intended to be reified. They present no problem for materialism, which simply recognizes them as ideas.

 

[Satans_Serrated_Edge]

1. Materialism requires Platonism to be correct.

2. Platonism proves materialism incorrect.

3. Therefore, it would be paradoxical for materialism to be correct.

Why number 1? Platonism recognizes things like natural kinds and the existence of Forms - objective characteristics that provide the essence of objects. If Platonism is not true then all characteristics, identification, etc are simple mental fabrications. Without it science itself would not be possible, for science relies on the being objective characteristics to study.

Why number 2? Rather obviously Forms and natural kinds and such are not material. If immaterial things are necessary for the world then materialism cannot be true.

Why 3? Because to reject Platonism would reject all that led to and supports physicalism. If characteristics and categories are only assigned by the brain, this is the exact opposite of materialism. And yet this is one of the most common objections to Platonism.

LOL

You can't be being serious right now? Satire, right?

 

[1137]

The Forms are what we call, today, Abstract Objects. They are not intended to be reified. They present no problem for materialism, which simply recognizes them as ideas.

Yeah exactly, materialism sees them as simply ideas. They are not simply ideas, characteristics objectively exist, and they HAVE to for materialism to even make sense as a confused position. Like no materialist would ever actually apply this line of reasoning in practice. If I described my coffee table as short, black, and rectangular, assuming I'm not just lying for whatever reason, I'm not describing ideas, I'm describing objectively existent characteristics.

LOL

You can't be being serious right now? Satire, right?

Thank you, just knowing you have no refutation always adds support to my positions. If you manage to scrounge up any let me know.

 

[sayak83]

Yeah I agree with that definition. But for it to be true natural kinds and forms must also be true. Let's look at the biological study of species. Species are natural kinds, there are objective differences between them which define them. This is in fact how science categorizes them in the first place. There is a form of home sapien-ness that differs from all other species, for example. Yet the form of home sapiens is itself not something material. We can't hold characteristics. One of the most common objections from atheists to Platonism is that forms and natural kinds are "just classifications we make up." This would mean that all reality relies solely on the mind and is not in any way objectively real! Which then obviously leads materialism to fail if they reject them.



I don't start at the end. How is one "clearly false?" You don't think materialism relies on am objective and consistent external world?

Materialism defines matter along with it structure, property and relationships with each other as "Matter".

 

[Liu]

There is a form of home sapien-ness that differs from all other species, for example. Yet the form of home sapiens is itself not something material. We can't hold characteristics. One of the most common objections from atheists to Platonism is that forms and natural kinds are "just classifications we make up." This would mean that all reality relies solely on the mind and is not in any way objectively real! Which then obviously leads materialism to fail if they reject them.

I'm neither a platonist nor an atheist. I do believe that all reality solely relies on the mind (or rather, on an all-pervading consciousness). There is nothing truly material, just information. But that doesn't make platonism true.
I don't believe in any forms that would exist independently from the cosmos. Instead, something like the "form" of, in your example, homo sapiens is a simplified perception, created via computations by the brain, of the perceived similarities between actual humans.

 

[Willamena]

Yeah exactly, materialism sees them as simply ideas. They are not simply ideas, characteristics objectively exist, and they HAVE to for materialism to even make sense as a confused position. Like no materialist would ever actually apply this line of reasoning in practice. If I described my coffee table as short, black, and rectangular, assuming I'm not just lying for whatever reason, I'm not describing ideas, I'm describing objectively existent characteristics.

Materialism makes sense because it relegates abstract objects (the Forms) to the mind. Bigness, heaviness, shortness, beauty, utility... even being, are things that do not have to reside with the object in any modern philosophical view. They are viewed as judgements. You are correct that physical characteristics are thought to be inherent of the object, but as such they are not distinct from the object--rather, they make up the object in the sense of being placeholders: there is no object without them. The materialist shares that view. Do not make the mistake of thinking that materialism rejects ideas. What distinguishes the materialist is not that abstract characteristics are idea, but the idea that material is primary (irony intended).

 

[Willamena]

Let's look at the biological study of species. Species are natural kinds, there are objective differences between them which define them. This is in fact how science categorizes them in the first place. There is a form of home sapien-ness that differs from all other species, for example. Yet the form of home sapiens is itself not something material. We can't hold characteristics. One of the most common objections from atheists to Platonism is that forms and natural kinds are "just classifications we make up." This would mean that all reality relies solely on the mind and is not in any way objectively real! Which then obviously leads materialism to fail if they reject them.

A "species" is distinguishable from another by a difference in the set of physical characteristics. The physical characteristics that make up each set are real, but that there is a difference or distinction between the one set and another is a judgement. "Species" is a judgement, not a physical characteristic.*

* "that" is a referent; "between" is a relation - both are types or kinds of judgement

 

[Satans_Serrated_Edge]

Thank you, just knowing you have no refutation always adds support to my positions. If you manage to scrounge up any let me know.

Oh so you are serious? I'm actually not surprised.

Carry on.

 

[Jumi]

Yeah I agree with that definition. But for it to be true natural kinds and forms must also be true.

