All Facts Are Based in Faith

[Sunstone]

I don't necessarily distinguish between "religious faith" and "mathematical faith" or "scientific faith"; they all have to do with assuming certain things to be true without proof--faith statements.

And yet there seem to be key differences between the epistemic grounds for each kind of "faith". e.g. As polymath pointed out, what you call, "scientific faith", is based on observation, and what you call "religious faith" is not.

Moreover, your conflation of those two kinds of "faith" does not seem to be epistemologically justified but rather appears to be as arbitrary on your part as if you were to whimsically refuse to distinguish between Macintosh and Granny Smith apples on the logically weak and insipid grounds that "both kinds of apples are apples and therefore should not be distinguished one from the other".

So first of all, not all facts are based on observation. Some facts are based on formal systems of reasoning, like mathematical or geometrical theorems.

Agreed, and good point. In formal philosophy, the distinction you are drawing has for the past 2,300 years been known as the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge.

But even for those facts which ARE based on observation, one must have faith in one's observations--that is, one must have faith that they are not just a brain in a vat being stimulated by a mad scientist.

No, that's simply not true. Contrary to popular belief, it is neither epistemologically nor logically necessary to indulge oneself in distasteful metaphysical speculations (I consider all metaphysics mere speculation and therefore distasteful) by positing an ontological grounds or basis for observation. The reason it is not necessary to posit an ontological grounds for observation is because of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism provides a logical and epistemic framework or justification for scientific inquiry involving observation without resorting to detestable speculation.

...faith in the axioms (faith statements) that underlie formal systems of reasoning.

If that were actually true (and I do not believe it is), then how would you explain away those good folks who treat axioms as prescriptive rather then descriptive statements? Such folks certainly do not appear to have any faith at all that axioms correspond to an ontological state of affairs.

Although we disagree on several points, it is obvious to me that you've put some thought into your beliefs in this matter. That makes your remarks interesting. Thank you for that.

 

[Axe Elf]

It's dodgy trying to equate the two. Faith usually doesn't require any concrete evidence - belief does. How much testing of science do you need to test your beliefs? Where would I look to test any faith? As in results obtained.

It seems like a rather artificial distinction to me. What "concrete evidence" do people have for belief in God? How about for faith in God?

Let's consult the book of faith statements about words.

belief: 1. an acceptance that a statement is true or that something exists. 2. trust, faith, or confidence in someone or something.

faith: 1. complete trust or confidence in someone or something. 2. strong belief in God or in the doctrines of a religion.

The two definitions are virtually parallel, right down to using each word to define the other.

 

[Axe Elf]

By that definition, yes. But there are other definitions of "faith" and it is worth noting that not all of them fit the assertion in the OP.

I would be interested in hearing any alternate definitions you might offer, and how they might contradict the thread's assertion.

 

[Sunstone]

I like it, although since I just explained that not all facts are of the observable variety, I might modify your definition to "any state of affairs that can be reliably verified." Or I might just go with Google: "a thing that is indisputably the case."

The phrase, "any state of affairs that be reliably verified" and the phrase, "a thing that is indisputably the case", seem near synonyms to me but -- and it's a big but -- the former does not raise the questions, "What is a 'thing' in this context?", and "What does it mean to be 'indisputably' the case?" The former does, however, raise the fascinating question of, "What is 'reliable verification'?"

 

[sandy whitelinger]

Google says "complete trust or confidence in someone or something."

I like it, although since I just explained that not all facts are of the observable variety, I might modify your definition to "any state of affairs that can be reliably verified." Or I might just go with Google: "a thing that is indisputably the case."

It's interesting how you cherry pick definitions to suit your view. Im sure it helps you jump to conclusions.

How about this from google;

faith: 2 strong belief in God or the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual apprehension rather than proof.

Or maybe Hebrews 11:1.

 

[Sunstone]

...it is better to simply *define* the real world via potential observations.

I prefer to say, the term "reality" can best be defined methodologically. I also prefer chocolate ice cream to raspberry pies. Just wanted you to know about my preferences in these matters.

