What is naturalism?

[mikkel_the_dane]

This is a good question with no easy answer. However, since I consider myself an ontological naturalist, I feel compelled to answer.

among all possible complicate explanations, I think the one which condense all of them is the following: naturalism is the philosophical position that states that there is no ultimate teleology, nor purpose whatsoever in what exists.

ciao

- viole

I get that. We make our own purpose. Existential absurdism for the world.

 

[Polymath257]

Kant believed that ideas, the raw matter of knowledge, must somehow be due to realities existing independently of human minds; but he held that such things-in-themselves must remain forever unknown. Human knowledge cannot reach to them because knowledge can only arise in the course of synthesizing the ideas of sense.

I'm trying to parse this to make sense of it. So, our ideas (which he considers to be what knowledge is made of) are 'somehow due' (in other words, caused) to 'realities' (meaning, say, matter?) existing independently of our minds.

But he held that such 'things in themselves' must remain forever unknown (so they are beyond what we can know). Human knowledge cannot reach them because knowledge can only arise in the course of synthesizing the ideas of sense.

My problem here is in the last paragraph. The fact that something exists independently of our minds (so, its existence is not dependent on our minds), does not mean it cannot be known.

As an example, the sofa across the room from me exists 'independently of my mind'. But, I can still know a great deal about it. I can know it is strong enough to sit on, for example. I can know its mass. I can know its density. i can know if it carries an electric charge, etc.

What *else* is required to 'have knowledge' of that sofa? The very fact that I can interact with it carries information that gives me knowledge. And the facts about that sofa, if independently verified, is independent of my mind. But I can still know them.

It is precisely because I have my senses that I can have knowledge. And, the 'thing in itself' is *defined* by how it can interact. Those interactions *are* detections and carry information about that thing. So, I can know about it.

From what I can see, to even talk about a thing that does not interact (and hence, cannot be detected), is simply nonsense.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

The trouble is naturalism is a method of science and not an ultimate explanation of why reality is the way it is.

The problem is the presumption of a why with little or no realization that it is only that.

 

[Polymath257]

Well, I think the way the term is generally used it is essentially the same thing as materialism/physicalism. That 'what is' is just the result of natural physical laws playing out. That there is no thinking intelligence or spiritual planes beyond the physical is an important derivative of this philosophy.

Or, perhaps, simply that if these planes exist, we should consider their laws as physical laws and them to be physical as well.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

among all possible complicate explanations, I think the one which condense all of them is the following: naturalism is the philosophical position that states that there is no ultimate teleology, nor purpose whatsoever, in what exists.

How does that exclude purposeful lesser deities or, for that matter, a purposeless God?

 

[Polymath257]

The trouble is naturalism is a method of science and not an ultimate explanation of why reality is the way it is.

And what *would* be such an ultimate explanation?

Surely not everything in reality is empirically verifiable.

Sure, my opinion that tomatoes are vile cannot be empirically verified. That is because it is an opinion.

Science would do so much better if they just quit trying to philosophize and conform everyone to their ultimate expectations of what constitutes reality.

Can you give an example of this behavior?

Science goes hand in hand with the method of naturalism. When science gets into the truth telling business naturalism sounds more like a religion.

Science is in the business of *testing* ideas. Those ideas that cannot be tested are discarded as useless. Those ideas that fail to pass their tests are either discarded or modified.

The tests in science are all ultimately observation by some senses.

 

[Salty Booger]

What is naturalism?
That is my question.

I once owned The Naturalist's Handbook. It was all about appreciating nature through study and observation.

 

[George-ananda]

Or, perhaps, simply that if these planes exist, we should consider their laws as physical laws and them to be physical as well.

I can agree that the distinction between natural and supernatural can be looked at as physical plane versus higher planes in other dimensions and vibratory rates. It can all be called natural/material but that is often not the colloquial usage of those words.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

I can agree that the distinction between natural and supernatural can be looked at as physical plane versus higher planes in other dimensions and vibratory rates.

Indeed, the very first thing I look at when investigating ontological naturalism is the vibratory rate.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Ontological naturalism is the thesis that the physical world is causally closed: any cause of a physical event is also physical.
In a sense, this is more a definition of the term 'physical' than anything else.

