Any Arguments by which to Conclude that Consciousness Is a Product of Brains?

[Evangelicalhumanist]

there is just no amount or complexity of neuronal electrical activity that logically produces mental phenomena.

You said that -- and if it does not come from neural processes, then either it doesn't exist, or it has another source.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

It proves that you are unable to argue for your religion.

No, it proves that the majority of people actually doing the hard work of study in this area are ever more rapidly converging around brain-generated consciousness. It's just not settled science yet because there are still unknowns. But unknowns remain unknown -- you don't get to claim that something which is unknown or incompletely understood therefore isn't -- which is what you do.

 

[Nous]

there is just no amount or complexity of neuronal electrical activity that logically produces mental phenomena.

You said that -- and if it does not come from neural processes, then either it doesn't exist, or it has another source.

I did state that proposition. So you can show that it is false? Be sure to cite your sources.

 

[Nous]

No, it proves that the majority of people actually doing the hard work of study in this area are ever more rapidly converging around brain-generated consciousness.

They're converging? Do they have an argument? If so, you should use it here.

 

[lostwanderingsoul]

After years of research I have never found a person who was conscious and did not have a brain.

 

[Nous]

After years of research I have never found a person who was conscious and did not have a brain.

What research are you referring to that tested any such hypothesis? How was it tested?

 

[lostwanderingsoul]

Every person I spoke to was conscious and they assured me they had a brain.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

They're converging? Do they have an argument? If so, you should use it here.

Read them for yourself. Darned if I'm going to do the work for you:

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[Evangelicalhumanist]

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[Evangelicalhumanist]

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[Nous]

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Gennaro, R.J. “Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness.” In Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32: 293-330, 2002.

Gennaro, R.J. “Higher-Order Thoughts, Animal Consciousness, and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Carruthers and Levine,” 2004. In Gennaro 2004a.

Gennaro, R.J., ed. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2004a.

Gennaro, R.J. “The HOT Theory of Consciousness: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?” In Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2): 3-21, 2005.

Gennaro, R.J. “Between Pure Self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT Theory of Consciousness.” In Kriegel and Williford 2006.

Gennaro, R.J. “Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts.” In R. Lurz ed. Philosophy of Animal Minds. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Gennaro, R.J. The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012.

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Guzeldere, G. “Is Consciousness the Perception of what passes in one’s own Mind?” In Metzinger 1995.

Hameroff, S. "Quantum Computation in Brain Microtubules? The Pemose-Hameroff "Orch OR" Model of Consciousness." In Philosophical Transactions Royal Society London A 356:1869-96, 1998.

Hardin, C. Color for Philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986.

Harman, G. "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience." In J. Tomberlin, ed. Philosophical Perspectives, 4. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, 1990.

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Hill, C. S. "Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem." In Philosophical Studies 87: 61-85, 1997.

Hill, C. and McLaughlin, B. "There are fewer things in Reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers' Philosophy." In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 445-54, 1998.

Hirstein, W. Brain Fiction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.

Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality." In Chalmers 2002.

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Jackson, F. "Epiphenomenal Qualia." In Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-136, 1982.

Jackson, F. "What Mary didn't Know." In Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-5, 1986.

James, W. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt& Company, 1890.

Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by N. Kemp Smith. New York: MacMillan, 1965.

Keenan, J., Gallup, G., and Falk, D. The Face in the Mirror. New York: HarperCollins, 2003.

Kim, J. "The Myth of Non-Reductive Physicalism." In Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1987.

Kim, J. Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Kim, J. Mind in Physical World. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.

Kind, A. “What’s so Transparent about Transparency?” In Philosophical Studies 115: 225-244, 2003.

Kirk, R. Raw Feeling. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Kirk, R. Zombies and Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Kitcher, P. Kant’s Transcendental Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Kobes, B. “Telic Higher-Order Thoughts and Moore’s Paradox.” In Philosophical Perspectives 9: 291-312, 1995.

Koch, C. The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood, CO: Roberts and Company, 2004.

Kriegel, U. “PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.” In Philosophical Psychology 15: 55-64, 2002.

Kriegel, U. “Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles.” In Synthese 134: 477-504, 2003a.

Kriegel, U. “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.” In Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33: 103-132, 2003b.

Kriegel, U. “Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.” In The Monist 87: 182-205, 2004.

Kriegel, U. “Naturalizing Subjective Character.” In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.

Kriegel, U. “The Same Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.” In Kriegel and Williford 2006.

Kriegel, U. Subjective Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Kriegel, U. & Williford, K. Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.

Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.

Leibniz, G. W. Discourse on Metaphysics. Translated by D. Garber and R. Ariew. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1686/1991.

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Levine, J. "Materialism and Qualia: the Explanatory Gap." In Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64,354-361, 1983.

Levine, J. "On Leaving out what it's like." In M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds. Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

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Lurz, R. “Neither HOT nor COLD: An Alternative Account of Consciousness.” In Psyche 9, 2003.

Lurz, R. “Either FOR or HOR: A False Dichotomy.” In Gennaro 2004a.

Lycan, W.G. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.

Lycan, W.G. “A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness.” Analysis 61: 3-4, 2001.

Lycan, W.G. "The Superiority of HOP to HOT." In Gennaro 2004a.

Have you read any of these books, papers or chapters? Such as:

Chalmers, D.J. "Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness." In Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:200-19, 1995.

Chalmers, D.J. The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Chalmers, D.J. “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?” In Metzinger 2000.

or:

Seager, W. “A Cold Look at HOT Theory.” In Gennaro 2004a.

?

If so, tell us what Chalmers and Seager's argue.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

Those were all citations from a major article arguing the following: "Some form of materialism is probably much more widely held today than in centuries past. No doubt part of the reason for this has to do with the explosion in scientific knowledge about the workings of the brain and its intimate connection with consciousness, including the close connection between brain damage and various states of consciousness. Brain death is now the main criterion for when someone dies. Stimulation to specific areas of the brain results in modality specific conscious experiences. Indeed, materialism often seems to be a working assumption in neurophysiology. Imagine saying to a neuroscientist “you are not really studying the conscious mind itself” when she is examining the workings of the brain during an fMRI. The idea is that science is showing us that conscious mental states, such as visual perceptions, are simply identical with certain neuro-chemical brain processes; much like the science of chemistry taught us that water just is H2O."

Author Rocco J. Gennaro
University of Southern Indiana
U. S. A.

 

[Nous]

Those were all citations from a major article arguing the following: "Some form of materialism is probably much more widely held today than in centuries past. No doubt part of the reason for this has to do with the explosion in scientific knowledge about the workings of the brain and its intimate connection with consciousness, including the close connection between brain damage and various states of consciousness. Brain death is now the main criterion for when someone dies. Stimulation to specific areas of the brain results in modality specific conscious experiences. Indeed, materialism often seems to be a working assumption in neurophysiology. Imagine saying to a neuroscientist “you are not really studying the conscious mind itself” when she is examining the workings of the brain during an fMRI. The idea is that science is showing us that conscious mental states, such as visual perceptions, are simply identical with certain neuro-chemical brain processes; much like the science of chemistry taught us that water just is H2O."

Author Rocco J. Gennaro
University of Southern Indiana
U. S. A.

Argumentum ad populum?

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

Have you read any of these books, papers or chapters? Such as:

Chalmers, D.J. "Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness." In Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:200-19, 1995.

Chalmers, D.J. The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Chalmers, D.J. “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?” In Metzinger 2000.

or:

Seager, W. “A Cold Look at HOT Theory.” In Gennaro 2004a.

?

If so, tell us what Chalmers and Seager's argue.

You gave me 2 names out of hundreds. I said "converging," did I not? Would that not have suggested I'm already aware that some disagree? I take it your two are the only ones you are going to count? And by the way, you'd be surprised how much (including Chalmers) I have read on the subject.

 

[Nous]

You gave me 2 names out of hundreds. I said "converging," did I not? Would that not have suggested I'm already aware that some disagree? I take it your two are the only ones you are going to count? And by the way, you'd be surprised how much (including Chalmers) I have read on the subject.

If you know what Chalmers argues, then tell us.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

If you know what Chalmers argues, then tell us.

And I must ask again -- why only Chalmers? Why not Bernard Baars or Susan Blackmore? Why not Boyd or Crick/Koch or Robert Gennaro or V.S. Ramachandran or Oliver Sacks -- or even Daniel Dennett?

Is it because Chalmers, with his very catchy "the hard problem of consciousness" supports your view and that's all you wish to hear about?

Okay, Chalmers, like Joseph Levine, are worried about what Levine calls "the explanatory gap", in our ability to explain the connection between phenomenal properties and brain properties," or Chalmers expresses as "How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience and emotion?"

Well, yes, that's the "hard problem" all right. But notice that neither Chalmers nor Levine says "therefore, consciousness ain't brain stuff, it's something else." They stick with "it's an unresolved (hard) problem."

And that it is. But just because a problem is hard does not mean you get to dismiss it. It's the same with quantum mechanics, when we explain that in its "particle nature" (as opposed to its simultaneous wave nature) an electron travelling through the double slits all by itself actually is in 2 places at once, and therefore gets to "interfere with itself." It's about impossible to visualize -- and yet the experiments show it to be true, in some way that defeats the best of us to truly explain.

And that's why the real thinkers in consciousness are "converging" on materialism -- while we can't visualize how it works (yet), the experimental evidence from thousands upon thousands of observations locates all consciousness in the brain, and also demonstrates how changes in the brain change consciousness. That's pretty suggestive, for most researchers.

 

[Nous]

And I must ask again -- why only Chalmers?

I already asked that once?

One might get the impression that you think that there is must be something illogical about Chalmers' arguments.

I asked you if there are any arguments by which people have "converged" on the proposition that consciousness is created by brains. Yet all you done so far is give a list of books and chapters from which you haven't been able to extrapolate an argument.

The challenge in the OP was not whether one can copy and paste someone else's bibliography.

Well, yes, that's the "hard problem" all right. But notice that neither Chalmers nor Levine says "therefore, consciousness ain't brain stuff, it's something else."

As I recall, Chalmers proposes a form of panpsychism, which means that consciousness or something experiential is a fundamental constituent of the universe.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

I already asked that once?

No, but you restricted yourself to just 2 names out of hundreds. And now [you've narrowed the list further, to just 1.

One might get the impression that you think that there is must be something illogical about Chalmers' arguments.

No, I just don't think that they are definitive, and thus the only arguments that anybody should consider.

I asked you if there are any arguments by which people have "converged" on the proposition that consciousness is created by brains. Yet all you done so far is give a list of books and chapters from which you haven't been able to extrapolate an argument.

I find it hard to believe you cannot understand how I can't do what you demand here. The subject is simply too big. With the help of really, really good editors (and I need at least 6 editors to help me say "hello" in under 20 words), encyclopedia's get this subject down to perhaps 30,000 words -- and I'm allowed a lot fewer than that.

But I also point out that you have provided no arguments for your own statement that "there is just no amount or complexity of neuronal electrical activity that logically produces mental phenomena." Why are you holding me to a higher standard?

As I recall, Chalmers proposes a form of panpsychism, which means that consciousness or something experiential is a fundamental constituent of the universe.

Then you may also recall 2 other points: that Chalmers maintains an "official" stance of agnosticism about that (and it's panprotopsychism, by the way), and also openly acknowledges that in this, he is at odds with most of his contemporaries. And further, he basis a large part of that thinking on the "zombie" hypothesis, which a lot of researchers are now rejecting as silly. (See Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia)

 

[Nous]

I find it hard to believe you cannot understand how I can't do what you demand here. The subject is simply too big. With the help of really, really good editors (and I need at least 6 editors to help me say "hello" in under 20 words), encyclopedia's get this subject down to perhaps 30,000 words -- and I'm allowed a lot fewer than that.

If there were an argument that concludes that the various phenomena of consciousness are created by something happening in brains, then someone would have to eventually articulate it. E.g., eventually there would have to be evidence that my ability to choose to say that I will copy and paste some Chinese phrase on this thread tomorrow, and to then accomplish that feat, is somehow a logical product of the activity of cells, proteins, electricity, etc. You apparently want to believe (and want others to believe) that there is something rational in that idea, yet you can't even give us the first hint of any such evidence or argument.

But I also point out that you have provided no arguments for your own statement that "there is just no amount or complexity of neuronal electrical activity that logically produces mental phenomena." Why are you holding me to a higher standard?

Mine is a negative statement. All I could do is to provide every jot of information on "amount" of neuronal electrical activity and what are the products of "complexity". But I have every reason to believe that if there were such a conclusion about the creation of consciousness from such factors as "amount" and "complexity" of neuronal electrical activity, someone more capable than I would have already made it.

Making my negative statement is not holding you to a different standard. You are free to acknowledge what I have just acknowledged.

Then you may also recall 2 other points: that Chalmers maintains an "official" stance of agnosticism about that (and it's panprotopsychism, by the way), and also openly acknowledges that in this, he is at odds with most of his contemporaries.

You definitely seem to believe that there is some validity to argumentum ad populum.

 

[idav]

You haven't been able to account for the facts of people having complex, coherent experiences, engaging in logical thought processes, forming memories, and having veridical perceptions not gotten through their sense organs during clinical death, or for the evidence of anomalous cognition. Right?

You just ignore all the evidence that contradicts your religion.

No I gave you plenty of citations on those aspects of the brain. I'm not ignoring the "hard" problem, I simply think it's over rated. Certainly the brain is the most complex machine we have come across but it's still just a machine, a consiousness generating machine for use of organism viability.