Why Free Will does not Exist

[blü 2]

Very carefully.

That's on good days. What about the rest?

 

[blü 2]

I add to the response of Willamena. If you knew how the brain worked you would be immortal.

(But, honestly, my case is different because the paradigm is different).

The details are a work in progress.

But I find no reason to question either the purpose of that enquiry or the principles by which it's conducted.

 

[Willamena]

That's on good days. What about the rest?

Ooh, is this an ethics discussion?

 

[blü 2]

Ooh, is this an ethics discussion?

Even angels have off days. Or so I hear.

 

[Nous]

We've been through all that. We're up to the part where you tell us whether automatic obedience to the rules of physics in the exercise of all our brain functions is a 'restraint' or not.

What "rules of physics" are you talking about?

In any case, I already noted that all I refer to is defined in the quoted definition of "will." If you need some other concept to add to "will," that's your doing.

In my view all brain function, being physical, operates within the rules of physics.

Name all the "rules of physics" that you are referring to. Who discovered or articulated these rules--Newton, Maxwell, Einstein, Schrodinger?

 

[blü 2]

What "rules of physics" are you talking about?

The expressions that science uses to summarize the various kinds of consistency of behavior and relationship within nature. E=mc^2 is an example. So is S=Ut+(at^2)/2. And so on.

I already noted that all I refer to is defined in the quoted definition of "will." If you need some other concept to add to "will," that's your doing.

Why the coyness about stating whether determinism, fuzzy or strict, is a 'restraint' on the power of choice or not? It goes to the heart of what we're talking about.

Or do you seriously not have an answer?

 

[Nous]

The expressions that science uses to summarize the various kinds of consistency of behavior and relationship within nature. E=mc^2 is an example. So is S=Ut+(at^2)/2. And so on.

Neither of these mathematical relations nor the phenomena that they describe has anything to do with the ability to choose between available options. Obviously neither "rule" is violated by the ability to choose.

Why the coyness about stating whether determinism, fuzzy or strict, is a 'restraint' on the power of choice or not?

It remains a fact that all I refer to as "free will" is defined here:

the definition of will

noun
1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:
the freedom of the will.
2. power of choosing one's own actions:
to have a strong or a weak will.
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:
My hands are obedient to my will.​

It also remains a fact that your fuzzy idea of determinism is nonsense. There is no such animal as "fuzzy determinism," as the SEP article makes clear.

And it also remains a fact that the thesis of determinism has been demonstrated to be false by the experiments that show the postulate of local realism to be violated. Unless you are just dedicated to bad religion, it seems at some point you should be able to correct your erroneous beliefs.

 

[blü 2]

Neither of these mathematical relations nor the phenomena that they describe has anything to do with the ability to choose between available options. Obviously neither "rule" is violated by the ability to choose.

They're simply examples of the consistent operations of nature we observe.

It's these operations that dictate the performance of each neuron, the generation of and response to bioelectricity in brains, the performance of each synapse, the generation and response to each neural command to the body's muscles, all of the things that make up the brain, the body, and the universe.

If you don't understand that, then you don't understand your own definition of (strict) determinism, leading me to wonder why you mentioned it.

It remains a fact that all I refer to as "free will" is defined here:

And you keep running away from addressing the role of determinism, strict or fuzzy, in considering the sense in which will might or might not be 'free'.

It also remains a fact that your fuzzy idea of determinism is nonsense. There is no such animal as "fuzzy determinism," as the SEP article makes clear.

Your falling back on an argument from authority shows you don't actually understand the issues you've raised.

If quantum randomness is capable of interrupting the smooth sequences of cause&effect, so that the future (calculatable in principle under strict determinism) can no longer be considered calculatable, then since that doesn't result in will free of the restraint of the consistent operations of nature (the rules of physics), will is not, in the final analysis free in any useful sense.

And you haven't described how it could be. You've simply waved your arm at the dictionary and said, 'Like that', where nothing except magic is implied by the dictionary definition.

If that's wrong, talk me through the process by which a brain 'freely' makes a decision.

And it also remains a fact that the thesis of determinism has been demonstrated to be false by the experiments that show the postulate of local realism to be violated. Unless you are just dedicated to bad religion, it seems at some point you should be able to correct your erroneous beliefs.

Dear oh dear! All you've got is a misconceived argument from authority?

The experiment you cite points straight to the very reason why we need the concept of fuzzy determinism! The future is NOT strictly determined, is NOT in principle calculatable. BUT there's still no way for the will to be 'free' in any sense relevant to determinism.

We've been over this again and again. Please, at least address the points put to you.

 

[Nous]

Neither of these mathematical relations nor the phenomena that they describe has anything to do with the ability to choose between available options. Obviously neither "rule" is violated by the ability to choose.

They're simply examples of the consistent operations of nature we observe.

It's these operations that dictate the performance of each neuron

What?

What "operations" are you referring to?

I noted that neither of the mathematical relations that you referred (E=mc^2 and S=Ut+(at^2)/2) are violated by the ability to choose between available options. Do you disagree? If so, then please explain how equations are violated by the ability to choose. Be sure to cite your sources.

And explain how these two mathematical relations "dictate the performance of each neuron". Be sure to cite your sources.

the generation of and response to bioelectricity in brains

Where have you gotten this idea that the two equations you noted "dictate" the generation of "bioelectricity"? Obviously not from any scholarly literature.

And you keep running away from addressing the role of determinism, strict or fuzzy, in considering the sense in which will might or might not be 'free'.

Your falling back on an argument from authority shows you don't actually understand the issues you've raised.

No, I haven't made any argument from authority by noting that the SEP article explains why your fuzzy idea of determinism is contrary to the definition of determinism, nor by noting that the experimental evidence refutes the thesis of determinism.

If quantum randomness is capable of interrupting the smooth sequences of cause&effect

What the hell does any of that mean? Where have you gotten these ideas?

 

[blü 2]

What "operations" are you referring to?

For the third time, the operations of your neurons, biochemicals, blood supply, and all the other things that happen in the course of brain function. The physical processes that constitute your mentation.

No, I haven't made any argument from authority by noting that the SEP article explains why your fuzzy idea of determinism is contrary to the definition of determinism

You've used that datum to argue: THEREFORE there's no such thing as fuzzy determinism. An argument straight from authority.

So let me turn the question around, since you clearly haven't come to grips with it in its present form.

Take the definition of determinism in the SDP. Adjust the reasoning in deriving that definition so that the definition now takes into account the occurrence of genuinely random events.

Then give your revised theory a name, so we can proceed with the conversation. (It is, of course, what I've been calling fuzzy determinism.)

AND meanwhile you're still fleeing from the question that we were discussing about the manner (if any) in which will can be said to be free.

You've said will is free when it can be exercised 'without restraint'.

If either of determinism, and of determinism redefined to take quantum randomness into account (by whatever name you've given it) is correct, then does that constitute a 'restraint' or not?

For the third, or is it the fourth, time, I ask you please to give a clear answer to this central question.

 

[David T]

For the third time, the operations of your neurons, biochemicals, blood supply, and all the other things that happen in the course of brain function. The physical processes that constitute your mentation.

You've used that datum to argue: THEREFORE there's no such thing as fuzzy determinism. An argument straight from authority.

So let me turn the question around, since you clearly haven't come to grips with it in its present form.

Take the definition of determinism in the SDP. Adjust the reasoning in deriving that definition so that the definition now takes into account the occurrence of genuinely random events.

Then give your revised theory a name, so we can proceed with the conversation. (It is, of course, what I've been calling fuzzy determinism.)

AND meanwhile you're still fleeing from the question that we were discussing about the manner (if any) in which will can be said to be free.

You've said will is free when it can be exercised 'without restraint'.

If either of determinism, and of determinism redefined to take quantum randomness into account (by whatever name you've given it) is correct, then does that constitute a 'restraint' or not?

For the third, or is it the fourth, time, I ask you please to give a clear answer to this central question.

I don't even Remember this post!!! Not fair! Did I say that wow I used to sound smart sort of OK not at all.

This all is a really old topic in modern culture in accedemics it started in theology In context to God its older than that. Did you know there were religious wars over it. At the end of the day its a strange question for me. I am very ambivalent about Determinism vs freewill as being a valid question but more inclined to see it as a symptomatic issue.

 

[Nous]

For the third time, the operations of your neurons, biochemicals, blood supply, and all the other things that happen in the course of brain function. The physical processes that constitute your mentation.

You didn't answer my question as to how the mathematical relations that you noted supposedly "dictate" "the operations of . . . neurons, biochemicals, blood supply, and all the other things that happen in the course of brain function."

I asked you to cite your sources for your claims here. You haven't cited any. Are these ideas that just bubbled up in your neurons?

We can be confident that your claims are not found in any scholarly literature. Right?

You've used that datum to argue: THEREFORE there's no such thing as fuzzy determinism. An argument straight from authority.

I've cited and quoted the definition of "determinism," which your idea of "fuzzy determinism" contradicts. The phrase "fuzzy determinism" is analogous to "square circle". That's how nonsensical your idea is. You are apparently having difficulty comprehending the clearly explained definition quoted from the SEP. In a world where there is even a single random event, the thesis of determinism is false. The thesis of determinism is definitely false. Sticking "fuzzy" in front of it will not make it any less false.

