Yerda
Veteran Member
Ok. I'd agree that doing mathematics is a conceptual activity but I wouldn't agree that the results are conceptual. A proof is a proof whether anyone conceives it or not, imo.
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Things you don't like about Materialism
- Thread starter Laika
- Start date
Is English just not your language? Have you tried to read and understand the SEP article? As would seem overtly evident, and as I've pointed out to you several times already, according to this definition--
Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.
Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
--in a world where there is even a single random event, the thesis of determinism is false.
Why don't you let that fact sink in for a couple of years or however long it may require to grasp it, and get back to me then? Perhaps you could even try to finish the article in order to understand what it's saying.
A mathematical proof is a result (concept) derived by the carrying out of procedures that are all conceptual eg abstract quantities like c,, d, E, s, t, add, subtract, power, root, integrate, on and on. Those elements are abstractions (concepts) and those procedures operate on concepts.
To put that another way, in what sense do you say Pythagoras' a^2 + b^2 = c^2 has objective existence? It's expressed as the equivalence (which is an abstraction) between the abstractions a and b and the abstraction c. No exact examples are found in nature, only better or worse approximations of it. And they only exist as the result of an interpretation imposed on nature by the observer for the observer's own purposes. A thousand other observers might never make that interpretation.
Abstractions are concepts and concepts are only found in brains (and perhaps one could argue, in computers, which can identify, discriminate, choose an appropriate response, and manipulate data accordingly, and so in that limited sense might be considered brainlike in this context).
No brain, no concepts. No concepts, no proofs.
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Well, the thesis of that particular strict and rigid interpretation of determinism is false. But so what? That's never been in dispute between us.
What's in dispute is your continued refusal to include random quantum phenomena in the mix. What I call fuzzy determinism (as I'm mentioned on many occasions) is strict determinism PLUS the departures from strictness brought about by quantum randomness.
And your continued inability to give a clear meaning to your definition of 'free' by saying whether you consider fuzzy determinism to be a 'restraint' or not.
Unlike you, I haven't refused to acknowledge any facts. I've merely pointed out the incoherence of your ideas. For instance:
When one has a world where determinism is true, and adds "randomness" to it, then the thesis of determinism is false.
And apparently such simple facts will continue to be beyond your grasp because you refuse to do any reading on the topics you have such religious anti-scientific dedication to. The SEP article explains why determinism is a thesis about the world.
My "definition of free"? What is my definition of "free"? Quote whatever you are referring to. What does it have to do with the topic here? Why is it so important to you that you're chasing me around on various threads?
As far as I can tell, your idea of "fuzzy determinism" is only a restraint on your ability to say something non-gibberishy. That is apparently why you are unable to find any scholars referring to "fuzzy determinism".
Of course. For the fourth or fifth time that's not in dispute between us, and it's the reason why I distinguish it with the title 'fuzzy determinism'.
Your definition (of 'freedom/ rather than 'free', but nothing hangs on that) is >here<.
As far as I can tell, you pretend not to understand fuzzy determinism
Of course. For the fourth or fifth time that's not in dispute between us, and it's the reason why I distinguish it with the title 'fuzzy determinism'.
Your definition (of 'freedom/ rather than 'free', but nothing hangs on that) is >here<.
It can't be that you don't understand the idea.
It's simply your own definition of (strict) determinism, after taking into account the loss of strictness caused by quantum randomness. I call it 'fuzzy determinism'. I invited you to give it some other name if you preferred, but you didn't.
I've invited you to discuss it. However your only replies have been that you can't find it in your encyclopedia (apparently with the implication that it therefore cannot exist), and ad homs (in the strict sense, since you use them instead of addressing the point).
And that leads directly to the question of whether the will is free and in what sense, and to the unanswered question regarding your definition of 'freedom' towit whether fuzzy determinism is a 'restraint' within the terms of that definition. And that all takes place within the context of materialism, which is the topic of this thread.
What is "not in dispute between us"?
Define "fuzzy determinism".
That's a definition I quoted from dictionary.com. What is your dispute about it?
OK. Let's call it "silly incoherence". That's what you have described.
My answer is: No, your idea of silly incoherence does not restrain anything. Everyone and everything remains free regardless of the existence of your silly incoherence.
That determinism, which I call 'strict determinism' to distinguish it from the fuzzy kind, is refuted by randomness.
To quote my previous post, fuzzy determinism is "your own definition of (strict) determinism, after taking into account the loss of strictness caused by quantum randomness." In other words, the process is fully physical (does not involve magic) but the chains of causation are imperfect, some being interrupted by quantum events that are random.
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Unfortunately the silliness and incoherence are on your side, so that name is not appropriate. I'll continue to call it 'fuzzy determinism' until you remember your manners and come up with a more suitable alternative.
