Are Objective Standards for Morals Superior in Practice to Subjective Standards for Morals?

[Nous]

The Golden Rule is a rule of thumb. It is nothing like a principle of objective morality.

What does that mean? What is "like a principle of objective morality," and does the Golden Rule differ?

Have you ever done any reading in ethics? I find the peculiar language and ideas grating. The meta-ethical theses are moral realism, nihilism and relativism. Moral realism posits the existence of objective moral facts. That is it moral to treat others as one wishes to be treated (ceteris paribus) is an objective moral fact.

[/quote]One of the justifications for the USA Christian slavers was that a lifetime of hard labor was a fair exchange for Christianization. [/quote]And you're saying that you see nothing wrong with that?

How about answering the other questions I asked above?

So you would say that slavery in the 18th and 19th centuries in the US was not truly immoral--some people did and some people didn't have those values about its wrongfulness.

In ancient Rome, boys (by the thousands, according to one commentator) born to slaves and the lower classes were taken and castrated in order to be used as sex toys. You would say that there is nothing really, truly wrong with that?​

The anti-realist answers to such questions demonstrate the social and political regressiveness of moral anti-realism.

Thank God there are moral realists who are able to recognize moral wrongs. That's how society progresses.

 

[LukeS]

I believe in objective morality. Its not the rules that are objective though, but the difference they make in peoples lives. Moral rules are for people, not vice versa.

I think the insight has lead me to lead a more healthy lifestyle ( I believe - or encounter - that health is benign) and look into the way I engage with the world, more carefully and with more definite objectives in mind rather than tagging along without clear purpose.

Massochists are probably slightly messed up (no offence meant), they may have maybe addiction to pain, I dunno, and health in a part of an oddly wired dopamine system ( I am thinking sexual arousal hormones) and substance p (pain hormone) system ... at the expense of.... well I don't know too much about this and what they do etc.

So a masochists morals (preferences and valued things) and tactics (rules and directives) in life are not transferrable in general, even though they make an objective difference to their encounter with the world and self as individuals. They're not for most people IOW.

My belief that health is good is backed up by the idea that we evolved to prefer health because that preference helps support life. But masochists etc, have unusual health needs.

 

[stevevw]

It would depend on what the objective morals were. If they represented truth what was ultimately the greatest good and there was some guarentee that they were the best morals for us then this would be beneficial whether people agreed or not. When you consider that humans are fallible then chances are whatever good we think is good is not going to be the best. We get influenced by too many things that may delude or tempt us into thinking things are the best so we cannot be trusted with judgeing what is ultimately good or not. So if there was some sort of guarentee that a set of morals was best and would give us the best results then this would be good. But still the nature of humans is that even if we did have this people would still want to try their own way of doing things becuase of free will.

 

[Nous]

It would depend on what the objective morals were. If they represented truth what was ultimately the greatest good and there was some guarentee that they were the best morals for us then this would be beneficial whether people agreed or not.

As far as I know, there isn't any method to objectively assess "the greater good".

 

[stevevw]

As far as I know, there isn't any method to objectively assess "the greater good".

Thats the problem because so far we humans have messed things up.

 

[icehorse]

As far as I know, there isn't any method to objectively assess "the greater good".

First off, I'd agree that it's impossible to effectively argue against moral relativism. So we need to agree to an axiom or two and build a moral code from there. Axioms are typically unprovable, they are simply agreed to. The golden rule is such an axiom. Maximizing well being is such an axiom. Sam Harris claims that as neuro-science progresses, we will be more and more able to assess how behaviors impact well being.

 

[Nous]

First off, I'd agree that it's impossible to effectively argue against moral relativism.

I can. Moral relativism is incoherent. We see again and again at RF people trying justify relativism by claiming the "X is not not objectively immoral. But I believe it is immoral." That's illogical. If an act is not objectively immoral, then there is no rational reason to maintain the belief that it is immoral.

So we need to agree to an axiom or two and build a moral code from there. Axioms are typically unprovable, they are simply agreed to. The golden rule is such an axiom. Maximizing well being is such an axiom.