Outside of human-like concepts, not necessarily. The real world is quite alien to much of our ideas. Forms are temporary and ever evolving. Humans tend to categorize. We say "this is my arm", but nature doesn't differentiate this way.

Let's look at the biological study of species. Species are natural kinds, there are objective differences between them which define them. This is in fact how science categorizes them in the first place. There is a form of home sapien-ness that differs from all other species, for example. Yet the form of home sapiens is itself not something material. We can't hold characteristics. One of the most common objections from atheists to Platonism is that forms and natural kinds are "just classifications we make up." This would mean that all reality relies solely on the mind and is not in any way objectively real! Which then obviously leads materialism to fail if they reject them.

Humans are not humans because of an abstract sapien-ness, but due to our ability to reproduce with other humans and genetic make up producing similar beings with similar kinds of limits. The categorization, of what it means to be human is our own idea which is somewhat alien to nature.

You don't think materialism relies on am objective and consistent external world?

Consistent? Somewhat.

 

[1137]

I'm neither a platonist nor an atheist. I do believe that all reality solely relies on the mind (or rather, on an all-pervading consciousness). There is nothing truly material, just information. But that doesn't make platonism true.
I don't believe in any forms that would exist independently from the cosmos. Instead, something like the "form" of, in your example, homo sapiens is a simplified perception, created via computations by the brain, of the perceived similarities between actual humans.

Can you elaborate on this view of a universal consciousness?

Materialism makes sense because it relegates abstract objects (the Forms) to the mind. Bigness, heaviness, shortness, beauty, utility... even being, are things that do not have to reside with the object in any modern philosophical view. They are viewed as judgements. You are correct that physical characteristics are thought to be inherent of the object, but as such they are not distinct from the object--rather, they make up the object in the sense of being placeholders: there is no object without them. The materialist shares that view. Do not make the mistake of thinking that materialism rejects ideas. What distinguishes the materialist is not that abstract characteristics are idea, but the idea that material is primary (irony intended).

But of course they are distinct from the object. Does anything that includes "having points" have to be a triangle? Does anything that has wetness have to be H2O? If you say no then you accept characteristics as something quite real, not bound to one thing. Further, could you physically show me the concept of pointedness, or could you only show me specific points?

A "species" is distinguishable from another by a difference in the set of physical characteristics. The physical characteristics that make up each set are real, but that there is a difference or distinction between the one set and another is a judgement. "Species" is a judgement, not a physical characteristic.*

* "that" is a referent; "between" is a relation - both are types or kinds of judgement

You literally say here that they differ by their characteristics but that those characteristics aren't actually real. That's nonsense pure and simple. Either they're real or they are not. If you simply mean the term we use isn't objective then sure, but so what?

Oh so you are serious? I'm actually not surprised.

Carry on.

Aw, cute as always kiddo.

 

[Willamena]

But of course they are distinct from the object. Does anything that includes "having points" have to be a triangle? Does anything that has wetness have to be H2O? If you say no then you accept characteristics as something quite real, not bound to one thing. Further, could you physically show me the concept of pointedness, or could you only show me specific points?

You literally say here that they differ by their characteristics but that those characteristics aren't actually real. That's nonsense pure and simple. Either they're real or they are not. If you simply mean the term we use isn't objective then sure, but so what?

I never say that characteristics are not real; I specifically say that they are. I'm not sure what your complaint is.

 

[siti]

If I described my coffee table as short, black, and rectangular, assuming I'm not just lying for whatever reason, I'm not describing ideas, I'm describing objectively existent characteristics.

No you're not, you're describing subjective qualia.

The problem with the first premise of your argument is that there is no way we can know that Platonic forms have objective existence and clearly significant reason to doubt this. What is the compelling evidence against these forms simply being observed commonalities or regularities in the physical world? What, for example, would roundness mean in a world with no round things in it? Could roundness even exist in a world devoid of round things? Can you think of a Platonic form that is not approximated by some physically existing reality? Can you think of a shape that does not exist in reality? Why not? Because Platonic forms are abstractions not impositions. There is no more reason to believe that the forms of physical entities are imposed on them from outside of physical reality than to believe that they are abstracted from within physical reality as apparent 'universals' that represent broad commonalities of physical attributes among existing entities. Is there?

 

[Liu]

Can you elaborate on this view of a universal consciousness?

I of course don't know how this consciousness actually works or even is structured. Whether it even is in every part of the cosmos or just in living beings. Whether it is one unity on some level or rather myriads of completely distinctive consciousnesses.
But since the only thing one can really know to exist is one's own consciousness, and since it seems so utterly other from what it perceives, I have basically two possibilities: To believe that this consciousness is completely separate from the cosmos, stems from some external source and only exists in certain beings. Or that consciousness is a property of the cosmos and it's my perceptions of the universe as objective that is flawed.
I tend to the latter view.

 

[shunyadragon]

I don't start at the end. How is one "clearly false?" You don't think materialism relies on am objective and consistent external world?

Your first assumption remains clearly false.

Yes, materialism, philosophical naturalism, relies on objective consistent evidence of our physical existence. Define 'external world.' It simply makes the assumption that there is no other worlds other than our physical existence verifiable, for which there is no objective evidence for any other world other than our physical existence.