Any Defenses of Materialism?

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Your inability to state an argument that concludes that physicalism is true has nothing to do with me. Right?

Maybe you weren't paying attention earlier in the thread. Here you go:

No, the materialist position is that if these things exist, they're "material" in some way.

What counts as "material" is constantly changing. "The physical matter that we're all familiar with" once didn't include germs. Or quarks. Or quantum effects. Or radio waves. These are all "material" now.

Once we get enough evidence to substantiate that something actually exists, it gets recognized as "material".

So really, what's within the scope of "materialism" isn't just "the physical matter we're all familiar with"; it's ANYTHING that will ever be recognized as physical.

... and since things are recognized as physical based on how they interact with other physical things, you're really pre-judging future evidence when you declare certain things to be beyond the scope of materialism. What you're really doing by saying this is that physical evidence will never, ever be found for them. This is several steps further than even skeptics go: in the case of skeptics, they're happy to point out that evidence hasn't been found so far .

I think the definition of "materialism" that you're trying to peddle is a rhetorical trick used by people who accept claims without good evidence to cast their critics as closed-minded.

I think that if we're being fair to materialism and non-materialism, the division breaks down like this:

- materialists incorporate facts and ideas into their worldview based on what they're convinced of, and they interpret these facts to all make up one general (and perhaps messy and often counter-intuitive) whole, "the material" (or "the natural").

- non-materialists also incorporate facts and ideas into their worldview based on what they're convinced of, and they interpret these facts to make up two distinct parts of a dichotomy: "the material" and "the immaterial" (or "the natural" and "the supernatural"). Within each of these categories, things may be messy and often counter-intuitive, but there's still a clear divide between what is material and what is immaterial, and both actually exist.

So maybe it's just an aesthetic preference. At the very least, it seems to me that any claim that materialism isn't viable would have to be supported by demonstrating a real divide between "the material" and "the immaterial" in facts that are generally accepted.

Materialism definitely isn't a matter of factual bias, because any "supernatural" claim could be incorporated into a materialist worldview, whether it's ghosts, psychic ability, or the idea that our consciousness resides somewhere other than our brains. With any of these, we're talking about - if the claims are true - real effects that have manifestations in physical effects, so they could be accepted by materialist. The materialists would just presume that the effects are expressions of physical phenomena, and once the phenomena are better understood, the materialist worldview would just expand to accommodate them.

If we're being fair to both sides, then the disagreement between materialists and immaterialists should be like disagreements between biologists about whether two parts of a population form distinct subspecies, or the two "subspecies" are better understood as just examples of variation within a species that should be considered all together.

It isn't really about evidence or which claims a person is going to accept. I think too often, "materialism" is just a label that people with poor standards of evidence put on people who don't accept their claims. It's sour grapes: "he thinks my beliefs are faulty, so there must be something wrong with him."

If two people have the same standards of evidence but one is a materialist and one isn't, they'll both accept the same claims as factual; the only difference is whether they'll categorize those factual claims into one big group or two separate groups. That's it. When a materialist rejects a claim that a non-materialist accepts, it isn't about anything inherent in materialism; it's because the two people have different standards of evidence (or are privy to different information).

 

[Nous]

Maybe you weren't paying attention earlier in the thread. Here you go:

Define "material". Then delineate your premises and conclusion like someone who is able to make a deduction would, like this:

P1: [. . . ]
P2: [. . . ]
C: Therefore, the thesis of materialism is true.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Define "material". Then delineate your premises and conclusion like someone who is able to make a deduction would, like this:

P1: [. . . ]
P2: [. . . ]
C: Therefore, the thesis of materialism is true.

Did you bother to read either of my posts? Your reply suggests that you didn't... or if you did, you utterly missed my points.

I'm not going to put much effort into my posts to you unless you're going to read them. I've given you enough material that you could fone up with a few questions if you wanted. Do you have any?

 

[Nous]

Did you bother to read either of my posts?

Yes, I did. That's precisely why I asked you to define your terms and to identify your premises and conclusion.

It isn't my fault that you are unable to deduce that the thesis of materialism is true.