Whose well being should society attend to when the police discover that someone has killed another person?

Sam Harris claims that as neuro-science progresses, we will be more and more able to assess how behaviors impact well being.

Yes, the only problem with that idea is that there is no evidence and no rational reason to belief that some finding by neuroscience can determine what acts are moral or immoral. Undoubtedly a lot of people feel quite good when stealing from others or when raping a child.

 

[icehorse]

I can. Moral relativism is incoherent. We see again and again at RF people trying justify relativism by claiming the "X is not not objectively immoral. But I believe it is immoral." That's illogical. If an act is not objectively immoral, then there is no rational reason to maintain the belief that it is immoral.

Whose well being should society attend to when the police discover that someone has killed another person?

Yes, the only problem with that idea is that there is no evidence and no rational reason to belief that some finding by neuroscience can determine what acts are moral or immoral. Undoubtedly a lot of people feel quite good when stealing from others or when raping a child.

If you have an effective argument to refute relativism I would sincerely love to hear it!

As far as well being goes, I'd say that first world countries already have a decent foundation built into their social and legal systems. Criminals get punished. The psychologically damaged criminal's sense of well being is given very little weight, which seems appropriate.

So what if I were to amend the goal to something like "supporting aggregate well being".

 

[Nous]

If you have an effective argument to refute relativism I would sincerely love to hear it!

Moral relativism is nonsense in more than one way, and leads to illogical consequences.

In the first place, there is no objective way to distinguish societies for which different moral rules may apply, nor to determine which moral rules apply to a person from one society who moves to another society. Where does one draw the line between "European" society and "Middle Eastern" society, or between "Middle Eastern" and "Asian" societies? Which society's moral rules apply to the person who has lived 30 of her 40 years in the Melanesia and the last 10 years in the US?

Given the inscrutability of answers to these questions, there really no reason to continue. Moral relativism is refuted as a rational meta-ethical thesis.

But a further glaring example of its illogical consequences is that it leads people to assert nonsensical things such as, "X is not objectively immoral, but I believe it is immoral." Substitute rape, murder, stealing for X. What could possibly be a rational reason to believe that rape is immoral if it isn't objectively immoral? And if rape isn't objectively immoral, then why condemn and prosecute another person for an act of rape?

As far as well being goes, I'd say that first world countries already have a decent foundation built into their social and legal systems. Criminals get punished. The psychologically damaged criminal's sense of well being is given very little weight, which seems appropriate.

This merely demonstrates that you are not abiding by any "axiom" of "maximizing well being". For whatever reason, you've chosen to not try to maximize the criminal's well being.

 

[icehorse]

This merely demonstrates that you are not abiding by any "axiom" of "maximizing well being". For whatever reason, you've chosen to not try to maximize the criminal's well being.

you need to read ahead to the part where I said "aggregate" well being

 

[Nous]

you need to read ahead to the part where I said "aggregate" well being

I don't suppose there is any objective method for "aggregating" all well-being. Is the well-being that you wish to take away from the rapists, murderers and thieves subtracted from the sum?

 

[icehorse]

I don't suppose there is any objective method for "aggregating" all well-being. Is the well-being that you wish to take away from the rapists, murderers and thieves subtracted from the sum?

Given that we're in a sub-forum of the philosophy forum, it's probably appropriate to be a little more precise in our definitions. When we say "objective", we already have a problem. 100% objective, or "as objective as anything we know can be"?

To riff off of a previous post, modern society already makes such calculations, although perhaps not using the phrase "aggregate well being". So yes, modern society has concluded that aggregate well being is improved if criminals are dissuaded from criminal acts ahead of time and punished for those criminal acts they commit. So yes, the criminal's well being is subtracted from the sum.

 

[Mister Silver]

Can we now appropriately add "aggregate" to the semantics list?

 

[Nous]

Given that we're in a sub-forum of the philosophy forum, it's probably appropriate to be a little more precise in our definitions. When we say "objective", we already have a problem. 100% objective, or "as objective as anything we know can be"?

