Why Free Will does not Exist

[Willamena]

Notice that I didn't say anything about "technically a prediction".

You don't dispute that I correctly foretold that I would write the name of Kiing Lear's youngest daughter in my next post, do you?

Foretelling is prediction.

 

[Nous]

Foretelling is prediction.

So you do not dispute that in #55 I correctly foretold that I would write the name of King Lear's youngest daughter in my next post.

the definition of foretell

verb (used with object), foretold, foretelling.

1. to tell of beforehand; predict; prophesy.​

By the way, when you click on the word "predict" on that webpage, the definition does not say anything about "uncertain outcomes".

In any case, were it not for my ability to willfully determine what voluntary acts I will perform, the "outcome" of my claim in #55 about what I would do in the future would have been uncertain. Right?

 

[Willamena]

So you do not dispute that in #55 I correctly foretold that I would write the name of King Lear's youngest daughter in my next post.

the definition of foretell

verb (used with object), foretold, foretelling.

1. to tell of beforehand; predict; prophesy.​

By the way, when you click on the word "predict" on that webpage, the definition does not say anything about "uncertain outcomes".

In any case, were it not for my ability to willfully determine what voluntary acts I will perform, the "outcome" of my claim in #55 about what I would do in the future would have been uncertain. Right?

I did dispute that your actions were technically a prediction.

Predictions that have certain outcomes are known as promises.

 

[Nous]

I did dispute that your actions were technically a prediction.

What does that mean? You don't dispute that this proposition is true: In post #55 I correctly foretold that I would write the name of King Lear's youngest daughter in my next post. Do you? If you do dispute that that sentence is true, then show that it isn't true.

Predictions that have certain outcomes are known as promises.

Cite that definition of "prediction".

 

[Willamena]

Keeping a promise is a trivial example for Free Will. Free Will, as the faculty to act, is demonstrated in everything we do. Central to it is "me," the free agent whose parsing of the world has resulted in a mental self with the capacity to dictate.

 

[Nous]

Keeping a promise is a trivial example for Free Will.

The mortgage company will evict you from your house if you don't keep your promise to pay them. That isn't trivial.

Free Will, as the faculty to act, is demonstrated in everything we do. Central to it is "me," the free agent whose parsing of the world has resulted in a mental self with the capacity to dictate.

Those claims do not demonstrate that people can choose to perform (or not perform) voluntary acts. My foretelling of performing a voluntary act, then actually performing that act, is something that can't be accounted for except as a willful act.

 

[blü 2]

The title of the thread does not ask about anyone's "sense" or "experience" in any situation.

No, it simply refers to a video on 'Why free will does not exist'. But I referred to my experience in order to answer your question as to why my understanding of determinism didn't lead me act in any way essentially different to others.

The ability to foretell a bodily movement is the mark of its voluntariness, that it is a willed act, not an involuntary bodily movement. You haven't addressed that issue here.

But determinism doesn't rule out willed acts. 'Will' refers to the human experience that one's decisions are one's own; which indeed they are, since they're the products of one's brain functions, determined though they be.

Apparently you haven't understood that the experimental evidence shows that the postulate of realism is violated therefore the thesis of determinism is false. You should try to understand that evidence.

No, this is where fuzzy determinism ─ mechanism (as it were) that instead of proceeding with total predictability, is interrupted by random events and hence is unpredictable ─ comes in. And why I called it 'fuzzy determinism' since the mechanism is still there but isn't perfect in its operation.

That's because what you defined as "fuzzy determinism" is not determinism according to the definition of determinism.

No, it's 'fuzzy determinism'.

Incidentally, do you have a view on how will might be free of underlying mental organization obeying natural laws?

Or not?

 

[Willamena]

Those claims do not demonstrate that people can choose to perform (or not perform) voluntary acts. My foretelling of performing a voluntary act, then actually performing that act, is something that can't be accounted for except as a willful act.

