Abrahamic Time-Asymmetry.

[John D. Brey]

We are in possession of this collection of 66 books which we call The Bible, written by more than 40 authors over several thousands of years, yet we now discover it is an integrated message from outside our time domain. It repeatedly authenticates this uniqueness by describing history before it happens. And this discovery totally shatters our traditional concepts of reality.​

​

Dr. Chuck Missler, Cosmic Codes: Hidden Messages From The Edge Of Eternity, pp. 67-68. Kindle Edition.​

​

Dr. Missler's book documents that many of the most educated and intelligent men who've ever lived (to include the likes of Isaac Newton and Immanuel Kant) have, in their time, come to realize that the Bible is a book whose origin is derived from a place and a conceptual realm outside our current understanding of time. To their great credit, Jewish sages thousands of years ago came to realize through exegesis of the holy script that though the sacred-text is logical, it's not always, nor simply, chronological, but that the way it's written transcends our current, natural, asymmetrical, understanding of time and chronology. Because we ourselves are held down in this world by means of our biological chains, only that part of our understanding that's free from biological barriers and boundaries is able to perceive the deeper things of the spirit of the biblical text.

The נפש [or soul], being of Divine origin as part of His Breath, is part of God’s eternity and thus is not subject to death or transitory existence. . . While the souls of other creatures are concerned only for self-preservation and self-satisfaction, the soul of man is concerned for others. . . While the animal carries the measure of הי in its accepting and rejection for itself, human life alone is the free, highest realization of the Divine thought of Creation.​

​

Rabbi Samson R. Hirsch, Collected Writings, vol. 8, p. 52.​

​

It is the glory of the human cerebral cortex that it -----unique among all animals and unprecedented in all geological time ---has the power to defy the dictates of the selfish genes. . . We can even discuss ways of deliberately cultivating and nurturing pure, disinterested altruism – something that has no place in nature, something that has never existed before in the whole history of the world.​

​

Richard Dawkins.​

John

 

[John D. Brey]

We are in possession of this collection of 66 books which we call The Bible, written by more than 40 authors over several thousands of years, yet we now discover it is an integrated message from outside our time domain. It repeatedly authenticates this uniqueness by describing history before it happens. And this discovery totally shatters our traditional concepts of reality.​

​

Dr. Chuck Missler, Cosmic Codes: Hidden Messages From The Edge Of Eternity, pp. 67-68. Kindle Edition.​

​

Dr. Missler's book documents that many of the most educated and intelligent men who've ever lived (to include the likes of Isaac Newton and Immanuel Kant) have, in their time, come to realize that the Bible is a book whose origin is derived from a place and a conceptual realm outside our current understanding of time. To their great credit, Jewish sages thousands of years ago came to realize through exegesis of the holy script that though the sacred-text is logical, it's not always, nor simply, chronological, but that the way it's written transcends our current, natural, asymmetrical, understanding of time and chronology. Because we ourselves are held down in this world by means of our biological chains, only that part of our understanding that's free from biological barriers and boundaries is able to perceive the deeper things of the spirit of the biblical text.

The נפש [or soul], being of Divine origin as part of His Breath, is part of God’s eternity and thus is not subject to death or transitory existence. . . While the souls of other creatures are concerned only for self-preservation and self-satisfaction, the soul of man is concerned for others. . . While the animal carries the measure of הי in its accepting and rejection for itself, human life alone is the free, highest realization of the Divine thought of Creation.​

​

Rabbi Samson R. Hirsch, Collected Writings, vol. 8, p. 52.​

​

It is the glory of the human cerebral cortex that it -----unique among all animals and unprecedented in all geological time ---has the power to defy the dictates of the selfish genes. . . We can even discuss ways of deliberately cultivating and nurturing pure, disinterested altruism – something that has no place in nature, something that has never existed before in the whole history of the world.​

​

Richard Dawkins.​

The quotations from Rabbi Hirsch and Richard Dawkins set up a duality between two kinds of cognition. In his most famous book, Dawkins goes so far as to imply that "we" can rebel against the selfish elements of biological necessity (biological evolution) and even cultural evolution/indoctrination. In this vein, linguist Benjamin Whorf famously implied that our natural or familiar language/tongue is not only the organ through which our mind evolves (our language/grammar being parallel to a given body type for mind), but that in the same sense that the evolutionary design of the biological body determines the relationship that occurs between it and its environment (even creating most aspects of its so-called "environment" by means of the way it responds to external signals, Dorian Sagan, Richard Lewontin, et al.), so too, our language/grammar determine the relationship between our mind and the broader or "real" world in which that mind is evolving and functioning.

The idea of linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (/səˌpɪər ˈhwɔːrf/ sə-PEER WHORF), the Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, is a principle suggesting that the structure of a language influences its speakers' worldview or cognition, and thus individuals' languages determine or shape their perceptions of the world.​

​

Wikipedia, Linguistic relativity.​

John

 

[Bthoth]

Conscious life is capable.
The entanglements transcend time.

 

[John D. Brey]

The quotations from Rabbi Hirsch and Richard Dawkins set up a duality between two kinds of cognition. In his most famous book, Dawkins goes so far as to imply that "we" can rebel against the selfish elements of biological necessity (biological evolution) and even cultural evolution/indoctrination. In this vein, linguist Benjamin Whorf famously implied that our natural or familiar language/tongue is not only the organ through which our mind evolves (our language/grammar being parallel to a given body type for mind), but that in the same sense that the evolutionary design of the biological body determines the relationship that occurs between it and its environment (even creating most aspects of its so-called "environment" by means of the way it responds to external signals, Dorian Sagan, Richard Lewontin, et al.), so too, our language/grammar determine the relationship between our mind and the broader or "real" world in which that mind is evolving and functioning.

The idea of linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (/səˌpɪər ˈhwɔːrf/ sə-PEER WHORF), the Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, is a principle suggesting that the structure of a language influences its speakers' worldview or cognition, and thus individuals' languages determine or shape their perceptions of the world.​

​

Wikipedia, Linguistic relativity.​

Combining Benjamin Whorf's theory of language relativity with Ludwik Fleck's explanation for how "thought-collectives" guard their clique-oriented and hyper-subjective confirmation bias, and or or cognitive dissonance, lends itself to some extremely valuable revelations concerning the most fundamental ideological polarities found throughout human existence.

What we are faced with here is not so much simple passivity or mistrust of new ideas as an active approach which can be divided into several stages. (1) A contradiction to the system appears unthinkable. (2) What does not fit into the system remains unseen; (3) alternatively, if it is noticed, either it is kept secret, or (4) laborious efforts are made to explain an exception in terms that do not contradict the system. (5) Despite the legitimate claims of contradictory views, one tends to see, describe, or even illustrate those circumstances which corroborate current views and thereby give them substance.​

​

Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (p. 27). Kindle Edition.​

What Fleck states as a natural element of human ideological compartmentalization, Whorf implies is built into the language, the means of communicating ideas, of a given ideological worldview, such that in Whorf's thinking, every language represents something like an in-built ideological-clique functioning to protect its own peculiar biases (since the nature of a language and grammar dictates to a great degree what can be communicated, and, therefore, thought). In the words of Wilhelm von Humboldt, "The diversity of languages is not a diversity of signs and sounds but a diversity of views of the world." The biases built into grammar and language are secondarily protected by using the 5 points Fleck lays out in the quotation above. Whorf says:

Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by far the greatest light upon it that we have is thrown by the study of language. This study shows that the forms of a person’s thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language—shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. His thinking itself is in a language—in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese. And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.​

​

Benjamin Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality, p. 360. Kindle Edition.​

​

Ironically, the second person named in the Sapir-Whorf hypotheis, Edward Sapir, points out that culture isn't itself wholly circumscribed within the hypothesis. That is, in one nation, or cultural boundary, persons speaking the same language, and raised in the same culture, can exhibit contradicting ideological foundations, therein implying that at the most fundamental level, and at the deepest ideological divide, binary ideological differentiation can occur within persons speaking the same language and living under the same cultural predispositions. What this implies is that although the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is scientifically verified to a great extent (language does circumscribe to some important degree what a person thinks, and can think) nevertheless there has to be something of the greatest importance making persons speaking the same language, raised in the same culture, conflict (in a contradistinctive way), ideologically, and on the most fundamental level?