 

[Axe Elf]

And yet there seem to be key differences between the epistemic grounds for each kind of "faith". e.g. As polymath pointed out, what you call, "scientific faith", is based on observation, and what you call "religious faith" is not.

Yes and no. First of all, I didn't call anything "scientific faith," but scientific facts are based on observation--which requires faith in the existence of a real world outside of our own heads, and faith in our perceptions and sensations to reflect that reality at least sometimes. Scientific facts are usually subject to replication and peer review, which require faith in the testimony of trusted others about their own personal experiences. Some religious "facts" are also based on personal experience and the testimony of trusted others about their own personal experiences, but some religious "facts" are of the more formal type, which requires faith in foundational axioms. The fact that we do not have free will can be seen as requiring faith in the axiom of God's omniscience, for instance.

Moreover, your conflation of those two kinds of "faith" does not seem to be epistemologically justified but rather appears to be as arbitrary on your part as if you were to whimsically refuse to distinguish between Macintosh and Granny Smith apples on the logically weak and insipid grounds that "both kinds of apples are apples and therefore should not be distinguished one from the other".

But I AM distinguishing among the various things in which one can have faith in order to establish fact. One must have faith in the reality of a world outside of their own head in order to determine facts from personal experience (observation). One must have faith in the testimony of trusted others to determine facts from the experiences of others (such as learning about the Leaning Tower of Pisa from books, or believing the testimony of the Gospels). And one must have faith in arbitrary axioms in order to determine facts from formal systems of reasoning.

But whatever it is that you choose to have faith in, the inescapable conclusion remains: ALL facts are based in faith.

No, that's simply not true. Contrary to popular belief, it is neither epistemologically nor logically necessary to indulge oneself in distasteful metaphysical speculations (I consider all metaphysics mere speculation and therefore distasteful) by positing an ontological grounds or basis for observation. The reason it is not necessary to posit an ontological grounds for observation is because of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism provides a logical and epistemic framework or justification for scientific inquiry involving observation without resorting to detestable speculation.

You can avoid distasteful metaphysical speculations all you like, but the inescapable conclusion remains: there is absolutely NOTHING you can know about the "real world" until you have faith that a "real world" exists outside of your own head, and that at least some of your perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality.

I know you enjoyed trotting out the big words, too, but methodological naturalism just denies that any supernatural causes are possible explanations for physical phenomena. The scientific method still embraces speculation--and testing of those speculations.

If that were actually true (and I do not believe it is), then how would you explain away those good folks who treat axioms as prescriptive rather then descriptive statements? Such folks certainly do not appear to have any faith at all that axioms correspond to an ontological state of affairs.

I'm not sure what you mean by explaining them away. Some axioms are descriptive, like "two parallel lines never intersect," and others are prescriptive, like "if a and b are true, then c must also be true."

And note that it is not necessary for axioms to have any correspondence to an ontological state of affairs in order to determine facts from them. Whether you accept that two parallel lines never intersect (as in Euclidean geometry) or that two parallel lines intersect at least twice (as in elliptical geometry), you can still determine useful facts in either case--facts that have real world applications. One chooses which axiom in which to place one's faith not because one is more "true" than the other, or because one isr more reflective of an ontological state of affairs than the other, but because of the kind of work one wants to do. If one wants to do plane geometry, they have faith that two parallel lines never intersect. If one wants to calculate the shortest distance between two points on a globe, they have faith that two parallel lines intersect at least twice.

Although we disagree on several points, it is obvious to me that you've put some thought into your beliefs in this matter. That makes your remarks interesting. Thank you for that.

You're welcome.

 

[Axe Elf]

It's interesting how you cherry pick definitions to suit your view. Im sure it helps you jump to conclusions.

How about this from google;

faith: 2 strong belief in God or the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual apprehension rather than proof.

Well, I provided the FIRST definition from Google, you provided the second. Which one of us is cherry-picking? But again, there is the conclusion that faith is the acceptance of an assertion as being true without proof.

Or maybe Hebrews 11:1.

"Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." --Hebrews 11:1 (KJV)

Eh, I dunno, sounds more like a poetic allegory than a suitable definition, but if it works for you...

 

[Axe Elf]

The phrase, "any state of affairs that be reliably verified" and the phrase, "a thing that is indisputably the case", seem near synonyms to me but -- and it's a big but -- the former does not raise the questions, "What is a 'thing' in this context?", and "What does it mean to be 'indisputably' the case?" The former does, however, raise the fascinating question of, "What is 'reliable verification'?"

Yep. Looks like you'll have to make some faith statements and go from there.

 

[ImmortalFlame]

I would be interested in hearing any alternate definitions you might offer, and how they might contradict the thread's assertion.

Sure. A common definition that is often used in religious discussions is "belief despite an absence of evidence or in spite of evidence to the contrary". In this case, it cannot possibly be a basis for fact as much as it is a basis for belief.

 

[Axe Elf]

Sure. A common definition that is often used in religious discussions is "belief despite an absence of evidence or in spite of evidence to the contrary". In this case, it cannot possibly be a basis for fact as much as it is a basis for belief.

Well, misplaced faith is certainly no basis for fact, but the assertion is not that all faiths are suitable for sustaining fact, but that all facts are based in faith. So you have not contradicted the thread's assertion at all; you have merely pointed out that not all faiths are good bases for facts.

 

[ImmortalFlame]

Well, misplaced faith is certainly no basis for fact, but the assertion is not that all faiths are suitable for sustaining fact, but that all facts are based in faith. So you have not contradicted the thread's assertion at all; you have merely pointed out that not all faiths are good bases for facts.

But how can you base a fact on a belief which is held despite a lack of evidence or in spite of evidence to the contrary?

 

[Axe Elf]

But how can you base a fact on a belief which is held despite a lack of evidence or in spite of evidence to the contrary?

I would hope that no one ever holds as fact anything derived from beliefs held in spite of evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, this is a widely practiced flaw among the more religious-minded. But--as I just got through pointing out in my previous response--the inappropriateness of some beliefs or faiths to support fact does not contradict the assertion that all facts are based in faith.

Consider that my assertion is "All fish live in water." You are holding up some polluted water and saying, "But no! See? No fish can live in THIS water, therefore your assertion must not be true!" Holding up misplaced faith as an inappropriate basis for fact is the same as holding up the polluted water as an inappropriate home for fish--but the latter does not contradict the assertion that all fish live in water any more than your argument does not contradict the assertion that all facts are based in faith.

Now, holding a belief in the ABSENCE of evidence is a much more reasonable thing. There is no evidence, for instance, that two parallel lines never intersect, but it is useful to assume it is true for certain real-world applications. There is likewise no evidence that two parallel lines intersect at least twice, but it is also useful to assume that IT is true for certain real-world applications. Choosing to hold a belief when there is no proof either way--where there is legitimate room for a difference of opinion--is not irrational.

 

[Polymath257]

Facts about the "real world" are based on observation and testing. Observation and testing are based in faith--faith in personal experiences and the experiences of others. Ergo, facts about the real world are based in faith. Now if you keep insisting that they are not, that they are in fact based on observation and testing, then I'm really going to have to question my faith in making one last attempt here.

And does this sort of 'faith' based on evidence and testing differ in any substantial way from religious faith? The answer is clearly yes. So while the *confidence* one has in observation and testing is 'faith' in a very weak sense, it is nothing at all like religious faith that is not based on observation or testing.

 

[Sunstone]

We can't test "God exists" either, but one would be mad to insist that it is "literally a meaningless claim," given the very profound meaning that it obviously has to literally billions of people around the world.

This seems to be an equivocation on the core term "meaning". @Polymath is talking about pragmatic or positivistic meaning, if I'm not mistaken, while you seem to be talking about emotional, religious, or spiritual meaning. Thus, it is no genuine criticism of Polymath's notion that Harman's brain in a vat concept is pragmatically meaningless that millions of people might find God spiritually meaningful despite that both BIV and God represent untestable concepts.

