Any Arguments by which to Conclude that Consciousness Is a Product of Brains?

[siti]

I don't know any reason to consider chemotaxis among bacteria to be any more volitional than phototropism among plants is. Do you? I am unaware of any fact by which to conclude that either chemotaxis or phototropism are voluntary activities for an organism or involve the organism choosing between options.

I'm not sure in what way you might be proposing that electrochemical reactions might be connected to volition. Perhaps you can explain it.

The fact is that, while volition or free will is the ability to choose between available options, I'm unsure how to distinguish it from mere random behavior in the absence of some kind of awareness of what the consequences of one's decision may entail. Humans (and, I think, other animals) have such awareness. I am hard pressed to understand how a bacterium or plant has such awareness.

Obviously 'volition' is the wrong word - so is 'awareness', so is 'consciousness'...etc. But it is in some sense a 'choice' or 'selection' of activity from an array of potential activities based on sensory perception and mediated by electrochemical signalling. We might say 'they have no choice' - but in the absence of a selective process they would simply meander or wave around randomly - but this is not what happens. Like us, plants and bacteria 'relate to' or 'experience' their world and 'act' accordingly - the difference between them and us, I am suggesting, is the complexity of the relationship, rather than a fundamental categorical difference. Its not, I don't think, the case that consciousness exists out there in the world and we tap into it (that would be very difficult to explain and I don't see the point in having an unsubstantiated explanation that itself is even more intractable than the problem we are trying to explain by means of it), rather we tap into the world through our complex physico-chemical connection to it and generate consciousness as a result. By exactly what mechanism, I don't know - but I am guessing that electrochemistry plays a very significant role.

 

[Nous]

In the entire history of mankind there has never once been an example of consciousness existing without a brain.

The OPs here provide several well verified examples of complex, coherent experiences, formation of memories, logical thought processes and veridical perceptions from an out-of-body experience at a time when a person did not have a functioning brain: Do Realistic Interpretations of NDEs Imply Violation of the Laws of Physics?

Insofar as accounting for these for the production of these experiences, memory formation, logical thought processes and veridical perceptions, "no brain" and "no functioning brain" are equivalent.

[/quote]Oh, and who ever told you that energy can NOT be detected?[/quote]Wow. What does energy look like when it's detected? What instrument detected it? Be sure to cite your sources.

 

[Nous]

Well, not JUST brains, there are also sensory organs involved.

But hey, if you find it more reasonable to believe magical eternal energy beings that can't be detected wear us like a flesh suit while awaiting passage to an eternity of constantly reminding an even bigger energy being how great he is, and THAT is indeed why we are animate, you go right ahead.

The questions the OP asked are: So what are any arguments that something in the brain produces consciousness? and: Is there any logical or empirical reason to dispute that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon (like energy)?

So am I correct that your answers are "None" and "No"?

 

[Nous]

Obviously 'volition' is the wrong word - so is 'awareness', so is 'consciousness'...etc. But it is in some sense a 'choice' or 'selection' of activity from an array of potential activities based on sensory perception and mediated by electrochemical signalling. We might say 'they have no choice' - but in the absence of a selective process they would simply meander or wave around randomly - but this is not what happens.

Does this not imply that that when a hydrogen gas and simple oxygen gas meet, they are choosing to form H2O?

I don't think they have a choice. I see no reason to suggest that bacteria that perform chemotaxis have a choice in their movements. I don't think that plants engaging in phototropism have a choice in their movements.

 

[siti]

Does this not imply that that when a hydrogen gas and simple oxygen gas meet, they are choosing to form H2O?

We're getting bogged down in semantics - I used 'choice' in inverted commas because I was trying to avoid repeating the mistake I made confusing it with 'volition'. But in a sense I think 'they' do 'choose' to form the molecule because that is what it is in 'their' nature to do. And forming complex neural networks that have the computational ability to predict with some accuracy what might happen in the future to guide our (human) volition is what it is in the nature of brain cells to do. But its still all electrochemistry fundamentally.