Each action by a free agent that is voluntary--from getting up in the morning, to participating in a socio-economic culture in a democratic civilization, to picking your nose--is a demonstration of Free Will.

No foretelling is necessary.

 

[corynski]

Yes it can. Take a look at the video, which explains why. In essence, It's the only logical operative mechanism behind our actions. If there was a better one we'd here about it. Free will certainly doesn't qualify because it's operation has never been explained. At best it's merely a label. A label suggesting "I could have done differently if I had wanted to." but lacking any explanation as to how this could have come about.


If you honestly believe this then you don't understand the issue.


Problem is, choosing doesn't exist under the causality of determinism. Choice is an illusion.


No such thing as choice so, yes, they do necessitate your actions.


Yup.


If by "natural forces" you mean the inevitable causality of determinism, then Nope.


Well there are a lot of things we humans can do that an 8 ball can't, and if I understand your framework here, any resistance you made was because you could do no differently. The chain of cause/effect events leading up to the moment of resisting determined that you had to resist. You could do no differently.


And that's part of the illusion. There is no such ability other than what the previous events leading up to the resisting made you do.

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Good discusion. It brought up a memory of an argument I was having with a fellow at work, something about religion. And my friend suddenly looked puzzled about what I had said, so he picked up the phone and called his grandmother to help him answer my question. Well I started to wonder if she had raised him and taught him, and if he could even remember all she had told him growing up. It was her teaching I thought, that came from him even if he didn't remember it. There was a saying by what's his name, about just this idea: 'There is no antidote for religion mixed with mother's milk'.

 

[atanu]

The "quality" of the event, however measured, is determined by its causal factors. In other words, it can well be the case of GIGO. In the case of free will vs determinism, the position that determinism is better than the position of free will is, in part, a result of the lack of a convincing argument for free will. Unlike determinism, which is grounded in the operative mechanism of causality, free will believers have never presented an operative mechanism of any kind. As with creationists, who never make a case for creationism, but try to find fault with evolution, free willers seldom if ever make a logical case for free will, but instead are forced to find fault with determinism. Present a good, rational case for fee will without referencing determinism and I'll be all ears. Free will fails because there's nothing propping it up other than wishful thinking. At most it's a label indicating not-determinism.


Much clearer. Thank you.


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I think you either by-passed the point or altogether missed it. The analysis you have offered, if it were already determined, could not hold any truth value. But you propose it as convincing. How?
......

I remember that a few years back I had given an example of a man on a boat on a river sailing to a fall and certain death. He knows nothing of what lies ahead but only has a memory of the past. Suppose there is a man watching the boat from sky from a balloon or something. He will see the future ahead and take certain action to save the man in boat. Result does not matter.

If we are stuck with the notion that intelligence is only the manifest sensations and thoughts and that I am this body that is thinking xyzzy etc., then determinism applies with full force.

But the very fact that you are proposing an argument, assuming that the argument is convincing, indicates that we are not only the deterministically produced thoughts.

If you could open up to the possibility that we could be the seer of the body-mind, then you may intuit that we have a free will.

 

[atanu]

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But determinism doesn't rule out willed acts. 'Will' refers to the human experience that one's decisions are one's own; which indeed they are, since they're the products of one's brain functions, determined though they be.

Is it called Compatibilism?

 

[Skwim]

I think you either by-passed the point or altogether missed it. The analysis you have offered, if it were already determined, could not hold any truth value. But you propose it as convincing. How?

The logic that all effects (events) have a cause. Outside of the possibility of absolutely random events on the quantum level, show me an effect, be it mental or otherwise, that is uncaused (undetermined).

I remember that a few years back I had given an example of a man on a boat on a river sailing to a fall and certain death. He knows nothing of what lies ahead but only has a memory of the past. Suppose there is a man watching the boat from sky from a balloon or something. He will see the future ahead and take certain action to save the man in boat. Result does not matter.

If we are stuck with the notion that intelligence is only the manifest sensations and thoughts and that I am this body that is thinking xyzzy etc., then determinism applies with full force.

