Atheistic Double Standard?

[1robin]

The cosmological argument is of course a complete failure from the first line.

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

If the person using this argument can't show proof that whatever begins to exist has a cause the whole argument goes down the toilet.
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise

You claimed the cosmological argument is no good, then you posted a premise' 1 which has no known exception, then premise 2 which is supported by both of the most accepted cosmological models in modern science, then you posted the logical conclusion from the 2 premise'. Where is the argument?

The arrangement of matter referred to as Earth's moon began to exist even if just in a certain arrangement at a moment in time, does science claim it lacks a cause, no they step all over each other to test causal assumptions. You are left having to show that the lack of anything is the efficient cause of everything. I do not have time for this.

Aquinas' argument from efficient causes—also known as "the second way"—is straightforward and does not lend itself to many interpretative disputes. The argument is as follows:

In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate [cause] is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause.

For our purposes, it might be helpful to present Aquinas' argument in a more formal way:

1. The world contains instances of efficient causation (given).
2. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself.
3. So, every efficient cause seems to have a prior cause.
4. But we cannot have an infinite regress of efficient causes.
5. So there must be a first uncaused efficient cause

Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 

[1robin]

The philosophical arguments for a god are all refuted, and the other two are evidence of the belief in a god, not of a god.

That's yelling at traffic not an argument.

I didn't call the god and multiverse hypotheses equivalent. I said that the multiverse hypothesis was superior because it had the merit of being more parsimonious.

I said you accept one and deny the other despite the balance of evidence being 100% the opposite direction.

That's your definition, not mine.

It does not matter who typed it, it's true. However since you made it an issue.

2.1. The classical notion of causality.

The classical notion of causality is succinctly expressed in Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics: "Those upon which others depend for their being or becoming are called causes."(3) The key characteristic here is ontological dependency.

The earliest Greek philosophers recognized that one thing may be materially dependent on another and searched for the fundamental material principle out of which the whole cosmos was composed. Later, Plato saw the changing world of human sense experience as somehow dependent upon unchanging forms or ideas. Changeable things participated in the unchanging reality of the subsistent forms or exemplar causes and depended on them for their intelligibility.

Aristotle retained the notion of formal cause, but viewed it as an intrinsic principle in substances rather than an extrinsic exemplar. Each changeable substance must be composed of two intrinsic principles, formal and material. The formal cause explains why a substance exists as this particular kind of thing, and the material cause explains why it can cease to be what it is and become something else. Aristotle also investigated the nature of efficient and final causality. The efficient cause is the agent or source of some change. It may be the actual doer of a certain act (the man who builds the house), but can also be the instigator of the action in a broader sense (not the actual builder, for instance, but the one who gives advice on how to build).(4) The final cause is the purpose or aim of a certain action. It is that for the sake of which something is done, as a house might be built for the sake of shelter.

Aquinas adopts Aristotle's explanation of the four fundamental kinds of causes, but also finds a place for Plato's exemplar causes, not as subsistent forms but as ideas in the mind of God: "In the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e., exemplar forms existing in the divine mind."(5)

In this classical understanding, causality is an analogous notion that can be employed in a number of ways. The material stuff of the universe can be seen as a cause, but so can ideas in the mind of God. The sculptor is the cause of a statue, but so is the form or shape of the statue itself. A cause is always that upon which something depends for its being or becoming, but the modes of causality and dependency vary greatly depending on the kinds of causes involved.
Thomistic Institute 2000: Dodds

The history of the cosmological argument follows below.

 

[Polymath257]

1. Do efficient causes imply a temporal order? So all efficient causes are causes *in time*? So time itself cannot be caused.

2. If efficient causes do NOT imply a temporal order, then #2 is in doubt. In fact, quantum fluctuations show that it is possible to have things that begin to exist that do not have a cause.

3. You need to work better on #4. This has not been demonstrated well.

4. Instead of #5, the argument, if valid, would show that there is *at least* one uncaused cause. It does not, however, show the uniqueness of such an uncaused cause. So, there could be, according to this argument, 1 billion uncaused causes.

5. And, in fact, #3 and #4 are contradictory. If *every* cause has a prior cause, and if there exists something with a cause, it necessarily follows that there is an infinite regress of causes. This is an easy proof by induction.

 

[1robin]

A Sample Demonstration: The Argument from Efficient Causality

In the Summa Theologiae Ia 2.3, Aquinas offers five demonstrations for God’s existence (these are famously referred to as the “five ways”). Each demonstration proceeds roughly as follows: Aquinas identifies some observable phenomenon and then attempts to show that, necessarily, the cause of that phenomenon is none other than God. The phenomena Aquinas cites in these demonstrations include: 1) motion; 2) the existence of efficient causes; 3) the reality of contingency; 4) the different grades of perfection in the natural order; and 5) the end-directed activity of natural objects. We should note that these demonstrations are highly abridged versions of arguments he addresses at length elsewhere (most notably, SCG I.13). Constraints of space do not permit an explication of each argument. But it will be helpful to consider at least one argument in order to see how these demonstrations typically proceed.

Aquinas' argument from efficient causes—also known as "the second way"—is straightforward and does not lend itself to many interpretative disputes. The argument is as follows:

In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate [cause] is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God (ST Ia 2.3).

For our purposes, it might be helpful to present Aquinas' argument in a more formal way:

1. The world contains instances of efficient causation (given).
2. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself.
3. So, every efficient cause seems to have a prior cause.
4. But we cannot have an infinite regress of efficient causes.
5. So there must be a first efficient cause “to which everyone gives the name God.”

First premise. Like all of Aquinas' theistic demonstrations, this one begins by citing an observable fact about the world, namely, that there are causal forces that produce various effects. Aquinas does not say what these effects are, but according to John Wippel, we can assume that these effects would include “substantial changes (generation and corruption of substances) as well as various instances of motion … that is, alteration, local motion, increase, and decrease” (2006: Wippel, 58). Note here that there is no need to prove this premise. Its truth is manifestly obvious, and thus Aquinas employs it as an argumentative point of departure.

Second premise. Aquinas then claims that it is impossible for any being to be the efficient cause of itself. Why is self-causation impossible? For the sake of ease, consider what it would mean for something to be the cause of its own existence (although this is not the only form of self-causation Aquinas has in mind). In order to bring about the existence of anything, one needs a certain amount of causal power. Yet a thing cannot have causal power unless it exists. But if something were to be the cause of itself—that is, if it were to bring about its own existence—it would have to exist prior to itself, which is impossible (ST Ia 2.3). Hence the third premise: every efficient cause must have a prior cause.

Aquinas' argument in the first way—which is structurally similar to the argument from efficient causality—employs a parallel line of reasoning. There, he says that to be in motion is to move from potentiality to actuality. When something moves, it goes from having the ability to move to the activity of moving. Yet something cannot be the source of its own movement. Everything that moves does so in virtue of being moved by something that is already actual or “in act.” In short, “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another” (ST Ia 2.3).

Aquinas' aim here is not to explain discrete or isolated instances of causation. His interest, rather, is the existence of a causal order—one consisting of substances whose existence and activity depend on prior causes of that same order (Wippel, 59). Yet this attempt to clarify Aquinas' aim introduces an obvious problem. If every constituent member of that order is causally dependent on something prior to itself, then it appears that the order in question must consist of an infinite chain of causes. Yet Aquinas denies this implication (fourth premise): if the causal order is infinite, then (obviously) there could be no first cause. But without a first cause, then (necessarily) there could be no subsequent effects—including the intermediate efficient causes and ultimate effect (ST Ia 2.3). In other words, the absence of a first cause would imply an absence of the causal order we observe. But since this implication is manifestly false, he says, there must be a first cause, “to which everyone gives the name God” (Ibid.).

A few clarifications about this argument are in order. First, commentators stress that this argument does not purport to show that the world is constituted by a temporal succession of causes that necessarily had a beginning (see for example Copleston, 1955: 122-123). Interestingly, Aquinas himself denies that the argument from efficient causality contradicts the eternality of the world (ST Ia 46.2 ad 1). Whether the world began to exist can only be resolved, he thinks, by appealing to sacred teaching. Thus he says that “by faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist" (ST Ia 46.2). With respect to the second way, then, Aquinas' aim is simply to demonstrate that the order of observable causes and effects cannot be a self-existing reality.

An illustration may help clarify the sort of argument Aquinas wishes to present. The proper growth of, say, plant life depends on the presence of sunlight and water. The presence of sunlight and water depends on ideal atmospheric activities. And those atmospheric activities are themselves governed by more fundamental causes, and so forth. In this example, the events described proceed not sequentially, but concurrently. Even so, they constitute an arrangement in which each event depends for its occurrence on causally prior events or phenomena. According to Copleston, illustrations of this sort capture the kind of causal ordering that interests Aquinas. For “when Aquinas talks about an ‘order’ of efficient causes he is not talking of a series stretching back into the past, but of a hierarchy of causes, in which a subordinate member is here and now dependent on the causal activity of a higher member” (Copleston, 1955: 122). Thus we might explain the sort of ordering that interests Aquinas as a metaphysical (as opposed to a temporal) ordering of causes. And it is this sort of order that requires a first member, that is, “a cause which does not depend on the causal activity of a higher cause” (Ibid., 123). For, as we have already seen, the absence of a first cause would imply the absence of subsequent causes and effects. Unless we invoke a cause that itself transcends the ordering of dependent causes, we would find it difficult to account for the causal activities we presently observe. Aquinas therefore states there must be “a first efficient, and completely non-dependent cause,” whereby “the word ‘first’ does not mean first in the temporal order but supreme or first in the ontological order” (Ibid.: 123; For valuable commentaries on these points, see Copleston, 122-124; Wippel, 2006: 59; Reichenbach, 2008).

Second, it may appear that Aquinas is unjustified in describing the first efficient cause as God, as least if by “God” one has in mind a person possessing the characteristics Christian theologians and philosophers attribute to him (for example, omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, love, goodness, and so forth.). Yet Aquinas does not attempt to show through the previous argument that the demonstrated cause has any of the qualities traditionally predicated of the divine essence. He says: “When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence” (ST Ia 2.2 ad 2). In other words, the term God—at least as it appears in ST Ia 2.2—refers only to that which produces the observed effect. In the case of the second way, God is synonymous with the first efficient cause; it does not denote anything of theological substance. We might think of the term “God” as a purely nominal concept Aquinas intends to investigate further (Te Velde, 2006: 44; Wippel, 2006: 46). For the study of what God is must be subsequent to demonstrating that he is. A complete account of the divine nature requires a more extensive examination, which he undertakes in the subsequent articles of ST.
Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

That's where the argument came from and is.

I believe that it was also you that claimed that a god was necessary as opposed to contingent by definition.

I claim that is what Plantinga and other philosophers classify God as.

Your claim about causality has already been refuted. Most recently, Polymath described quantum indeterminacy to you.

1. We did not discuss indeterminacy that I can remember, and it was not explained. 2. Even if it was explained it is merely a possibility, or at least it is not known to be impossible. 3. The last time I had the misfortune to be at a faculty speech the physicist said there were about (at that time) 10 possible ways to interpret quantum mechanics, about half were indeterminate and half were deterministic and no one was sure which (if any) were true. Only the tiniest fraction of scholars have credibility concerning QM, Polymath demonstrated that they potentially were among that handful. Until you demonstrate you are competent, you just come off as desperate and arrogant.

As already noted, that argument has also been refuted, most recently on this thread.

It is still just as un-refuted today as it was 3000 years ago. Just because someone continues to talk does not mean they are getting anything done. This also was not an argument, it was a proxy declaration.

 

[1robin]

A Sample Demonstration: The Argument from Efficient Causality

In the Summa Theologiae Ia 2.3, Aquinas offers five demonstrations for God’s existence (these are famously referred to as the “five ways”). Each demonstration proceeds roughly as follows: Aquinas identifies some observable phenomenon and then attempts to show that, necessarily, the cause of that phenomenon is none other than God. The phenomena Aquinas cites in these demonstrations include: 1) motion; 2) the existence of efficient causes; 3) the reality of contingency; 4) the different grades of perfection in the natural order; and 5) the end-directed activity of natural objects. We should note that these demonstrations are highly abridged versions of arguments he addresses at length elsewhere (most notably, SCG I.13). Constraints of space do not permit an explication of each argument. But it will be helpful to consider at least one argument in order to see how these demonstrations typically proceed.

Aquinas' argument from efficient causes—also known as "the second way"—is straightforward and does not lend itself to many interpretative disputes. The argument is as follows:

In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate [cause] is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God (ST Ia 2.3).

For our purposes, it might be helpful to present Aquinas' argument in a more formal way:

1. The world contains instances of efficient causation (given).
2. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself.
3. So, every efficient cause seems to have a prior cause.
4. But we cannot have an infinite regress of efficient causes.
5. So there must be a first efficient cause “to which everyone gives the name God.”

Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Lets continue:
The Kalam cosmological argument is based on the concept of the prime-mover, introduced by Aristotle, and entered early Christian or Neoplatonist philosophy in Late Antiquity, being developed by John Philoponus.[6] Along with much of classical Greek philosophy, the concept was adopted into medieval Islamic tradition, where it received its fullest articulation at the hands of Muslim scholars, most directly by Islamic theologians of the Sunni tradition (Aqidah wasitiyyah by Ibn Taymiyyah).

Its historic proponents include Al-Kindi,[7] Al-Ghazali,[8] and St. Bonaventure.[9][10][11]

One of the earliest formulations of the cosmological argument in Islamic tradition comes from Al-Kindi (9th century), who was one of the first Islamic philosophers to attempt to introduce an argument for the existence of God based upon purely empirical premises. His chief contribution is the cosmological argument (dalil al-huduth) for the existence of God, in his work "On First Philosophy".[12] He writes:

"Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning."[13]
Between the 9th to 12th centuries, the cosmological argument developed as a concept within Islamic theology. It was refined in the 11th century by Al-Ghazali (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), and in the 12th by Ibn Rushd (Averroes).[14] It reached medieval Christian philosophy in the 13th century, and was discussed by Bonaventure, as well as Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica (I, q.2, a.3) and Summa Contra Gentiles (I, 13).

Islamic perspectives may be divided into positive Aristotelian responses strongly supporting the argument, such as those by Al-Kindi, and Averroes, and negative responses critical of it, including those by Al-Ghazali and Muhammad Iqbal.[15] Al-Ghazali was unconvinced by the first-cause arguments of Al-Kindi, arguing that only the infinite per se is impossible, arguing for the possibility of the infinite per accidens. He writes:

"According to the hypothesis under consideration, it has been established that all the beings in the world have a cause. Now, let the cause itself have a cause, and the cause of the cause have yet another cause, and so on ad infinitum. It does not behove you to say that an infinite regress of causes is impossible."[16]
Muhammad Iqbal also stated:

"A finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an un-caused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds."
Kalam cosmological argument - Wikipedia



That's where the argument came from and is.

I believe that it was also you that claimed that a god was necessary as opposed to contingent by definition.

I claim that is what Plantinga and other philosophers classify God as.

Your claim about causality has already been refuted. Most recently, Polymath described quantum indeterminacy to you.

1. We did not discuss indeterminacy that I can remember, at lost it was mentioned, and it was certainly not explained. 2. Even if had been explained it is merely a possibility, or at least it is not known to be impossible. 3. The last time I had the misfortune to be at a faculty speech the physicist said there were about (at that time) 10 possible ways to interpret quantum mechanics, about half were indeterminate and half were deterministic and no one was sure which (if any) were true. Only the tiniest fraction of scholars have credibility concerning QM, Polymath demonstrated that they potentially were among that handful. Until you demonstrate you are competent you just come off as desperate and arrogant.

As already noted, that argument has also been refuted, most recently on this thread.

It is still just as un-refuted today as it was 3000 years ago. Just because someone continues to talk does not mean they are getting anything done. This also was not an argument, it was a proxy declaration.

 

[Polymath257]

2.1. The classical notion of causality.

The classical notion of causality is succinctly expressed in Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics: "Those upon which others depend for their being or becoming are called causes."(3) The key characteristic here is ontological dependency.

On the contrary, there is no *logically necessary* causality. Causality happens because things have properties and interact. Ultimately, it is because there are laws of physics that causality makes sense at all. And, whether you like it or not, there are laws of physics that are no causal.

The earliest Greek philosophers recognized that one thing may be materially dependent on another and searched for the fundamental material principle out of which the whole cosmos was composed. Later, Plato saw the changing world of human sense experience as somehow dependent upon unchanging forms or ideas. Changeable things participated in the unchanging reality of the subsistent forms or exemplar causes and depended on them for their intelligibility.

Aristotle retained the notion of formal cause, but viewed it as an intrinsic principle in substances rather than an extrinsic exemplar. Each changeable substance must be composed of two intrinsic principles, formal and material. The formal cause explains why a substance exists as this particular kind of thing, and the material cause explains why it can cease to be what it is and become something else. Aristotle also investigated the nature of efficient and final causality. The efficient cause is the agent or source of some change. It may be the actual doer of a certain act (the man who builds the house), but can also be the instigator of the action in a broader sense (not the actual builder, for instance, but the one who gives advice on how to build).(4) The final cause is the purpose or aim of a certain action. It is that for the sake of which something is done, as a house might be built for the sake of shelter.

