I wish I knew more Sanskrit to comment on this. 'Advaita-para', now what is that?
Its not about sanskrit Aup ji, in plains terms:
a) Supposition of nirviśeṣatva of brahman makes it cumbersome to explain and understand several śrutis including the one above which clearly says - tadātmānam eva avet 'aham brahma asmi iti because it leads to kartṛkarma-virodha.
Now consider two propositions:
b-1) Do the so-called 'mahavakyas (these are also referred to as supposedly advaita-para meaning those that only convey advaita)' directly convey 'aikya'? If so, then no exegetical treatment will be required.
b-2) Are they interpreted to convey 'aikya' based on exegetical treatment (for eg, like the lakṣaṇa described in great detail by HLK)? If so, the exegesis is open to critical analysis because they are not svataḥ-pramāṇa (self-validating)
There's 'Paingala' upanishada from Shukla-Yajurveda, cited by Shankaracharya in his Brahma-Sutra Bhashya. It's a conversation of Sage Paingala and Yadnyavalkya, that is throwing light on the supreme knowledge of Brahman.
III-1-2. Then Paingala said to Yajnavalkya: Set forth the explanation of the major text(s) [Maha-vakyas]. Yajnavalkya replied: Thou art That; Thou That art; Thou Brahman art; I am Brahman – One should meditate thus.
III-3. The expressed sense of the word ‘tat’ is the world-cause, marked by ‘other-ness’ (mediacy), having Being, Consciousness and Bliss as his characteristics, Maya as his adjunct and omniscience, etc., as his features. The very same with awareness mixed up with the inner sense, the object of the I-notion, is the expressed meaning of ‘tvam’. Rejecting the adjuncts of the supreme (God) and the Jiva, viz.: Maya and avidya, the indicated sense of tat and tvam is Brahman, non-different from the inner Self.
III-4. ‘Hearing’ is investigation into the import of propositions like ‘That Thou art’ and ‘I am Brahman’. Reflection is the exclusive dwelling on the content of what has been heard. Meditation is the fixing of the mind one-pointedly on the reality, made doubtless through investigation and reflection. Concentration, resembling a flame in a windless spot, is the thought (chitta) whose content is solely the object meditated, exclusive of the agent, and the act, of meditation.
III-8. The microcosm consumed in the fire of knowledge together with (its) causes is dissolved in the supreme Self. Therefore the Brahmana should concentratedly dwell on the identity (of the contents) of the terms tat and tvam. Thence, when the clouds are
dispelled as the sun (shines forth), the Self is manifested.
Bhaga-Lakshana:
“That Devadatta (as a child) is this youth” is a statement wherein a child from a given time an place and of a given size and with other qualities of childhood is shown to have become, after fourteen years, this youth. The listener has to subtract the time, the place, the size, the shape, the innocence in the child and add the new time, place, size, shape, and the mischief of the youth, retaining the person himself, in order to arrive at the perfect identity between the person in the child and the square-shouldered teenager who is now sitting right in front of him. This is an example of jaha ajaha laksana.
Sri Ramacandra is elaborately explaining to his dear brother Laksmana that to grasp the significance of the mahavakya, we have to use the method of jaha ajaha laksana, which is also called bhaga laksana. Because jiva and Isvara are in essence nothing but the one Self (ekatmakattvat), jahati laksana cannot be used.
Now, why we can not use 'Jahati' and 'Ajahati' technique.
Thus these two are contradictory so the direct meaning is not possible. So another technique is used, which is known by 'Lakshana-Vrutti'.
Now as HLK has strenuously proved, proposition b-2) is unarguably correct. Which means to claim these śrutis convey 'aikya' is wrong, instead what can be claimed is '
advaitic interpretation of these śrutis convey aikya'.
The evaluation of exegesis used by different schools and their tenability is perhaps a different discussion. For purpose of this one, i think it suffices to say that
by themselves these śrutis
don't convey aikya and require exegetical treatment to do so, and HLK has driven this point home.
We can see how they are trying to defend their philosophy irrationally by getting exhausted by seeing 'I am Brahman' 'You are that' like texts.. They know that Maha-Vakya
frequently mentions 'Aham Brahmasmi' or 'You are that' like Mahavakya-s.
1) The fact is, the amount of śrutis that are disregarded as 'atatattvāvādaka' far exceed the amount of texts accepted by the māyāvāda/advaita school.
2) [Am assuming you've studied them] Where exactly and how many times has Śri Śaṁkara used the term 'mahavakya' in the prasthānas?
3) Also isn't māyāvāda based on principal upaniṣads? Why relegate to quoting from others, most of whose authenticity is dubious.
If you wear yellow glass you'll see yellow. That's inevitable. That's just simple !
Passion for chosen school of thought is admirable, but that doesn't qualify for scholarship in either the chosen one or others. By using lakṣaṇa on both terms, the māyāvādins would be, by your 'yellow glass' analogy, wearing not one but two at a time!
1) brahman itself is under ignorance- no support in śrutis
Oh really as if you've read all Veda and Purana. It seems you've not studied even the Upanishada.
Before the creation there was only Brahman. He thought to become many.
So why should one presuppose ignorance in brahman? Isn't it because of another presupposition of nirviśeṣatva. Brahman being satyasaṁkalpa doesn't need māyā to remain one or become many. Nor by becoming many will each of those be any less compete (pūrṇamidam...).
If Brahman can not be under ignorance then why would Purusha assimilate with Prakruti.
That's another presupposition.
'Adhyatma Vidya' is born out of Maya, just as Ignorance is.
Okay, I give you scriptural supports.
From prasthānas, if you will.
श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ।