Which Theory of Evolution do you Believe?

[leibowde84]

Shame is for weaklings.

Published papers can be quite cromulent, but
that doesn't mean they support a poster's claim.

You've certainly embiggened your role with a surprisingly cromulent performance.

 

[atanu]

The dead body wouldn't be an organism with different DNA. It would merely be a dead organism where the DNA was artificially replaced. Artificially replacing DNA certainly takes the example outside the realm of what we are discussing here.

Yes. It apparently seems so. I will rather ask Zosimus to show us a rabbit fossil from Permian age.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

When one doesn't know the probability of an alternative, to presume its probability is the reciprocal
of the quantity of alternatives Is what's called in probability theory a "wild arsched guess".

I do like it when you talk technical.

 

[Zosimus]

http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Falsifiability_of_evolution
Disproving evolution first requires to look at what the theory predicts and see where it can be shown to make incorrect predictions. It is easy to be side-tracked by specifics of the theory, such as individual evolutionary pathways of certain features, and confuse these with what would falsify the overall theory of evolution by natural selection. Indeed, many creationists do this whenever a new discovery is made in biology that causes scientists to rethink some pieces of evolution. To avoid this problem, it is best to be clear what evolution is. It is based on three main principles: variation, heritability and selection. Given these three principles, evolution must occur, and many features of evolution appear given only these three guiding principles.[3] If any of these were shown to be flawed then the theory would be untenable.

Consequently any of the following would destroy the theory:

• If it could be shown that organisms with identical DNA have different genetic traits.

Tacking by disjunction.

• If it could be shown that mutations do not occur.

Again, tacking by disjunction.

• If it could be shown that when mutations do occur, they are not passed down through the generations.

Again, tacking by disjunction.

• If it could be shown that although mutations are passed down, no mutation could produce the sort ofphenotypic changes that drive natural selection.

Once again, tacking by disjunction.

• If it could be shown that selection or environmental pressures do not favor the reproductive success of better adapted individuals.

Okay, finally we have one that isn't tacking by disjunction! But be more specific. Exactly how could it be shown that environmental pressures do not favor the reproductive success of the as yet undefined "better adapted individuals."

• If it could be shown that even though selection or environmental pressures favor the reproductive success of better adapted individuals, "better adapted individuals" (at any one time) are not shown to change into other species.

Tacking by disjunction.

 

[Zosimus]

The following explains where your logic is flawed, in that, with the scientific method, we are dealing with the following:

For any statements H, E and b, E confirms H relative to b if H & b and E are contingent, E is a logical consequence of H & b but not of b alone, and E is verified.

... rather than:

For any statements H and E, E confirms H if H and E are contingent, E is a logical consequence of H, and E is verified.

1 Introduction: Hypothetico-deductivism and the tacking by disjunction paradox In this paper, I focus on the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. I show that, though the hypothetico-deductivist attempts to resolve this paradox made by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable, the Bayesian who endorses the Total Evidence Condition can settle the paradox without any apparent difficulty. A crude formulation of Hypothetico-deductivism says that: (HD) For any statements H and E, E confirms H if H and E are contingent, E is a logical consequence of H, and E is verified. (Cf. Grimes 1990: 515). Some philosophers prefer to define Hypothetico-deductivism by appealing to the notion of confirmation relative to (or given) background knowledge. The adduced reason is, usually, that in 2 actual science background knowledge does play a role in deduction and confirmation. A simple formulation of relative Hypothetico-deductivism is the following: (RHD) For any statements H, E and b, E confirms H relative to b if H & b and E are contingent, E is a logical consequence of H & b but not of b alone, and E is verified. I will hereafter focus on (RHD) rather than on (HD), as the former principle appears to reflect scientific practice more accurately. A difficulty for Hypothetico-deductivism is the tacking by disjunction paradox. If Hypothetico-deductivism is defined by (RHD), the tacking by disjunction paradox hinges on the following counterintuitive confirmation rule: (TD) For any statements H, E and b, if H & b is contingent and entails E, for any arbitrary statement E*, if E ∨ E* is contingent and is not entailed by b alone, whenever E ∨ E* is verified, E ∨ E* confirms H relative to b. (TD) follows from (RHD) by introduction of the disjunction (if X entails Y, then, for whatever Z, X entails Y ∨ Z).1 Roughly, the trouble with (TD) is that E* may appear irrelevant to H’s confirmation given b (in the intuitive sense that if one verifies E*, this does not affect one’s confidence in H given b) or E* may even be inconsistent with H & b. One can thus feel reluctant to admit that the verification of E ∨ E* does confirm H given b. Let us call any statement E ∨ E* such that H & b entails E, E appears positively relevant to H given b (in the intuitive sense that one’s verification of E* increases one’s confidence in H given b), and E* appears irrelevant to H given b or is inconsistent with H & b, a tacked disjunction for H given b, or simply a tacked disjunction. Consider for example the case in which a hypothesis H has 3 the form of the generalization (x)(Fx), E is equivalent to Fa, and E* is equivalent to Ra or to ¬Fc. Notice that ¬Fc is logically inconsistent with (x)(Fx) & b, and Ra seems irrelevant to (x)(Fx) given b if b is tautologous. The first impression may be that the verification of the tacked disjunctions Fa ∨ Ra and Fa ∨ ¬Fc should not confirm the hypothesis (x)(Fx) given b. This impression can be strengthened by other considerations. For example, it can be argued that if one allows tacked disjunctions to confirm hypotheses, for any statement H however idiotic, as long as H is contingent and there is some other verified statement E* such that H ∨ E* is contingent, one has a confirmation of H. Thus the foolish claim ‘The moon is made of Green cheese’ is confirmed by the verification of ‘The moon is made of Green cheese or London is in the UK’, which is unacceptable. In Section 2, I show that the tacking by disjunction problem is much less univocal than one might expect: the verification of a tacked disjunction E ∨ E* appears in certain cases not to confirm H given b but, in other cases, to confirm it. Any adequate solution of the tacking by disjunction paradox should distinguish the cases in which E ∨ E* confirms H from those in which it does not. In Sections 3 and 4, I examine the two most recent hypothetico-deductivist attempts to resolve this paradox, given in Gemes (1998) and in Kuipers (2000). I argue that both solutions are inadequate because they do not distinguish the cases in which E ∨ E* confirms H from those in which it does not. In Section 5, I show that the Bayesian who accepts Total Evidence Condition as a constraint for the application of the rule of incremental confirmation can settle the paradox without falling afoul of similar difficulties. Finally, in the conclusion of the paper, I argue that the application of the Total Evidence Condition is hampered by serious difficulties when hypothetico-deductivist analysis of confirmation is presupposed. (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2289/1/Disjunction.pdf)

Okay, you can google and can cut and paste. Impressive. However, apply what you have just read to the problem at hand because everything you just posted supports my side of the argument rather than yours!

You said:

For any statements H, E and b, E confirms H relative to b if H & b and E are contingent, E is a logical consequence of H & b but not of b alone, and E is verified.

Let H = the theory of natural selection. Let E = an animal is found with mutations and let b = the theory that mutations occur because of known processes (errors in copying, random radiation, etc.).

Would you really say that finding an animal with mutations confirms the hypothesis of natural selection relative to the theory that mutations occur because H&b and E are contingent, E is a logical consequences of H&b but not of b alone?

Finding an animal with mutations is a logical consequence of b alone! Thus E does not confirm H&b it just confirms b and ~E falsifies not H&b but b alone.

 

[Zosimus]

Yes. It apparently seems so. I will rather ask Zosimus to show us a rabbit fossil from Permian age.

I fail to see how showing a rabbit fossil from the Permian age would confirm or falsify the theory of natural selection. I believe that you are caught in the tacking by disjunction paradox.

 

[leibowde84]

Okay, you can google and can cut and paste. Impressive. However, apply what you have just read to the problem at hand because everything you just posted supports my side of the argument rather than yours!

You said:

For any statements H, E and b, E confirms H relative to b if H & b and E are contingent, E is a logical consequence of H & b but not of b alone, and E is verified.

Let H = the theory of natural selection. Let E = an animal is found with mutations and let b = the theory that mutations occur because of known processes (errors in copying, random radiation, etc.).

Would you really say that finding an animal with mutations confirms the hypothesis of natural selection relative to the theory that mutations occur because H&b and E are contingent, E is a logical consequences of H&b but not of b alone?

Finding an animal with mutations is a logical consequence of b alone! Thus E does not confirm H&b it just confirms b and ~E falsifies not H&b but b alone.

It works because the evidence is found to confirm the theory thousands of times over and no evidence is found that contradicts the theory. Actually thousands of attempts have been made to find contradictory evidence but none is found.

 

[Ouroboros]

I do like it when you talk technical.

Tech talk is the new sex talk.

 

[Zosimus]

It works because the evidence is found to confirm the theory thousands of times over and no evidence is found that contradicts the theory. Actually thousands of attempts have been made to find contradictory evidence but none is found.

This is not an answer for multiple reasons.

First of all, nothing you have said refutes the idea that you are relying on the tacking by disjunction paradox for your confirmations.

Second, even if things are confirmed, that proves nothing because your confirmation procedure involves a logical fallacy.

Finally, the main point that I am making is that the theory of natural selection is a tautology. Tautologies are always confirmed because they are circular in nature.

 

[atanu]

I fail to see how showing a rabbit fossil from the Permian age would confirm or falsify the theory of natural selection. I believe that you are caught in the tacking by disjunction paradox.