What's the alternative - that the 'choice' (of atoms forming a molecule, plants waving to the sun and humans having thoughts) is all in the 'consciousness' of the universe? How is this an explanation at all - let alone a satisfactory one.

 

[Satans_Serrated_Edge]

The questions the OP asked are: So what are any arguments that something in the brain produces consciousness? and: Is there any logical or empirical reason to dispute that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon (like energy)?

So am I correct that your answers are "None" and "No"?

Sure, there are lots of arguments, not that you are able to accept any of them. How about brain damage, Alzheimer's, or hallucinogenic drugs? There's 3. All of which alter the brain thereby altering consciousness.

Secondly, energy is simply the ability to do work, not some unified phenomenon, but even if it was we have no evidence, anywhere, of brain free consciousness, so the question itself doesn't seem too relevant.

 

[Nous]

We're getting bogged down in semantics - I used 'choice' in inverted commas because I was trying to avoid repeating the mistake I made confusing it with 'volition'. But in a sense I think 'they' do 'choose' to form the molecule because that is what it is in 'their' nature to do. And forming complex neural networks that have the computational ability to predict with some accuracy what might happen in the future to guide our (human) volition is what it is in the nature of brain cells to do. But its still all electrochemistry fundamentally.

What's the alternative - that the 'choice' (of atoms forming a molecule, plants waving to the sun and humans having thoughts) is all in the 'consciousness' of the universe? How is this an explanation at all - let alone a satisfactory one.

I would assume that chemotaxis and phototropism are reducible to chemical reactions occurring in the organisms, and that chemistry is reducible to quantum mechanics--which doesn't account for the ability that humans (and presumably some other animals) have to choose between available options (i.e., the willful choosing between available options does not reduce to quantum mechanics).

The first part of that sentence before the dashes does not, as far as I can tell, rule out consciousness as a fundamental phenomenon. I.e., the proposition that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon does not entail that every movement of every organism is a voluntary or willful act.

(Does any of that answer your question?)

 

[Nous]

Sure, there are lots of arguments, not that you are able to accept any of them. How about brain damage, Alzheimer's, or hallucinogenic drugs? There's 3.

Your question, "How about brain damage, Alzheimer's, or hallucinogenic drugs?" is not even one argument, much less three.

If you don't know how to make a deduction, just say so. You won't be able to answer the questions of the OP.

Secondly, energy is simply the ability to do work, not some unified phenomenon

I don't know what you mean by "energy is . . . not some unified phenomenon." What's not "unified" about the capacity to do work?

we have no evidence, anywhere, of brain free consciousness

Several examples of people having complex, coherent experiences, forming memories, engaging in logical thought processes and veridical perceptions from an out-of-body perspective during clinical death are noted in the OPs here: Do Realistic Interpretations of NDEs Imply Violation of the Laws of Physics?

These experiences, thought processes, memories and perceptions are not accounted for as products of a functioning brain since the people did not have functioning brains during (or immediately after resuscitation from) clinical death.

so the question itself doesn't seem too relevant.

My second question in the OP here is relevant to the first question in that if one were able to provide an argument in answer the first question, the answer to the second would probably be "yes".

 

[siti]

the willful choosing between available options does not reduce to quantum mechanics

Doesn't it? I mean we really don't know that do we? And in fact, it seems that far-from-equilibrium (highly ordered) systems (like living cells) are able to impose sufficient order on chemistry (akin to what happens when you cool stuff down to extremely low temp) so that the quantum effects (tunneling, entanglement...???) that we can normally ignore at macro levels of reality (in experiments for example) become significant factors in biological functions. Its still an emerging field, but work has been done to investigate possible quantum mechanical explanations of certain aspects of enzyme activity in cells, the process of photosynthesis and even the navigational abilities of migratory birds and insects (see here for example). Anyway, my point is that I think it is far too early to rule out a naturalistic explanation of consciousness based on electrochemistry and quantum mechanics.

