The Ontological Argument is incompatible with Trinitarian monotheism

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Something just occurred to me:

Consider the classical Ontological Argument, which argues that God - defined as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" - exists. We can say more about God's properties than this... every religion does. For instance, maybe someone would say that God is "that than which nothing greater than be conceived... and exists as three persons"... or that God exists as one person.

Whatever attribute you can think of for God, if you can conceive of a God with it and if the attribute doesn't interfere with God's "greatness", then the Ontological Argument suggrsts that such a God must exist.

... but at first glance, it seems like this would create a contradiction: how can God exist with mutually contradictory properties? If the argument suggests that "God in exactly n persons" exists for every value of n, then how can a single God satisfy all of these?

The answer is that a single God can't... but the premises of the Ontological Argument don't require a single God. Instead, the implication of the argument is that many Gods exist simultaneously, all tied for "greatness".

But there's one problem remaining: what if this attribute does have some effect on the greatness of God? What if - for reasons that escape me - a God with more persons is more or less great than one with fewer? In that case, most of the Gods would not be "that than which nothing greater can be conceived".

In that case, 3 persons in one God is still not going to be the single greatest God: if number of persons makes a God less great, then a God with 2 or 1 persons (or zero) is greater than a God with 3. Similarly, if the number of persons make a God greater, than a God in 4 persons (or 5, or 6, upward to infinity) would be greater than a God in 3.

So there you have it:

- if the number of persons in a God has no effect on a God's greatness, then the Ontological Argument is incompatible with monotheism.

- if it does have an effect, then it's incompatible with Trinitarianism.

Either way, it speaks against the beliefs of most people I see using it.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Something just occurred to me:

Consider the classical Ontological Argument, which argues that God - defined as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" - exists. We can say more about God's properties than this... every religion does. For instance, maybe someone would say that God is "that than which nothing greater than be conceived... and exists as three persons"... or that God exists as one person.

I follow so far...

Whatever attribute you can think of for God, if you can conceive of a God with it and if the attribute doesn't interfere with God's "greatness", then the Ontological Argument suggrsts that such a God must exist.

Follow...

... but at first glance, it seems like this would create a contradiction: how can God exist with mutually contradictory properties?

He can't.

If the argument suggests that "God in exactly n persons" exists for every value of n, then how can a single God satisfy all of these?

Are you asking how can a single God have omni-everything attributes?

The answer is that a single God can't...

What is the reasoning behind such a claim?

but the premises of the Ontological Argument don't require a single God. Instead, the implication of the argument is that many Gods exist simultaneously, all tied for "greatness".

The Ontological Argument makes the logical case for a Supreme Being (SB or Maximally Great Being/MGB), which, in light of the argument, the concept seems valid and sound. The Christian God just happens to have a tri-unity between three beings which share the same nature of Godship. But the concept of a SB is not just distinctive to Christianity...any monotheistic religion can postulate such a being..the argument doesn't tell us specifically WHICH God it is, it just claims that such a being's existence is possible, and if it is possible, it must be true.

So what does a Christian do? A Christian would give arguments based on the Resurrection of Jesus, and if these arguments are as valid and sound as the Ontological Argument, then it would be clear as to exactly WHICH God we are referring too regarding the Ontological Argument.

But there's one problem remaining: what if this attribute does have some effect on the greatness of God? What if - for reasons that escape me - a God with more persons is more or less great than one with fewer?

Then that would be contradictory, because if you can think of a being greater than that which you already considered the "greatest conceivable being", then that being which is greater is...God...and the lesser god was never the greatest conceivable being in the first place.

If you can think of a being that that is greater than God..then that would make that being God, right?

In that case, most of the Gods would not be "that than which nothing greater can be conceived".

Exactly.

In that case, 3 persons in one God is still not going to be the single greatest God: if number of persons makes a God less great, then a God with 2 or 1 persons (or zero) is greater than a God with 3. Similarly, if the number of persons make a God greater, than a God in 4 persons (or 5, or 6, upward to infinity) would be greater than a God in 3.

But it isn't a matter of quantity, Peng. What could three God's that are maximally great do that one God that is maximally great couldn't do?

- if the number of persons in a God has no effect on a God's greatness, then the Ontological Argument is incompatible with monotheism.

Huh?

- if it does have an effect, then it's incompatible with Trinitarianism.

Either way, it speaks against the beliefs of most people I see using it.

Huh?

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

I follow so far...



Follow...



He can't.



Are you asking how can a single God have omni-everything attributes?

No, I'm asking if God can contain logical contradictions. However many persons make up one God, it's only one number: it can't be "exactly 3" and "exactly 10" simultaneously, for instance.

What is the reasoning behind such a claim?