Perhaps a somewhat stronger criticism of Polymath's seemingly positivist notion that Harman's brain in a vat concept is "meaningless" because it is "untestable" would be Heisenberg's assertion that such a notion of meaning will ultimately reduce us to speaking only of "completely uninteresting and trivial tautologies". Or, if you don't agree with Heisenberg, then you could criticize the notion on the even stronger grounds that it leads to scientism -- which involves making perfectly detestable metaphysical assumptions.

...you can't test [that things exist independent of my mind], so you have to accept [that things exist independent of my mind] on faith.

As it happens, "you have to accept it on faith" does not necessarily follow from the fact "you can't test it". I can easily test whether hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water without assuming that hydrogen, oxygen, or water have any existence independent of my mind. That is, I can believe their independent status is unknowable.

Put differently, just as I can be an agnostic about the existence of God, I can be an agnostic about the existence of an independent reality.

...axioms...are statements assumed to be true without proof--faith statements.

I disagree that axioms are really "statements assumed to be true". I know people say that all the time, but they are speaking loosely. If we closely examine how axioms operate in logical and epistemological terms, then it would be more accurate to say that axioms function in much the same way as "please assume for the sake of discussion" statements. Or -- better yet, -- "prescriptive declarations". If one absolutely feels one must call axioms "statements assumed to be true", then one should at least add to that, "Axioms are largely analogous to statements assumed to be true."

 

[ImmortalFlame]

I would hope that no one ever holds as fact anything derived from beliefs held in spite of evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, this is a widely practiced flaw among the more religious-minded. But--as I just got through pointing out in my previous response--the inappropriateness of some beliefs or faiths to support fact does not contradict the assertion that all facts are based in faith.

Consider that my assertion is "All fish live in water." You are holding up some polluted water and saying, "But no! See? No fish can live in THIS water, therefore your assertion must not be true!" Holding up misplaced faith as an inappropriate basis for fact is the same as holding up the polluted water as an inappropriate home for fish--but the latter does not contradict the assertion that all fish live in water any more than your argument does not contradict the assertion that all facts are based in faith.

This is why I asked you for the definition of faith and specified that not all forms of faith are basis for fact, just as not all water supports fish life. It was a clarification.

Now, holding a belief in the ABSENCE of evidence is a much more reasonable thing. There is no evidence, for instance, that two parallel lines never intersect, but it is useful to assume it is true for certain real-world applications. There is likewise no evidence that two parallel lines intersect at least twice, but it is also useful to assume that IT is true for certain real-world applications. Choosing to hold a belief when there is no proof either way--where there is legitimate room for a difference of opinion--is not irrational.

But that parallel lines don't intersect is self-evident since, if they did intersect, they would not be parallel. It's no different to saying there are no married bachelors. It's true by definition.

 

[Polymath257]

I would hope that no one ever holds as fact anything derived from beliefs held in spite of evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, this is a widely practiced flaw among the more religious-minded. But--as I just got through pointing out in my previous response--the inappropriateness of some beliefs or faiths to support fact does not contradict the assertion that all facts are based in faith.

Consider that my assertion is "All fish live in water." You are holding up some polluted water and saying, "But no! See? No fish can live in THIS water, therefore your assertion must not be true!" Holding up misplaced faith as an inappropriate basis for fact is the same as holding up the polluted water as an inappropriate home for fish--but the latter does not contradict the assertion that all fish live in water any more than your argument does not contradict the assertion that all facts are based in faith.

And we notice that this is a testable hypothesis. All I have to do to negate it is to give an example of a fish that does not live in water. We can also argue the vagueness of the phrase 'living in water' and precisely what it means to be a 'fish'. For example, do you mean that all fish must live all of their lives in water? Or is it enough for them to live only *part* of their lives in water? In the latter case, how do they differ from amphibians? In the former case, there are actual counter-examples.

Now, holding a belief in the ABSENCE of evidence is a much more reasonable thing. There is no evidence, for instance, that two parallel lines never intersect, but it is useful to assume it is true for certain real-world applications. There is likewise no evidence that two parallel lines intersect at least twice, but it is also useful to assume that IT is true for certain real-world applications. Choosing to hold a belief when there is no proof either way--where there is legitimate room for a difference of opinion--is not irrational.