That's science and we are nowhere near a conclusion IMO. Philosophically, I see no reason to divorce consciousness and volition from the spectrum of electrochemically-mediated sensory relationships that connect all living things to the wider universe in which they are immersed. That's what I call panexperientialism - and it runs even deeper than biological systems - even fundamental particles are connected to their world and 'act' accordingly. But there's probably nothing fundamentally mysterious about it - in the end its all just physics. And creative evolution.

 

[Satans_Serrated_Edge]

Your question, "How about brain damage, Alzheimer's, or hallucinogenic drugs?" is not even one argument, much less three.

If you don't know how to make a deduction, just say so. You won't be able to answer the questions of the OP.
I don't know what you mean by "energy is . . . not some unified phenomenon." What's not "unified" about the capacity to do work?

Several examples of people having complex, coherent experiences, forming memories, engaging in logical thought processes and veridical perceptions from an out-of-body perspective during clinical death are noted in the OPs here: Do Realistic Interpretations of NDEs Imply Violation of the Laws of Physics?

These experiences, thought processes, memories and perceptions are not accounted for as products of a functioning brain since the people did not have functioning brains during (or immediately after resuscitation from) clinical death.

My second question in the OP here is relevant to the first question in that if one were able to provide an argument in answer the first question, the answer to the second would probably be "yes".

As I suspected, I am wasting my time.

 

[Falvlun]

I certainly didn't conflate any terms that I didn't use. I didn't use either "cardiac death" (what's that? "clinical death"?) or "brain dead". Nothing I said implies that clinical death is anything other than clinical death:

Clinical death is the medical term for cessation of blood circulation and breathing, the two necessary criteria to sustain human and many other organisms' lives.[1]

[. . .]

At the onset of clinical death, consciousness is lost within several seconds. Measurable brain activity stops within 20 to 40 seconds.[2]​

Clinical death - Wikipedia

Perhaps you didn't, but it appears that both the Parnell and Van Lommel studies were on people experiencing cardiac arrest. People in cardiac arrest are not brain dead. Unconsciousness does not mean the brain is completely non-functioning.

Also, your wall of texts are very off-putting. Your subject is interesting. But if you could be more concise it might help your cause.

 

[idav]

I agree with your statement that "we are actually experiencing a little after an actual event occurs." And what you have quoted sounds reasonable. None of it helps to substantiate your premise, "Consciousness is dependent on memory."

I don't have a clue as to how memory could possibly be primary to consciousness. As far as I know, one can only remember something that one is first conscious of.

Saying dependent on something and saying its primary are two different things. Its more saying consciousness would not work without memory, but there are more than just memory that can possibly hinder consciousness, like the brain being able to process input for example is highly necessary but only further substantiates the premise.

 

[HonestJoe]

Dr. Rudy said that his patient had not had a heart beat or blood pressure for more than 20 minutes. That isn't a "brief period of clincal death". That's why Dr. Rudy declared him dead.

That doesn’t mean zero brain activity for the full 20 minutes and is still relatively brief in the context of a long surgical procedure.

(1) Pam Reynolds' eyes were taped shut when, according to the surgeon, the surgical saw and tray of interchangeable blades were brought out. Dr. Rudy's patient's eyes were closed and most likely taped closed, according to Dr. Amado-Cattaneo. I asked you to account for their perceptions. You have not done so. Even with a brain full of electricity, you cannot close your eyes and see the back of your head, can you?

That would require getting in to exactly what the patients reported and how the reporting, recording and later validation of those experiences were managed. The problem with these cases is that they come up in normal practice so aren’t (and can’t be expected to be) managed in a structured scientific manner.

