An Interesting Discussion on Pascal's Wager

[9-10ths_Penguin]

What Would Happen If Gravity Became 5% Stronger?

What would happen if gravity became 5 percent stronger right now? This question was originally answered on Quora by Thomas Ulrich.

www.forbes.com

This is an example of what I was getting at before.

You can't say whether gravity 5% stronger is even possible, let alone how likely it might be, so musing about what the results would be if it did happen tells us nothing about the probability of a universe that can support life.

What's the possible range of values for the gravitational constant? Cite your sources and show your work, please.

 

[Augustus]

The argument isn't about believing that a god exists. It's more along the lines of figuring out which religion you think is most probable and practicing that religion even if you don't believe the god exists, since there's a chance that the god doesn't actually care if you believe in it but only cares if you worship and pray to it. The idea is that the activity of doing that (even if it feels stupid because it's highly unlikely that the god exists) is worth doing anyway since there's very little cost or impact to your life of doing it but potentially huge consequences of not doing it.

What people often miss is that Pascal also thought that you would benefit even if you are wrong as you would gain from living a humble and moral life according to Christian values. For him, it was a no lose gamble. Many will disagree with him on this of course, but when looking at his argument, it seems relevant to consider the whole picture.

Now, to what harm will you come by making this choice? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not enjoy these pernicious delights—glory and luxury; but will you not experience others? I tell you, you will thereby profit in this life; and at every step you take along this road you will see so great an assurance of gain, and so little in what you risk, that you will come to recognize your stake to have been laid for something certain, infinite, which has cost you nothing.

 

[Heyo]

How about if we change "infinite" to "really really really big"? Does that salvage her argument?

Somewhat. At least, you can do (regular) maths with big numbers. She works with decision matrices, and a matrix is only complete when the sum over all chances times payoffs is one. When you have infinities in the matrix, you can't get to one.
(At least with the maths I can do. @Polymath257 may know ways to multiply infinities with infinitesimals so that finite numbers result. But that's way over my pay grade - or hers.)
That still leaves you with the work of assigning big numbers to the payoffs and small numbers to the chances - which will be mostly arbitrary, and not helpful in making a rational decision.

 

[LuisDantas]

But it wasn't like that in Pascal's context.

The effect of the sacraments - e.g. saving you from Hell and sending you to Heaven - is supposed to be mostly about two things:

- is the person performing the sacrament a valid priest (i.e. did they receive the sacrament of holy orders from a bishop in the line of apostolic succession)? and

- was the form of the sacrament valid (i.e. did the priest hit what the Church considers the minimum key points)?

In that context, choosing to participate is enough.

Kind of... materialistic, though, don't you think? Or at least self-interested and with no interest in religious practices and values.

Were I a Christian I expect that I would hate it instead of just despising it.

 

[Shadow Wolf]

since there's a chance that the god doesn't actually care if you believe in it but only cares if you worship and pray to it.

A lot of gods don't care. Pagan gods especially are more concerned with things like valor, integrity, bravery, strength, honor, wisdom and arts. The Norse, for example, it was more important to not die dishonorably than to worship any god. To the Greeks most people were destined for the middle ground if eternity, while those who angered the gods (especially Zeus) went to we would essentially call Hell (Tartarus) while those who good went to Paradise/Heaven (Elysium). The Celts believed in reincarnation.
It also assumes an eternal existence. Many religions don't and even many gods are destined to die in the many different versions of the Ultimate End to the Earth and all Life on it.
And it assumes Pascal's wager isn't offensive to both reason and faith.

 

[RestlessSoul]

There are *many* things wrong with this line of argument.

1. We don't know that the constants *can* change. As of now, we have not detected any changes nor is there any good theory that describes how they could change.

2. If the constants *can* change, we don't know if there is a natural dynamic giving rise to the values we see now. In other words, the currant values might be an equilibrium state arrived at after some dynamics. Maybe the dynamics maximize complexity....

3. The argument assumes we have the right constants and that they are independent. The latter, especially, is doubtful. maybe the values we see are the result of fewer constants.

4. Related to this is the assumption that we have the right laws of physics (and thereby the right constants). I don't know of any physicists that would claim this at this point. For example, we certainly do NOT understand dark matter or dark energy.

5. Dark matter shows that either we don't understand gravity very well OR that we don't understand particle physics very well. Either way would have a huge impact on those constants.

6. Dark energy shows we don't understand much about the quantum aspects of gravity (ever hear of the prediction off by 120 orders of magnitude?). Again, as we learn more, we *expect* that the laws and underlying constants will be understood differently.

7. It is very much NOT clear what other values to the constants would lead to. We have to be very careful to not think the universe was made for *us* as opposed to us developing in this universe.

8. The argument is much stronger if the 'goal' is the production of stars and galaxies as opposed to thinking it is the formation of life. There are plenty of stars and galaxies, from even the earliest times (well, within the first few hundred million years). Life doesn't seem to have started until at least 10 billion years in. More of an afterthought, I'd say.

Yes, at one level it is rather vacuous.

Actually, it isn't the case that the theories are unverifiable. For example, most attempts we have made towards quantum gravity naturally lead to such a multiverse. If (and when) such theories are tested in *this* universe, if they work well enough, it would add to the acceptance of the overall multiverse description. This is still very much in the future, but is not at all unreasonable.

Most physical theories have aspects that are not directly testable, but are required for the theory to *be* testable in some aspects. it may well be that any workable theory of quantum gravity necessarily leads to a multiverse description. Time will tell.

Even allowing for all the constants and associated variables being subject to new understanding which might account for their seeming randomness, we are still, in the light of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, left with what Roger Penrose has called “the enormity of the specialness” of the initial state of the universe. Didn’t Einstein say something to the effect that the Second Law of Thermodynamics was the one physical theory he was convinced would never be overthrown? In which case we either have to find some way to account for random processes somehow generating an extraordinarily special initial state, or the standard model of cosmology is thrown into question and the Big Bang becomes, well, who knows what? A product of some larger process barely glimpsed as yet.

However that may be, it seems perfectly reasonable in the light of what we do know, to be astonished by the existence of galaxies capable of giving rise to planets, which support the life of conscious beings, looking out at all this from within and struggling to understand it. Or maybe we just got lucky.

 

[Mock Turtle]

Whether by God, the Logos, or the laws of physics, the universe has been very precisely arranged - fine tuned, as the cosmologists say - to make it possible for life to exist. If the universe were hostile, we would not exist, on this glorious jewel of a planet.

Seemingly in this universe (but perhaps not, given we haven't actually discovered all there is to know regarding physics and especially the fundamental nature of existence - quantum physics and anything else being part of this) and I'm not sufficiently qualified to know if this is all that exists, so I would leave such as an open belief. And as pointed out no doubt, the universe is extremely large (and possibly pointless) for one life form to exist that apparently has the answers as to why and how we came to be here. Me, I am not so adoring of the human race to think we have any such answers yet.

As for the choice between faith and futility, hope and despair, those were my choices, as I saw them at the time. I’m not making any calls or judgements on your or anyone else’s behalf.

Good call.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Kind of... materialistic, though, don't you think? Or at least self-interested and with no interest in religious practices and values.

Yes. It also has no interest in critical thinking about how likely each possibility is and why.

Were I a Christian I expect that I would hate it instead of just despising it.

If you respected the tenets of your religion, sure.

I think it gets played up by certain Christians because they have a mandate to "win souls" for Jesus, but convincing non-believers just based on the merits of their religion is really hard and mostly unsuccessful, especially considering the source material they have to work with. Given that, I get the appeal of an approach that just sets aside the merits of the religion and argues that these merits are irrelevant.

 

[Ignatius A]

No, it is not a different one. I just explaining to you his contention.



Is there any reason to believe it could be some other way?

Yes because nothing says it must be this way it just is this way. L

And I find it much more believable to think that the creator of the universe was a multidimensional art student that failed their class.

Whatever you say

 

[Koldo]

Yes because nothing says it must be this way it just is this way. L

Nothing says it can be some other way either.

 

[Polymath257]

Yes because nothing says it must be this way it just is this way. L

Whatever you say

We are talking about a collection of incredibly unlikely possibilities and arguing about which probability is larger or smaller than another.

You are assuming that causality makes sense outside of the universe, where that is the only place we know causality applies. You are arguing that a consciousness is required when consciousness is a complex phenomenon of matter. You are arguing the Bible should be taken seriously when it shows the world viewed by people from 2000 years ago, long before the skepticism and science allowed knowledge other than superstition. You are arguing that the Biblical deity (actually several merged deity stories) is more likely than what has been discovered by honest investigation into the evidence provided by the universe itself.

But, whatever you say....

 

[Polymath257]

Even allowing for all the constants and associated variables being subject to new understanding which might account for their seeming randomness, we are still, in the light of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, left with what Roger Penrose has called “the enormity of the specialness” of the initial state of the universe. Didn’t Einstein say something to the effect that the Second Law of Thermodynamics was the one physical theory he was convinced would never be overthrown? In which case we either have to find some way to account for random processes somehow generating an extraordinarily special initial state, or the standard model of cosmology is thrown into question and the Big Bang becomes, well, who knows what? A product of some larger process barely glimpsed as yet.

However that may be, it seems perfectly reasonable in the light of what we do know, to be astonished by the existence of galaxies capable of giving rise to planets, which support the life of conscious beings, looking out at all this from within and struggling to understand it. Or maybe we just got lucky.

The second law is a statistical law, not a fundamental one. In the long run it is *expected* to be violated by the very way it is supported in statistical mechanics. I'd suggest you look up the concept of the Poincare recurrence time.

The point is that significant violations are very unlikely given the number of particles in even a very small system. But the probabilities can be calculated and are not zero. And that means violations *will* occur given sufficient time.

I don't see it as luck or otherwise. The universe exists. It simply is the way it is. I don't even know, philosophically, what it would *mean* to say it could be different.

 

[Alien826]

I just gave two examples.

You quoted two passages from the Bible.

If you are debating "what the Bible says", then your argument is addressed to those that agree with your premise that the Bible has authority, more than any other ancient writing. In that case I'll bow out as I don't share that opinion.

If on the other hand you are arguing for some kind of universal truth, then you have to establish that the Bible is a valid source of that truth.

 

[PureX]

Yes because nothing says it must be this way it just is this way.

Actually, the fact that it is this ways says that it must be this way. Whereas nothing at all says anything at all about anything being any other way.

See, this is why philosophy is an important tool when we come to these questions that science can't address.

 

[Ignatius A]

Actually, the fact that it is this ways says that it must be this way. Whereas nothing at all says anything at all about anything being any other way.

See, this is why philosophy is an important tool when we come to these questions that science can't address.

Thats illogical.

 

[Ignatius A]

You quoted two passages from the Bible.

If you are debating "what the Bible says", then your argument is addressed to those that agree with your premise that the Bible has authority, more than any other ancient writing. In that case I'll bow out as I don't share that opinion.

If on the other hand you are arguing for some kind of universal truth, then you have to establish that the Bible is a valid source of that truth.

Correct. Those are the people I was talking about. Sorry you missed that

 

[RestlessSoul]

Seemingly in this universe (but perhaps not, given we haven't actually discovered all there is to know regarding physics and especially the fundamental nature of existence - quantum physics and anything else being part of this) and I'm not sufficiently qualified to know if this is all that exists, so I would leave such as an open belief. And as pointed out no doubt, the universe is extremely large (and possibly pointless) for one life form to exist that apparently has the answers as to why and how we came to be here. Me, I am not so adoring of the human race to think we have any such answers yet.

Good call.

Oh, I think we are a long way from having answers to most of the really big questions - it’s our capacity to ask those questions which makes us so marvellous, so awesome, so incredible. We are the universe become conscious, looking out at itself from within.