John

 

[John D. Brey]

Combining Benjamin Whorf's theory of language relativity with Ludwik Fleck's explanation for how "thought-collectives" guard their clique-oriented and hyper-subjective confirmation bias, and or or cognitive dissonance, lends itself to some extremely valuable revelations concerning the most fundamental ideological polarities found throughout human existence.

What we are faced with here is not so much simple passivity or mistrust of new ideas as an active approach which can be divided into several stages. (1) A contradiction to the system appears unthinkable. (2) What does not fit into the system remains unseen; (3) alternatively, if it is noticed, either it is kept secret, or (4) laborious efforts are made to explain an exception in terms that do not contradict the system. (5) Despite the legitimate claims of contradictory views, one tends to see, describe, or even illustrate those circumstances which corroborate current views and thereby give them substance.​

​

Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (p. 27). Kindle Edition.​

What Fleck states as a natural element of human ideological compartmentalization, Whorf implies is built into the language, the means of communicating ideas, of a given ideological worldview, such that in Whorf's thinking, every language represents something like an in-built ideological-clique functioning to protect its own peculiar biases (since the nature of a language and grammar dictates to a great degree what can be communicated, and, therefore, thought). In the words of Wilhelm Von Humbolt, "The diversity of languages is not a diversity of signs and sounds but a diversity of views of the world." The biases built into grammar and language are secondarily protected by using the 5 points Fleck lays out in the quotation above. Whorf says:

Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by far the greatest light upon it that we have is thrown by the study of language. This study shows that the forms of a person’s thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language—shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. His thinking itself is in a language—in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese. And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.​

​

Benjamin Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality, p. 360. Kindle Edition.​

​

Ironically, the second person named in the Sapir-Whorf hypotheis, Edward Sapir, points out that culture isn't itself wholly circumscribed within the hypothesis. That is, in one nation, or cultural boundary, persons speaking the same language, and raised in the same culture, can exhibit contradicting ideological foundations, therein implying that at the most fundamental level, and at the deepest ideological divide, binary ideological differentiation can occur within persons speaking the same language and living under the same cultural predispositions. What this implies is that although the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is scientifically verified to a great extent (language does circumscribe to some important degree what a person thinks, and can think) nevertheless there has to be something of the greatest importance making persons speaking the same language, raised in the same culture, conflict (in a contradistinctive way), ideologically, and on the most fundamental level?

The philosopher Georg Lichtenberg once stated that he wished there were a language where a falsehood, or an error against truth shown up in the grammar of the language such that there could be no gross falsehoods and errors spoken into existence. Wittgenstein's logic as found in his Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus appears to have granted Lichtenberg's wish:

Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically. It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic. ---The truth is that we could not say what an "illogical" world would look like . . . [since] it is as impossible to represent in language anything that "contradicts" logic as it is in geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist.​

​

3.03-3.032.​

Wittgenstein's statement above lends itself to solving the problem established by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis since that hypothesis states, as Wilhelm von Humboldt was quoted supporting, that the limits of our grammar, or language, are, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, the limits of our world (Tractatus 5.6).

If an ideological-clique lives in a geographical area sharing the same language and culture as another ideological-clique, whose worldview, the latter's, clashes in the most antithetical manner with the first clique, even though they share the same culture and language, and should thus be circumscribed in the same world, if Wittgenstein's statement is correct, then there are either two antithetical, logical worlds, couched in one language and culture (which is illogical), or else, one of the ideological-cliques betrays the illogical nature of its worldview, ideology, and the foundation of all that's believed and protected (Fleck's 5 points), by ignoring, being blind to, the illogical nature of the propositions and statements upon which the worldview and ideology rests.