It’s a difficult area for various reasons but there are formal experiments to try to get better quality data on these experiences, like ones where they have images printed on high shelves in operating theatres so if anyone reports a NDE or out-of-body experience, they can be asked about that. As far as I’m aware, these experiments remain inconclusive.

Quote exactly what Dr. Parnia says in that paper that you claim "seems to be a combination of wishful thinking and guesswork.."

In hindsight I think I was unfair to him, putting too much credit in the context you’re quoting him in. I don’t think he is actually saying what you’d like to believe he’s saying. He is saying that there are lots of aspects here we don’t yet understand and these extreme cases can be a basis for further study. My only concern would be in using extreme cases to reach conclusions about normal events and the one thing we are clear on here is that the mind of these patients is behaving differently to how it does in normal circumstances.

So you acknowledge that you cannot account for phenomena of NDEs noted here from any fact?

I acknowledge that nobody (not even you) can account for the phenomena. The only definitive statements I’m making is that the assertion these phenomena could never be explained by mental activity exclusively within the brain is wrong and that asserting the possibility of something other than that being involved is a non-starter without some structured hypothesis and evidence of what that could be.

 

[FearGod]

I've stated precisely what your silly claims imply: "If it measures the environment in some way and reacts as such, that would constitute "conscious" in my book." Thermostats measure the environment. Therefore thermostats are conscious in your book.

Your silly claims are definitely not found in any scholarly literature.

Then act like one.

Does the thermostat feel and know about the environment?
I think you should realize that the plant is a living thing and not a device.

 

[FearGod]

BTW, does a plant have consciousness? According to a recent article in Scientific American, there's evidence that it does.

And it doesn't have a brain.

 

[metis]

Does the thermostat feel and know about the environment?

I guess that depends on how one would use the word "feel"?

With a plant, it is intrinsic within the plant itself. OTOH, a thermostat is simply programmed from an external source-- us.

I think you should realize that the plant is a living thing and not a device.

Oh gee, why didn't they teach me that in those biology classes I took in college?!

 

[FearGod]

I guess that depends on how one would use the word "feel"?

With a plant, it is intrinsic within the plant itself. OTOH, a thermostat is simply programmed from an external source-- us.

Yes of course, hope @Nous realizes that.

 

[dust1n]

You "don't really believe in 'free will'"? Does that mean you kind of "believe in free will"?

No, it means I don't believe in free will.

What is there about "free will" to believe in?

I don't know. People who assert its existence claim it entails all sorts of things. I've never seen anyone enumerate a sound deductive argument indicating I should take any of it seriously, so...

Do you or do you not believe that you have the ability to choose to assert a true proposition rather than a false one?

Correct. Validity is a function of a system of rules and statements. A proposition is a proposition... just that. The premises one uses to arrive a proposition is a determination of its truth value. Truth is a function of the human mind in evaluating information... not an ontological descriptor of propositions.

So no, I don't have the ability to choose to assert a true proposition rather than a false one, because any assertion I make is true or false only given a certain set of assumed conditions in which things are being proposed. Doing so would require absolute certainty, for which there is none, because all deductive arguments arrive at legitimate conclusions from assumed conditions.

E.g., do you or do you not have the ability to choose to assert (a) "Donald Trump was sworn in as President of the US in January 2017," rather than (b) "Justin Trudeau was sworn in as President of the US in January 2017"?

I have the ability to assert that either or neither or both of those things are true. I just fail to see how any such assertion isn't derived from a physical state that a brain is in (as opposed to some decision entirely free from the shackles of the empirical world, despite the fact all my sensory inputs are mediating by physical organs in my body.)

What you have proven here is that you apparently don't know how to make a deduction. The term "dualism," which occurs in your "conclusion," does not occur in any premise.

If you become able to state a deduction (a logical argument) that concludes that consciousness (intentions, beliefs, awareness, free will, etc.) is produced by brains, please do so. I would be most interested in reading it.

Lol, your objection to a sloppy argument I wrote in a morning before going to work is that I didn't explicitly define "dualism" for you.

