Time to lay this rhinoceros to rest. If you accept that atheism describes the person who has no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god, then atheism cannot be described as a "default position" on a scale of beliefs.
Hmm. So I expect that by the end of this post, you'll have successfully demonstrated that humans are
born with an innate:
A.)
Interest in a god (or gods).
B.)
Knowledge of a god (or gods).
C.)
Particular beliefs regarding a god (or gods).
Because if you cannot, how could anyone take your thesis statement (“
Atheism is not a default position “) seriously? Shall we see if you can actually sustain such a seemingly indefensible position on the topic?
Amongst a mess of options, the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing.
Does nothing? You mean like
“be born a blank slate to be filled up with learned behavior?” Isn't that what human development is all about? Unless you can somehow demonstrate that humans are
born believing in X, then won't you have to concede that your argument is a flawed one?
Thing about this: belief isn't an act. It's not something we do, and especially not something we choose to do.
Whoa there! Wait. Isn't “believe” a
verb? Don't verbs typically involve
actions? Aren't actions typically something that we
do?
Of course, one can
choose to ignore the evidence or
work backwards from a given conclusion while trying to shoehorn the evidence to fit your presuppositions … but I digress.
Take the world.
The world is the case.
I'd like to casually go on the record and say that this next bit just loses me altogether. I have no idea what you're talking about or why it's even necessary to your argument.
If we wish to examine truth or untruth, belief or doubt, certainty or uncertainty about the world, then we must hold the world distinct from those things we wish to examine.
Why?
Hence, we will refer to it, and all its parts, as "the case."
Why not refer to it as “the world?” Why the additional verbiage?
The world is the case, and of the case things may be true or false, hence they may be believed or doubted, with degrees of certainty or uncertainty.
So what you're saying is that things may be true or false and they can be believed or not believed to varying degrees?
If so, this seems fairly reasonable to me.
If I say, "I believe George went to the store," that lends it uncertainty.
Does it? Or does it merely reflect the almost certain fact that omnipotence is not a quality that you possess?
It says that because of insufficient knowledge there may some amount of doubt about George's activities, but still I have a degree of certainty about it. Similarly, to say, "I don't believe George went to the store," is to assert its uncertainty. Belief is the case described in such a way as to hold a degree of certainty.
If I say "George went to the store," then asserting the truth of that lends it a face that says there is no doubt, no uncertainty about George's journey. Truth is the case described as apart from me, apart from the certainty a consciousness might know.
That's because a consciousness is distinct from the world it knows.
Really? Would you care to substantiate that? Isn't the brain that houses the consciousness a part of the world? Or did George's consciousness saunter off to the store while his brain stayed at home listening to raga and huffing incense?
The default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing. The world is the case.
In the case of humans, isn't the blank slate the default?
Both asserting a degree of certainty to the world and describing it as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do. They are dong something, not nothing. Where the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing, asserting belief and truth--and their counterparts disbelief and falsehood--about what is the case are doing something.
In discussion, we do not fail to do something about the world.
Wow. You lost me. I really tried to stay with you on this ride, but you lost me.
...
Allow me to remind you that you'd securely set my expectations regarding the alleged innateness of three items:
A.) Interest in a god (or gods).
B.) Knowledge of a god (or gods).
C.) Particular beliefs regarding a god (or gods).
Do you feel you've addressed
any of these points in your post? Allow me to say that if you have, your argument remains impressively elusive.
...
Meanwhile, on my way out the door, I'm going to assert that:
- Healthy humans aren't born with any “-isms” whatsoever.
- The default setting isn't atheism. It's a complete lack of belief(s). There is a difference.
If (as you've opted to do) atheism is defined as a lack of interest in, or knowledge of, or particular beliefs regarding a god or gods … then you've failed to convince me that we don't all basically start off as (more or less) atheists. You'll need to convince me that we start off as theists, I suppose.