Your example is messed up: the definition of parallel is that the lines do not intersect. So the real world question is whether there *are* parallel lines at all.

And you are right that an absence of evidence allows for the possibility of both the truth and the falsity of any given statement. But there *are* times when the absence of evidence is sufficient to show non-existence. For example, the absence of evidence of an adult elephant in my room is quite sufficient to show there is no adult elephant in my room: if one existed, then there would be evidence.

So, there are some issues that arise when there is an absence of evidence: 1) if the object did, in fact, exist, would we *expect* to see evidence given the extent of our investigation? 2) is the object well defined enough that we would recognize evidence if we found it? 3) is it even theoretically possible to find evidence for the object? 4) what are the theoretical reasons for suspecting the existence of the object?

So, as I already pointed out, if there has been an extensive investigation of the sort that would be expected to give evidence, then the lack of evidence can be quite enough to demonstrate non-existence. In the case of deities, the long history of unjustified claims to evidence along with the literally thousands of years of investigation tilts towards non-existence for this reason alone.

As for the second, this i a significant issue with the concept of a deity. Given the number of different religions, and all the different claims to the properties of a deity, it isn't clear that the idea is even well enough defined to have a meaningful question on the table. Do you mean the Gnostic Christian deity? or the Islamic deity? One or more of the Hindu deities?

The third is an interesting issue: the lack of evidence has been enough that some have proposed the 'hiddenness' of God. This is a fancy trick to negate the impact of the lack of evidence. But it is a clear case of special pleading. In NO other situation would we allow someone to claim the existence of something while saying it is impossible to actually detect it in some way. I would go further and say that the existence of something *requires* that it be detectable in some way: hiddenness cannot be a way to avoid the requirement of evidence.

It is a general principle that the one making a positive existence statement is the one having the burden of proof of the existence. This is universally the case. Except, of course, those who claim that God exists and want an argument for the non-existence. Again, this is an obvious ploy to avoid the inconvenience of the lack of evidence and is another case of special pleading.

Finally, the theoretical aspects in favor of the existence of God are all based on philosophies that are now seen as invalid. Any claims of necessary existence, for example, harken back to Aristotelian ideas and are no longer part of modern philosophy, and for good reason. The standard 'proofs' for the existence of God are all generally acknowledged to be deeply flawed.

 

[Polymath257]

You can avoid distasteful metaphysical speculations all you like, but the inescapable conclusion remains: there is absolutely NOTHING you can know about the "real world" until you have faith that a "real world" exists outside of your own head, and that at least some of your perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality.

I know you enjoyed trotting out the big words, too, but methodological naturalism just denies that any supernatural causes are possible explanations for physical phenomena. The scientific method still embraces speculation--and testing of those speculations.

No, it is simply using the information we have (i.e, observation) and seeing if there are recognizable patterns. We do not have to take the existence of an outside reality on faith. Even if there is no outside reality, we can still do observation, hypothesis formation, and testing concerning the observations we make. We can still deduce that these 'illusions' have a consistency and the information we get from 'others' is reliable through our own testing. And that is quite enough to do science.

I'm not sure what you mean by explaining them away. Some axioms are descriptive, like "two parallel lines never intersect," and others are prescriptive, like "if a and b are true, then c must also be true."

Neither of which is technically an axiom (although the second is in some ways closer). The first is a definition: to say two lines are parallel *means* that they never intersect. The second is a rule of deduction. it allows us to go from one set of strings in our formal system to another set of strings in our formal system.

And note that it is not necessary for axioms to have any correspondence to an ontological state of affairs in order to determine facts from them.

Not quite correct: we need no ontological status to derive *consequence* of the axioms using the rules of deduction. The results need not be 'facts', although there is a 'fact' that they were derived.

Whether you accept that two parallel lines never intersect (as in Euclidean geometry) or that two parallel lines intersect at least twice (as in elliptical geometry), you can still determine useful facts in either case--facts that have real world applications.