So you still haven't been able to account for the fact that there is a distinct difference between voluntary acts and involuntary bodily movements, or the fact that I was able to correctly foretell that I would be posting the name of King Lear's youngest daughter in my subsequent post.

You also claimed earlier that you decided the content of (one of) your posts. You never explained how you decided to write one sentence rather than something else.

 

[Nous]

You've said will is free when it can be exercised 'without restraint'.

This is what I said in #107:

It remains a fact that all I refer to as "free will" is defined here:

the definition of will

noun
1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:
the freedom of the will.
2. power of choosing one's own actions:
to have a strong or a weak will.
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:
My hands are obedient to my will.​

 

[blü 2]

You didn't answer my question as to how the mathematical relations that you noted supposedly "dictate" "the operations of . . . neurons, biochemicals, blood supply, and all the other things that happen in the course of brain function."

Since you've offered a definition of determinism which I assume you understand, let's take that as our base instead. That will obviate any need for me to tell you what 'the rules of physics' or 'the regular physical operations of biochemistry' mean.

I've cited and quoted the definition of "determinism," which your idea of "fuzzy determinism" contradicts.

What I call fuzzy determinism is determinism as you've defined it, modified by taking into account the effect of quantum randomness on the inflexible chains of cause+effect in strict determinism.

Since you don't like the name 'fuzzy determinism' for that view, I asked you to choose another name and we can use that instead. Until you offer an alternative I'll continue to call it fuzzy determinism. Either way, don't complain about the name 'fuzzy determinism' again.

In a world where there is even a single random event, the thesis of determinism is false.

I agree. Why do you think I use the name 'fuzzy determinism' fpr determinism modified by quantum randomness, if not to distinguish it from the strict determinism you speak of?

The thesis of determinism is definitely false. Sticking "fuzzy" in front of it will not make it any less false.

There you go again, refusing to take into account the 'quantum randomness' section of the view. As long as you're doing that, you're ducking the substance of the discussion.

So you still haven't been able to account for the fact that there is a distinct difference between voluntary acts and involuntary bodily movements

The difference assumes an "I", a sense of self, who draws that distinction.

And the meaning of 'voluntary' here is still waiting for you to clarify whether fuzzy determinism is a 'restraint' or not.

For at least the fourth time, what's the answer?

or the fact that I was able to correctly foretell that I would be posting the name of King Lear's youngest daughter in my subsequent post.

You didn't foretell it. You decided in advance to do it.

You also claimed earlier that you decided the content of (one of) your posts. You never explained how you decided to write one sentence rather than something else.

My conscious mind very rarely knows what I'm going to say, or type, before I say or type it. As I've mentioned on various occasions, this is the foundation of Auden's famous dictum, 'How do I know what I think till I hear what I say?'

 

[Apologes]

Instead of saying fuzzy determinism, you might as well use proper terminology and just say soft determinism (compatibilism).

 

[Epic Beard Man]

I personal subscribe to action theory

"Basic action theory typically describes action as behavior caused by an agent in a particular situation. The agent's desires and beliefs (e.g. my wanting a glass of water and believing the clear liquid in the cup in front of me is water) lead to bodily behavior (e.g. reaching over for the glass). In the simple theory (see Donald Davidson), the desire and belief jointly cause the action. Michael Bratman has raised problems for such a view and argued that we should take the concept of intention as basic and not analyzable into beliefs and desires."

We are bounded by other agents that causes us to do things and we cannot act independently outside.

 

[Polymath257]

It isn't perfectly clear to me what the phrase 'Free Will' even means. So I will explore a few examples and see what arises.

Suppose, for example, that you either jump or fall out airplane that is a ways off the ground. Do you have Free Will not to fall? I think most people would agree that there is no free will in this regards: the laws of physics take over and while you might be able to choose to flap your arms, you won't be able to choose not to fall.

As another example, if you find yourself in the desert with no water, there is no Free Will involved in dehydration. Sure, you can choose to search for water. Or you can choose to only move at night, thereby reducing water loss. But the basic facts of physics and biology will overcome any free will and dehydration will eventually happen.

It is easy to come up with quite a number of scenarios where Free Will is *at least* limited. So even in the most optimistic cases, Free Will is not *completely* free. It is always subject to the laws of physics.

Next, Free Will and training are independent things. Any training you have will not allow you to contravene the laws of physics. It may give you the ability to exploit those laws more than you would without training, but no amount of training will circumvent physical law.

Also, you can train yourself not to be afraid, or to have other responses, but that would be the case even if Free Will did not exist at all: it just means that you have added another layer of causality to your behavior.