So you say that a brain which makes a decision as the result of a mix of determinism and quantum effects (and nothing else), makes a free choice, yes?
If not, how do you say a brain makes a free choice?
How do you "mix" this thesis--
Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.
Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
--with random events? How is that meaningful?
What if someone proposed "fuzzy immaterialism"? It's a "mix" Berkeley's immaterialism and materialism. What does it that mean? How does someone interpret that idea into something coherent?
The definition of determinism you quote does not take quantum randomness into account. Fuzzy determinism does just that. Or to paraphrase that, the mechanistic view of the universe includes not just the strictness of chains of cause and effect, but the randomness of quantum mechanics.
My trouble with 'immaterialism' is that I know of no objective test that can distinguish the 'immaterial' from the imaginary, or the 'immaterial' from the non-existent. If you know one, I'd be interested to hear it.
Nor can I find Berkeley's definition of 'immaterial'. Did he offer one?
The imaginary is but one bit of immaterial, or so-called "mental entities." There is also idea, memory, prediction, projection, promise, predilection, poetry, preference, particular, and a whole lot of other words that don't begin with 'p.'
Mental Entities | Making sense of Philosophy
The trouble with 'immaterial' in this context is that it's taken to be an aspect of objective reality, whereas as you and I appear to agree, it's only an aspect of ─ let's call it ─ mentation.
The definition of the thesis of determinism "does not take quantum randomness into account" because a world in which even a single random event occurs refutes the thesis.
So, I'll ask my question again: How does one "mix" random events into the thesis of determinism? How is it a meaningful idea to do so?
I didn't ask what your "trouble with immaterialism" is. I asked how one "mixes" materialism into Berkeley's thesis.
Apparently you haven't done much reading on metaphysics, this topic on which you have such religious dedication.
Berkeley summarized his thesis in a simple way: Esse est percipi.
Why do I have to keep saying the same things over and over? AS REGARDS STRICT DETERMINISM, THAT'S NOT IN DISPUTE BETWEEN US.
HOWEVER. FUZZY DETERMINISM IS NOT STRICT DETERMINISM. IT DIFFERS FROM STRICT DETERMINISM BY TAKING QUANTUM RANDOMNESS INTO ACCOUNT.
Get it? There are two views of reality on the table. On the basis of our present scientific understanding, you and I agree that the first one, strict determinism is not correct.
That leaves fuzzy determinism. Fuzzy determinism is what you get when the chains of strict causality of strict determinism are at times deprived of their strictness by random quantum events.
Take a simple example. According to strict determinism,
A causes B, B causes C, C causes D ... X causes Y, Y causes Z. Therefore if A then Z ─ the future is in principle perfectly predictable (though in practical terms very rarely so).
In fuzzy determinism this isn't strictly so. To keep with our example, "A causes B" becomes "A causes B unless a random quantum event occurs which prevents A causing B". And so on for all the other steps in the chain to Z. Thus the future is in principle not predictable (though still derived only from sequences of physical events ─ which is what it has in common with strict determinism).
Now now! You asked a question about Berkeley's immaterialism, and as I told you, I think the 'immaterial' is indistinguishable from the imaginary, thus in this context a nonsense word.
But in case Berkeley was talking about something different, I asked you if he had defined 'immaterial' and if so how. Esse est percipi doesn't explain it; on the contrary it potentially enlarges the question. So once again, if you know how Berkeley defined 'immaterial', say so, and if you don't, likewise say so, but don't leave the question hanging.
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How is a world in which "fuzzy determinism" is true different from a world in which all events are undetermined?
I'll ask again: How does one "mix" materialism with immaterialism coherently?
Because even with fuzzy determinism, a great many events are caused by classical; chains of causation ─ the ones that aren't relevantly interrupted by quantum events.
And I'll ask again (since as you know I think 'immaterial' is a nonsense word in this context):
You want me to answer your question regarding Berkeley's 'immaterialism'.
How did Berkeley define 'immaterial'?
It's your question. What does it actually mean?
Which ones are these? How did you determine that an event is not "relevantly interrupted by quantum events"? Do you deny reductionism?
He didn't define "immaterial". He defined a metaphysical thesis, like the SEP definition of determinism defines a metaphysical thesis.
We'll get back to that when you've answered my questions:
You want me to answer your question regarding Berkeley's 'immaterialism'.
How did Berkeley define 'immaterial'?
It's your question. What does it actually mean?
How did Berkeley define 'immaterial'?
It's your question. What does it actually mean?
#338 blü 2, 10 minutes ago
As in my previous post.
By elaborate tests in an expensive and specialized laboratory.