John

 

[John D. Brey]

If an ideological-clique lives in a geographical area sharing the same language and culture as another ideological-clique, whose worldview, the latter's, clashes in the most antithetical manner with the first clique, even though they share the same culture and language, and should thus be circumscribed in the same world, if Wittgenstein's statement is correct, then there are either two antithetical, logical worlds, couched in one language and culture (which is illogical), or else, one of the ideological-cliques betrays the illogical nature of its worldview, ideology, and the foundation of all that's believed and protected (Fleck's 5 points), by ignoring, being blind to, the illogical nature of the propositions and statements upon which the worldview and ideology rests.

They do not recognize him because they cannot even imagine that this is really him, He, who has rejoined them, so far do their poor, cobbled-together, honest-to-goodness concepts find themselves outstripped by “events” that leave them petrified within a matrix of irrefutable prejudices. Not that they would not want to believe; they simply do not even imagine any other hypothesis, it never crosses their minds, even for an instant. The dead man is dead, period. Every other possibility finds itself completely excluded, cannot even be considered. They see nothing—in the sense that one sees nothing in a game of chess if one does not know how to play; they hear nothing—in the sense that one hears nothing (except noise) in a conversation if one does not know the language in which it is taking place.​

​

Jean-Luc Marion, Believing in Order to See.​

Marion's comments describe the nature of the blindness affecting the souls on the road to Emmaus in a manner that equally depicts the ideological-clique unable to see the illogical nature of the very propositions and statements upon which their worldview and ideology rest. Later, when at the meal the man risen from the dead reaches out to receive the bread that will be broken for the meal, the eyes of the blind are finally opened when they spy the holes in Jesus' hands such that what their lying eyes were trying to tell them was true on the road to Emmaus finally lifts the veil from their mind such that they marvel to see a sight as only one can who was very recently blind.



John

 

[IndigoChild5559]

We are in possession of this collection of 66 books​

I realize that this is off topic, but I just want to remind you that only the Protestant Bible has 66 books. The Catholic bible has 73. The Orthodox have 81. And the Ethiopian church has even more.

 

[John D. Brey]

I realize that this is off topic, but I just want to remind you that only the Protestant Bible has 66 books. The Catholic bible has 73. The Orthodox have 81. And the Ethiopian church has even more.

Yes. I thought about that for a second when I composed the message. Nevertheless, in my opinion, what Missler claims as the symmetry between all 66 of these books, and the same is likely true to some degree for the Catholic 73, and the Orthodox 81, I find to be correct. And fwiw, the Jewish Bible has only 24 books.

So yes. There's some disagreement concerning canonicity. And for my part, I think canonicity is always tentative and overwrought. I would add writings penned by Luther, Samson Hirsch, and Augustine (to name just a few) to any canon of spiritually guided writings, not to mention the Talmud and perhaps the Koran, and or the Bhagavad Gita. Where do we stop?



John

 

[John D. Brey]

They do not recognize him because they cannot even imagine that this is really him, He, who has rejoined them, so far do their poor, cobbled-together, honest-to-goodness concepts find themselves outstripped by “events” that leave them petrified within a matrix of irrefutable prejudices. Not that they would not want to believe; they simply do not even imagine any other hypothesis, it never crosses their minds, even for an instant. The dead man is dead, period. Every other possibility finds itself completely excluded, cannot even be considered. They see nothing—in the sense that one sees nothing in a game of chess if one does not know how to play; they hear nothing—in the sense that one hears nothing (except noise) in a conversation if one does not know the language in which it is taking place.​

​

Jean-Luc Marion, Believing in Order to See.​

Marion's comments describe the nature of the blindness affecting the souls on the road to Emmaus in a manner that equally depicts the ideological-clique unable to see the illogical nature of the very propositions and statements upon which their worldview and ideology rest. Later, when at the meal the man risen from the dead reaches out to receive the bread that will be broken for the meal, the eyes of the blind are finally opened when they spy the holes in Jesus' hands such that what their lying eyes were trying to tell them was true on the road to Emmaus finally lifts the veil from their mind such that they marvel to see a sight as only one can who was very recently blind.