Ha. Ha. What is disjunction paradox? Can you kindly explain why finding a rabbit fossil in Permian sediments does not constitute a proof?

 

[Rick O'Shez]

Tech talk is the new sex talk.

Eeeew!

 

[McBell]

This is a false dichotomy. If someone brings a box to you and says, "This box contains $1 million" then you will not consider two possibilities. You must consider a multitude of possibilities. Perhaps the box contains a deadly snake. Perhaps the box contains a note saying, "Fooled you." Perhaps the box contains $999,999 and the guy miscounted. You must consider an infinite number of possibilities, each of which is as likely as the next.

From there, you will begin to refine your estimations. Has the person in question ever lied to you in the past? Does he have $1 million? etc.

Since the claim is merely "this box contains one million dollars" the box either contains one million dollars or it does not contain one million dollars.
Everything else is irrelevant to the claim.

 

[McBell]

All right. Let's stick strictly to what you said.

Someone comes to you and says, "This box contains either $1 million or nothing."

So the first determination you need to make is whether the man is lying. This occurs before trying to calculate the odds of the box having $1 million.

and now YOU have completely changed the claim into a false dichotomy....

 

[Zosimus]

Ha. Ha. What is disjunction paradox? Can you kindly explain why finding a rabbit fossil in Permian sediments does not constitute a proof?

All right, let's make this simple. Let's say someone comes up to you and says, "Hi. I'm a Christian from Grace Community Church. Christianity is a falsifiable, scientific theory that should be taught in schools."

We assume that you are a skeptic, so you say, "How in the world is the concept of an invisible supernatural being that no one can see or detect falsifiable?"

To which he responds, "No, no, don't you see? I'm a Christian. We believe that God is an unchangeable God of order. We believe that God created the universe and thus the universe has unchangeable, orderly rules that govern it. All you have to do to disprove Christianity is to prove that the universe has fickle rules or no rules at all."

This is a textbook example of tacking. In reality the person in question is making two claims:

A. A supernatural being exists.
B. This supernatural being has created an organized universe.

Then he is saying that you can disprove the theory because the theory is not A, it's A&B and B is falsifiable.

Yet what is to stop someone from saying, "Okay, my theory is that Thor exists and that water is wet. This is a falsifiable scientific theory, because if you find water that isn't wet, you'll have disproved it." Is this a serious argument? To what extent does the wetness of water have to do with whether Thor exists? It doesn't. Let's go further and say that you prove that water frozen near absolute 0 is not wet at all. So his theory is disproved, but the very next day he comes back with "Thor exists, and air is breathable." So you find some air that isn't breathable. The next day he comes back with "Thor exists, and wood is flammable." So you find some petrified wood that isn't flammable. The next day he comes back with "Thor exists, and diamonds are hard."

When will does this stop? It will never stop. He can simply tack a new, falsifiable claim onto the "Thor exists" claim and say that the new theory is falsifiable, empirically testable, and scientific. Few people will say that the Thor argument is a good one, but many people accept some tacking as legitimate. For example, neo-Darwinism, which is sometimes called the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, is a conglomeration of various scientific theories together. The theory of common descent, the theory of genetic inheritance, the theory of mutations, etc. are all glued together into one big theory.

So when I ask, "Is natural selection a testable scientific theory?" and you say "Yes, because you can find a fossilized rabbit out of place" you are using tacking. Natural selection, all by itself, does not predict rabbit fossils much less the idea that they can or cannot occur in any specific time period.

The paradox comes in when you try to come up with a rule that excludes "bad" tacking but permits "good" tacking. What rule can we use to say that tacking together "Thor exists" and "diamonds are hard" is unacceptable but that tacking the natural selection theory together with the common descent theory is perfectly okay?

 

[Zosimus]

Since the claim is merely "this box contains one million dollars" the box either contains one million dollars or it does not contain one million dollars.
Everything else is irrelevant to the claim.

Even assuming that you're right, what's the point of this argument?

The person who started this did so by stating:

Illustrative silly analogy time.....
I give you a box.
I tell you that it either contains $1,000,000 or nothing.
Here are 2 alternatives, but the probabilities are far from equal.
(The probability that I'd give you the money is exactly zero.)

This is clearly a FALSE DICHOTOMY. There are other possibilities than "the box contains $1,000,000" or "the box contains nothing."

So you have said, "Either the box contains $1 million or it does not contain $1 million." I agree. That is, however, NOT what the original argument stated.

The point of the principle of maximum ignorance is that you should not assume information that is not given in the original formulation of the problem.

To illustrate this, let's take the Betrand paradox, which was first posed by Bertrand Russell.

Consider an equilateral triangle inscribed in a circle. Suppose a chord of the circle is chosen at random. What is the probability that the chord is longer than a side of the triangle?