Well, if you most know, I was using it interchangeably with whatever this is supposed to mean:

"Is there any logical or empirical reason to dispute that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon (like energy)?"

A "fundamental phenomenon" doesn't have any explicit meaning as far as I am aware of. Maybe you should define specifically what you mean by this so I can adjustment my argument further.

The phenomenon of changing the brain as a result of willful effort is really no more (or less) mysterious than changing one's weight by willful effort. It's the willful acts that are unaccounted for by any known mechanics.

Except the idea of someone changing one's weight by willful effort isn't really that unaccounted for. People don't decide to "lose weight" in a bubble. They already have perceptions of what it means to be fat and skinny. They already have values embedded in their brain from years of associates with weight and self-perception. The physical alteration the brain by thoughts doesn't prove or even suggest that those thoughts responsible for the change themselves didn't arise from the brain.

For instance, agreeing to perform a particular act or set of acts--such as paying a mortgage company a certain amount of money by a certain date each month--is quite common. People can and do say that they will perform such a series of acts for 30 years, and 30 years later have done exactly what they said they would do.

There are 2 possible ways to account for these acts that people promise to perform far into the future and then fulfill: Those are either willful acts or they are involuntary bodily movements.

Assumed premise. I see no reason to see why this is the case at all.. it doesn't seem like there are only w possible ways to account for the acts, not do I see either of those accounts as really "accounting" for the act at all.

I say I'm going to eat a pie 30 years from now, and 30 years from now I eat a pie. Just saying that "that was free will" doesn't account for anything, at least no more than saying "he's a biological robot!"

But people can't correctly predict their involuntary bodily movements 30 years into the future.

Computers can correctly predict all sorts of involuntary body movements in will make in the future.
Also, I can correctly predict my involuntary bodily movements 30 years into the future. Assuming I have not died by then, I will take at least 100 breathes, January 7th, 2053. I'll let you know when I'm proven right many years from now.

People can't predict such involuntary bodily movements even hours into the future. People can't accurately predict the day or hour they are going to have a heart attack or stroke. People can't accurately predict the day or hour they are going to have their next headache or hiccup. The only way to explain making and fulfilling their contracts such as writing a check to a mortgage company each month is that those acts each month are willful acts that they can choose to perform and do choose to perform.

Well, if it's a matter of accuracy, no one is capable of determining the specific nanosecond 30 years in the future they are signing a check...

I can't predict the next day or hour I'll have a headache, but I can guess the next month.

"E" in the equation E=mc2 is a quantity.

So is the "m", the "c" and the "^2"... okay?

This equation is literally saying that Mass (I.E. Physical stuff) and Energy can be seen having the same fundamental conserved physical entity...

It is not an object with spatial extent; it has no color. "No one has ever seen or touched energy". The Matter Myth, by Paul Davies and John Gribbin.

It's just a linguistic nonsense statement. Strictly speaking... no one has ever seen or touched anything. Depending on how one goes about defining those terms, it can make so many things metaphorically, and just as many things literally.

But, if "seeing energy" means "electron hits my eyeball, which my eye can detect the frequency of, and then translate that frequency into a specific color."

This is literally radiant energy hitting your eye balls, which your nervous system is capable of transcribing into an image...

I have no idea what else is necessary before one is actually "seeing the energy"

 

[Nous]

the willful choosing between available options does not reduce to quantum mechanics

Doesn't it?

Of course not. Willful acts are no more accounted for by quantum mechanics than they are by Newtonian mechanics. Whether to leave the second mirror in place in the interferometer or remove it, which results in either particle or waves characteristics, is the experimenter's free choice, not determined by the mathematics of the theory. See The Observer in the Quantum Experiment

See also the paper I linked to earlier: Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of mind–brain interaction

The structure of quantum mechanics is such that, although the effect upon the observed system of the agent's choice about how to act is mathematically specified, the manner in which this choice itself is determined is not specified. This means that, in the treatment of experimental data, the choices made by human agents must be treated as freely chosen input variables, rather than as mechanical consequences of any known laws of nature. Quantum theory thereby converts science's concept of us from that of a mechanical automaton, whose conscious choices are mere cogs in a gigantic mechanical machine, to that of agents whose conscious free choices affect the physically described world in a way specified by the theory.​

Anyway, my point is that I think it is far too early to rule out a naturalistic explanation of consciousness based on electrochemistry and quantum mechanics.

Give us that "naturalistic explanation of consciousness [and volition] based on chemistry and QM (the former reduces to the latter). That's what I asked for in the OP.

 

[Nous]

Perhaps you didn't, but it appears that both the Parnell and Van Lommel studies were on people experiencing cardiac arrest. People in cardiac arrest are not brain dead.

So you're still knocking down straw man: "They're not really, really, completely stinking dead!"

Do you dispute this:

Monitoring of the electrical activity of the cortex (EEG) has shown that the first ischemic changes in the EEG are detected an average of 6.5 seconds from the onset of circulatory arrest, and with prolongation of the cerebral ischemia always progression to isoelectricity occurs within 10 to 20 (mean 15) seconds
(De Vries et al., 1998; Clute and Levy, 1990; Losasso et al., 1992; Parnia and Fenwick, 2002).​

?

As far as being able to account for the phenomena of NDEs (complex, coherent experiences, formation of memories, logical thought processes. and veridical perceptions from an out-of-body perspective), "brain dead" (whatever you mean by that) and "clinical death" are equally incapable. If you dispute that, then say so and provide your evidence.

In the Parnia paper I quoted at length above, which apparently bored you, he cites the evidence explaining why peoples' brains are not functioning immediately after resuscitation from clinical death:

Many critically ill patients have recalled lucid, well-structured thought processes together with reasoning and memory formation as well as consciousness from their period of cardiac arrest resuscitation. These vary from images of bright lights and tunnels to the very interesting recollection of actual verified events from their period of resuscitation in which people describe a feeling of separation from their bodies and being able to ‘watch’ themselves, as if from a vantage point above (out of body experience). Although initially largely anecdotal, recently four studies in cardiac arrest survivors have been carried out which have confirmed that 11–20% of cardiac arrest survivors report these experiences [21–24]. Out of body experiences have been reported in approximately 25% of patients who report mental states from during their period of cardiac arrest [22]. These experiences do not appear to be due to changes in serum electrolytes, PaO2 and PaCO2 [21,22]. The consensus of opinion raised by the authors of these studies has been that the occurrence of lucid well-structured thought processes together with reasoning and memory formation as well as an ability to recall detailed accounts of events from the period of resuscitation is a scientific paradox [21–24]. This is due to the fact that the studies of cerebral physiology during cardiac arrest have indicated that cerebral blood flow and cerebral function are severely impaired and therefore consciousness would be expected to be lost.

