It is possible to build a world in which there is no physical suffering, yet in which there is still free will (or the illusion thereof, depending on where you sit with that particular debate -- key takeaway, with the same amount of free agency we employ now, however much that is. I will henceforth just be using the term "free" and "free agency," but understand this still applies to objectors to
causa sui or libertarian free agency).
To convince you of this, I'd like to draw an analogy. There are multiple video games where it's possible to (by various means: cheat codes, console commands, unlockables, whatever) shrug off any damage dealt to the player. It doesn't take a big stretch of imagination to imagine a more complex situation until you end up with something like the world of The Matrix, where a world is simulated so accurately that its (conscious, sapient) occupants don't even realize that they're in a simulation.
It's easy to imagine how The Matrix could be programmed such that an occupant is literally unable to be physically harmed. Any situation you can imagine where they would be bodily harmed, there is an easily accessible solution that a programmer could come up with to prevent it.
Perhaps this could work with conditional physics: for instance, if you're wanting to cut up a potato, your knife is happy to oblige. If you try to sink your knife into your neighbor, the programmed physics of the world automatically drain all inertia from the knife, stopping it harmlessly against living skin. (And so on. This works for natural suffering, suffering from other people, anything involving bodily harm or violation).
Now, anything that can be simulated is necessarily logically possible. So we should agree that it's logically possible for a world to exist where physical suffering is made impossible by that world's physics. You can imagine where I'm going next.
An omnipotent being is capable of actualizing any logically possible state of affairs. So, it stands to reason that the same God from the Problem of Evil premises (omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent) should be able to create such a world.
One might object, "But Erin, then people wouldn't be free! I could no longer stab my neighbor if I wanted to!"
I would find this objection odd (why would this "freedom" existing be a good thing?), and have several responses:
- We already "aren't free" to perform a multitude of physical actions, yet we consider ourselves to be free agents. I can't bring the remote control to my hand with the power of my mind, or walk on the bottoms of clouds, or teleport myself to Andromeda. The mere state of being unable to do some things does not make one "not free." Conversely, we are also "not free" already from doing terrible things: I can't turn you inside out with my mind, or pretty much any of the things Freddy Krueger or Pinhead have done in fiction. (Are they "more free" than me? Is that good?)
- In such a world, you would still be free to decide what to eat for lunch, which movie you want to see tonight, with which friends. Literally all free actions would still be available to you; even writing fiction in which there are conflicts and bodily harm for entertainment purposes. It does not make sense to argue that you would "not be free."
- If it's argued that we need terrible things in order to have some good things, then I agree: with the strong caveat that we'd be better without either. For instance, if there are no houses burning down, then we wouldn't have the undeniably good thing of the existence of firefighters. If there were no smallpox, the undeniably good thing of a smallpox vaccine wouldn't exist. But is it really better to have smallpox just so that we might have a vaccine? Wouldn't it be better to have no smallpox and no need for a vaccine?
To close out my argument, the theist that believes in a deity that fulfills the premises of the Problem of Evil must be able to account for why physical suffering exists, if we agree that it's possible for said God to create a world in which it's impossible.
(Addendum: I do not argue that ALL suffering is preventable while maintaining free will, just physical suffering. For instance, I do not see how it would be possible to maintain free will while preventing the possibility of things like broken friendships, unrequited love, and things of that nature.
Still, those things are telling: they are not things God would be culpable for, whereas God is culpable for the physics of the world beings inhabit.)