 

[Koldo]

Perhaps you didn't see or weren't able to comprehend this the first dozen times I posted it:

#362:

Then I repeat what I already said several times here, e.g., in #351:

. . . according to the definition of "physical body" given in the first sentence of the Wikipedia article that you linked to, the current theories and findings of physics demonstrate that the thesis of physicalism isn't true if "physicalism" means that everything consists of or supervenes on "physical bodies".​

#368:

If the thesis of physicalism means that everything consists of or supervenes on "physical bodies" (which are just matter, according to the definition in the Wikipedia article), then the thesis of physicalism is false, because energy is not matter, and matter is not primary to energy. Energy is a conserved quantity; matter is not.​

So you were actually speaking in strict terms when you said 'If the thesis of physicalism means that everything consists of or supervenes on "physical bodies"'.
Strictly speaking, you have got physicalism wrong. Physicalism says that everything is physical or supervenes on the physical.

The object-based conception then tells you how to understand this 'physical'. It tells you that a property is 'physical' if it is required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of a physical object ( in other words, matter ) and its constituents or if there is supervenience.

Apparently what you are trying to say with your idea of the "intrinsic nature of matter" is that it is the quantity known as energy (E) that is primary, not matter. Right? No one has ever seen or touched energy. Energy is not a "physical object" according to the definition given in the Wikipedia article you linked to. Right?

No. In physicalism, what is primary is the 'physical'.

A lot of good it's done you. You obviously cannot provide a non-circular definition of the adjective "physical," on which the thesis of physicalism depends, and you obviously cannot articulate an argument that concludes that the thesis of physicalism is true.

Still waiting for your examples.

 

[Koldo]

So you have no rational reason to conclude that when I posted #380 I was suddenly unable to choose to spell "physicalism" correctly, not with the letters in reverse order, and in regular black font that is used here rather than in purple font.

You didn't have the will to do differently. That's the rational reason.

And you do not disagree that the ability to choose to between available options is not accounted for by any laws that govern "physical objects".

That depends on what you mean by 'available'. As I have pointed before, you need to precise on this subject.

And you are unable to account for the fact that I stated beforehand that I would make a post with "physicalism" spelled backwards and in purple font, other than the fact that I chose to will my fingers to perform the required actions to accomplish that.

Let's delve further into this: Why did you choose to will your fingers to do that ?

 

[Yerda]

That isn't an argument.

Why not? Are we going to go down the route of semantics in order to avoid having a conversation?

I'm genuinely interested in an alternative to physicalism that makes more sense. If you could point me to it I would be grateful.

The findings and theories of modern physics long ago refuted the thesis that matter is primary. Matter isn't even one of the fundamental conserved quantities in physics.

And?

As this thread well demonstrates, materialism/physicalism is incoherent drivel, an anti-science religion that some people need to believe for some goofed-up reason. I say that if one needs a religion, get one that isn't nonsensical and anti-science.

I also find it a bit incoherent and I have the same disdain for those who use it to attempt to rule out a priori the things they dislike (souls, Gods, free-will etc).

 

[Nous]

No. In physicalism, what is primary is the 'physical'.

I know that. Define "physical," then state your argument concluding that the thesis of physicalism is true. Like this:

P1: [. . . ]
P2: [. . . ]
C: Therefore, the thesis of physicalism is true.

 

[Nous]

You didn't have the will to do differently.

No, I willed my fingers to type exactly what I said I would type.

 

[Nous]

The object-based conception then tells you how to understand this 'physical'. It tells you that a property is 'physical' if it is required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of a physical object

Are numbers physical, according to your definition? How do we determine whether or not something such as numbers and uncountably infinite sets are "physical"?

or if there is supervenience.

The idea of "supervenience" is just another aspect of the anti-scientific nature of the incoherent metaphysical thesis that is your religion. No scientific discipline defines, utilizes or identifies the existence of such a relation as "supervenience". Supervenience literally means something extraneous or additional to something else. A blue filter on a photograph of a red apple would be something that supervenes on the apple--the apple didn't produce that blue filter.

 

[Nous]

Why not?

Single sentences are not arguments (unless one has listed one's premises and conclusion in the single sentence, which you didn't.

I'm genuinely interested in an alternative to physicalism that makes more sense. If you could point me to it I would be grateful.

