Yes, that is precisely my position.
Dice can be describe via classical mechanics to the extent required to predict their results.
Quantum mechanics, on the other hand is *inherently* random.
I disagree.
I think the unpredictability of QM is the result of an inability to observe precisely. Your belief that QM is 'inherently random' is your interpretation of what QM means and not a confirmed reality.
I can't accept that QM is *inherently* 'random' in the absence of an experiment that verifies or rejects the hypothesis. There is no such experiment (as I pointed out the objections to Bell's Theorem).
However, none of that is necessary for my definition of 'random' to apply to QM. My definition applies equally well to QM or to dice thrown.
No, it is dependent on the fact that dice are macroscopic objects where the quantum randomness doesn't significantly affect the end results.
Your ability to predict the result of the dice is dependent upon certain observations about their state.
Lack of knowledge about the state of the dice is an expression of the capability of the observer and not an expression of the nature of the dice.
Lack of knowledge of microscopic states in QM is an expression of the capability of the observer and not an expression of the inherent nature of particles.
OK, what does randomness mean to you? I've stated that, for me, randomness means that it is impossible to predict what will happen *even in theory*. Chaos, as opposed to randomness, can happen in deterministic systems and amounts to sensitive dependence on initial conditions making it *difficult* to predict results, but not impossible in theory.
By characterizing randomness as something that is impossible to predict *in theory*, you creating a definition for randomness that changes as theory changes. As science develops and changes, things that were impossible to predict in theory become possible to predict using new theory. And I see that as problematic. I prefer a definition that does not change just because the theory changes.
Otherwise, you just asserting something fundamental about reality that can't be confirmed. You might be right; you might be wrong; but you aren't doing science.
I find most attempts to determine what QM 'means' to be an attempt to force QM into a classical model. That, to me, is backwards: we explain why the old model works based on the new one, NOT the details of the new one based on the old model. QM has supplanted classical mechanics and classical notions of causality. Trying to force classical notions into it is doomed to fail.
In the example of the dice, I'm actually applying the model from QM to dice as opposed to applying the classical model to QM. If you really understood what I had said, then you would understand that in my definition
it doesn't matter if you have perfect knowledge of the dice or not. There is no need in my examples to apply the classic model to dice. You are the one insisting on doing so by insisting that you can ascertain perfect information about the dice with your snap shots of reality when it is completely unnecessary to do so to allow the model to work.
No. The speed of light *wasn't* unpredictable *even in theory*. Given sufficient data, the speed could be resolved.
But they didn't have sufficient data... that the whole point!
There was no theory that predicted it's speed!
Something that you can't predict is, by definition, 'unpredictable'.
Huh? is there *any* evidence to even suggest an intelligence is involved? No. Instead, we have definite dynamical laws (physical laws) that we can use to predict future events.
That is not an experiment that affirms or rejects an intelligence. Scientifically speaking, you can't talk about 'evidence' in the absence of an 'experiment'. It doesn't make sense scientifically. This is the point.
Our ability to measure doesn't affect the ability *in theory* to make specific predictions for gravity. And, in practice, we can and do make such predictions with high quality results. That means the action of gravity is not random. The orbits of the planets are not random.
I understand that your conclusion about the general nature of gravity fits your chosen definition for 'random'. This is why I wanted to really talk about what exactly you meant.
I point out that there are things you can't predict about gravity
in practice.
You seem confident in asserting that 'perfect information' is not a problem with regard to gravitational systems, but you turn around and rely on
sufficient information to make
sufficient predictions. You don't actually ever use 'perfect information', nor do you ever make 'perfect predictions' (except *in theory*). And the key here is again a question of what you observe. You can't predict the motion of the planets without observations.
And you didn't answer my question as to what word you would use to describe the influences that result in errors of measurement (hint: in science we use the word 'random'). Are they 'accidents', 'intelligence'? How do you describe them?
This is distinctly different than what happens in QM, where *even in theory*, the results of an observation of a superpositional state cannot be predicted, even if we have perfect information about that state beforehand (i.e, what states it is the superposition of and with what weights).
In what experiment did we actually have perfect information (or sufficient information for a predication) and failed to predict the result? To what are you referring?