The claim in the first proof is that there is a beginning of time. The justification for the claim is in the text. A similar thing is the case for the second proof.
I could write it in a more formal way (consistent with mathematical proofs) but I think it is not necessary.
I agree it isn't necessary to write out mathematically. However, it is often good to write out semi-formal or informal proofs using "natural language" (i.e., not a bunch of symbols) but "mathematical" structure, etc.
For example:
“In order to reach the present, the past must have happened, and because an infinite amount of time cannot be passed through, the universe must have begun a finite amount of time ago.”
It is unclear what you are assuming and why. Clearly, you assume that the present exists (and aside from some radical interpretations of relativity most would agree at least implicitly/tacitly). However, you do not address the equivalent of one of Zeno’s paradoxes. For any time
t, I can define a time
t/2,
t/4, etc., such that I have infinitely many intervals of time given any interval of time. Put differently, take any unit of time (an hour, a year, a second, etc.) and you can continue to “halve” these units infinitely many times and still reach a finite point. But you do not address this or any other argument, you simply assert that what you claim is true. Essentially everything in your argument is an assumed premise except for the part “the universe must have begun…” which doesn’t follow from your premises. Nor do you give any indication why anybody should accept your claims, namely these claims:
1) There is a “present” time that we have reached.
2) In order to reach that present time, there must be a past.
3) An infinite amount of time can’t be passed through
Having accepted these claims, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the universe must have begun a finite amount of time ago because you have not shown e.g., that every interval of time is an infinite “amount” of time, still less why an infinite amount of time can’t be “passed through.”
Okay, then the word 'state' can be changed to something more suitable to how you model the universe.
Perhaps I’m not being clear. First, you have assumed that determinism entails something it doesn’t. Determinism does not say either that ‘in some sense the future has already happened”, nor can one conclude given determinism that there is an end to the universe
even if determinism meant the future has happened. Special relativity is deterministic. However, under a popular interpretation it means there exist no present. An even more radical but still supportable model is a universe in which everything has already happened and nothing will ever happen because we have a “block universe” in which time only seems to “unfold” but in reality every position in spacetime is relative to our future or are past depending upon its coordinates. As any coordinate system can extend infinitely along all axes, this allows for a universe in which everything that will ever happen has happened from some reference frame, yet there is no end to the universe.
I view probability as something of a model we use to predict things.
That’s one interpretation sure. However, it isn’t the only one and when we are talking about interpretations that have to do with ontology (“reality” or that which is) rather than mathematical interpretations, things get even trickier. For example, a common model of causation is counterfactual. Imagine a glass full of milk on a table. I accidently knock the glass over and it falls. Now the floor is covered in spilt milk. Counterfactual causation asserts that I caused this state because
had I not knocked the glass over, the milk would not have spilt. In short, something can’t be said to cause something else unless we can say that, had the cause not happened, the effect would not (I’m simplifying here). In probability theory such counterfactual reasoning/notions are captured by conditional probabilities and Bayesian reasoning. Both such notions, as used often in philosophy, are a way of describing the world in terms of why the present was caused/determined by the past. Conditional probabilities are of the form (or are often of the form) “granted that X happened, Y” where Y is some claim about the probability of an outcome that has already occurred.
Additionally, once again quantum physics is entirely and irreducibly statistical/probabilistic.
A description of reality is not the same as reality.
Very true. But as your proof and any other like it and indeed any attempt to refer to or in any way characterize, describe, relate, etc., to “reality” we require descriptions or referents. This is true even of
ergo cogito sum/”I thing therefore I am”, that one thing whence Descartes begins his arguments about reality because it cannot be false (i.e., the impossibility for one’s mind not to exist, because in order to question the existence of one’s mind requires that mind to question it).
Again, I think the same may apply to statistical mechanics - is it not just a model?
Sure. More importantly, it consists of models we know are wrong. This is not true, though, of all statistical/probability models, especially the one that describes all reality.
There may be Christians who have dealt with this issue in more detail.
There are:
Polkinghorne, J. C. (2007).
Quantum physics and theology: An unexpected kinship. Yale University Press.
Coyne, G. V., & Heller, M. (2008).
A Comprehensible Universe: The Interplay of Science and Theology. Springer.
Amoroso, R., & Rauscher, E. (2009).
The Holographic Anthropic Multiverse: Formalizing the Complex Geometry of Reality (
Series on Knots and Everything). World Scientific.
Clayton, P., & Davies, P. (Eds.) (2006).
The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford University Press.
Saunders, N. (2002).
Divine action and modern science. Cambridge University Press.
Among others.
I find trying to bridge the gap between science and theology interesting but I may not be enough acquainted with the matter to give it the treatment it deserves.
Nobody is.