It makes more sense to not adopt any metaphysical thesis as one's religion than to adopt a false or incoherent one. On the other hand, if one needs a metaphysical thesis as a religion, there's always pluralism, which is certainly consistent with physics and every other science. No science presumes to have discovered the "intrinsic nature" of or the adjective that applies to everything that can be said to exist, much less all the unknown stuff that might exist.

One can also note that what physicists discover about empirical reality are mathematical relations--relations between quantities (E=mc2; F=ma; the laws of conservation, which are proven by theorem). Thus one would seem to be justified in assuming that empirical reality is of a mathematical nature.

I also find it a bit incoherent and I have the same disdain for those who use it to attempt to rule out a priori the things they dislike (souls, Gods, free-will etc).

Good for you. I knew you are reasonable.

 

[Koldo]

No, I willed my fingers to type exactly what I said I would type.

Correct. Which means you didn't have the will to act in a different manner.

 

[1137]

Did you bother to read either of my posts? Your reply suggests that you didn't... or if you did, you utterly missed my points.

I'm not going to put much effort into my posts to you unless you're going to read them. I've given you enough material that you could fone up with a few questions if you wanted. Do you have any?

Just give your argument man. Why is that so hard?

 

[Koldo]

Are numbers physical, according to your definition? How do we determine whether or not something such as numbers and uncountably infinite sets are "physical"?

Yes. By asking whether they fit the descriptions laid in either the object-based conception or the theory-based conception.

The idea of "supervenience" is just another aspect of the anti-scientific nature of the incoherent metaphysical thesis that is your religion. No scientific discipline defines, utilizes or identifies the existence of such a relation as "supervenience". Supervenience literally means something extraneous or additional to something else. A blue filter on a photograph of a red apple would be something that supervenes on the apple--the apple didn't produce that blue filter.

Supervenience just means 'there can be no difference in A without a difference in B'.
You can read more about it at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/

 

[Nous]

Yes. By asking whether they fit the descriptions laid in either the object-based conception or the theory-based conception.



Supervenience just means 'there can be no difference in A without a difference in B'.
You can read more about it at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/

So you still are not able to provide a non-circular definition of the adjective "physical," and you still cannot articulate an argument that concludes that the thesis of physicalism is true.

Why does anyone need a vacuous religion such as physicalism?

 

[Nous]

No, I willed my fingers to type exactly what I said I would type.

Correct. Which means you didn't have the will to act in a different manner.

Are you trying a draw a distinction here about something?

I didn't "have the will" to perform a different act than what I said I would perform only because I chose to perform the act that I said I would perform.

There is obviously no reason to try to suggest that people are passive victims of their wills. Will is:

1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions [. . . ]

2 power of choosing one's own actions [. . .]

3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition [. . .]​

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/will?s=t

And as noted, the ability to choose to perform or not perform an act is not accounted for by any law of physics, chemistry or biology.

 

[Koldo]

So you still are not able to provide a non-circular definition of the adjective "physical," and you still cannot articulate an argument that concludes that the thesis of physicalism is true.

So you are still unable to understand what is meant by 'physical'.

Why does anyone need a vacuous religion such as physicalism?

As loaded as a question can be.

 

[Koldo]

Are you trying a draw a distinction here about something?

I didn't "have the will" to perform a different act than what I said I would perform only because I chose to perform the act that I said I would perform.

There is obviously no reason to try to suggest that people are passive victims of their wills. Will is:

1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions [. . . ]

2 power of choosing one's own actions [. . .]

3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition [. . .]​

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/will?s=t

And as noted, the ability to choose to perform or not perform an act is not accounted for by any law of physics, chemistry or biology.

It is. Depending, of course, on what you mean by that.
Causality is the answer.

What is the basis for your choices ? How do you answer this question without resorting to causality ?

This is, however, another debate entirely. It suffices to say that if compatibilism can be true, then you can't use free will as evidence against Physicalism.
And just so you realize where you are getting into, there was a survey ( http://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP ) done with nearly a couple thousand of philosophers and the most widely held position on the free will debate is compatibilism by a large margin.

 

[Nous]

So you are still unable to understand what is meant by 'physical'.

Define your adjective "physical" and state your argument that the thesis of physicalism is true.

 

[Koldo]

Define your adjective "physical" and state your argument that the thesis of physicalism is true.

I am afraid I can't explain the meaning of 'physical' any better than I have done so far.