When you back in caused beings, it is only logical that there is a first cause. It is not "that cause is the first cause", but that there is a first cause.
Your statement is contradicting.
OK, let's go through the first cause argument in a bit more detail.
For the sake of argument, let's assume that the following is a true statement:
P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause for it beginning to exist.
So, we also need
P2: there is something that begins to exist.
I think we all agree that this is true (although there is some difficulty with it in the B theory of time).
So, take something that begins to exist. It has at least one cause for it beginning to exist.
Now, look at that cause. Either it begins to exist or it doesn't. If it does begin to exist, it has a cause for its beginning.
At this point, there are *three* possibilities:
1. There is an infinite regress of causes: in this everything in the sequence has a cause and begins to exist.
2. There is a loop of causality: this is where we have a situation where the causal sequence loops back and we have some object that is caused by some sequence that it, in turn, causes.
3. There is some cause that does not begin to exist.
For the argument to proceed, we need to eliminate 1 and 2 from consideration and go into more detail in 3.
At this point, NOBODY has given a sound argument against 1. From what I have seen, nobody has even given a valid argument against 1. So this remains a possibility.
As for 2, we have an *assumption* that such loops cannot occur, but I have yet to see any argument concerning this point. It is generally seen that cases like 2 lead to some paradoxes, however (say, someone going back in time to kill their grandfather).
As for 3, the first thing I notice is that it *doesn't* prove that there is a first cause. All it shows is that there is a cause that does not begin to exist. Whether that cause that does not begin is uncaused is not addressed.
So far, the *best* we can say (if 1 and 2 are eliminated) is that there is a cause that does not begin to exist. We do NOT know that this unbeginning cause is uncaused, though. If it *is* caused, we can continue the argument and either get an infinite regress, a loop, or, eventually an uncaused, unbeginning cause.
The next issue is whether this deserves to be called a 'first cause'.
For this, there is a further issue:
Q1: can there be more than one unbeginning, uncaused cause?
Again, this possiblity is not addressed, but because MOST things that begin have more than one cause, the expectation would be that there would be many, perhaps infinitely many such uncaused, unbeginning, causes.
I have yet to see this possibility addressed either.
In sum, the first cause argument fails in the following ways:
1. It fails to show an infinite regress is impossible.
2. It fails to show a loop of causes is impossible.
3. It fails to show any uncaused unbeginning cause is unique.
This is the case even *if* we agree that P1 is true. And *that* is still not settled.