Presuppositionalism is a blanket term for a broad spectrum of beliefs that are self-described by their adherents as axiomatic: in the relevant sense here, that belief in the existence of a god is as properly basic as an adoption of logical laws. These sorts of positions immediately call a few questions to my mind -- questions I would like to answer (if I can, or to wrangle with if I might) here: must we all, in fact, presuppose at least something? Is there a difference between some presuppositions and others in terms of epistemic strength and value?
The answer to the first question (must we all presuppose something?) is, without question, and somewhat counter-intuitively -- yes. There are no epistemic foundations that are free of presupposition; and ironically this very fact undermines a few theistic presuppositional epistemologies which claim access to direct divine knowledge of an absolute sort. So what is it that any epistemology must presuppose such that there is no justification possible in principle which could provide a foundation for the belief?
The belief I'm referring to -- which all epistemes presuppose in lieu of primary justification (recursive justification does not count) -- is the belief that our mental and cognitive faculties are capable of (and geared towards) producing true beliefs while avoiding false ones. After all, how can we possibly justify that belief without presupposing it? It's not possible, and so the presuppositionalist is vindicated on at least one minor point: we are all, to some degree, presuppositionalists.
However, what presuppositionalist arguments for the rationality of theistic beliefs often fail to do is to ask the question of whether some presuppositions have more epistemic merit than others in an objective sense. Is there an epistemic difference between presupposing our cogntive faculties are efficacious -- as opposed to presupposing the existence of a deity? Yes, and I'd like to point to the principle of parsimony here, an epistemic incarnation of Occam's Razor.
All I must do is point out that everyone must presuppose their mental faculties are reliable in order to have an episteme at all in the first place -- we are transcendentally bound to that presupposition: we can't even disagree with it without at the same time calling upon it! It is therefore safe from criticism from even the most worried skeptic.
However, the same can't be said for theistic presuppositions: there is no transcendental force urging its acceptance to us; we are quite free to doubt theistic presuppositions in our epistemic methods without invoking an immediate, explicit contradiction. Thus there is an objective and fundamental difference between the two presuppositions: one is universal, transcendental, and so required of us; the other is subjectively adopted, open to skepticism without contradiction, and in comparison to the other -- extraneous.
There I call attention to a sort of epistemic principle of parsimony: why carry more presuppositions than are absolutely necessary, particularly when there exist alternative epistemologies with fewer presuppositions?
Anyone?
The answer to the first question (must we all presuppose something?) is, without question, and somewhat counter-intuitively -- yes. There are no epistemic foundations that are free of presupposition; and ironically this very fact undermines a few theistic presuppositional epistemologies which claim access to direct divine knowledge of an absolute sort. So what is it that any epistemology must presuppose such that there is no justification possible in principle which could provide a foundation for the belief?
The belief I'm referring to -- which all epistemes presuppose in lieu of primary justification (recursive justification does not count) -- is the belief that our mental and cognitive faculties are capable of (and geared towards) producing true beliefs while avoiding false ones. After all, how can we possibly justify that belief without presupposing it? It's not possible, and so the presuppositionalist is vindicated on at least one minor point: we are all, to some degree, presuppositionalists.
However, what presuppositionalist arguments for the rationality of theistic beliefs often fail to do is to ask the question of whether some presuppositions have more epistemic merit than others in an objective sense. Is there an epistemic difference between presupposing our cogntive faculties are efficacious -- as opposed to presupposing the existence of a deity? Yes, and I'd like to point to the principle of parsimony here, an epistemic incarnation of Occam's Razor.
All I must do is point out that everyone must presuppose their mental faculties are reliable in order to have an episteme at all in the first place -- we are transcendentally bound to that presupposition: we can't even disagree with it without at the same time calling upon it! It is therefore safe from criticism from even the most worried skeptic.
However, the same can't be said for theistic presuppositions: there is no transcendental force urging its acceptance to us; we are quite free to doubt theistic presuppositions in our epistemic methods without invoking an immediate, explicit contradiction. Thus there is an objective and fundamental difference between the two presuppositions: one is universal, transcendental, and so required of us; the other is subjectively adopted, open to skepticism without contradiction, and in comparison to the other -- extraneous.
There I call attention to a sort of epistemic principle of parsimony: why carry more presuppositions than are absolutely necessary, particularly when there exist alternative epistemologies with fewer presuppositions?
Anyone?