Intelligence has nothing to do with the issue.

But the very fact that you are proposing an argument, assuming that the argument is convincing, indicates that we are not only the deterministically produced thoughts.

It indicates nothing of the sort.

Here is a post I made some time ago that may help you understand my position.

Philosophically, free will is a term for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. In essence, freewill is commonly taken to mean "I could have done differently if I desired." But just how does this work? How does the mental operation work that makes the choice to go left rather than right?

So far, the only operative agents in the universe that have been found to bring events into being are utter randomness and causation. Utter randomness is a total lack of causation. Events simply pop into being for absolutely no reason whatsoever. While seemingly preposterous, this reportedly occurs in quantum mechanics; subatomic particles sometimes behave as they do for absolutely no reason at all. While this is the prevailing notion in quantum physics, there are those who do question it, but assuming utter randomness does exist could it contribute to free will? Hardly. Any effect it had on the mental operation of choosing would render the choosing itself random. So utter randomness can be eliminated as the agent of choosing. This leaves us with causation as the explanation for our actions.

What we choose to do is caused.

Causation is a "because of this, then that" sort of operation---notice the "cause" in the word "because," it's telling. So, looking at our choice to go left rather than right, we have to ask ourselves what caused this choice? The common and immediate answer is, "our free will." Nice, but what is the will and what is it free of?

"The will is the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions"
Source: Dictionary.com

The "free" part indicates that no coercive factor was involved, but as we've seen, there was a causal agent operating within the will that, in effect, determined its action. It determined (coerced) the will to make the choice to go left rather than right. If there wasn't then why would the will choose what it did? So, where does this causal agent get its instructions that determine the action of the will? Well, we've ruled out randomness as a possibility, so it too must have had a causal agent that determined its action. And where does this casual agent get it's instructions? As is probably evident, it's turtles all the way down. What we choose to do is because of a successive series of cause/effect operations that ultimately led to one choosing to go left rather than right. But, could we have chosen differently? Chose to go right instead? Not unless there was something different in the chain of cause/effect events that led up to the moment of going one way or the other. Think of each cause/effect event as a series of numbers. Say its a series of six numbers of 1 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7, which equals 26. For the series to equal some other number one or more of the numbers would have to be different. But they weren't, they were 1 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7, so the final outcome has to be 26 and no other number. Same is true of the series of events leading up to moment of going one way or the other. They were what they were and not something else. This means it was inevitable that one "chose" to go left rather than right. One simply couldn't have gone right. One HAD TO go left.

So where is the meat in the notion of choosing? There isn't any. Choosing, and all of its cognates, are really empty terms that don't mean a thing---other than in their most simplistic usage. We no more choose to go left than a rock chooses to sit where it does. While the will does control the mind as to its actions, what it does is not free, but controlled (determined) by everything the leads up to and impinges on any doing.

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[Nous]

Each action by a free agent that is voluntary--from getting up in the morning, to participating in a socio-economic culture in a democratic civilization, to picking your nose--is a demonstration of Free Will.

No foretelling is necessary.

You're just making claims. None of them can be used to argue that free will exists, that any creature than choose what acts they perform, or that there is any difference between willful acts and involuntary bodily movements. You can't even support the truth of your claims with definitions from dictionaries!

 

[Nous]

I referred to my experience in order to answer your question as to why my understanding of determinism didn't lead me act in any way essentially different to others.

You can't define what your idiosyncratic "understanding of determinism" is, can you?

Your "understanding of determinism" is obviously inconsistent with the definition of determinism in the SEP article. Correct?

Incidentally, do you have a view on how will might be free of underlying mental organization obeying natural laws?

What natural laws? Name them. I don't know of any "natural laws" that conflict with or preclude the expression of will as defined here:

the definition of will

noun
1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:
the freedom of the will.
2. power of choosing one's own actions:
to have a strong or a weak will.
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:
My hands are obedient to my will.​

The above definition of "will" is actually all that I ever mean by "free will"--that ability, power or faculty to choose whether or not to perform an act. My concept of "free will" is fully encapsulated and expressed by the ordinary concept of voluntary acts, as distinguished in medical encyclopedias from involuntary bodily movements.

