Why The Correspondence Theory of Truth is so Sex-z!

[Sunstone]

Be there anyone so depraved, so barbaric, so thoughtless, so lacking in insight, good sense, and intelligence that he or she does not subscribe to one or another version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth? If so, identify the miscreant! Let him or her come forth and defend their heresy!

More seriously, what do you make of The Correspondence Theory? And less seriously, have you ever made out with The Correspondence Theory? I mean, it is sex-z, right? Am I right?

 

[Gjallarhorn]

I...don't...know? I'm wary about claiming to know what corresponds to reality in general, since we only have perceptions of reality to go off of.

So probably nay here.

 

[Sunstone]

I...don't...know? I'm wary about claiming to know what corresponds to reality in general, since we only have perceptions of reality to go off of.

So probably nay here.

Good point. One of the weakness of the Correspondence Theory, so far as I can see, lies in the notion of "reality".

For instance: The proposition, "Jane is wearing lacy underwear", is true, according to at least some versions of the theory, in so far as Jane is in reality wearing lacy underwear. But what do we mean by "in reality"?

 

[Gjallarhorn]

Good point. One of the weakness of the Correspondence Theory, so far as I can see, lies in the notion of "reality".

For instance: The proposition, "Jane is wearing lacy underwear", is true, according to at least some versions of the theory, in so far as Jane is in reality wearing lacy underwear. But what do we mean by "in reality"?

Well, replace "in reality" with "in my head" and it becomes a truth...even if you're nowhere near Jane. Or clothing.

 

[Sunstone]

Well, replace "in reality" with "in my head" and it becomes a truth...even if you're nowhere near Jane. Or clothing.

The problem with that, as I see it, is that everything becomes true -- just so long as it's in our heads. Whereas, the real problem is to get our heads into Jane's lacy underwear, if you will.

 

[Sunstone]

Personally, I think propositions can be treated as if they are maps or models. They are true precisely to the extent that they reliably predict or indicate whatever observable facts they reference.

That isn't The Correspondence Theory, though -- actually kind of far from it.

 

[DreadFish]

I think I also agree with Gjallar that we are functioning off of perceptions of reality, so there doesn't seem to be a way to tell whether those perceptions really correspond with reality.

It seems like maybe it could function in a relative, provisional way, like how Jane's lacy underwear is only provisional, i.e. "arranged or existing for the present, possibly to be changed later". But I dont know about making absolute, ontological statements about reality using this theory.

 

[Sunstone]

But I dont know about making absolute, ontological statements about reality using this theory.

Yeah, it seems to me there is no need for the metaphysical speculations that seem to be demanded by the theory. A better theory of truth is needed.

 

[Willamena]

Be there anyone so depraved, so barbaric, so thoughtless, so lacking in insight, good sense, and intelligence that he or she does not subscribe to one or another version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth? If so, identify the miscreant! Let him or her come forth and defend their heresy!

*raises hand* ...*tentatively*

More seriously, what do you make of The Correspondence Theory?

What causes the (incredibly lucky) correspondence?

 

[Willamena]

Good point. One of the weakness of the Correspondence Theory, so far as I can see, lies in the notion of "reality".

Pshaw! The whole concept is terribly unintelligible.

 

[Willamena]

Personally, I think propositions can be treated as if they are maps or models. They are true precisely to the extent that they reliably predict or indicate whatever observable facts they reference.

And how are the reliable observable facts that they reference not also proposition?

 

[Sunstone]

What causes the (incredibly lucky) correspondence?

How is that a mystery to you?

 

[Sunstone]

And how are the reliable observable facts that they reference not also proposition?

You're free to use words in whatever way you wish, of course. If you want to call observed facts "propositions", that's your prerogative. I myself have been know to call a cat a god, for instance.

 

[Kilgore Trout]

So, essentially, something is true if it describes something that is true. So much of philosophy is excruciatingly enlightening.

 

[Sunstone]

So, essentially, something is true if it describes something that is true. So much of philosophy is excruciatingly enlightening.

To be fair, I think that would apply to only the more clumsy formulations of the theory, if any.

So far as I can see, the real weakness of the theory isn't that "something is true if it corresponds to something that is true" -- that's just an equivocation on "truth". But rather, a real weakness is that the theory amounts to the claim "a proposition is true to the extent that it corresponds to an ontological state (and, for ontological state, pick between realism and idealism)" -- that claim amounts to metaphysical speculation. And how can you base a satisfactory theory on unresolvable speculation?

 

[Kilgore Trout]

To be fair, I think that would apply to only the more clumsy formulations of the theory, if any.

So far as I can see, the real weakness of the theory isn't that "something is true if it corresponds to something that is true" -- that's just an equivocation on "truth". But rather, a real weakness is that the theory amounts to the claim "a proposition is true to the extent that it corresponds to an ontological state (and, for ontological state, pick between realism and idealism)" -- that claim amounts to metaphysical speculation. And how can you base a satisfactory theory on unresolvable speculation?

If we don't decide that "the stuff we see actually exists," then we'd never get anywhere, and all of our theories would rest on a bed of unresolvable speculation. The human ability for abstract thought presents the danger of some people overthinking things to the point of irrelevance, or more often, semantical vagueness and confusion.

 

[DreadFish]

If we don't decide that "the stuff we see actually exists," then we'd never get anywhere, and all of our theories would rest on a bed of unresolvable speculation. The human ability for abstract thought presents the danger of some people overthinking things to the point of irrelevance, or more often, semantical vagueness and confusion.

I guess maybe what im getting at is the question of how the stuff we see actually exists. We can definitely say on a relative level that certain things exist, but on an absolute level does it really exist in the way we think apart from the perception of the persons experiencing it?

 

[Kilgore Trout]

I guess maybe what im getting at is the question of how the stuff we see actually exists. We can definitely say on a relative level that certain things exist, but on an absolute level does it really exist in the way we think apart from the perception of the persons experiencing it?

I'm not really sure what you're asking. If we take an ice cube, for instance, it exists as a hexagonal crystalization of water molecules cooled below its freezing point, which roughly form the shape of a cube, described as a 3D object consisting of six square faces where three of the faces meet at each of eight vertices. We have ways of measuring the elements contained in an object, as well as their organization, temperature, and other attributes. So, does someone even need to be experiencing the ice cube for it to exist? If someone is looking at the ice cube, but having a different intepretation or experience than my description, does that render my description of an ice cube invalid?

 

[DreadFish]

I'm not really sure what you're asking. If we take an ice cube, for instance, it exists as a hexagonal crystalization of water molecules cooled below its freezing point, which roughly form the shape of a cube, described as a 3D object consisting of six square faces where three of the faces meet at each of eight vertices. We have ways of measuring the elements contained in an object, as well as their organization, temperature, and other attributes. So, does someone even need to be experiencing the ice cube for it to exist? If someone is looking at the ice cube, but having a different intepretation or experience than my description, does that render my description of an ice cube invalid?

I think this is it. It does not make yours invalid, but it shows that your description is relative to a certain point of view, it is not the be-all, end-all fact of the matter regarding the nature of ice cubes.

 

[Sunstone]

If we don't decide that "the stuff we see actually exists," then we'd never get anywhere, and all of our theories would rest on a bed of unresolvable speculation.

Not really. I'm quite comfortable with accepting methodological naturalism as a basis for science, for instance, even though methodological naturalism says nothing about ontology.