Aquinas adopts Aristotle's explanation of the four fundamental kinds of causes, but also finds a place for Plato's exemplar causes, not as subsistent forms but as ideas in the mind of God: "In the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e., exemplar forms existing in the divine mind."(5)

In this classical understanding, causality is an analogous notion that can be employed in a number of ways. The material stuff of the universe can be seen as a cause, but so can ideas in the mind of God. The sculptor is the cause of a statue, but so is the form or shape of the statue itself. A cause is always that upon which something depends for its being or becoming, but the modes of causality and dependency vary greatly depending on the kinds of causes involved.
Thomistic Institute 2000: Dodds

The history of the cosmological argument follows below.

Too bad Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas did their work long before the rise of science. The whole notion of causality they expounded has been discarded by most rational people because it fails miserably to deal with the realities around us. For example, the concept of a 'final cause' only makes sense when there is a consciousness with a plan. So the vast majority of things do not have a final cause. Also, causality has been recognized to depend on time: there can be no causes without time. So, if time has a beginning, there *cannot* be a cause for it.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

@1robin - Aquinas's "five causes" all make a mistake in their conclusion.

The valid conclusion isn't "therefore God exists;" it's "therefore at least one thing exists that is consistent with God (as far as we can tell)."

 

[1robin]

It's not about media credibility. The media are a reflection of cultural attitudes.

I don't care what it is about, the media have virtually negative credibility. If you assumed the opposite of everything they said you would have a greater success rate.

Once upon a time not long ago, the family pastor or priest was always depicted as a man of character, knowledge, and gravitas, because that was how most people imagined them to be. Today, we have a different view of the clergy, one reflected in entertainment media.

No we do not. There is no universal characterization of "the clergy".

It's not about accuracy, either. My point was about how rarely the church and clergy are depicted positively.

You have absolutely no idea.

You're being too generous.

Demonstrate it. Heck, demonstrate anything. Your 100% conclusion 0% argument.

Not relevant, nor the claim.

It is relevant to your claim but you are right in that your claim was irrelevant.

It's not necessary for every America to like hamburgers for it to be correct to say that Americans like hamburgers. It may also be possible to say if they like them more or less than fifty years ago.

Likewise, the culture at large and its dominant values and beliefs can be described including how it perceives the church and how that perception has been trending.

Your the one making claims about the monolithic view concerning things, not me.

 

[1robin]

What point do you think you have proven, and how have you proven it? I've seen you claim a few times that a post you were responding to proved your point, but I can no longer remember what it was.

Incidentally, proof is that which convinces, meaning that you have to prove something to somebody else to have proven anything. Proof is an interaction - a cooperative effort.

Writing out an argument that you already accept is not proving anything to yourself, and if nobody is convinced by your argument, you have proven nothing. You merely made an unconvincing case for something.

You complain about how many times you had to agree with me, now your asking me what it was we agreed upon? That is it, we are done for now. I can't justify the time.

 

[1robin]

OK. We can forget this post if you wish.

Good, that thing was half man, half beast. I could not figure out who said what.

 

[Polymath257]

Second premise. Aquinas then claims that it is impossible for any being to be the efficient cause of itself. Why is self-causation impossible? For the sake of ease, consider what it would mean for something to be the cause of its own existence (although this is not the only form of self-causation Aquinas has in mind). In order to bring about the existence of anything, one needs a certain amount of causal power. Yet a thing cannot have causal power unless it exists. But if something were to be the cause of itself—that is, if it were to bring about its own existence—it would have to exist prior to itself, which is impossible (ST Ia 2.3). Hence the third premise: every efficient cause must have a prior cause.

This *assumes* that everything does, in fact, have a cause.

Aquinas' argument in the first way—which is structurally similar to the argument from efficient causality—employs a parallel line of reasoning. There, he says that to be in motion is to move from potentiality to actuality. When something moves, it goes from having the ability to move to the activity of moving. Yet something cannot be the source of its own movement. Everything that moves does so in virtue of being moved by something that is already actual or “in act.” In short, “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another” (ST Ia 2.3).

And this is where the flaws in Aristotelian physics come to the front. Change is not equivalent to motion. It *is* quite possible for something to be the cause of its own change. For example, a large mass of gas (say, several times the mass of the sun) will *spontaneously* cause its own contraction because of gravity. Aquinas was wrong here. For him, that was simply because he didn't have the advantages of modern physics. You have no such excuse.