 

[lincoy3304]

I try to approach Pascal's Wager differently.
I start with the question, what is the maximal good action or course of action we can take? When we go down that route, it seems that a maximally good action that could be performed by a human being has 5 separate properties: (1) maximal length of the impact, (2) maximal impact on the human being performing the action, (3) impact on a maximal amount of people, (4) maximal impact on nature, and obviously (5) is morally good.
We could debate on whether these properties are what fill the criteria of utility, but (5) seems to be the only objectionable one. (5) also includes various considerations such as the intention, conscience, and circumstances of the person performing the action.
When we get these 5 properties of the goodness of the maximally good, we can ask what the maximal action is.
This will depend on your worldview, but a religious person who believes in an eternal afterlife would have the upper hand here, as choosing the eternal, blissful, and wonderful afterlife satisfies these conditions better than choosing the maximally great action in an atheistic worldview.
However, it also seems ethically intuitive that in situations where the potential utility of doing an action is proportionally greater than the potential utility of refraining from the action, we are called to perform the proportionally greater action. Some may object by saying that there isn't a way to measure the utility of an action, but I just offered 4 categories that would measure the utility of the action. (5) is a yes or no option, so that must be fulfilled for an action to have utility. Exclude the maximal qualifiers of each, and the listed qualities are suitable for ways of measuring utility.
Some may object and say that splitting utility up into categories doesn't answer that question. These categories of utility are qualitative, not quantitative, so we can approach debates on the utility of actions through asking how actions must fulfill this criteria. To strengthen the possibility of measuring utility, we could add a fifth category--"The action must fill categories (1)-(4) greater than rival actions to be considered of better utility."
Although we may not be able to quantify these categories, it seems plausible that utility can be measurable.
Now, how can we decipher what the action with the most utility could be? This comes down to an epistemological consideration. One could say that being an atheist could fulfill those categories, but they would have a hard time doing so. Here, various arguments for and against different worldviews need to be brought up. Recall that (5) requires that the action be moral, which includes the intention of the person acting. The utility of an action also must here be distinguished between believed utility and actual utility. The actual utility is what we hope to achieve when performing the believed utility. The believed utility may or may not be greater than the actual utility, in that we identify the wrong action of greatest utility, believe the action to have different levels of fulfillment of the actual criteria of the action, or conjoin those two. We cannot guarantee what the actual utility is, but we can aspire to achieve acting for the greatest actual utility. This requires us to be epistemologically honest with what is the greatest possible action, as we must perform the greatest believed utility action. To rationally believe something requires justification. Simply saying "Action x could bring maximal utility," is not sufficient. One would need to provide a justification for that statement that surpasses the justification of, say, Action y.
From here, we can consider various hypotheses on what the greatest action of utility could be. Put forth your own!

(I'll be coming back to edit this, but I already recognize one thing that must be explained further - Should we perform actions that give more utility even though they may seem irrational? I have a deeper understanding of this question, but I do not have enough time tonight to finish my response to that. Let me just say for now that the answer is not yes or no.)

 

[Polymath257]

I try to approach Pascal's Wager differently.
I start with the question, what is the maximal good action or course of action we can take? When we go down that route, it seems that a maximally good action that could be performed by a human being has 5 separate properties: (1) maximal length of the impact, (2) maximal impact on the human being performing the action, (3) impact on a maximal amount of people, (4) maximal impact on nature, and obviously (5) is morally good.
We could debate on whether these properties are what fill the criteria of utility, but (5) seems to be the only objectionable one. (5) also includes various considerations such as the intention, conscience, and circumstances of the person performing the action.

I have often found that philosophers would do well to learn a bit of mathematics. In this case, learning about partial orders would be an immense help. In particular, the distinction between maximal and largest is relevant here. Something is maximal if there is nothing greater. It is largest is everything else is smaller.

The difference is when there are things that are simply not comparable. In this case, there can be multiple maximal elements and no largest.

Of the criteria you give, 1 and 3 are well defined, given that there is a number that can be associated to determine greater than or less than. In technical terms, the numbers are linearly ordered and so a greatest element of a finite set always exists.

But even there, it is far from clear that mere length of the utility is the best measure as opposed to, say, the cumulative utility (maybe utility is not added evenly over time).

But when it comes to 2 and 4 it is far from clear how to compare many possibilities. And means that there may well be maximal elements that are quite small and there may not be a largest at all. So, exactly how to you define 'impact' and how do you compare impacts of different actions? What makes you think there *are* maximal impacts?

And this doesn't even address the possibility that a maximum for one criterion might exclude maxima for other criteria. Maybe the maximal length of impact will not be a maximum on the impact on nature, for example.

When we get these 5 properties of the goodness of the maximally good, we can ask what the maximal action is.

Assuming there is only one and that we can choose between different maximal actions, even if an order is defined.

This will depend on your worldview, but a religious person who believes in an eternal afterlife would have the upper hand here, as choosing the eternal, blissful, and wonderful afterlife satisfies these conditions better than choosing the maximally great action in an atheistic worldview.

Only if such an afterlife actually exists. If not, then an atheistic world view might both be more true and more useful.

However, it also seems ethically intuitive that in situations where the potential utility of doing an action is proportionally greater than the potential utility of refraining from the action, we are called to perform the proportionally greater action. Some may object by saying that there isn't a way to measure the utility of an action, but I just offered 4 categories that would measure the utility of the action. (5) is a yes or no option, so that must be fulfilled for an action to have utility. Exclude the maximal qualifiers of each, and the listed qualities are suitable for ways of measuring utility.

And only two of those have actual measurements to be taken.

Some may object and say that splitting utility up into categories doesn't answer that question. These categories of utility are qualitative, not quantitative, so we can approach debates on the utility of actions through asking how actions must fulfill this criteria. To strengthen the possibility of measuring utility, we could add a fifth category--"The action must fill categories (1)-(4) greater than rival actions to be considered of better utility."

And what happens if all 4 cannot be satisfied simultaneously? Which can be dispensed with?

Although we may not be able to quantify these categories, it seems plausible that utility can be measurable.

I find it rather unlikely.

Now, how can we decipher what the action with the most utility could be? This comes down to an epistemological consideration. One could say that being an atheist could fulfill those categories, but they would have a hard time doing so. Here, various arguments for and against different worldviews need to be brought up.

Hmmm...are we now looking at utility of worldviews? Is their truth of any matter? Must truth always be useful?

Recall that (5) requires that the action be moral, which includes the intention of the person acting. The utility of an action also must here be distinguished between believed utility and actual utility. The actual utility is what we hope to achieve when performing the believed utility. The believed utility may or may not be greater than the actual utility, in that we identify the wrong action of greatest utility, believe the action to have different levels of fulfillment of the actual criteria of the action, or conjoin those two. We cannot guarantee what the actual utility is, but we can aspire to achieve acting for the greatest actual utility.

Again, there is a difference between maximal and greatest. For finite sets, maximal elements will exist, but those might not be comparable and hence not greatest.

This requires us to be epistemologically honest with what is the greatest possible action, as we must perform the greatest believed utility action. To rationally believe something requires justification. Simply saying "Action x could bring maximal utility," is not sufficient. One would need to provide a justification for that statement that surpasses the justification of, say, Action y.
From here, we can consider various hypotheses on what the greatest action of utility could be. Put forth your own!

(I'll be coming back to edit this, but I already recognize one thing that must be explained further - Should we perform actions that give more utility even though they may seem irrational? I have a deeper understanding of this question, but I do not have enough time tonight to finish my response to that. Let me just say for now that the answer is not yes or no.)

 

[joelr]

I won't preface this with anything, other than the fact that this discussion was genuinely interesting to me, and is one of the few discussions that I have seen where the theist actually made me think. I don't think it's at all likely that any gods exist, but perhaps Dr. Jackson made a good argument for religious participation in the religion one sees to be most probable.

What does she find most probable and why?