To riff off of a previous post, modern society already makes such calculations, although perhaps not using the phrase "aggregate well being". So yes, modern society has concluded that aggregate well being is improved if criminals are dissuaded from criminal acts ahead of time and punished for those criminal acts they commit. So yes, the criminal's well being is subtracted from the sum.

Obviously no other meta-ethical thesis depends on calculating the "aggregate well being" of a species.

Show us your numbers. Let's say someone comes along and says that according to her calculations we should no longer prosecute suspected rapists. It results in a negative aggregate well-being balance. Show us that she would be wrong if you disagree with making not prosecuting rapists.

By the way, do we count the horrible things humans do to non-human animals, including ruining their habit?

 

[icehorse]

Obviously no other meta-ethical thesis depends on calculating the "aggregate well being" of a species.

I'm assuming this is meant sarcastically.

Show us your numbers. Let's say someone comes along and says that according to her calculations we should no longer prosecute suspected rapists. It results in a negative aggregate well-being balance. Show us that she would be wrong if you disagree with making not prosecuting rapists.

By the way, do we count the horrible things humans do to non-human animals, including ruining their habit?

I don't claim to have the formula. I never did.

What I'm claiming is that - in theory - such formulas are possible, and we should strive for them. This is just another is/ought discussion, correct?

I'm agreeing with Sam Harris and disagreeing with Hume. I believe that critical thinking CAN help us answer questions of morality. I believe we should NOT allow religious demagogues tell us what is or is not moral, based on their claims of secret communications channels with their versions of god.

With all of that said, it seems to me that what you're saying is that it's tricky business. I completely agree. you bring up the rapist scenario - isn't that just a rehashing of the "repugnant conclusion" discussion? Don't get me wrong, it's a thorny problem.

As for the treatment of animals, I would say that our treatment of animals if often cruel and immoral, and we should not let that stand.

None of this is to say that I'm not open to debating these gnarly questions, I am.

 

[Nous]

I'm assuming this is meant sarcastically.

Not at all. I repeat: Obviously no other meta-ethical thesis depends on calculating the "aggregate well being" of a species.

I don't claim to have the formula. I never did.

Then how do you decide what are moral and immoral acts?

What I'm claiming is that - in theory - such formulas are possible

Then you should provide the evidence by which to conclude that such formulas are possible.

and we should strive for them.

I hate to see you get your hopes up for something so nonsensical.

I'm agreeing with Sam Harris and disagreeing with Hume.

Have you read Hume? Quote the passages of his that you dispute.

Harris's writings seem to me to be for teen audiences. As already noted, nothing found in the brain will ever reveal what acts are moral or immoral.

 

[Meow Mix]

Suppose there were objective standards for morality. Putting aside, for the moment, just how problematic that would be (after all, what would it mean, an "objective standard"?), do you think the existence of objective standards for a morality would be any more effective in practice at getting people to comply with that morality than subjective standards for the same morality? Why or why not?

I don't think so.

In practice, moral realism is indistinguishable from moral nihilism (e.g., moral noncognitivism) unless you ask a person their motivation for whatever choices they're making (you'd actually have to ask two: "was this a moral choice at all" and "why did you make it").

For instance, a moral realist might witness someone trying to abduct a child and rush to save the child because they feel there is some intrinsic moral truth (whatever that would mean) that gives them some deontological burden.

A moral noncognitivist might witness someone trying to abduct a child and rush to save the child because they happen to value altruism and the happiness and wellbeing of others, perhaps especially innocents, such that the hypothetical imperative gives them something that looks very much like a deontological burden (or it could even be argued that the burden they feel IS still deontological)

Same actions, wildly different moral philosophies: you can't tell unless you ask. Likewise with people who make different choices: what's the difference between someone who goes around punching babies? Moral realists would say they chose wrong with respect to intrinsic moral truths, moral nihilists of various kinds would say their hypothetical imperatives didn't line up right or that they simply happen to have different values that don't emphasize altruism.

Both are capable of describing the world that we see, though if you ask me, it's a bit more thought-gymnastic-y to get moral realism to feel like it *naturally* describes the world we see.

Edit: I think the only difference you'd be able to tell without asking is whether someone is a pragmatist or a deontologist primarily.