Aquinas' aim here is not to explain discrete or isolated instances of causation. His interest, rather, is the existence of a causal order—one consisting of substances whose existence and activity depend on prior causes of that same order (Wippel, 59). Yet this attempt to clarify Aquinas' aim introduces an obvious problem. If every constituent member of that order is causally dependent on something prior to itself, then it appears that the order in question must consist of an infinite chain of causes. Yet Aquinas denies this implication (fourth premise): if the causal order is infinite, then (obviously) there could be no first cause. But without a first cause, then (necessarily) there could be no subsequent effects—including the intermediate efficient causes and ultimate effect (ST Ia 2.3). In other words, the absence of a first cause would imply an absence of the causal order we observe. But since this implication is manifestly false, he says, there must be a first cause, “to which everyone gives the name God” (Ibid.).

And this, of course, is where Aquinas gets causality badly wrong. There is no contradiction in having an infinite regress of causes. Each cause is caused by a previous and causes, in turn, something later. In fact, it is clear that Aquinas assumes his own conclusion here when he asserts there must be a first cause to have a causal sequence.

He also fails to show that there is only *one* uncaused cause. In fact, according to this argument, there easily could be billions of such.

Now, for the science. MOST quantum events are uncaused in the sense of not having a previous efficient cause. In fact, most events are only probabilistically determined. Some are completely random. So the actual existence of uncaused causes is not in dispute. But, contrary to expectations from the religious side, there are many such uncaused causes and they are not 'all powerful'. In fact, they are small and numerous.

 

[1robin]

OK, fair enough. I do often respond to posts that are not directed specifically at me.

Platinga's version of the ontological argument is deeply flawed. if you wish, I can go into details, but that certainly isn't required.

Out of the tope 20 or so arguments for God that is the only one I do not get. I however trust many of the philosophers who say it is amongst the strongest argument for God. If I understood it, then I could decide if I accepted it. If I could accept it, and understood it, I would defend it. Since I can't then I won't. Pick of the teleological, cosmological, cause and effect, sufficient explanation, historical, moral, modal being, experiential, hard problem of consciousness, from freewill, or the like and I will defend it. The Ontological argument is like a blurry picture of bigfoot IMO.

I am like that concerning many things. I won't get them for years, but over a random hour they will crystalize, and make me ashamed of my former ignorance. I thought about determinism for about a decade then in about 5 minutes I thought of an ocean of evidence against hard determinism. Besides we already had some rather tedious discussions in progress. How much of me can you stand?

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

@robin1

I just gave you a mercy and pity "like" on one of your posts after looking at how few positive ratings you have received for your posting.

 

[Polymath257]

Out of the tope 20 or so arguments for God that is the only one I do not get. I however trust many of the philosophers who say it is amongst the strongest argument for God. If I understood it, then I could decide if I accepted it. If I could accept it, and understood it, I would defend it. Since I can't then I won't. Pick of the teleological, cosmological, cause and effect, sufficient explanation, historical, moral, modal being, experiential, hard problem of consciousness, from freewill, or the like and I will defend it. The Ontological argument is like a blurry picture of bigfoot IMO.

I am like that concerning many things. I won't get them for years, but over a random hour they will crystalize, and make me ashamed of my former ignorance. I thought about determinism for about a decade then in about 5 minutes I thought of an ocean of evidence against hard determinism. Besides we already had some rather tedious discussions in progress. How much of me can you stand?

If I need to take a break, I simply do not log into these forums.

 

[Polymath257]

@robin1

I just gave you a mercy "like" on one of your posts after looking at how few positive ratings you have received for your posting.

Am I the only person who looks at the ratio of ratings to messages?

 

[Milton Platt]

Just look at the people in this thread who are the most upset over this thread, and feel a need to defend atheism because they see an "attack" on it. It a religious like zeal for atheism.

A "religious like zeal" does not equal having a religion, though. I can have a "religious like zeal" for driving my Miata on a curvy road, but that does not mean I now have a religion based on a car.

 

[1robin]

Why is it iimpossible to span an infinite number of events given an infinite amount of time to do so? That isn't a contradiction.

Are we still stuck on the semantic "contradiction" off ramp? For the same reason that if the person I asked to borrow a dollar from had to borrow it from an infinite number of past persons I would never actually get the dollar.

In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate [cause] is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, (to which everyone gives the name of God (ST Ia 2.3).

I will concede something here though, I do not think that Aquinas (last sentence) is justifiable. We do wind up with a God shaped hole but it is not true that everyone would call that hole God.

No, what is said is perfectly reasonable. Again, look at the example of the negative integers.

That is the point, I can't look at it, because you can't find it. We will remain shipwrecked on the same rock if you do not keep in mind that I said the only place infinity exists is in our minds, as in your negative integer line.

And it is neither logically incoherent nor contradictory. In fact, it works quite well.

Works on what? What have we built with infinity, other than ideas?

On the contrary, it is a very real possibility and is supported by all currently available theories of quantum gravity.

This is like the Leiden frost effect, I ask for scientific evidence against the existence of God and non-theists instantly run to the deepest hypothetical end of science they can think of. Why does 100% of the scientific arguments against God exist in the .01% of science that is least understood?

I find the A and B distinction to be incoherent.

I find B to be incoherent to begin with. My point was to establish what theories of time actually exist. Most of your arguments come from what sounds like B theory, but you claim they are from some hybrid theory of time I am unfamiliar with. Is there a C theory you subscribe to?

The quantum theories of gravity have just as much support as general relativity.

I was willing to assume you were among the handful of people that were competent with relativity and beyond. I however stated that I am not. So if you want to persuade me of something try finding it in the 99% of science most of us understand.

We *know* that both general relativity and quantum mechanics are very good descriptions of the universe in their respective realms. Neither has been contradicted by any observation, experience, or data. The quantum theories of gravity attempt to merge the two into a single overall theory. Because their differences with general relativity only happen at extreme energy levels, ALL current data is equally consistent with the known versions of quantum gravity. SO they are NOT simply 'abstract'; they are realistic descriptions that encompass what we currently know in one description.

Last I heard they don't even know which (of the ten or more) theories (if any) accurately describes the quantum. I will make this very clear give me some Newtonian reason to doubt God's existence.

On the contrary, I freely admit we do not know which of the available possibilities is the case. YOU are the one attempting to eliminate cases that are consistent with all current data.

Since we do not have certainty for anything except for the fact we think, there is always an assumed uncertainty for any given proposition. I believe my initial post about double standards was that non-theists will accept a theory who's only merit was that it can't be proven impossible. So my opening statement fit perfectly with your admission. Over the course of tens of thousands of characters typed I probably used shorthand labels at times. Debates usually accept common language uses. If they do not they get bogged down in hyper semantics. We are circling that very drain at the moment.

My grandfather talked of educated fools. Same idea.

Probably, I respect application science. I have a good analogy. I work in a defense laboratory. Actually I can't give more detail than that in a forum, but the up time and down time for everything I work on is about 50/50. If 1990s applied science has a track record that bad, you can see why I distrust speculative theories younger than nieces.

I will give you an actual example of another reason. I have no idea what Hawking is talking about 90% of the time. If I listen I can evaluate maybe 10% of his ideas. That 10% is usually composed of garbage like this:

Because there is a law such as gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we exist. It is not necessary to invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going. ”
— Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design, 2010

When the 10% I do get looks like it is composed of the same garbage I reject the entire thing. Even Penrose debunked many of his "theories".

But the point is that the *actual* scientific theory is of a *four* dimensional spacetime with three dimensional cross sections. Such a description is, shall we say, difficult to show an image of.

I have forgotten what context to consider this within.

And that would be wrong also. It is perfectly coherent.

Then we are past the semantic part and back to simply disagreeing?

No, I have a PhD in math. and almost a PhD in physics.

Why aren't you the CEO of apple instead of wasting your time on me? The only reason I have any time to kill doing this is specifically because science is so unreliable. If we can't design reliable RBREFs, DACs, and HSDWGs why are we speculating about infinite regressions. You geniuses need to get off the keyboard, back into your respective labs, and build stuff that works better. Just kidding, kind of.

OK, logical coherence. It is still wrong. The idea is perfectly coherent.

You may not agree but that is the term the philosophers use.

Hey, you are the one that keeps repeating that there is something logically wrong with infinite time when there isn't.

No, actually it was Vilenkin.

And at this point we do not know which of several alternatives is valid. The 'accepted' one is 'accepted' to be incomplete for times before inflation.

That is why I use the BGVT, it was designed not to give a rip what the singularity ever turned out to be.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

@1robin - Aquinas's "five causes" all make a mistake in their conclusion.

The valid conclusion isn't "therefore God exists;" it's "therefore at least one thing exists that is consistent with God (as far as we can tell)."

I would not go even as far as that: I would leave it as "therefore at least one thing exists." To say "consistent with God" (even adding "as far was we can tell") presupposes that you know at least something about God. And I contend that is not the case for anyone.

 

[Polymath257]

Are we still stuck on the semantic "contradiction" off ramp? For the same reason that if the person I asked to borrow a dollar from had to borrow it from an infinite number of past persons I would never actually get the dollar.

Yes, if you *initiate* and need an infinite regress to get your dollar, you will never get it. But if there has always been a succession of dallars changing hands, there is nothing contradictory (or incoherent) about you getting one.

In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

But once again, there are things with no efficient cause at all. Most quantum events qualify.

Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate [cause] is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause.

But this assumes the conclusion when it claims that there has to be a first for there to be a later. That is precisely the point at issue.

But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, (to which everyone gives the name of God (ST Ia 2.3).

But this does two things:
1. It shows that the claim that everything has an efficient cause is incorrect.
2. It only shows there is at least one 'first cause' in each chain. It dhow there is only one initial cause overall.

That is the point, I can't look at it, because you can't find it. We will remain shipwrecked on the same rock if you do not keep in mind that I said the only place infinity exists is in our minds, as in your negative integer line.

And while this is possible, I have yet to see evidence that is the case.

Works on what? What have we built with infinity, other than ideas?

The whole thing here is a theoretical discussion. And infinity comes up in essential ways in many theories, for example quantum electrodynamics. It can be and is used.

This is like the Leiden frost effect, I ask for scientific evidence against the existence of God and non-theists instantly run to the deepest hypothetical end of science they can think of. Why does 100% of the scientific arguments against God exist in the .01% of science that is least understood?

Who said anything about God so far? I merely said that it is *possible* logically and coherently to have an infinite regression of causes. So the standard 'proof' of God that uses that impossibility fails. Furthermore, not only is it a logical possibility it is even a realistic possibility.

I find B to be incoherent to begin with. My point was to establish what theories of time actually exist. Most of your arguments come from what sounds like B theory, but you claim they are from some hybrid theory of time I am unfamiliar with. Is there a C theory you subscribe to?

Like I said, I'm closest to the A theory, but I have found philosophers to be very simple-minded in these subjects. It would do them a world of good to learn a bit of theoretical physics. They might learn that the way they think things 'must' be is not the way things actually are.

I was willing to assume you were among the handful of people that were competent with relativity and beyond. I however stated that I am not. So if you want to persuade me of something try finding it in the 99% of science most of us understand.

Sorry, but that may not be possible. Some of the discoveries of the last 100 years are relevant.

Last I heard they don't even know which (of the ten or more) theories (if any) accurately describes the quantum. I will make this very clear give me some Newtonian reason to doubt God's existence.

Sorry, but classical physics is wrong.

Probably, I respect application science. I have a good analogy. I work in a defense laboratory. Actually I can't give more detail than that in a forum, but the up time and down time for everything I work on is about 50/50. If 1990s applied science has a track record that bad, you can see why I distrust speculative theories younger than nieces.

And yet a good part of our current technology base is dependent on our understanding of quantum mechanics. Pretty much everything dealing with semi-conductors. Everything with lasers. Everything using spectra to analyze a chemical. These are ALL non-Newtonian aspects of reality that are central to modern life.

I will give you an actual example of another reason. I have no idea what Hawking is talking about 90% of the time. If I listen I can evaluate maybe 10% of his ideas. That 10% is usually composed of garbage like this:

Because there is a law such as gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we exist. It is not necessary to invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going. ”
— Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design, 2010

Typically, when an intelligent person looks like he is saying BS in his field, you might want to reconsider your own viewpoint. You might want to find out why Hawking thinks that a quantum thoery of gravity would lead to a spontaneous formation of a universe.

When the 10% I do get looks like it is composed of the same garbage I reject the entire thing. Even Penrose debunked many of his "theories".

Penrose was an incredibly smart man, but like many such men he has fallen off the deep end lately.

Then we are past the semantic part and back to simply disagreeing?

Looks like it.

Why aren't you the CEO of apple instead of wasting your time on me? The only reason I have any time to kill doing this is specifically because science is so unreliable. If we can't design reliable RBREFs, DACs, and HSDWGs why are we speculating about infinite regressions. You geniuses need to get off the keyboard, back into your respective labs, and build stuff that works better. Just kidding, kind of.

Math doesn't have labs, per se. And infinite regressions are an essential part of the topics I study.

You may not agree but that is the term the philosophers use.

My problem wasn't the terminology. My problem is that the idea is neither incoherent nor contradictory.

 

[Jeremiahcp]

A "religious like zeal" does not equal having a religion, though. I can have a "religious like zeal" for driving my Miata on a curvy road, but that does not mean I now have a religion based on a car.

Never meant to imply that atheism was a religion; only that some treat it that way.