This is to point out the strange situation of the travelers on the road to Emmaus: the risen Jesus of Nazareth walks and talks with them and yet they know him not? How can they not suspect what's so obvious? -----Because, as Marion points out (as does Jean-Paul Sartre before him) we can only see what we're looking for, or more precisely, what we believe can be seen. The truthfulness of the narrative account of the travelers on the road to Emmaus is found part wise in the fact that the narrative justifies what Sartre points out: it's impossible to see (at least initially) something the epistemology of the viewer considers impossible. Case in point:

I share with the materialists or physicalists not only the emphasis on material objects as the paradigms of reality, but also the evolutionary hypothesis. But our ways seem to part when evolution produces minds, and human language. And they part even more widely when human minds produce stories, explanatory myths, tools and works of art and of science. All this, so it seems, has evolved without any violation of the laws of physics. But with life, even with low forms of life, problem-solving enters the universe; and with the higher form, purposes and aims, consciously pursued. We can only wonder that matter can thus transcend itself, by producing mind, purpose, and a world of the products of the human mind.​

​

Karl Popper, The Self and Its Brain, p. 11.​

Carefully parsed, Popper's statement above is inverse to the revelation received by the travelers on the road to Emmaus when suddenly they see the holes in Jesus' hands. In the statement above, Popper spies the holes in the foundation of his ideological-clique, the truth that the materialism and physicalism that undergirds his entire epistemology, his worldview, i.e., the "thought-collective" into which he was born and in which he died, is, in keeping true to the type (the travelers on the road to Emmaus), still-born from the get-go even though it is, his materialism and physicalism is, animated and enlivened for a time, that is, seemingly alive (though definitely dead-on-arrival) within his two-forked mind: a mind that sees the fork in the road leading out of the morass of his materialism and physicalism, but can't, as Yogi Berra advised, take it.

In Popper's statement above, and he makes many others like it, Popper clearly concedes, guardedly, that there's gaping holes in his worldview which could only be happily accepted with broken bread and wine toasts if in fact his worldview were able to rise from the death that is its illogical and unreasonable reality.

The parallel with the travelers on the road to Emmaus is near perfect since they're blind to the possibilty of a man rising from the dead, though that fact is the fork in the road to Emmaus, while Popper isn't looking at an ideological-clique that's risen from the fact that it's illogical and unreasonable. He's looking at what he thought was alive, but which at the moment of breaking bread in its full revelation, he sees is dead. His revelation is the opposite of the travelers on the road to Emmaus. They can't believe what was dead can rise, while Popper can't believe what he thought was alive, is in fact dead.

As the poet Christian Wiman points out, death is, so far as we know, more comprehensive than life, such that if a man rises from the comprehensivenes of death, then he's alive indeed, while if an ideology thought to be alive, is in fact dead, then it can't be retrieved from that comprehensive state unless and until that state is reversed by something like a resurrection from the dead.

What the travelers on the road to Emmaus have revealed to them when they see the holes in the hands of a dead man is far more comprehensive than it might seem at first glance since the holes in those hands are the only passageway through which Popper and his ideological-clique can enter into an understanding of the relationship between their materialism and physicalism (a worldview otherwise weighed down so heavily that it can't escape from its finding itself in darkness and sheol), that would allow it to rise again into the light of a new world epoch beyond the clutches of the death principle.

What we call “scientific thought” is a specialization of the western Indo-European type of language . . . Every language and every well-knit technical sublanguage incorporates certain points of view and certain patterned resistances to widely divergent points of view. . . These resistances not only isolate artificially the particular sciences from each other; they also restrain the scientific spirit as a whole from taking the next great step in development—a step which entails viewpoints unprecedented in science and a complete severance from traditions. For certain linguistic patterns rigidified in the dialectics of the sciences—often also embedded in the matrix of European culture from which those sciences have sprung, and long worshipped as pure Reason per se—have been worked to death. Even science senses that they are somehow out of focus for observing what may be very significant aspects of reality, upon the due observation of which all further progress in understanding the universe may hinge.​

​

Benjamin Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality, p. 352-353. Kindle Edition.​

John