 

[Willamena]

You're just making claims. None of them can be used to argue that free will exists, that any creature than choose what acts they perform, or that there is any difference between willful acts and involuntary bodily movements.

You are correct that I have not attempted to make an argument for Free Will. I shall do so.

- A self is composed of thought, which is the sum of all mental entities, such as sensations, realizations, expectations, and predictions, with the additional idea of agency.
- We necessarily must think of thought-driven outcomes as self-generated (willed), since the thought that drives them does not differ from our self.
- We necessarily must think of ourselves as free when making thought-driven decisions, since if we surrender agency for a decision to forces of nature we automatically exempt self from responsibility for the outcome of the decision.
- Hence, Free Will.

 

[atanu]

The logic that all effects (events) have a cause.

How do you know that? Logic is incompatible, ultimately, to determinism. If determinism is true, you are just bound to see only that which was determined for you.

 

[Nous]

You are correct that I have not attempted to make an argument for Free Will. I shall do so.

- A self is composed of thought, which is the sum of all mental entities, sensations, realizations, expectations, and predictions, with the additional idea of agency.
- We necessarily must think of thought-driven outcomes as self-generated (willed), since the thought that drives them does not differ from our self.
- We necessarily must think of ourselves as free when making thought-driven decisions, since if we surrender agency for a decision to forces of nature we automatically exempt self from responsibility for the outcome of the decision.
- Hence, Free Will.

What kind of argument is this? Are the sentences true propositions? If so, can you substantiate that they are true proposition? Does this set of propositions entail the use of logic? If so, can you identify any rule of inference that you used?

 

[Skwim]

- A self is composed of thought, which is the sum of all mental entities, sensations, realizations, expectations, and predictions, with the additional idea of agency.

I believe you're overstating the nature of thought.

THOUGHT
the action or process of thinking.

THINKING
the process of using one's mind to consider or reason about something.
(source Google Dictionary)​

- We necessarily must think of thought-driven outcomes as self-generated (willed), since the thought that drives them does not differ from our self.

Ouch! The self is far more than just thought. But if all you're saying is that thought originates within the self, Okay. And no determinist would disagree that

The will is the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions"​

It's just that the nature of the control is determined.

- We necessarily must think of ourselves as free when making thought-driven decisions, since if we surrender agency for a decision to forces of nature we automatically exempt self from responsibility for the outcome of the decision.

Sorry, but consequences don't dictate the cause. It's the other way around. It may be too bad that responsibility can't be plopped down in the lap choice, but that's the way it works. Responsibility lies with the all the determining causal factors leading to the event in question.

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[Skwim]

How do you know that?

By the sense it makes, AND the utter lack of any other operational mechanism. Got one? Please share.

Logic is incompatible, ultimately, to determinism.

Why?

If determinism is true, you are just bound to see only that which was determined for you.

Yup, and at the same time personally remain open to any other operational mechanism you may suggest. Got one? Please share.


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[Willamena]

I believe you're overstating the nature of thought.

THOUGHT
the action or process of thinking.

THINKING
the process of using one's mind to consider or reason about something.
(source Google Dictionary)​

Overstating, how? It is the case that I was referring to a mass noun.

Ouch! The self is far more than just thought. But if all you're saying is that thought originates within the self, Okay. And no determinist would disagree that

The will is the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions"​

It's just that the nature of the control is determined.

What more is self?

Sorry, but consequences don't dictate the cause. It's the other way around. It may be too bad that responsibility can't be plopped down in the lap choice, but that's the way it works. Responsibility lies with the all the determining causal factors leading to the event in question.

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Consequences often influence the outcome of decisions. But you are correct in that they are frequently overlooked or dismissed as inconsequential, such as when a criminal decides to commit a crime.