Are God Concepts Incoherent?

[blü 2]

So you are a skeptic. Now please solve Cartesian skepticism as relevant for your claims.

The only debt that I consciously owe René is my assumptions. Mine aren't identical to his ─ he was into dualism, after all ─ but he pointed out that some basics can't be demonstrated to be correct unless you've already assumed they're correct, and therefore you have to acknowledge they're assumptions. Mine aren't complicated ─ everyone here shares them, including you. They're that a world exists external to the self; that our senses are capable of informing us of that world; and that reason is a valid tool.

My skepticism is the normal skepticism of reasoned enquiry.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

The only debt that I consciously owe René is my assumptions. Mine aren't identical to his ─ he was into dualism, after all ─ but he pointed out that some basics can't be demonstrated to be correct unless you've already assumed they're correct, and therefore you have to acknowledge they're assumptions. Mine aren't complicated ─ everyone here shares them, including you. They're that a world exists external to the self; that our senses are capable of informing us of that world; and that reason is a valid tool.

My skepticism is the normal skepticism of reasoned enquiry.

I don't share those.

Regards
Mikkel

 

[Left Coast]

The problem with this whole debate is that materialism is based on a biased tautology. "Existence is defined by physicality, because if it doesn't physically exist, it isn't real." Hence, their own conception of reality is being defined by physicality, and then being used to define what's 'real' to them. And anything else must therefor be "unreal" (i.e., doesn't really exist). But of course this is untrue, as many things "exist" that are not physical. Equality, for example. Or beauty. Or even peace. The materialists try to rationalize these experiences by pointing to the physics that enable their effect, thus excusing (ignoring) the existence of the effect, itself. Because the effect, itself, is not physical, and therefor cannot 'really' exist (according to their truth-paradigm). But we all know that such effects do exist, even though they don't exist, physically.

Aren't equality, or peace, or beauty, simply labels that we apply to physical states? I suppose equality in purely logical terms would be conceptual rather than physical (e.g. 1+1=2), but if we want to talk about something like "equal rights" or "equal parts flour and sugar" aren't we describing a physical state of affairs?

 

[Curious George]

Ah, I think it falls into place. If I remember correctly, you think 'God' is a title bestowed by humans on certain other humans, yes? Or am I confusing you with someone else?

Someone else. See my reply to leftcoast for a refresh. Though i wouldn't rule out humans.

 

[Left Coast]

I don't think that all theists across the board. I also don't think that it's only applied to gods; I've heard similar claims about ghosts, for instance.

Overall, I take these sorts of claims as excuse-making and not as real, honest arguments. If we do take these claims at face value, they run into problems right away.

For starters, anything with physical effects can be investigated empirically regardless of what the thing itself is. The people I most often see saying that "God isn't physical" to exempt him from rational inquiry will turn around and also claim all sorts of physical effects of God, from coming to Earth in human form to shrinking someone's tumour.

And the theists who really do argue that God has no physical effects (e.g. some deists) don't have it any easier. Their "non-physical" God may have been designed so that it can't be refuted by rational inquiry, but that's not enough to justify belief. In the process of making their god unfalsifiable, they also threw away any way they could rationally justify belief in their god.

I agree re: non-physical gods being empirically unfalsifiable. The question is, does something being unfalsifiable make it incoherent as a concept? I would say no. Blu's position, if I understand it correctly, is yes.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Aren't equality, or peace, or beauty, simply labels that we apply to physical states? I suppose equality in purely logical terms would be conceptual rather than physical (e.g. 1+1=2), but if we want to talk about something like "equal rights" or "equal parts flour and sugar" aren't we describing a physical state of affairs?

Do that again but this only in physical terms as per science. I want you describe as follows "everything is physical states of affairs" as a scientific physical theory and no everyday words. I want the science!!!

Mikkel

 

[Left Coast]

Do that again but this only in physical terms as per science. I want you describe as follows "everything is physical states of affairs" as a scientific physical theory and no everyday words. I want the science!!!

Mikkel

I genuinely don't know what you're asking for, sorry. I gave specific examples of how "equality" is a description of physical states, unless we're purely talking math or logic. Any applied use of the term to describe things in our awareness involves some assessment of empirical data. Same with beauty and peace.

I realize you think we might be in the Matrix, so you don't accept that the ability to observe or measure a thing qualifies it as physical. As I said to you in another thread a few days ago, if that's the case, this dream or illusion or projection operates exactly how we'd except objective reality to operate, so I don't see a meaningful difference.

 

[Yazata]

If I understand the point correctly, the argument is that anything real, anything that exists, has defining features that we can identify if we look out in the world for them - presumably physical features.

How does the existence of something depend on our human ability to recognize and apply a name and concept to it? It sees to me that the existence of objective reality is prior to my reacting to it. (I'm very much an ontological realist.)

Since God is generally proposed to be non-physical, it seems incoherent to say God(s) "exist(s)" as anything more than a concept in our minds.

Physical sensation isn't the only way that we know things.

We know about the existence of many things by inference. Much of the inventory of the scientific worldview is known by inference from various experimental results plus plenty of theory.

Suppose that we define 'God' as whatever the unknown explanation(s) are for why existence exists, what the first cause was, why reality displays the order that we perceive it displaying, and questions like that. Then if we take reality as a given and then introduce something like the Principle of Sufficient Reason as an additional premise, we can infer the existence of 'God'. The traditional "theistic proofs" work this way.

So, if you believe in God(s), in what sense does he "exist?"

Well, I don't believe in God in any religious sense. I am sorta-persuaded by the kind of argument that I've just outlined, but feel that it doesn't deliver up a deity, but merely a metaphysical mystery. (The greatest of all metaphysical mysteries, perhaps.)

That's pretty much why I consider myself an agnostic.

Is it coherent to say that something non-physical exists outside our minds?

Mathematics and logical relationships, arguably. The 'laws of physics'.

 

[PureX]

Aren't equality, or peace, or beauty, simply labels that we apply to physical states?

How can these logically be called a physical state? What is their physicality? What kind of physical matter or energy comprises equality? Or beauty? Aren't these a phenomena of experienced relation, rather than of experienced physicality? And how can that be if physicality is all that exists (or can exist, as the materialists would assert)?

... suppose equality in purely logical terms would be conceptual rather than physical (e.g. 1+1=2), but if we want to talk about something like "equal rights" or "equal parts flour and sugar" aren't we describing a physical state of affairs?

No, because we would be talking about a perceived relationship, not a physical phenomena. There is no physical phenomena called "equality". Logically, such a phenomena cannot physically exist. No two anythings can logically be considered equal, or they would no longer be two different things. They would be the SAME thing. They would, logically, have to be.

And yet we are still able to experience the notion of equality, and impose that notion on the physical world around us, even though it cannot possibly physically exist. If physicality defines what can and cannot exist, then how could our experience of such a notion, happen? How could it exist? How could we impose it on the real world?

Yet it does exist, and we all know it does.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

I genuinely don't know what you're asking for, sorry. I gave specific examples of how "equality" is a description of physical states, unless we're purely talking math or logic. Any applied use of the term to describe things in our awareness involves some assessment of empirical data. Same with beauty and peace.

I realize you think we might be in the Matrix, so you don't accept that the ability to observe or measure a thing qualifies it as physical. As I said to you in another thread a few days ago, if that's the case, this dream or illusion or projection operates exactly how we'd except objective reality to operate, so I don't see a meaningful difference.

Please explain in empirical data what a meaningful difference is? What external sensory data you use; what instrument to use or what scientific theory covers a meaningful difference? What is it dimensions, weight and so on?
So how do you see a meaningful difference?

Well, you don't see a meaningful difference, because you can't describe a meaningful difference as a physical state or give empirical data for it. Do you understand it now? You are using words, which can't be described, as you claim, they can.
That is the point of this exchange.

Mikkel

 

[Left Coast]

How can these logically be called a physical state? What is their physicality? What kind of physical matter or energy comprises equality? Or beauty? Aren't these a phenomena of experienced relation, rather than of experienced physicality? And how can that be if physicality is all that exists (or can exist, as the materialists would assert)?

I'm not sure what the difference is. The relations I'm experiencing when I say things are equal are physical ones, aren't they? If I have two apples in one basket, and two apples in another basket, I can coherently say I have an equal number of apples in each basket. So it's a description of experienced relation, but a clearly physical one. What am I missing?

No, because we would be talking about a perceived relationship, not a physical phenomena. There is no physical phenomena called "equality". Logically, such a phenomena cannot physically exist. No two anythings can logically be considered equal, or they would no longer be two different things. They would be the SAME thing. They would, logically, have to be.

When we say two things are equal in a particular way, we're not saying they're identical in every respect. If I say a recipe calls for equal parts flour and sugar, no one would understand me to be saying that flour and sugar are identical to each other. What is meant is that equal or identical amounts of each ingredient are called for. And again, I'm not seeing how that description is anything but physical. I am literally referring to the physical amount or volume of two physical substances. The only way to deny this, it seems to me, is to go the idealist route and allege that none of our sensory experiences describe physical phenomena at all.

 

[Left Coast]

Please explain in empirical data what a meaningful difference is? What external sensory data you use; what instrument to use or what scientific theory covers a meaningful difference? What is it dimensions, weight and so on?
So how do you see a meaningful difference?

Well, you don't see a meaningful difference, because you can't describe a meaningful difference as a physical state or give empirical data for it. Do you understand it now? You are using words, which can't be described, as you claim, they can.
That is the point of this exchange.

Mikkel

A meaningful difference is one that would impact how I would respond to the situation, either intellectually or in terms of my actions. Both those responses can be empirically observed and analyzed.

Does that cover it?

 

[Left Coast]

How does the existence of something depend on our human ability to recognize and apply a name and concept to it? It sees to me that the existence of objective reality is prior to my reacting to it. (I'm very much an ontological realist.)

Agreed. Which is why I found Blu's sentiment so unexpected, since I would think materialists would be realists, generally?

Physical sensation isn't the only way that we know things.

We know about the existence of many things by inference. Much of the inventory of the scientific worldview is known by inference from various experimental results plus plenty of theory.

Suppose that we define 'God' as whatever the unknown explanation(s) are for why existence exists, what the first cause was, why reality displays the order that we perceive it displaying, and questions like that. Then if we take reality as a given and then introduce something like the Principle of Sufficient Reason as an additional premise, we can infer the existence of 'God'. The traditional "theistic proofs" work this way.

Well, I don't believe in God in any religious sense. I am sorta-persuaded by the kind of argument that I've just outlined, but feel that it doesn't deliver up a deity, but merely a metaphysical mystery. (The greatest of all metaphysical mysteries, perhaps.)

That's pretty much why I consider myself an agnostic.

I'm sympathetic to this idea too. Recently explored it in a thread about Aquinas' cosmological argument.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

A meaningful difference is one that would impact how I would respond to the situation, either intellectually or in terms of my actions. Both those responses can be empirically observed and analyzed.

Does that cover it?

I want intellectually in physical terms as a physical state of affairs! I don't want your words about other words like intellectual.
I want empirical data. A scientific theory.
How many times are you going to do this? I ask for observations and all that and you answer with a mental and non-physical word like intellectual. I want the empirical data for intellectual.

Mikkel

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

I agree re: non-physical gods being empirically unfalsifiable. The question is, does something being unfalsifiable make it incoherent as a concept? I would say no. Blu's position, if I understand it correctly, is yes.

I think it's splitting hairs a bit. If someone has decided they have good reason to believe in the literal existence of something unfalsifiable, then there's something incoherent in their worldview somewhere. Maybe the incoherence is with their god-concept itself and maybe the incoherence is in their beliefs about the god; the distinction doesn't particularly matter to me. It still ends up with me considering their theistic belief system to be unreasonable.

 

[Sunstone]

This was the point I kept coming back to as well. Even if we agree on the effectiveness of empirical data to help us navigate the world, empirical data can't establish that empirical data is all there is.

Very true. But it can provide some support for the notion that there is more to reality than empirical data. However, I said "some support", not "conclusive support".

Empirical data does not establish the existence of a reality that is independent of our minds. But it's tendency to be orderly, logical, consilient, and coherent with other empirical data does offer support for the notion that there is a reality independent of our minds.

 

[Sunstone]

I agree re: non-physical gods being empirically unfalsifiable. The question is, does something being unfalsifiable make it incoherent as a concept? I would say no. Blu's position, if I understand it correctly, is yes.

I find nothing incoherent in the notion that I experience qualia, such as the feeling of loving, but my claim to experience the feeling of loving cannot be falsified. At least, not in so far as anyone but myself is concerned.

 

[Left Coast]

I want intellectually in physical terms as a physical state of affairs! I don't want your words about other words like intellectual.
I want empirical data. A scientific theory.
How many times are you going to do this? I ask for observations and all that and you answer with a mental and non-physical word like intellectual. I want the empirical data for intellectual.

Mikkel

I can tell you what I'm thinking, can't I? Or does that not count as physical, either?

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

I can tell you what I'm thinking, can't I? Or does that not count as physical, either?

You are not using physical terms. You are using mental terms. Now express your quote in physical terms.

Mikkel

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

This was the point I kept coming back to as well. Even if we agree on the effectiveness of empirical data to help us navigate the world, empirical data can't establish that empirical data is all there is.

It doesn't need to establish this.

If a theist wants to argue that their god is somehow exempt from empirical investigation, this still doesn't automatically mean that their belief in the god is justified. Maybe the theist can do it and maybe they can't, but until they actually justify their beliefs by some sort of sound method, their beliefs are unjustified.

The question that matters is whether justification has happened, not whether justification is possible.

"You have not conclusively ruled out that my beliefs could potentially be justified by something other than empirical evidence" does not equal "I have justified my beliefs without empirical evidence."