Next, the *perception* of Free Will is not the same as there actually *being* Free Will. I can, for example, believe that I make totally free choices even if those choices are determined *if* my belief in the freedom of those choices is also determined.

So what does it even mean to have 'Free Will'?

At the least, it seems to mean that in *some* cases there is more than one possible future and that there is something 'I' can do which will influence which future actually happens.

Well, there are several issues here. The first is whether there is ever more than one possible future. Sure, at the subatomic level, quantum mechanics shows there to be more than one possibility, but most macroscopic events are determined simply because the quantum level probabilities get averaged out to a very high degree of accuracy. But, it is at least *possible* that some quantum events can be amplified to allow for macroscopic differences in the possible futures.

I will pass over the issue of what the noun 'I' actually means to consider whether it is possible, given the limited cases where there is more than one possible future, whether it is possible for 'me' to do something that affects which future actually transpires. This seems incredibly unlikely. There are two cases: 1) 'I' am part of the physical universe, in which case the randomness of the quantum world just means 'I' am also randomized, or 2) 'I' am not part of the physical world, in which case *any* causal connection between 'me' and the physical world is, at best, problematic.

So, the formulation of the problem of Free Will as there being more than one possible future and there being something 'I' can do to effect one of those possibilities seems *incredibly* unlikely.

But, we can look at this from a different perspective. Even in a deterministic universe, every event has many, many 'causes'. For some of those causes, the presence or absence has an effect, but only a small one on the outcome. For other causes, if the 'cause' had been even slightly different, the 'effect' could hugely different.

A simple example would be the deck of cards, or the book kept in the chest pocket of a shirt that intercepts a bullet, preserving the life of the person wearing the shirt. Here, a small 'cause' can make the difference between life and death. In other situations, though, a great number of 'causes' have little end effect.

So, suppose we are our brains. Suppose we live in a deterministic universe. It is *still* possible that a great number of 'causes' for certain events trace back to the brain states of some person. In that case, the person could well be said to 'cause' the effect.

Furthermore, whether there is Free Will or not, the brain *does* process information and, based on that processing, causes actions to be performed. So it is quite possible that in this brain processing, the brain 'sees' more than one possibility and 'chooses' one of them. This is solely part of the *deterministic* processing, but there is still a sense in which a choice was made and even small differences in brain state could have readily lead to a different 'choice'.

Finally, in this case, where the ultimate outcome depends on small changes in the initial conditions, and where the processing in the brain is a significant factor in which factor in those small differences in cause, can we not then say we have 'made a choice freely'?

So, in this situation, the possible futures are simply based on the limited information of the brain in its processing and the 'choice' is the particular outcome of that processing.

Is this not a way to say there is 'Free Will' even in a deterministic system?

 

[Nous]

If asked, I can foretell well in advance that, and when, I will make such bodily movements--just like I can foretell that I will pay my internet bill by the 5th of December, or like I can foretell that in my next post I will write the name of King Lear's youngest daughter. The ability to foretell a bodily movement is the mark of its voluntariness, that it is a willed act, not an involuntary bodily movement.

Cordelia.

I notice that no one was able to otherwise account for this ability of being able to foretell one's acts, which characterizes the distinction between voluntary acts and involuntary bodily movements, the former being a product of the will:

the definition of will

noun
1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:
the freedom of the will.
2. power of choosing one's own actions:
to have a strong or a weak will.
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:
My hands are obedient to my will.
​

 

[Willamena]

I notice that no one was able to otherwise account for this ability of being able to foretell one's acts, which characterizes the distinction between voluntary acts and involuntary bodily movements, the former being a product of the will:

the definition of will

noun
1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:
the freedom of the will.
2. power of choosing one's own actions:
to have a strong or a weak will.
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:
My hands are obedient to my will.
​

That it is a promise and not a foretelling is an account of it.

I don't see prediction as characterizing voluntary acts, I see ownership as doing so. The significant distinction between the act that is voluntary and the act that is involuntary is literally ownership. Not prediction.

We take ownership of some events, entities, states, knowledge and ideas as "our own" when we cannot separate them from what we consider to be our essential selves. Those we can easily separate from ourselves, we give over to other forces to be proxy owner.

 

[Nous]

That it is a promise and not a foretelling is an account of it.

the definition of foretell According to the definition of "foretell," I foretold what I would do, and those were correct foretellings of what I would do. And the only plausible explanation for those series of events is not that I am psychic about the future but because those were voluntary acts that I chose to perform.

I don't see prediction as characterizing voluntary acts, I see ownership as doing so. The significant distinction between the act that is voluntary and the act that is involuntary is literally ownership.

You are welcomed to present any definitions you have about "ownership". When you do, I will assure you that I own my voluntary acts.