Quibble: it is NOT the case in elliptical geometry that parallel lines intersect. To be parallel *means* that the lines do not intersect. What happens in elliptical geometry is that *no* pair of lines is parallel.

One chooses which axiom in which to place one's faith not because one is more "true" than the other, or because one isr more reflective of an ontological state of affairs than the other, but because of the kind of work one wants to do.

And this is wrong. One chooses based on which set of axioms is consistent with the observations that have been made. So, we use elliptical geometry (as an approximation) for routes on the Earth because observation and testing show it to be better at making predictions that other axiom systems.

If one wants to do plane geometry, they have faith that two parallel lines never intersect. If one wants to calculate the shortest distance between two points on a globe, they have faith that two parallel lines intersect at least twice.

If you want to work in the respective formal systems, this is correct. if you want to model something about reality, you choose the one that is consistent with observations.

 

[Polymath257]

This seems to be an equivocation on the core term "meaning". @Polymath is talking about pragmatic or positivistic meaning, if I'm not mistaken, while you seem to be talking about emotional, religious, or spiritual meaning. Thus, it is no genuine criticism of Polymath's notion that Harman's brain in a vat concept is pragmatically meaningless that millions of people might find God spiritually meaningful despite that both BIV and God represent untestable concepts.

Perhaps a somewhat stronger criticism of Polymath's seemingly positivist notion that Harman's brain in a vat concept is "meaningless" because it is "untestable" would be Heisenberg's assertion that such a notion of meaning will ultimately reduce us to speaking only of "completely uninteresting and trivial tautologies". Or, if you don't agree with Heisenberg, then you could criticize the notion on the even stronger grounds that it leads to scientism -- which involves making perfectly detestable metaphysical assumptions.



As it happens, "you have to accept it on faith" does not necessarily follow from the fact "you can't test it". I can easily test whether hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water without assuming that hydrogen, oxygen, or water have any existence independent of my mind. That is, I can believe their independent status is unknowable.

Put differently, just as I can be an agnostic about the existence of God, I can be an agnostic about the existence of an independent reality.



I disagree that axioms are really "statements assumed to be true". I know people say that all the time, but they are speaking loosely. If we closely examine how axioms operate in logical and epistemological terms, then it would be more accurate to say that axioms function in much the same way as "please assume for the sake of discussion" statements. Or -- better yet, -- "prescriptive declarations". If one absolutely feels one must call axioms "statements assumed to be true", then one should at least add to that, "Axioms are largely analogous to statements assumed to be true."

Thank you. You said this much better than I was able to.

 

[Polymath257]

And yet there seem to be key differences between the epistemic grounds for each kind of "faith". e.g. As polymath pointed out, what you call, "scientific faith", is based on observation, and what you call "religious faith" is not.

Moreover, your conflation of those two kinds of "faith" does not seem to be epistemologically justified but rather appears to be as arbitrary on your part as if you were to whimsically refuse to distinguish between Macintosh and Granny Smith apples on the logically weak and insipid grounds that "both kinds of apples are apples and therefore should not be distinguished one from the other".



Agreed, and good point. In formal philosophy, the distinction you are drawing has for the past 2,300 years been known as the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge.



No, that's simply not true. Contrary to popular belief, it is neither epistemologically nor logically necessary to indulge oneself in distasteful metaphysical speculations (I consider all metaphysics mere speculation and therefore distasteful) by positing an ontological grounds or basis for observation. The reason it is not necessary to posit an ontological grounds for observation is because of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism provides a logical and epistemic framework or justification for scientific inquiry involving observation without resorting to detestable speculation.



If that were actually true (and I do not believe it is), then how would you explain away those good folks who treat axioms as prescriptive rather then descriptive statements? Such folks certainly do not appear to have any faith at all that axioms correspond to an ontological state of affairs.

Although we disagree on several points, it is obvious to me that you've put some thought into your beliefs in this matter. That makes your remarks interesting. Thank you for that.

Once again, nicely done!