God Says ..., Science Says ...

[PureX]

I think the fact that so many people are questioning your use / accusation of "scientism", should serve as a hint that perhaps maybe, just maybe, you are being a little loose with the term....

All I am seeing are the people most inclined to scientism trying desperately to deny that scientism is a thing. Which is exactly what we would expect those inclined to scientism to do, because from their perspective, it's invisible. Scientism is just the way it is.

Sound familiar?

 

[Stevicus]

Examples from famous people, then?



Getting me to agree with you is probably off the table, but that isn't why I asked.

Right now, the question I'm trying to answer isn't whether you're right about the extent of "scientism" and it being a problem; the question I'm trying to answer is whether you've blown a real thing out of proportion, as opposed to it being something that's a complete figment of your imagination.

You aren't going to move the needle to "this guy's completely rightl," but you may be able to move it from "this guy is being completely delusional" to "this guy made some critical errors, but I kinda see how he got to his conclusions."

Out of curiosity, I did some searching to see if I could find any examples, and I found this article: Scientism.

The Case of Reber and Alcock

One of the characteristics of dogmatic belief systems is that their adherents accept assumptions as proven facts. This is certainly true of scientism. For example, it is a fact that consciousness exists, and that it is associated with neurological activity. But the assumption that consciousness is produced by neurological activity is questionable. (See this article of mine for further discussion.)

It is a fact that evolution has taken place. But it is also a questionable assumption that evolution can be explained wholly in terms of random mutations and natural selection. As illustrated by the contemporary "Third Way in Evolution" movement, there is growing evidence against this assumption, as Neo-Darwinists believe. In fact, as I show in my book Spiritual Science, there is a dearth of evidence to support many of the assumptions of materialism, and a good deal of evidence against them.

Leading on from this, another characteristic of dogmatic belief systems is a refusal to consider evidence which contradicts their assumptions. There was a good illustration of this in a recent article published by the American Psychologist journal.

Last year (2018), the journal published an article by Professor Etzel Cardeña of Lund University, in which he carefully and systemically reviewed the evidence for psi phenomena—examining over 750 discrete studies—and concluded that there was a very good case for their existence.

As a commentary on the article from the British Psychological Society reported, “on this basis, it is arguable that, as much as any other field of psychology, there is at least something meriting investigation.”

However, in June of this year, the journal published an online rebuttal of Cardeña’s article by Arthur Reber and James Alcock. The authors take an unusual approach, based on theory rather than evidence. Rather than engaging carefully with the evidence presented by Cardeña, they put forward a theoretical argument for the non-existence of psi.

As they write, “Claims made by parapsychologists cannot be true… Hence, data that suggest that they can are necessarily flawed and result from weak methodology or improper data analyses or are Type I errors.”

Their attitude appears to be that since psi is impossible, no amount or type of evidence would be sufficient to support it. Therefore it is unnecessary to deal with any specific pieces of evidence.

It is difficult to see the scientific logic of this approach. Surely a truly scientific approach would entail engaging with the evidence and examining it on its own terms, accepting the possibility that—if the evidence is convincing—theories may have to be revised.

The authors’ approach is clearly more similar to the kind of dogmatism that is usually associated with fundamentalist religion. It is akin to a judge declaring that since we have already decided that a person is guilty, there is no need to look at any further evidence.

In more detail, Reber and Alcock argue that psi phenomena, in general, cannot exist, because there is no causal mechanism to account for them, and because they contravene a number of the tenets of physics.

However, the idea that psi contravenes the laws of science is very questionable. Specifically, Reber and Alcock argue that psi phenomena violate the laws of causality, of linear time, of thermodynamics, and the inverse-square law. However, many other scientists have put forward theories that would allow for the possibility of psi.

 

[Pogo]

Out of curiosity, I did some searching to see if I could find any examples, and I found this article: Scientism.

Wherein we find this:

However, the idea that psi contravenes the laws of science is very questionable. Specifically, Reber and Alcock argue that psi phenomena violate the laws of causality, of linear time, of thermodynamics, and the inverse-square law. However, many other scientists have put forward theories that would allow for the possibility of psi.

In fact, in modern physics—following on from Einstein’s theories and the theories and findings of quantum physics—the concept of causality is much more complex than Reber and Alcock presume.