From section 3.2: The World is Not Causally Closed:
"In the weakest conception, causal closure means that 'every physical phenomenon that has a sufficient cause has a sufficient physical cause' (Montero, 2003, p. 174). According to Kim (1998, p. 40) another way of stating the principle of physical causal closure is this:

'If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. . . . If you reject this principle, you are ipso facto rejecting the in-principle completability of physics.'​

This argument is not correct. It is true that under very general conditions any causally open physical system can be embedded into a causally closed time-invariant description with a larger state space. However, such an ad hoc extension presupposes a two-way determinism, where the present is 'mathematically determined jointly by the past and future, however remote' (Good, 1962). That is, only if the external influences are given for all past and future times, then we can reconstruct a local time-invariant deterministic description. Even if we can reconstruct a causal ancestry (which is by no means unique) in every particular case, this does not imply the possibility of a global causal reconstruction.
The assertion that 'modern science is premised on the assumption that the material world is a causally closed system' (Heil, 1998, p. 23) is in striking contradiction to experimental science. Every experiment requires an irreversible dynamics. No experiment refers to a closed physical system. In a strictly deterministic world it would neither be possible to perform meaningful experiments nor to verify the partially causal behavior of a physical system. We conclude that science neither assumes that the material world is a causally closed system, nor that physical laws imply the causal closure of physics." (italics in original; emphasis added)
Primas, H. (2009). Complementarity of Mind and Matter. In H. Atmanspracher & H. Primas (Eds.). Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science (pp. 171-209). Springer.
References cited in quotation:
Good, I.J (1962): Two-way determinism. In: Good, I.J. (ed.), The Scientist Speculates. Heinemann, London, pp. 314–315.
Heil, J. (1998): Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge, London.
Kim, J. (1998): Mind in a Physical World. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Montero, B. (2003): Varieties of causal closure. In: Walter, S. and Heckmann, H.-D. (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic, Exeter, pp. 173–187.

 

[George-ananda]

Indeed, the very first thing I look at when investigating ontological naturalism is the vibratory rate.

Well you just might be wasting oxygen. Yawn.

 

[Polymath257]

From section 3.2: The World is Not Causally Closed:
"In the weakest conception, causal closure means that 'every physical phenomenon that has a sufficient cause has a sufficient physical cause' (Montero, 2003, p. 174). According to Kim (1998, p. 40) another way of stating the principle of physical causal closure is this:

'If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. . . . If you reject this principle, you are ipso facto rejecting the in-principle completability of physics.'​

This argument is not correct. It is true that under very general conditions any causally open physical system can be embedded into a causally closed time-invariant description with a larger state space. However, such an ad hoc extension presupposes a two-way determinism, where the present is 'mathematically determined jointly by the past and future, however remote' (Good, 1962). That is, only if the external influences are given for all past and future times, then we can reconstruct a local time-invariant deterministic description. Even if we can reconstruct a causal ancestry (which is by no means unique) in every particular case, this does not imply the possibility of a global causal reconstruction.
The assertion that 'modern science is premised on the assumption that the material world is a causally closed system' (Heil, 1998, p. 23) is in striking contradiction to experimental science. Every experiment requires an irreversible dynamics. No experiment refers to a closed physical system. In a strictly deterministic world it would neither be possible to perform meaningful experiments nor to verify the partially causal behavior of a physical system. We conclude that science neither assumes that the material world is a causally closed system, nor that physical laws imply the causal closure of physics." (italics in original; emphasis added)
Primas, H. (2009). Complementarity of Mind and Matter. In H. Atmanspracher & H. Primas (Eds.). Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science (pp. 171-209). Springer.
References cited in quotation:
Good, I.J (1962): Two-way determinism. In: Good, I.J. (ed.), The Scientist Speculates. Heinemann, London, pp. 314–315.
Heil, J. (1998): Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge, London.
Kim, J. (1998): Mind in a Physical World. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Montero, B. (2003): Varieties of causal closure. In: Walter, S. and Heckmann, H.-D. (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic, Exeter, pp. 173–187.

This seems to confuse causal closure with determinism. it may well be that the minimal causally closed system is the universe as a whole.

 

[atanu]

And for the record, nothing of importance was added to the argument.

Was there an argument or an assertion from you?