Immediately following the cardiac arrest, the mean arterial pressure (MAP) becomes immeasurable, however, properly performed chest compressions may raise the systolic values to 60–80 mmHg, but the diastolic values and hence the mean arterial pressure still remains inadequate. [25]. The use of vasopressors such as epinephrine has been shown to increase blood pressure, as well as cardiac and cerebral perfusion pressures [26], but since coronary and cerebral perfusion rely on adequate diastolic pressures the pressures generated during advanced life support, although better than no intervention, are still too low for adequate cerebral perfusion. [. . . ] It has also been shown that during a prolonged cardiac arrest, the intracranial pressure rises and hence a higher mean arterial pressure is needed to maintain cerebral perfusion [27]. These relatively low mean arterial blood pressures are maintained during advanced life support until the resumption of cardiac output [26,27]. In one study of cardiac arrest in cats treated using advanced life support, mean arterial pressure (MAP), intracranial pressure (ICP) and cerebral perfusion pressure (CPP) were measured. It was found that MAP fell from 107 ± 26 to 65 ± 18 after 4 minutes of resuscitation. At the same time, ICP increased from 4 ± 2 to 15 ± 6, while CPP reduced from 101 ± 26 to 31 ± 20 and cerebral blood flow reduced to 39% of baseline [27]. In another study in humans, it was concluded that during the cardiac arrest there was an average of 50% reduction in cerebral blood flow compared to control levels and in some areas of the brain this was reduced further to less than 20% [28]. The EEG is often used to assess cerebral ischaemia during procedures such as cardiac and neurosurgery. Concurrent EEG monitoring during a cardiac arrest has shown an initial slowing of the EEG waves which then progress to an isoelectric line within approximately 10–20 s and remain flat during the cardiac arrest until the resumption of cardiac output [27,30]. In cases of prolonged cardiac arrest, however EEG activity may not return for many tens of minutes after cardiac output has been returned. [29]. Therefore, during cardiac arrest impaired cerebral blood flow leads to a lack of electrophysiological activity in the cortex, which is made worse, as the time from the initial period of ischaemia to adequate resuscitation is increased. A reduction in cerebral blood flow in humans is associated with a deterioration in sustained attention [30].

Immediately after resuscitation there is a period of multifocal no-reflow, a phenomenon observed following recovery from cardiac arrest, in which, despite the restoration of adequate blood pressure multiple areas of the brain have been shown to develop perfusion defects that range from a pin hole, up to 95% of the brain [31]. This is thought to occur due to insufficient restoration of nutritive blood flow due to a combination of increased blood viscosity and perivascular oedema and is related to the initial period of ischaemia. This is followed by a period of transient global hyperaemia lasting 15–30 min, thereafter, cerebral blood flow becomes severely reduced while cerebral metabolic rate of oxygen gradually recovers. This is termed the delayed hypoperfusion phase and is thought to occur due to a disturbed coupling between brain function, metabolism and blood flow [31]. Clinically, these observations are supported by the loss of brainstem reflexes such as the gag reflex that indicate a loss of brainstem function, which normally activates the cortical areas via the thalamus.

Discovering the nature of human consciousness

The occurrence of lucid, well-structured thought processes together with reasoning, attention and memory recall of specific events during a cardiac arrest raise a number of interesting and perplexing questions regarding how such experiences could arise. As seen these experiences appear to be occurring at a time when global cerebral function can at best be described as severely impaired, and at worse non-functional. However, cerebral localisation studies have indicated that the thought processes are mediated through the activation of a number of different cortical areas, rather than single areas of the brain and therefore a globally disordered brain would not be expected to lead to lucid thought processes or the ability to ‘see’ and recall details. This consistent yet paradoxical observation needs to be considered in the search for understanding the relationship between mind, consciousness and the brain. In addition, from a clinical point of view any acute alteration in cerebral physiology such as occurs with a reduction in cerebral blood flow leads to impaired attention and impairment of higher cerebral function [30]. The experiences reported from cardiac arrest are clearly not confusional and in fact indicate heightened awareness, attention, thought processes and consciousness at a time when consciousness and memory formation are not expected to occur.

[. . . ]

Any cerebral insult leads to a period of both anterograde and retrograde amnesia In fact memory is a very sensitive indicator of brain injury and the length of amnesia before and after unconsciousness is a way of determining the severity of the injury. Therefore, events that occur just prior to or just after the loss of consciousness would not be expected to be recalled. At any rate recovery following a cerebral insult is confusional and cerebral function as measured by EEG has in many cases been shown not to return until many tens of minutes or even a few hours after successful resuscitation.​

http://www.newdualism.org/nde-papers/Parnia/Parnia-Medical hypotheses_2007-69-933-937.pdf

Please read and summarize that information for us, especially the underlined sentences.