You might have found it for @PureX , but the guilty party appears to be the author of this article on Scientism.

If a sentence has the word "quantum" in it, and if it is coming out of a non-physicist's mouth, you can almost be certain that there's a huge quantum of BS being dumped on your head.

—Physicist Devashish Singh, quoting a colleague[

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

Physicality: the physical mechanics of how a thought happens in the brain.

Metaphysicality: the ability to recognizing how thoughts happen in the brain, as they happen, and using this ability to recognize how and even perhaps why everything else that we experience happening, is happening.

I'm afraid I'm not following. What's the practical difference between these two?

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

All I am seeing are the people most inclined to scientism trying desperately to deny that scientism is a thing.

Yes, you keep claiming this.
But you haven't actually supported your accusation of how those people are supposedly inclined to "scientism".


From where I sit, it rather seems that on every topic where you get argued into a corner, you resort to the "defense" of claiming "scientism!", as if it is any kind of argument.

Which is exactly what we would expect those inclined to scientism to do, because from their perspective, it's invisible. Scientism is just the way it is.

Sound familiar?

See? There you go again.

 

[RestlessSoul]

I'm afraid I'm not following. What's the practical difference between these two?

I think you've put your finger on the problem. Materialists often don't recognise subjective experience as a qualitative phenomenon in itself, because they are incapable of experiencing their own conscious awareness in this way. This may be because their waking experience is almost entirely dominated by the ego.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

I think you've put your finger on the problem. Materialists often don't recognise subjective experience as a qualitative phenomenon in itself, because they are incapable of experiencing their own conscious awareness in this way. This may be because their waking experience is almost entirely dominated by the ego.

That doesn't answer my question.

I didn't deny subjective experience.
I merely asked what the practical difference was between the two points in his example.
I also didn't say that there is no difference. I'm merely trying to understand his example.
So I ask.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

I'm afraid I'm not following. What's the practical difference between these two?

The second one has an important likely-incorrect assumption in it. That's a big difference.

I'm sure this will set @PureX off again because it relies on science, but it seems that we don't recognize our thoughts "as they happen." While it might feel like we're multitasking, neurological evidence suggests that the human brain doesn't really "multitask," but is very good at task switching.

... so when it feels like we're simultaneously thinking one thought and recognizing the thought that we're thinking, apparently what's actually going on is that we're recalling the memory of the thought from a split second earlier. The thing that feels simultaneous isn't actually simultaneous.

I heard an interview with some neuroscientists on this years ago and it was really interesting. I want to say it was an episode of the BBC In Our Time podcast, but I'm not 100% sure.

 

[PureX]

I'm afraid I'm not following. What's the practical difference between these two?

This is why scientism, and it's founding cohort philosophical materialism are so intellectually debilitating. I have no doubt that you can't see any "practical" difference between physicality and metaphysicality. As that is the failure of philosophical materialism in a nutshell, and is why philosophers rejected it as soon as it was proposed. Just as I have no doubt that any further explanation will be useless to you.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

The second one has an important likely-incorrect assumption in it. That's a big difference.

I'm sure this will set @PureX off again because it relies on science, but it seems that we don't recognize our thoughts "as they happen." While it might feel like we're multitasking, neurological evidence suggests that the human brain doesn't really "multitask," but is very good at task switching.

... so when it feels like we're simultaneously thinking one thought and recognizing the thought that we're thinking, apparently what's actually going on is that we're recalling the memory of the thought from a split second earlier. The thing that feels simultaneous isn't actually simultaneous.

I heard an interview with some neuroscientists on this years ago and it was really interesting. I want to say it was an episode of the BBC In Our Time podcast, but I'm not 100% sure.

Interesting.

Reminds me of multi-threading in single core cpu pc's.
The idea is also "multi-tasking". Multiple processes / threads running at the "same time". But the CPU is always only working on 1. It's simply switching between both.
While it's doing calculation for thread A, thread B is "waiting" for the CPU to be free.

As a user, we don't see that on the screen simply because the CPU is switching between threads so fast that for all practical intents and purposes, to our eyes, it is happening 'at the same time'.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

This is why scientism, and it's founding cohort philosophical materialism are so intellectually debilitating. I have no doubt that you can't see any "practical" difference between physicality and metaphysicality. As that is the failure of philosophical materialism in a nutshell, and is why philosophers rejected it as soon as it was proposed.

I guess I should have no doubt that you can't explain the practical difference between the two because why else would you, once again, resort to your empty accusation of "scientism" when all I did was to ask for clarification of what you said.....


Apparently, asking question to get a better grasp at what someone is saying, is "scientism".

Remember what I said about you being kinda loose with the term? This seems like a great example.

Just as I have no doubt that any further explanation will be useless to you.

Try me.


Whenever you feel like having an actual conversation instead of throwing empty accusations around in a seeming attempt to dodge questions, I'm here.

If this however is the only way you want to play this, then be my guest.
But then I don't see the point in continuing.

 

[RestlessSoul]

That doesn't answer my question.

I didn't deny subjective experience.
I merely asked what the practical difference was between the two points in his example.
I also didn't say that there is no difference. I'm merely trying to understand his example.
So I ask.

But the fact you don’t understand the difference, suggests that you don’t see what is so obvious, it requires no explanation.

I’ve noticed this with philosophical materialists, that it’s often almost impossible to explain the Hard Problem of Consciousness to them. And I think it may be because they - you - are unable to distinguish consciousness itself, from ideas about consciousness.

 

[Quintessence]

But the fact you don’t understand the difference, suggests that you don’t see what is so obvious, it requires no explanation.

I’ve noticed this with philosophical materialists, that it’s often almost impossible to explain the Hard Problem of Consciousness to them. And I think it may be because they - you - are unable to distinguish consciousness itself, from ideas about consciousness.

I don't think it's that.

The issue is that metaphysical monism - the insistence that everything reduces down to a single substance or concept - is something of an extreme position that flattens the complexity of reality. So there can easily be an acknowledgement that the physical thing and the idea of the thing are different but it would all be reduced down to the physical even though it doesn't necessarily make any sense to do so. Scientism on the whole tends to be metaphysically monist - reducing all reality down to the physical processes that the sciences can make their subject. It rejects and denies that anything else is even a thing. And in spite of this being a philosophical position, not a scientific one, this is seen as being a scientific perspective. Which, as a scientist, drives me nuts because the philosophy of science - the philosophical assumptions that underpin the sciences whether it's physicalism or empiricism - is not science.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

But the fact you don’t understand the difference, suggests that you don’t see what is so obvious, it requires no explanation.

I’ve noticed this with philosophical materialists, that it’s often almost impossible to explain the Hard Problem of Consciousness to them. And I think it may be because they - you - are unable to distinguish consciousness itself, from ideas about consciousness.

Blablabla.

Meanwhile, still no answer to my question.
Pretty soon I'll be forced to think you can't explain the difference either and you are just resorting to this condescending blablabla to hide it.
If it's so "obvious", why does it seem so hard to explain? Or why be reluctant to explain it?


If you don't plan on explaining the difference clearly so that a "short sighted materialist scientismist", such as I apparently am, can understand it, I suggest you keep silent.

I have no use for this condescending arrogant ego-striking.

 

[RestlessSoul]

I don't think it's that.

The issue is that metaphysical monism - the insistence that everything reduces down to a single substance or concept - is something of an extreme position that flattens the complexity of reality. So there can easily be an acknowledgement that the physical thing and the idea of the thing are different but it would all be reduced down to the physical even though it doesn't necessarily make any sense to do so. Scientism on the whole tends to be metaphysically monist - reducing all reality down to the physical processes that the sciences can make their subject. It rejects and denies that anything else is even a thing. And in spite of this being a philosophical position, not a scientific one, this is seen as being a scientific perspective. Which, as a scientist, drives me nuts because the philosophy of science - the philosophical assumptions that underpin the sciences whether it's physicalism or empiricism - is not science.

Yeah, sure, it’s reductionism to the extreme. But even if you do reduce all of conscious experience to it’s physical correlates in areas of the brain, that still doesn’t account for either the why’s or wherefores of qualitative subjective experience. It doesn’t explain why conscious agents are watching and participating in, a movie of their lives.

That’s what both neuroscientists and philosophers of mind recognise as the Hard Problem of Consciousness. And many people just don’t see this at all, perhaps because - I’m speculating here - they are psychically blind to one dimension of awareness.

 

[RestlessSoul]

Blablabla.

Meanwhile, still no answer to my question.
Pretty soon I'll be forced to think you can't explain the difference either and you are just resorting to this condescending blablabla to hide it.
If it's so "obvious", why does it seem so hard to explain? Or why be reluctant to explain it?


If you don't plan on explaining the difference clearly so that a "short sighted materialist scientismist", such as I apparently am, can understand it, I suggest you keep silent.

I have no use for this condescending arrogant ego-striking.

You want me to explain the difference between physics and metaphysics?

Okay, maybe it’s not that hard; the one reduces everything ultimately to the material, the other ultimately to the ideal. But in human experience they are so entwined as to be inseparable, to the extent that neither makes sense without the other.

That’s about the best I can do for now.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

That’s what both neuroscientists and philosophers of mind recognise as the Hard Problem of Consciousness. And many people just don’t see this at all, perhaps because - I’m speculating here - they are psychically blind to one dimension of awareness.

Are you saying that "people" are denying the "hard problem of consciousness" as a thing while neuroscientists don't?

As this comes forth from the post I was asking questions about, are you saying I am one of those people?

 

[Pogo]

You want me to explain the difference between physics and metaphysics?

Okay, maybe it’s not that hard; the one reduces everything ultimately to the material, the other ultimately to the ideal. But in human experience they are so entwined as to be inseparable, to the extent that neither makes sense without the other.

That’s about the best I can do for now.

What is "the ideal" for us college dropouts.

 

[Stevicus]

Wherein we find this:

You might have found it for @PureX , but the guilty party appears to be the author of this article on Scientism.

If a sentence has the word "quantum" in it, and if it is coming out of a non-physicist's mouth, you can almost be certain that there's a huge quantum of BS being dumped on your head.

—Physicist Devashish Singh, quoting a colleague[

I found it by doing a search for an example of scientism as used in a debate. I've heard the term used before, and it's been tossed around quite a bit.

I may have previously misunderstood its application.

For example, every so often, I encounter shady ads about some "new product," whether it's some kind of nutritional supplement, new gadget, or just about anything, really. It's often peppered with phrases like "scientists have discovered that..." or "proven to work by SCIENCE!" If one cares enough to delve further, it might not really be as "scientific" as they claim. Whatever they're claiming may be on shaky ground, scientifically, yet much of the general public (who are not scientists) may not know that just from seeing the ad (and typically not reading the fine print with all the disclaimers).

That's what I thought what scientism was, using science as a ploy for selling snake oil. There is a general perception among the public where a person's credentials and expertise are automatically respected and trusted just because they have an advanced degree or a high-falutin' job title. As a result, adding the phrase "four out of five dentists surveyed" adds a good deal of weight in trying to persuade people to buy your product.

A lot of people might be inclined to simply defer, thinking "well, this is what science says, so I won't question it." But they may not really understand the science, and they may not consider looking for the opinions of other scientists. "Get a second or third opinion" might be good advice, but some people don't bother to do that.

When it's not used to sell snake oil or advance some political agenda, when it's just science for science's sake, then I find it fascinating, but not really something to argue about or anything really political in nature. I daresay most of the general public is likely ignorant and quite apathetic to what may go on in the scientific community, except only just a few key political issues which have become divisive. Perhaps that's what "scientism" might be, if it's misusing science as a vehicle for tricking and confusing a gullible public.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

The point, though, is that science only produces knowledge of physical functionality. It does not produce knowledge about metaphysicality. Which is in many ways the more significant aspect of our experience of existence.

Science can be applied to anything observable. If what you're saying is true about the disconnect between the physical and the metaphysical, how could the metaphysical be an "aspect of our experience of existence" at all?

You're trying to have it both ways: you want your opinions about the metaphysical to be both valid and shielded from scrutiny, but that doesn't work.

Also, knowledge is not truth. Nor is it wisdom. So that even the functional knowledge that science can give us is far more likely to be abused, misunderstood, and misapplied then it ever will be used to control our fate in the way we so badly want it to. And all we have to do is look around us to see how true that is.

Knowledge isn't wisdom; it's the foundation upon wisdom is built. It's not sufficient for wisdom, but it is necessary.

And if you think that people who know plenty of science can do unwise things - which I agree they can do, BTW - just wait until you check out how unwise the scientifically ignorant can be.