 

[Martin]

It is not to be confused with Naturism

I used to describe myself as an amateur naturalist, but gave up after some funny looks.

 

[shunyadragon]

Okay, if something is in itself and independent of mind for which you only know trough the mind, what can you know of it, other than it is in itself and independent of mind. It is from Immanuel Kant.

Supported by objective verifiable evidence outside the mind.

Immanuel Kant is a dead philosopher.

 

[osgart]

And what *would* be such an ultimate explanation?



Sure, my opinion that tomatoes are vile cannot be empirically verified. That is because it is an opinion.



Can you give an example of this behavior?



Science is in the business of *testing* ideas. Those ideas that cannot be tested are discarded as useless. Those ideas that fail to pass their tests are either discarded or modified.

The tests in science are all ultimately observation by some senses.

An ultimate explanation in science is that everything emerged from mindless processes, and that everything is computational.

Surely not everything in the natural world can be made use of. Many things are beyond explanation. And things like a multiverse are not testable. Nor can it be tested that there is an ultimate beginning to our universe, or that it existed in a more fundamental form.

Would you consider quantum mechanics to be the fundamental nature of reality? How do you know there are no deeper realities then quantum?

Perhaps what is useful to humans is not an explanation of why things are the way they are. Explanation is a why question. Science seems to be limited to only how things work.

 

[shunyadragon]

Furthermore, mental causation and/or consciousness is not explained by any physical parameters or process.

Yes it has.

I will not get into this argument again.

Not so nice a dodge based on you agenda without substance.

 

[shunyadragon]

An ultimate explanation in science is that everything emerged from mindless processes, and that everything is computational.

Surely not everything in the natural world can be made use of. Many things are beyond explanation. And things like a multiverse are not testable. Nor can it be tested that there is an ultimate beginning to our universe, or that it existed in a more fundamental form.

Would you consider quantum mechanics to be the fundamental nature of reality? How do you know there are no deeper realities then quantum?

Science does not know anything. The present objective verifiable evidence can falsify hypothesis and theories down to the Quanta level of our physical existence explainable by Quantum Mechanics. Beyond this at present is speculation.

Perhaps what is useful to humans is not an explanation of why things are the way they are. Explanation is a why question. Science seems to be limited to only how things work.

True, science can only make falsifiable hypothesis and theories and ask How?, What, and Where? and not Why?. The question Why? is a philosophical and/or Theological subjective question.

 

[Polymath257]

An ultimate explanation in science is that everything emerged from mindless processes, and that everything is computational.

Really? I have yet to see that enunciated in any of my science classes.

Surely not everything in the natural world can be made use of. Many things are beyond explanation. And things like a multiverse are not testable. Nor can it be tested that there is an ultimate beginning to our universe, or that it existed in a more fundamental form.

Some versions of multiverse models are testable in that specific. Others are testable in the basic physics that they are based upon.

I'm not convinced that the 'ultimate beginning' question is inherently untestable as opposed to simply not having evidence currently. perhaps a more complete theory of physics will answer that conclusively.

I'm not even sure what a 'more fundamental form' would be.

Would you consider quantum mechanics to be the fundamental nature of reality? How do you know there are no deeper realities then quantum?

I don't. I know that QM is *one* aspect of reality. And it works well for everything it has been tested on. Given our known lack of understanding of quantum gravity, it would be rash to say we currently have the final word on physics.

Perhaps what is useful to humans is not an explanation of why things are the way they are. Explanation is a why question. Science seems to be limited to only how things work.

Why questions tend to be answered by the how questions: the answer to a why is a combination of an initial condition and a how.

 

[Polymath257]

True, science can only make falsifiable hypothesis and theories and ask How?, What, and Where? and not Why?. The question Why? is a philosophical and/or Theological subjective question.

I don't think that is completely true. For example, we can, and do, ask why planets orbit the sun in ellipses. The answer is, ultimately, because of the inverse square law of gravity and Newton's laws of motion.

We can answer why some chemical compound is unstable. We can answer why light is refracted by lenses. We can answer why viruses are able to infect people.

In all of these cases, the WHY question is answered by some basic general insight applied to the specific situation. And that *is* an answer to some form of WHY questions.

The problems come in when the WHY question is one of teleology. Those WHY questions cannot be answered by science. But it isn't clear that they can be answered at all.