Bertrand offers three calculations, all of which are seemingly plausible, but which come up with three different answers to the question. The details are in the link, which leads to a Wikipedia article.

Bertrand's conclusion is that the problem is ill-defined because "random" is not defined in the problem.

The solution is found at http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/articles/well.pdf in which the author points out that we should not assume any information that is not given in the problem. The correct answer must be one that is scale and size independent because neither of those variables are included in the problem. By starting off by suggesting that we assign a size to the circle, a method suggested in one of the options... I think it's #3, we immediately start adding information that is not available in the original formulation of the problem. This is an error, and it leads to a false conclusion.

-----------------
In conclusion, noting that the box in question either has $1 million or it is not the case that the box has $1 million is true but irrelevant to the question as posed. Thus, what you have said in no way affects the conclusion that I reached.

 

[atanu]

..
The paradox comes in when you try to come up with a rule that excludes "bad" tacking but permits "good" tacking. What rule can we use to say that tacking together "Thor exists" and "diamonds are hard" is unacceptable but that tacking the natural selection theory together with the common descent theory is perfectly okay?

Thank you for your detailed explanation. I will read it again.

Are not "Thor exists" and "diamonds are hard" two unrelated propositions? Whereas, we know that from relicts of unicellular organisms in sediments of 3.5 billion old we have a massive variety in recent sediments? So, joining together all evidences why cannot we say that diversifications of forms with time is evident? Now, we can also propose a hypothesis of natural selection as the cause etc.?

 

[McBell]

Even assuming that you're right, what's the point of this argument?

The person who started this did so by stating:

Illustrative silly analogy time.....
I give you a box.
I tell you that it either contains $1,000,000 or nothing.
Here are 2 alternatives, but the probabilities are far from equal.
(The probability that I'd give you the money is exactly zero.)

This is clearly a FALSE DICHOTOMY. There are other possibilities than "the box contains $1,000,000" or "the box contains nothing."

So you have said, "Either the box contains $1 million or it does not contain $1 million." I agree. That is, however, NOT what the original argument stated.

The point of the principle of maximum ignorance is that you should not assume information that is not given in the original formulation of the problem.

To illustrate this, let's take the Betrand paradox, which was first posed by Bertrand Russell.

Consider an equilateral triangle inscribed in a circle. Suppose a chord of the circle is chosen at random. What is the probability that the chord is longer than a side of the triangle?

Bertrand offers three calculations, all of which are seemingly plausible, but which come up with three different answers to the question. The details are in the link, which leads to a Wikipedia article.

Bertrand's conclusion is that the problem is ill-defined because "random" is not defined in the problem.

The solution is found at http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/articles/well.pdf in which the author points out that we should not assume any information that is not given in the problem. The correct answer must be one that is scale and size independent because neither of those variables are included in the problem. By starting off by suggesting that we assign a size to the circle, a method suggested in one of the options... I think it's #3, we immediately start adding information that is not available in the original formulation of the problem. This is an error, and it leads to a false conclusion.

-----------------
In conclusion, noting that the box in question either has $1 million or it is not the case that the box has $1 million is true but irrelevant to the question as posed. Thus, what you have said in no way affects the conclusion that I reached.

Seems you need to do a much better job presenting the other persons argument.
I replied to what YOU posted....

 

[leibowde84]

This is not an answer for multiple reasons.

First of all, nothing you have said refutes the idea that you are relying on the tacking by disjunction paradox for your confirmations.

Second, even if things are confirmed, that proves nothing because your confirmation procedure involves a logical fallacy.

Finally, the main point that I am making is that the theory of natural selection is a tautology. Tautologies are always confirmed because they are circular in nature.

How is natural selection a tautology? It is merely an explanation as to what the trend or mechanism at work in the theory that, over long periods of time, leads to evolution.

 

[Zosimus]

Thank you for your detailed explanation. I will read it again.

Are not "Thor exists" and "diamonds are hard" two unrelated propositions? Whereas, we know that from relicts of unicellular organisms in sediments of 3.5 billion old we have a massive variety in recent sediments? So, joining together all evidences why cannot we say that diversifications of forms with time is evident? Now, we can also propose a hypothesis of natural selection as the cause etc.?

I understand your position completely. But what I want is a clear, objective rule that we can use to exclude the claim that Thor exists & diamonds are hard but include the related claims in evolution. That is the point of the paradox of tacking by disjunction. What rule can we devise that will eliminate A while preserving B?

 

[Zosimus]

Seems you need to do a much better job presenting the other persons argument.
I replied to what YOU posted....

Okay, my post was directed at someone who already knew what the conversation was about. You came in, and saw half of the conversation, and started talking about other things.

It's an A and B conversation ... so you can C...