What I just explained: logically contradictory things can't exist. If someone says "a square named Bob exists" and "a circle named Bob exists", then if both claims are true, there must be two shapes named Bob, since saying that there's a single square circle named Bob would imply a logical contradiction.

The Ontological Argument makes the logical case for a Supreme Being (SB or Maximally Great Being/MGB), which, in light of the argument, the concept seems valid and sound. The Christian God just happens to have a tri-unity between three beings which share the same nature of Godship. But the concept of a SB is not just distinctive to Christianity...any monotheistic religion can postulate such a being..the argument doesn't tell us specifically WHICH God it is, it just claims that such a being's existence is possible, and if it is possible, it must be true.

So what does a Christian do? A Christian would give arguments based on the Resurrection of Jesus, and if these arguments are as valid and sound as the Ontological Argument, then it would be clear as to exactly WHICH God we are referring too regarding the Ontological Argument.

It doesn't work that way. Not logically, anyhow.

If the Ontological Argument is correct, then any conceivable God that meets its criteria for God MUST exist. That's the whole point of the argument.

Then that would be contradictory, because if you can think of a being greater than that which you already considered the "greatest conceivable being", then that being which is greater is...God...and the lesser god was never the greatest conceivable being in the first place.

If you can think of a being that that is greater than God..then that would make that being God, right?

... only if the number of persons in a God has an effect on its greatness, and you say that it doesn't:

Exactly.



But it isn't a matter of quantity, Peng. What could three God's that are maximally great do that one God that is maximally great couldn't do?

Not three Gods; one God in three persons. Or in four persons. Or in ten persons.

Huh?

Think of the Trinitarian Christian God: one God in three persons. Now think of one God in four persons. Is the God in four persons any more or less great than one God in three persons? If they're equal in greatness, then the Ontological Argument implies that they both exist.

The Ontological Argument says that if a being is maximally great, then it must exist. If a God in one, two, three, or 250 persons is maximally great, then they all exist. The claim that there's just one God would have to be false.

Huh?

If the number of persons in a God increases a God's greatness, then a God in four persons would be greater than a God in three. If the number of persons in a God decreases a God's greatness, then a God in two persons would be greater than a God in three.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Another way to approach this question:

You say you can conceive of your God, who is in three persons, right?

Now... think of a God in two persons and a God in four persons as well. Which one is the greatest God? Are they all equally great?

 

[Buttercup]

Another way to approach this question:

You say you can conceive of your God, who is in three persons, right?

Now... think of a God in two persons and a God in four persons as well. Which one is the greatest God? Are they all equally great?

Yes, they are all equally great. Anyone who is a Trinitarian believes that God is three distinct persons but each basically represents a part of the "whole" being of God. All even Steven, all equally great.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Yes, they are all equally great. Anyone who is a Trinitarian believes that God is three distinct persons but each basically represents a part of the "whole" being of God. All even Steven, all equally great.

Not the persons; the Gods: would one God in four persons be any more or less great than one God in three persons?

 

[Buttercup]

Not the persons; the Gods: would one God in four persons be any more or less great than one God in three persons?

No, not if you're trying to define the Trinitarian God of Christianity. "Each is God, whole and entire" and makes up ONE. I'm sorry if that's repeating my previous post but that's simply how He is defined.

 

[xkatz]

FWIW, I feel that people try too hard trying to comprehend something that is supposedly so great and vast that it is impossible to fully comprehend. It's like trying to imagine a color that doesn't exist on the ROYGBIV spectrum, or like trying to give bigfoot a taxon based on the Patterson-Gimlin film.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

No, I'm asking if God can contain logical contradictions.

And I responded to this by saying "He can't". In fact, no one is even claiming that he can.

However many persons make up one God, it's only one number: it can't be "exactly 3" and "exactly 10" simultaneously, for instance.

And?

What I just explained: logically contradictory things can't exist. If someone says "a square named Bob exists" and "a circle named Bob exists", then if both claims are true, there must be two shapes named Bob, since saying that there's a single square circle named Bob would imply a logical contradiction.

So this is relevant to the concept of a trinune God because?

It doesn't work that way. Not logically, anyhow.

Yes it does work that way. If the argument for the Resurrection of Jesus is true, then he is who he said he is and therefore it is clear as to which God is identified in the Ontological Argument.

If the Ontological Argument is correct, then any conceivable God that meets its criteria for God MUST exist. That's the whole point of the argument.

Right, any conceivable God that meets the criteria must exist, but that says nothing about his personality, how and when he manifests himself, etc...so while those things are conceivable, they are not NECESSARY or essential to make a case that "because it is conceivable, it must be true" in the same way those omni attributes are.

... only if the number of persons in a God has an effect on its greatness, and you say that it doesn't:

It doesn't. God is no more/less great if he was a uni-God. If that were the case, then he wouldn't be the greatest conceivable being if his greatest dependent upon external factors.

Not three Gods; one God in three persons. Or in four persons. Or in ten persons.

Right...one God in three persons...the Holy Trinity.

Think of the Trinitarian Christian God: one God in three persons. Now think of one God in four persons. Is the God in four persons any more or less great than one God in three persons?

No

If they're equal in greatness, then the Ontological Argument implies that they both exist.

Right...so the question is what reason(s) do we have to postulate this particular concept of a maximally great God, and again, right back to the Resurrection argument.

The Ontological Argument says that if a being is maximally great, then it must exist. If a God in one, two, three, or 250 persons is maximally great, then they all exist. The claim that there's just one God would have to be false.

"God" is just a word used to describe a particular concept of a being. If 250 persons are all maximally great, then they would all be the same "God"...they wouldn't be all different gods, unless they all have different attributes/characteristics...if they are all omni-everything, then they are the same God, existing in different persons. So it would still technically be monotheistic.

If the number of persons in a God increases a God's greatness, then a God in four persons would be greater than a God in three. If the number of persons in a God decreases a God's greatness, then a God in two persons would be greater than a God in three.

God's greatness cannot be increased, because if it could, then this god cannot be said to be the "greatest conceivable being", because we can conceive of a greater being...one who's greatest cannot be increased or decreased.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Another way to approach this question:

You say you can conceive of your God, who is in three persons, right?

Now... think of a God in two persons and a God in four persons as well. Which one is the greatest God? Are they all equally great?

The problem is, you seem to have your mind set on "the more gods, the greater". But that isn't the correct way to look at things. Just take one God...if this God is maximally great, then it is not possible for such a being to increase greatness, or decrease greatness. This being would be great regardless of whether there are more like him, or whether he exists as the only being of his kind.

That is why I asked you; what can 250 maximally great Gods do that one maximally great God can't do??

I can't think of anything.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

The problem is, you seem to have your mind set on "the more gods, the greater".

No, I'm not. And if you think I am, then you haven't understood a word that I've said.

But that isn't the correct way to look at things. Just take one God...if this God is maximally great, then it is not possible for such a being to increase greatness, or decrease greatness. This being would be great regardless of whether there are more like him, or whether he exists as the only being of his kind.

That is why I asked you; what can 250 maximally great Gods do that one maximally great God can't do??

I can't think of anything.

They can resolve logical impossibilities: if the Ontological Argument is sound, then EVERY CONCEIVABLE maximally great being exists. If one God in ten persons would be just as great as the triune God you claim exists, then logic demands that you accept that this 10-person God exists, too.

Three does not equal ten, so by logical necessity, we're talking about two different Gods, not a single God with both attributes.

Of course, my money is on the Ontological Argument NOT being sound, but you seem to lut stock in it. If so, then you have to live with its polytheistic implications.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

No, I'm not. And if you think I am, then you haven't understood a word that I've said.

What? You said:

If the number of persons in a God decreases a God's greatness, then a God in two persons would be greater than a God in three.

Either way you look at it, you are still implying or bringing forth the notion that the greatness of God is dependent upon the quantity of how many there are within the "Godhead".

This is blatantly false, and the fact that you bring it up shows that you "don't understand the argument"

They can resolve logical impossibilities: if the Ontological Argument is sound, then EVERY CONCEIVABLE maximally great being exists. If one God in ten persons would be just as great as the triune God you claim exists, then logic demands that you accept that this 10-person God exists, too.

No it doesn't, because every conceivable being that is maximally great would be the same God as the others. It doesn't matter how many God's you postulate, as long as they are the same God then it doesn't matter how many of them there are..they are still one God, and each one of the "persons" is not any more greater than the rest...the argument makes a case that at least ONE kind of being exists, and if there are others, since the others are no different than the one, and the one cannot do anything less than the others, that would make the others irrelevant.

I think Occkam's razor should be used here...we don't need to multiply God's beyond necessity. Only one God is needed, so to multiply God's would be unecessary, due to the fact that 250 maximally great beings are no more greater than 1, which says a lot about the 1, meaning that despite the bigger number, technically speaking, the 250 aren't any more greater...which is why I think we are justified at leaving it at one.

Three does not equal ten, so by logical necessity, we're talking about two different Gods, not a single God with both attributes.

So if me, you, and 8 other people are in the same room...are we not the same "kind" of human? Which one of us are more human than the other? I am talking about the essence of what makes us all human? Is there any one in the room more human than the other? No, we are the same human...we may be different people/person's, but we are all the same kind of human.

Of course, my money is on the Ontological Argument NOT being sound, but you seem to lut stock in it. If so, then you have to live with its polytheistic implications.

I find the Ontological Argument the most fasinating of all of the arguments for the existence of God. I think it is very sound/valid, and I will continue to defend its soundness :yes: